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
LECTURES *on the* UNITED STATES

WILEY-RINES

SECTION V

LECTURES ON THE
UNITED STATES

WILEY RINEY





URITANS GOING TO CHURCH

From the painting by G. H. Boughton.

POETRY GOING TO CHURCH

From the pen of J. M. B. B. B.

LECTURES
ON THE
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE
UNITED STATES



Edited by EDWIN WILEY, M.A., Ph.D.
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SERIES FIVE

LECTURES SIXTEEN (Part 2) AND SEVENTEEN (Part 1)

The Revolutionary Era, 1764—1783

(Continued)

16. The Northern Campaigns; Foreign Relations and Finances (Part 2)
17. The Southern Campaign and the Establishment of Independence (Part 1)

THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER XV.

1777.

BATTLES OF TRENTON AND PRINCETON: PLUNDERING EXPEDITION.

Washington's letter to Congress regarding army affairs — Washington appointed dictator — He determines to strike an effective blow at the British — Captures the Hessians under Rall at Trenton — Consternation of the British — Cornwallis attacks Washington — The battle of Princeton — American troops overrun Jersey — Americans take advantage of Howe's proclamation — Washington's counter proclamation — Excesses and barbarities of both armies — Howe's treatment of prisoners — Washington's protests — Army is inoculated — Heath attempts to capture Fort Independence — British depredations at Peekskill and in Connecticut — Attack on Sag Harbor — Capture of General Prescott.

It will be remembered that when the British army approached Philadelphia, Congress had considered it prudent to retire to Baltimore. Despite the success of the British, Congress still manifested unshaken faith in the ultimate outcome and resolved upon active measures in behalf of the cause of liberty. One of the most important steps upon which they decided would probably never have taken place, had not Washington been in command of the army. Washington was well aware that the numerous reverses experienced by the Continental army had taught Congress that greater vigor and efficiency must be infused into the military system, or otherwise the colonial cause must be hopeless. On December 20, therefore, he addressed a letter to the President of Congress in which he urged that his views be adopted. He said:

"My feelings as an officer and a man have been such as to force me to say, that no person ever

had a greater choice of difficulties to contend with than I have. It is needless to add, that short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. We find, Sir, that the enemy are daily gathering strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snowball, by rolling, will increase, unless some means can be devised to check effectually the progress of the enemy's arms. Militia may possibly do it for a little while; but in a little while, also, and the militia of those States, which have been frequently called upon, will not turn out at all; or, if they do, it will be with so much reluctance and sloth, as to amount to the same thing. Instance New Jersey! Witness Pennsylvania! Could any thing but the river Delaware have saved Philadelphia? Can any thing (the exigency of the case may indeed justify it), be more destructive to the recruiting service than giving ten dollars' bounty for six weeks' service of the militia, who come in, you cannot tell how, go, you cannot tell when, and act, you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at a critical moment? These, Sir, are the men I am to depend upon ten days hence; this is the basis on which your cause will and must forever depend, till you get a large standing army sufficient of itself to oppose the enemy."*

He said also that the 88 battalions, which had already been ordered by

* Sparks, *Life of Washington*, pp. 206-207.

Congress, were insufficient to carry on the war, and urged that the army be greatly augmented. He concluded his letter in the following terms:

"It may be thought that I am going a good deal out of the line of my duty, to adopt these measures, or to advise thus freely. A character to lose, an estate to forfeit, the inestimable blessings of liberty at stake, and a life devoted, must be my excuse." *

This letter deeply impressed the members of Congress, and they promptly met the emergency. On December 27 it was resolved that unlimited powers be placed in Washington's hands. Declaring that "the unjust, but determined purpose of the British court to enslave these free states, obvious through every insinuation to the contrary, having placed things in such a situation, that the very existence of civil liberty, now depends on the right exercise of military powers; and the vigorous and decisive conduct of these being impossible to distant, numerous, and deliberate bodies," Congress passed the following resolution:†

"That General Washington shall be, and he is hereby, vested with full, ample, and complete powers to raise and collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any and all of these United States, sixteen battalions of infantry, in addition to those already voted by Congress; to appoint officers for the said battalions of

infantry; to raise, officer, and equip three thousand light horse, three regiments of artillery, and a corps of engineers, and to establish their pay; to apply to any of the states for such aid of the militia, as he shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provisions, and in such places as he shall think proper; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier-general, and to fill all vacancies in every other department of the American armies; to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable price for the same; to arrest and confine persons who refuse to take the continental currency, or are any otherwise disaffected to the American cause; and return to the states, of which they are citizens, their names and the nature of their offences, together with the witnesses to prove them." *

These powers were entrusted to Washington for a period of six months, unless Congress should revoke them prior to that time. When acknowledging these resolves, Washington assured Congress that he would employ his best endeavors to properly direct the powers which had been bestowed upon him, and to advance those objects and those only, which had given rise to so honorable a distinction. He said:

"If my exertions should not be attended with the desired success, I trust the failure will be imputed to the true cause—the peculiarly distressed situation of our affairs, and the difficulties I have to combat,—rather than to a want of zeal for my country, and the closest attention to her interests, to promote which has ever been my study." †

At this time, the condition of affairs was extremely alarming, and it was of great importance that some blow

* Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. iv., p. 232; *ibid*, *Life of Washington*, p. 207; Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 174.

† *Journals of Congress*, vol. ii., p. 475. This resolution was adopted December 27 before Congress had heard of the battle of Trenton, which occurred on the 25th.—Stryker, *Battles of Trenton and Princeton*, pp. 243-244; Force, *American Archives*, 5th series, vol. iii., p. 1613.

* See also Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 280; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 24-25.

† Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. iv., pp. 252, 552.

should be struck to revive the spirit of the country, which had been greatly depressed because of the retreat through Jersey. When Washington crossed the Delaware, winter was fast approaching, and the British general had not planned to carry on military operations during the winter. The British had constantly driven the Americans before them without loss on their part, and it was now confidently expected that it would be possible to completely annihilate the American army by a short and decisive campaign in the spring. Consequently, fearing little from the feeble American army, Howe cantoned his troops rather with the view to the convenient resumption of their march in the spring than with any regard to securing their present safety. He had not the slightest apprehension that an attack would be made, and established his posts with little regard as to whether they would be able to render mutual support to each other.

A body of about 1,500 Hessians had been stationed at Trenton under Colonel Rall,* and 2,000 at Bordentown, further down the river, under Count Donop, while the remainder of the army was scattered over the country between the Hackensack and the Delaware.† Because of his overpowering

force, Howe had no reason to suspect that the Americans would make an attack, and the idea that Washington would undertake any offensive measures never entered Howe's mind.* Washington, however, determined to anticipate Howe's movements and to strike a blow which would demonstrate to the enemy that the strictest military discipline must be maintained, if Howe wished to retain his army intact. He also wished to show that the cause of independence was by no means hopeless.† In pursuance of his plan, Washington formed his army into three divisions, and, accompanied by Greene, Sullivan, and Henry Knox with the artillery, he proposed to cross the Delaware at McConkey's Ferry, nine miles above Trenton, and fall upon the Hessians stationed at that town. A second division under General James Ewing‡ was to cross at Trenton ferry and cut off the enemy's

velyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 55 *et seq.*

* According to the journals of two Hessian lieutenants, there was more bustle than business at Trenton. The men were put through all sorts of maneuvers, apparently without cause or purpose. These officers state that Rall was a boon companion, kept late hours at night and slept until late in the morning, having little respect for his military duties. See Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. ii., p. 504 *et seq.*

† See the letter quoted in Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 267-268; and the instructions in Brooks, *Life of Knox*, p. 78.

‡ The name of this officer is spelled differently by several writers. Marshall and Lossing spell it Irvine; Washington himself gives it as Ewing; Wilkinson has it Irvin; Botta, Irwin; and Gordon, Erwing. Washington certainly ought to have known the proper spelling of the names of his generals, and we have followed him.

* This is also spelled Rohl, Roll, Ralle, Rhalle, Rhal, Rawle, but Rall is undoubtedly correct. See the notes in Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 277; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 20.

† Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 87. On the measures taken to defend themselves, see Tre-

retreat on the bridge over the Assanpink. The other division, under General John Cadwalader, was to cross the river lower down, from Bristol over to Burlington.* The only unfortunate part of the whole affair was that Washington's plan was not executed as he proposed, for, had it been carried out in all its details, the whole line of British cantonments would undoubtedly have been captured. Washington selected Christmas Eve as the time for the attack, under the belief that the British troops would be more than ordinarily given up to festivity and indulgence, and consequently would be more or less off their guard. The night proved to be intensely cold; the river was filled with masses of floating ice; the current was strong and the wind was keen and sharp. The encumbered state of the river prevented the passage of Washington's division until long after midnight, and it was not until four o'clock that the whole body was in marching order on the opposite side of the river. A heavy fog had also arisen, the road was rendered slippery by a frosty mist, and to further add to their discomfort, the whole march was conducted through a heavy storm of snow and hail.† Because of the delay in transporting the troops over the river, it would be daylight before the troops could reach Trenton, and consequently

a surprise of the Hessians at that place was impossible. There was now no alternative but to proceed according to the plan.* Accompanied by Generals Stirling, Greene, Hugh Mercer, and Adam Stephen, Washington proceeded by the upper road, while Sullivan took the lower.† About 8 o'clock in the morning, the pickets of the enemy were encountered. The latter opened a brisk fire on the Americans from behind the houses, and gradually fell back upon the town where they aroused their sleeping comrades. But the Americans followed the pickets so closely that before the Hessians could offer any effectual resistance, a battery had been opened up at the end of the main street of the town. Upon being called to arms, the Hessians attempted to form a battery in King Street, but William Washington and James Monroe (afterward President), with a small party, drove the artillery men from their post and captured the two cannon.‡

Washington was now in a critical position, for the intended attack had been made known to Grant at Princeton and the latter had warned Rall to be on guard;|| accordingly, Rall was on the alert. About dusk on the 24th, a party of Americans had fired on the

* Johnston, *Campaign of 1776*, pp. 289-290; Stryker, *Battles of Trenton and Princeton*, pp. 81-82, 113, 344-347.

† Brooks, *Life of Knox*, p. 79.

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. i., pp. 559-560; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 99-101.


† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 20.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

|| Trevelyan, p. 102; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. ii., p. 514.



WASHINGTON CROSSING THE DELAWARE.



picket, but were soon driven off.* As no further attack seemed imminent, Rall supposed that the attempt on the post had been abandoned, and, as the night was cold and stormy, allowed his troops to retire to quarters and lay aside their arms. Rall was very much mistaken in his surmise, however, for at this very moment Washington was crossing the Delaware.† By many it is said that Rall spent the night prior to the attack in a disgraceful carouse, and that even when the attack began he was still at the card table. When aroused by the roll of the American drums and the sound of the musketry, he hurried to his quarters, mounted his horse, and in a few moments was at the head of the troops, vainly endeavoring to atone for his fatal neglect by making as effectual a resistance as was possible under the circumstances. His attempt to rally the Hessians was cut short, however, when he was mortally wounded and carried to his quarters in a dying condition. All order was now at an end, and, bewildered and panic-stricken, the Hessians gave way and endeavored to make good their retreat by the road to Princeton. They were cut off, however, by a body of American troops which had been placed there for that special purpose, and about 1,000 men surrendered. Washington

* Gordon (vol. ii., p. 153) states that Captain William Washington was in command of a scouting party of about 50 soldiers, and performed this exploit without being aware of the advancing force under the commander-in-chief. See also Trevelyan, p. 103.

† Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 90-91.

also captured six cannon, about 1,000 stand of arms, and several colors.* Upon the termination of the battle, Washington, accompanied by Greene, visited the dying Hessian soldier and expressed his sympathy for Rall, even though he was engaged in an entirely opposite cause.†

Meanwhile, the divisions under Ewing and Cadwalader had been unable to cross the river according to the plan, because of the ice floes, and for the same reason it was impossible to land the artillery.‡ Had the operations of these two divisions been successful, undoubtedly the party of light horse that fled from Trenton would have been intercepted and captured, and Cadwalader would also have been able to do good service at Burlington. As it was, however, these divisions were of little service to Washington. In this attack upon Trenton, the Americans lost only four or five men, while the Hessians lost, in addition to prisoners, 22 killed and 84 wounded.|| Two of the Americans reported as lost were frozen to death. On the night of December 26, Washington recrossed

* See Stryker, *Battles of Trenton and Princeton*, pp. 218-220; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 92-99; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 89-99; Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 70-71; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 270-275; Stedman, *American War*, vol. i., pp. 230-234; Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 166-167; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 104-124; Brooks, *Life of Knox*, pp. 80-81.


† Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. ii., pp. 522-523.

‡ See Cadwalader's letter to Washington in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 309-310; Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 213.

|| Stryker, pp. 194-195.

the Delaware with his prisoners and the artillery, arms, etc., which he had captured.* While Washington had

failed in several parts of his enterprise, the success of the division under his own personal direction had



* Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. iv., pp. 246-248; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 63; Brooks, *Life of Knox*, p. 82.

a most beneficial effect upon the minds of the Americans; and the Hessians, the very mention of whom had hith-

erto inspired the people with fear, now ceased to be terrible. The prisoners were paraded through the streets of Philadelphia, where Putnam was now in command, to prove that the victory was a reality, as the British had denied that such an event had occurred.* The hopes of the Americans were considerably revived, because they had now clearly proven that the British were not invincible, and they became more firm in their belief that perseverance and courage would finally result in success.† The British also discovered that they had to deal with a commander who was not only daring, but at the same time cautious and prudent; who, while he was prepared to retreat, was also ever ready to take advantage of the least oversight on their part, in order to convert defeat into victory.

While General Cadwalader had been unable to make the passage of the Delaware at the appointed hour, yet on the 27th, believing that Washington was still on the Jersey shore, he crossed the Delaware with about 1,500 men, two miles above Bristol, and though he had been informed that Washington had again passed into Pennsylvania, he proceeded to Burlington and then marched to Borden-

town, all the while driving the enemy before him as he advanced.* Large numbers of the militia in Pennsylvania now joined the army under Washington,† and on the 29th, he again crossed the Delaware and marched to Trenton, where early in January, 1777, he was able to gather together a force of 5,000 men.

Becoming alarmed at the success of the Americans, the British determined to offset these recent successes by inflicting a crushing blow. General Grant marched to Princeton with a strong detachment, and Lord Cornwallis, who at that time was on the point of sailing for England, was ordered to resume his command in the Jerseys.‡ Cornwallis and Grant joined forces and then pressed forward to Trenton. On their approach, Washington crossed the Assanpink and took post on some high ground with a rivulet in his front.|| On Jan-

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 276; Stryker, *Battles of Trenton and Princeton*, p. 218; Cadwalader's letter to Washington in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 313-314.

† Ford's edition of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., pp. 136, 137, 141.

‡ Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 231.

|| Marshall, speaking of the importance to Washington of obtaining secret intelligence of the plans of Cornwallis, states that at that critical moment Mr. Robert Morris raised on his private credit in Philadelphia £500 in specie, which he transmitted to the commander-in-chief, who employed it in securing information not otherwise to be obtained. — *Life of Washington*, vol. i., p. 130. Oberholtzer says that the sum consisted of 410 Spanish dollars, 2 English crowns, a French half-crown, and 10½ English shillings. — *Life of Robert Morris*, p. 30. Morris also sent him \$50,000 which he had raised on his own credit from friends in Philadelphia, so that Washington could pay the soldiers a bounty to re-enlist. See Stryker, p. 256; Oberholtzer,

* Stryker, *Battles of Trenton and Princeton*, 213-214; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 102-106; Force, *American Archives*, 5th series, vol. iii., pp. 1429, 1441-1448; Livingston, *Life of Putnam*, pp. 335-336; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. ii., pp. 525-528.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 124-128.

uary 2 the British troops advanced against Washington's forces, and a cannonade was maintained until far into the night;* but though Cornwallis was urged by some of his officers to make an immediate attack, he concluded to wait until the next morning when he thought that it would be still more easy to secure a victory over the American forces. "At last," said he "we have run down the old fox, and we will bag him in the morning."†

Washington was now in a critical situation, for if he awaited the attack he would surely be crushed by a superior force, while, on the other hand, to attempt to escape by crossing the Delaware would be even more hazardous. He therefore called a council of war, at which it was suggested that he take his troops around the British army and strike them suddenly upon the rear, fall upon their magazines at Brunswick and carry the war again from the neighborhood of Philadelphia into the mountainous interior of Jersey. This plan was adopted and no time was lost in putting it into operation.‡ Sending the

superfluous baggage down the river to Burlington, keeping the watch fires lighted, maintaining a strict patrol, and also working upon new entrenchments so as to deceive the enemy, Washington's army silently abandoned the camp about midnight and marched off by a circuitous route through Allentown toward Princeton.*

While it was the most inclement season of the year, the Americans were greatly favored by the weather. For two days it had been warm and foggy, which rendered the roads almost impassable; but at about the time the march was begun, the wind suddenly shifted and a heavy frost set in, leaving the roads solid and easy of passage.† Greatly encouraged by this turn of affairs, the American army marched forward with high spirits. At Princeton, Cornwallis had left three regiments, under Colonel Charles Mawhood, with orders to advance on January 3. Toward daybreak of the 3d, as they were executing these orders, they suddenly came in sight of the approaching Continental forces and almost immediately were engaged in action. From their post behind the fence, the Americans poured in a heavy and well-directed fire against the

Life of Robert Morris, pp. 30-32; Force, *American Archives*, 5th series, vol. iii., p. 1514; Henry Simpson, *The Lives of Eminent Philadelphians*, p. 705. See also Morris' letter to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 316-317.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 284-286; Knox's letter of January 7 to his wife, in Brooks, *Life of Knox*, pp. 83-84.

† Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 232. See also Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 130-132; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 64.

‡ General St. Clair is supposed to have been the author of this plan. See Wilkinson's *Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 140; Stryker, *Battles of Trenton and*


Princeton, p. 273; *St. Clair Papers*, vol. i., pp. 35-36; Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., p. 303.

* Johnston, *Campaign of 1776*, pp. 293-294; Carrington, pp. 286-287; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 26-27; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. ii., pp. 541-543.

† Johnson, *General Washington*, p. 153.



1. SURRENDER OF RALL AT THE BATTLE OF TRENTON.
2. THE BATTLE OF PRINCETON.



British, who, after the first volley, charged with such impetuosity that the Americans broke and precipitately fled, closely pursued by the British.* In their flight, however, the Americans were suddenly arrested by the arrival of a force under Washington, who, having beheld the rout, hastened to the scene of battle, and, colors in hand, endeavored to rally the retreating soldiers.† Probably at no time during his life was Washington so exposed to danger, but he finally succeeded in rallying the Americans. Both the English and American lines were immediately reformed. Washington, whose ardor had carried him into a most perilous position, stood between the two forces, a mark for the bullets of both,‡ yet he fortunately escaped injury and urged his men forward to the attack. Without waiting the onset, the British fled. Mawhood, having seen reinforcements arrive, wheeled off, leaving his artillery, and, regaining the Princeton road, marched to join Cornwallis.|| Having routed the British, Washington advanced toward Princeton where he also put to flight a regiment of British and took a number of prisoners. In this action the American loss was about 30 killed, including several officers, while

the British loss was 150 killed and 230 prisoners.* The chief loss to the American army was General Mercer, who was mortally wounded and died on January 12.†

Meanwhile, early in the morning, Cornwallis discovered that Washington had made his escape and for a time was perplexed as to what direction the "old fox" had taken. However, when he heard the booming of cannon in the direction of Princeton, he quickly saw that Washington had outgeneraled him.‡ Becoming alarmed for the safety of the stores at Brunswick, he made a rapid march toward Princeton in the hope of overtaking the American forces and inflicting a decisive defeat. The Americans had intended to make a forced march to Brunswick to capture the British stores, but the battle in the morning had so completely exhausted the men (who had been without rest and almost without food for two days and nights) that this project was abandoned.|| As Washington proceeded toward Morristown, Cornwallis pressed close on his rear, but on crossing the Millstone River the American troops demolished the bridge at Kingston, and Cornwallis

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. i., p. 567; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 133-135.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 287-288; Johnson, *General Washington*, p. 154; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. ii., p. 546.

‡ Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 177.

|| Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 136.

* Baneroft, vol. v., pp. 100-107; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 289; Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. v., pp. 148-151; Wilkinson's *Memoirs*, vol. i., pp. 141-150; Stryker, *Battles of Trenton and Princeton*, p. 292.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 28-30; Brooks, *Life of Knox*, pp. 84-85.

‡ Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 234.

|| Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. i., p. 569; Trevelyan, p. 137.

was compelled to relinquish the pursuit.* Both armies were now completely exhausted, the British being as unable to pursue the Americans as the latter were to retreat. Washington occupied a position at Morristown, with Cornwallis remaining at Brunswick.†

From his headquarters at Morristown, Washington was able to direct a series of movements calculated to greatly annoy the British army. He had a fine country in his rear from which the army could draw bountiful supplies, and, if pressed by the enemy, he could easily retreat across the Delaware. Consequently, he despatched his troops on a number of expeditions, overrunning both East and West Jersey and penetrating into the county of Essex, finally making himself master of the coast opposite Staten Island. Even though his army was greatly inferior to the British, Washington succeeded in wresting from the British all the ground they had gained in their previous campaigns. Brunswick and Amboy were the only posts which remained in the hands of the British, and even there they were in a very straitened condition.‡ Because of the unwearied activities of the American detachments, the British advance guards

were frequently cut off and in a state of continual alarm. This desultory and destructive warfare not only lost to the British large numbers in killed and wounded, but caused many of their former adherents to desert the cause.*

It will be remembered that in the previous November General Howe had issued a proclamation calling upon the Americans to submit to British authority and promising them protection both to person and to property, should they do so. Many Americans in the neighborhood of the British troops took advantage of this proclamation and went over to the British,† among them being Joseph Galloway, who, in 1774, had been a member of Congress from Pennsylvania. Howe in his proclamation had allowed sixty days in which the Americans might abandon their country and join the British standard. On January 25, 1777, before the expiration of that period, Washington issued a counter proclamation commanding all those who had subscribed the Declaration, taken the oaths, and accepted the protections mentioned in the Declaration by the British commissioners, to retire to headquarters or to the nearest military station of the Continental army or militia, and there to deliver up such protection and to take the oath of allegiance to the United States.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 31-32.

† Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. iv., p. 258. See also Stryker, *Battles of Trenton and Princeton*.

‡ Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 140 *et seq.*; Brooks, *Life of Knox*, p. 86.

* See Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, pt. iii., (hereinafter referred to as vol. iv.), p. 1 *et seq.*

† See Adams' letter to Warren, April 29, 1777. Adams, *Works*, vol. ix., pp. 463-464.

He granted liberty, however, to all those who preferred "the interest and protection of Great Britain to the freedom and happiness of their country," to withdraw themselves and their families within the enemy's lines.* He declared that all those who failed to comply with his orders within thirty days would be deemed adherents of the British cause and be treated as enemies to the United Colonies.† This proclamation had a wonderful effect upon the people, for when Washington was being driven by the British across New Jersey, many had considered the American cause hopeless and had retired to the British side.‡ But instead of receiving the protection promised by the British, they had suffered all manner of indignity and had been plundered with indiscriminate and unsparing

rapacity, until their passions had been thoroughly aroused and they were in a mood to desire revenge. They were now ready to join the American forces in a supreme endeavor to drive the British oppressors from the country.* Washington's vigorous movements had created a most favorable impression not only in America, but also in foreign countries. Botta says:

"Achievements so astonishing obtained an immense glory for the captain-general of the United States. All nations shared in the surprise of the Americans; all equally admired and applauded the prudence, the constancy, and the noble intrepidity of General Washington. An unanimous voice pronounced him the savior of his country; all extolled him, as equal to the most celebrated commanders of antiquity; all proclaimed him the *FABRUS OF AMERICA*. His name was in the mouth of all; he was celebrated by the pens of the most distinguished writers. The most illustrious personages of Europe lavished upon him their praises and their congratulations. The American general, therefore, wanted neither a cause full of grandeur to defend, nor occasion for the acquisition of glory, nor genius to avail himself of it, nor the renown due to his triumphs, nor an entire generation of men perfectly well disposed to render him homage." †

* Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., p. 201 *et seq.*; Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 183; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 414 (ed. 1788); Force, *American Archives*, 5th series, vol. iii., pp. 1188, 1376, 1487; Van Tyne, *Loyalists in the Revolution*, p. 129 *et seq.*; Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 220.

† Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 8-9. Mr. Curtis notices the fact that the legislature of New Jersey were disposed to complain of this act of Washington as an invasion of their State rights and sovereignty. One of the delegates from that State in Congress, Abraham Clark, went even so far as to denounce it as improper. It is a curious illustration of the extreme jealousy and sensitiveness of many in the community on the subject of the power and authority of the Federal government. See Curtis, *History of the Constitution*, vol. i., pp. 107-108 (*Constitutional History*, vol. i., pp. 74-75).

‡ On the writings of the Loyalists at this time and subsequently see Tyler, *Literary History of the American Revolution*, vol. ii., chaps. xxvii.-xxix.

One of the saddest aspects of the war were the shocking excesses committed by both armies, but chiefly by the British. When the royal army crossed Jersey, many licenses of protection signed by the commander-in-chief had been given to the inhabitants, but to all intents and purposes the people might just as well have had none, for neither the proclamation of the commissioners nor the protections

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 5.

† Botta, *History of the War of Independence*, vol. ii., p. 227.

saved them from plunder or insult. Their property was confiscated, even though the protections were shown; the Hessians themselves could not read these protections or would not understand them, and the British troops considered that they possessed equally with the Hessians the right to share in the booty.* The worst of these plunderers was General De Heister, who even offered his New York residence for sale, though the property belonged to a Loyalist who had voluntarily accommodated De Heister and allowed him to use it as his headquarters. The possessions of those who were prisoners in the American camps were sold at auction, and even the carriages of the Americans at New York were seized by the British officers and appropriated to their own use. The pillaging of both friend and foe was carried on unrelentingly in Jersey, the British sparing neither age nor sex. Every description of furniture was destroyed and burnt; windows and doors were broken to pieces; houses were left uninhabitable and the people without provisions, the British carrying off every horse, cow, ox, and fowl. Not only were these excesses committed against property, but also against persons, the women in particular suffering from the brutality of the soldiers. A

number of young women fled to the woods to avoid the brutality of the soldiers stationed near Pennytown, but they were pursued and captured, and carried off to the British camp.

These actions aroused intense indignation throughout the country and were echoed and re-echoed throughout Europe, to the reproach of the British. Citizens of all classes flew to arms to expel from the country these infamous robbers. The British sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind, for the excesses of the army were more injurious to the British cause than even the efforts of Washington and the resolves of Congress. Had Howe at this time followed Carleton's humane course in Canada, a large portion of the people who had been fairly driven into Washington's army, if they did not join the British army, would at least have remained neutral. Furthermore, among the European nations, the British were regarded with unfeigned disgust as having revived in the New World the barbarities of the northern hordes and the fury of the Goths. Such countries as had remained friendly to England, now turned against her and became more bitter in their enmity than they had been warm in their friendship.

As before stated, however, the depredations and outrages were not altogether confined to the British. The American troops had been forced in a great many cases to go to the surrounding counties for supplies, etc., but instead of confining their

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 4. See also Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 368; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 29 *et seq.*; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 3 *et seq.*

operations to securing these supplies, the soldiers pillaged and plundered not only the property of enemies, but also that of friends of the American cause. Under the pretext that they were owned by Loyalists, the houses and property of the New Jersey people were sacked, the officers themselves leading in this form of excess. Consequently, the unfortunate Jerseyites were between two fires — the British robbing them under the pretext that they were rebels, while the Americans did the same under the pretext that they were British partisans. Finally, the excesses on the part of the Americans became so extensive and so revolting that Washington issued a proclamation forbidding it and promising the most vigorous punishment to those who should be convicted of such offenses. He said in his general orders: “The general prohibits, both in the militia and continental troops, in the most positive terms, the infamous practice of plundering the inhabitants, under the specious pretence of their being Tories. It is our business to give protection and support to the poor distressed inhabitants, not to multiply and increase their calamities. After this order, any officer found plundering the inhabitants, under the pretence of their being Tories, may expect to be punished in the severest manner. The adjutant-general to furnish the commanding officer of each division, with a copy of these orders, who is to cir-

culate copies among his troops immediately.” *

Gordon in his history of the war, a valuable and reliable work,† gives an account of the suffering of the prisoners in the hands of the British. According to Gordon,‡ General Howe in January discharged all the privates who were then prisoners of the British in New York, but the Americans complained that he had subjected them to all manner of horrible usage after they had been captured.¶ It will be remembered that on November 16 the garrison at Fort Washington had surrendered to the British, the terms being that the troops should be considered as prisoners of war and that the American officers should be allowed to retain their baggage and side arms. These articles had been written and signed and were afterward published in the New York newspapers; but hardly had the troops arrived in New York when the British began to treat them in a manner far from lenient. Major Otho H. Williams, of Rawlings’ rifle regiment, had fallen into the hands of the British, and his hopes of being treated with leniency were shortly dispelled by the insolence of the soldiers of the British army and by the haughty deportment

* See Van Tyne, *Loyalists in the Revolution*, p. 173 *et seq.*

† See Tyler’s opinion in *Literary History of the American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 423-427.

‡ *History of the American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 173-175 (1st ed.).

¶ See Allen, *Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen’s Captivity*, p. 78 *et seq.*

of the British officers. The baggage of the American prisoners was plundered; they were robbed of their side arms, hats, clothing, etc., and in many ways grossly maltreated. Williams and several of his companions were placed on board the *Baltic Merchant*, then lying in the Sound, and were allowed only a meagre pittance of pork and parsnip for rations, though the wretchedness of his situation was in a slight degree alleviated by the kindness of one of the British sailors who gave him food from his own mess. Rawlings and his companions, all wounded officers, on the fourth day of their captivity were placed in a common dirt cart and dragged through the city of New York, to be held up as objects of derision and to be reviled as rebels.* After this treatment, they were placed in an old, filthy waste house which Howe himself had refused as barracks for his soldiers. The food was of the worst quality, consisting of six ounces of pork, one pound of biscuit, and some peas per day for each man, with $2\frac{1}{2}$ bushels of coal per week for the officers to each fireplace. In the coldest season of the year, the privates were confined in churches, sugar houses, and other open buildings without fires, and consequently suffered from the cold and inclement weather. The officers were insulted and even struck for attempting to relieve the misery of the privates, who, because their constitutions

had been undermined by the treatment accorded them, were unable longer to withstand this punishment and died by hundreds. It is supposed that not less than 1,500 prisoners perished within the course of a few weeks in the city of New York alone, which mortality was undoubtedly due to the lack of provisions and the extreme cold.

The filth in the churches was beyond description, seven dead bodies being found in one of them at the same time.* The provisions allowed to the prisoners were insufficient to support them, and the quality was still worse. The bread was loathsome and unfit to be eaten, while the allowance of meat was trifling and of the baser sort.† The British added insult to injury by offering to relieve the sufferings of the poor wretches if they would join the British cause, but hundreds of the prisoners preferred death to enlistment in the British service.‡ It was supposed by the American troops that General Howe and his officers were perfectly conversant with the conditions among the American prisoners, and they firmly believed that these conditions were exactly as he and his council had devised.||

After Washington's success in the Jerseys, the obduracy and malevolence of the royalists to a great de-

* See Allen, *Narrative of Colonial Ethan Allen's Captivity*, pp. 79-81; Brown, *Ethan Allen*, pp. 139-140.

† Brown, *Ethan Allen*, pp. 140-141.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 142.


|| *Ibid.*, pp. 143-144.

* Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 77.

gree subsided. Such prisoners as survived were ordered to be exchanged, but while on their way to the vessel, numbers of them fell dead in the streets from exhaustion.* In April Washington wrote to General Howe protesting against this condition of affairs. He said: "Painful as it is, I am compelled to consider it as a fact not to be questioned, that the usage of our prisoners, whilst in your possession, of the privates at least, was such as could not be justified. This was proclaimed by the concurrent testimony of all who came out; their appearance sanctioned the assertion; and melancholy experience, in the speedy death of a large part of them, stamped it with infallible certainty."† On the other hand, Washington was careful to maintain his army in as good health as was possible under the circumstances. The small pox had attacked the army and made fearful ravages in the ranks. Early in 1777, therefore, Washington determined to have the army inoculated, which operation was carried on as secretly and carefully as possible. In addition to the troops particularly under Washington's supervision, all those who passed through Philadelphia on their way to join him were inoculated,

and the same precaution was taken in other military stations.*

Hoping that he might divert the attention of the British from the Jerseys, Washington planned an attack on the Highlands of New York. He ordered General Heath, in command of the post, to move down toward the city with a considerable force. Early in January, 1777, Heath undertook this movement and summoned Fort



OPERATIONS ON THE HUDSON RIVER.

Independence to surrender. The British, however, stood their ground, and after a few operations in the vicinity, Heath retreated, having done nothing save expose himself to the ridicule of the British for failing to follow up his words with suitable

* *Ibid.*, p. 149.

† Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 226, the whole letter being given on pp. 224-226. See also his other letter regarding the treatment of prisoners, in Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 18 *et seq.*

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 307-308; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 55-57.

deeds.* Washington's forces were now reduced to the lowest point, and it was a matter of much concern with him as to how he could meet Howe in the next campaign. The system of enlisting troops for short terms was beginning to produce disastrous results, and Congress had met with failure in their attempt to raise the army according to their late resolves. There was considerable jealousy among the officers as to rank, and in addition the troops were exposed to all manner of hardships,—to hunger, cold, and nakedness, which rendered it extremely difficult to fill up the ranks.† Washington, however, repeatedly urged the various States to send forward their enlistment of troops with all possible speed, so that he could make his plans for the following campaign in accordance with the strength of his army.

Howe, on the other hand, was quite active in the spring of this year. He inaugurated a movement to capture the American stores at Peekskill. Because of the smallness of the American force stationed at that point and the suddenness with which Howe attacked, the movement was to a great

degree successful.* In April of the same year, a similar expedition was despatched to the borders of Connecticut. Governor Tryon, with 2,000 men, marched to Danbury for the purpose of destroying the stores collected there for the use of the American army. The Connecticut militia bravely resisted, but were unable to save the stores, among which were about 1,000 tents, at that time especially valuable to the American army. Among those lost during these operations was General David Wooster who, though an old man, had engaged in the conflict with great spirit, but who fell mortally wounded. Benedict Arnold, then in the vicinity,† took post at Ridgefield in the hope of defeating the British, but after a sharp conflict he was compelled to

* Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 177; Stedman, *American War*, vol. i., p. 278; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 423 (ed. 1788). See also Sparks' edition of Washington's *Writings*, vol. iv., p. 369; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 740-742.

† Shortly after his return from Canada, Arnold had been sent to the New England States to co-operate with General Heath in rallying the militia to repel the British forces in Rhode Island, and while in this service, Congress, February 19, 1777, elected five major-generals. Four of these were Arnold's juniors in rank and one was raised from the militia, and as none had done anything to justify promotions over Arnold, the action naturally astonished and provoked him. Washington was equally astonished, and his indignation aroused, as is evinced by his various letters to Congress regarding the action. While on his way from Providence to Philadelphia to ask an investigation of his conduct by Congress, Arnold stopped at New Haven and there heard of the British invasion of Connecticut. He immediately joined Wooster and set out in pursuit of the British.—Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 126-130; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 50-51.

* See Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. ii., pp. 554-555; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 292; Heath's *Memoirs*, pp. 99-105 (Abbatt's ed.); Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., pp. 178, 191, 206, 214, 217; Gordon, *American Revolution*, pp. 419-420; Heath's letters to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 328-329, 333-334, 336-340.

† Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 242 et seq.

give way, and he himself was wounded. After destroying everything upon which they could lay their hands, the British retreated to New York.*

In order to offset these expeditions, the Americans conceived a plan to retaliate upon the British at Sag Harbor, Long Island. There the British were supposed to have collected large stores of forage, grain, and other necessities for the troops, and to guard these stores had left only a small detachment of infantry and a sloop of 12 guns. They believed themselves sufficiently protected against surprise because of the armed vessels in the Sound, and consequently had not thought of an attack by the Americans. But being in no way intimidated by these obstacles, the latter determined to strike a blow at Sag Harbor. Colonel Return Jonathan Meigs crossed the Sound, and before daybreak fired on the place where the magazines were situated. Notwithstanding that the garrison and the crews of the vessels strongly resisted, he succeeded in burning a dozen sloops and brigs which lay at the wharf, and entirely

destroyed everything on shore,* without losing a single man. He then returned to Guilford, Connecticut, bringing with him a large number of prisoners. In this enterprise, the Americans refrained from seizing private property and allowed the prisoners to retain whatever belonged to them. For his services in this expedition, Meigs was presented with a sword by Congress, and he and the men under him were publicly thanked.† Another bold step was taken shortly after this, when on July 10 General Richard Prescott, who commanded the British troops in Rhode Island, was captured. He had become almost as careless as General Lee. Finding himself on an island surrounded by ships, and with a force vastly superior to any the Americans could assemble in that quarter, he became extremely negligent of his guard. Upon learning this, the Americans determined to offset the capture of Lee by surprising Prescott in his quarters and bringing him off as a prisoner. Lieutenant-Colonel William Barton, at the head of 40 country militia, after a long journey succeeded in landing on the western coast of Rhode Island, between Newport and Bristol Ferry. After landing, they went to Prescott's

* Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 259; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 463 (ed. 1788); Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 130-133; Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 188; Bancroft, vol. v., p. 151; Stedman, *American War*, vol. i., p. 279; Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 178; Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 109 (Abbatt's ed.); Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 401-410; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 116 *et seq.*

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 297; Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 180-184; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 468 (ed. 1788); Stedman, *American War*, p. 282; Lamb, *City of New York*, vol. ii., pp. 160-161.

† Bancroft, vol. v., p. 152.

lodging, seized the sentinels who guarded the door, and making their way to the room of the general, arrested him without even allowing him time to put on his clothes. He was then carried to the American encampment. For this service, Barton was

publicly thanked by Congress and presented with a sword. Upon hearing of Prescott's capture, Howe, who had hitherto refused to exchange General Lee, now viewed the matter in a different light, and the exchange of the two officers was soon effected.*

CHAPTER XVI.

1777.

BURGOYNE'S INVASION.

Burgoyne appointed to command the British forces in Canada — Other officers sent with him — Employment of Indians determined upon — Burgoyne's speech to the Indians — His proclamation — Situation of Ticonderoga — St. Clair unable to check British progress — Ticonderoga abandoned — St. Clair pursued by the British — Battle near Hubbardton — Schuyler's measures to hinder Burgoyne's progress — Inquiry into Schuyler's conduct — Washington sends reinforcements — Fort George evacuated — Burgoyne halts at Fort Edward — Alarm in New England States — Battle of Bennington — St. Leger sent to the Mohawk Valley — Battle of Oriskany — The Death of General Herkimer — Siege of Fort Stanwix — Arnold goes to Relief — His stratagem — British retreat from Fort Stanwix — Dispute between Schuyler and Gates — Gates supersedes Schuyler — Correspondence between Gates and Burgoyne — The Jane M'Crea incident — Gates occupies Behm's Heights — First Battle of Saratoga — Sugar Loaf Hill — Ticonderoga recaptured by Americans — Clinton attempts to relieve Burgoyne — Attack on Forts Clinton and Montgomery — Correspondence with Gates and General Vaughan regarding British outrages — Second Battle of Saratoga — Burgoyne defeated — British Army surrenders — Terms of the surrender — Gates honored by Congress — Kindness of General Schuyler — Treatment of British prisoners. Appendix to Chapter XVI. — Burgoyne's Proclamation.

While Washington was conducting operations against the British in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, an important campaign was in progress in the North. It will be remembered that the American army had been driven out of Canada by the British under Carleton, who planned to open a passage by way of the Hudson to New York and thus sever the Eastern States from the rest of the confederacy. After having driven the Americans out of Canada, Carleton attempted to advance southwardly, but met with obstinate resistance on the part of the Americans under

Arnold; and as the season was too far advanced for further operations, Carleton had abandoned the pursuit and gone into camp. At the beginning of 1777 General John Burgoyne had been placed in command of the British forces in Canada, in spite of the fact that Carleton had conducted the campaign with much abil-

* J. L. Diman, *The Capture of General Richard Prescott*, in *Rider's Historical Tracts*, no. i.; E. Field, *The Militia in War Time*, in *Rhode Island at the End of the Century*, vol. i., chap. xxiii.; Richman, *Rhode Island*, pp. 223-226; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 642-645; Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 188-189; Bancroft, vol. v., p. 155; Heath's *Memoirs*, pp. 112-113 (Abbatt's ed.).

ity and was entitled to remain in command of the British forces.* But Burgoyne, having been in England during the winter, gained the ear of the ministry and consequently secured the chief post of honor. When in England, he had laid all his plans for a vigorous campaign, giving the ministry an estimate of the forces necessary successfully to carry out his schemes.† Among the generals accompanying him were Simon Fraser, William Phillips, James Hamilton, Johann Friedrich Specht, Friedrich Adolph von Riedesel, and John Powell. In addition, he had a fine train of artillery with well-trained artillerymen, and an army of more than 7,000 veteran troops, well equipped, highly disciplined and in excellent spirits.‡ He had, besides, a large number of Canadians and savages, and as he approached Albany, hundreds of Loyalists joined his forces.||

That the British government deliberately decided to employ Indians against the American troops is proved by the letters of Lord Dartmouth to Colonel Johnson, dated July 5 and 24, 1775.§ In one of these letters Dartmouth says: "It is his Majesty's pleasure that you do lose

no time in taking such steps as may induce the Six Nations to take up the hatchet against his majesty's rebellious subjects in America, and engage them in his Majesty's service upon such plan as shall be suggested to you by General Gage, to whom this letter is sent, accompanied with a large assortment of goods for presents to them upon this important occasion." * The British generals placed a large amount of dependence upon the Indian allies, whom General Carleton was directed to use all his influence to bring into the field. In this project he was quite successful.

Before starting to the southward, Burgoyne detached Lieutenant-colonel Barry St. Leger, with a body of 800 light troops and Indians, to the Mohawk Valley, ordering him to go by the way of Lake Oswego and the Mohawk River, so as to make a diversion in that quarter, after which he was to join Burgoyne on the Hudson. Early in June, 1777, Burgoyne, with an army consisting of about 4,000 British regulars, 3,000 German troops and 650 Canadians and Indians,† left St. John's, and, preceded

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 37-38.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 70 *et seq.*

‡ See the tables in Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 304-305, 307.

§ Flick, *Loyalism in New York*, p. 102 *et seq.*

§ See also Chatham's speech regarding this in Harrison, *Chatham*, pp. 231-233.

* See Judge Campbell's interesting paper, read before the New York Historical Society, October 7, 1845, in relation to "the direct agency of the British Government in the employment of the Indians in the Revolutionary War." Appendix to *The Border Warfare of New York*, pp. 321-338. See also S. A. Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion of 1777*, pp. 31-32; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 81 *et seq.*

† Fiskè says there were 4,135 regulars, 3,116 German troops, 148 Canadian militia, and 503 Indians — total 7,902.—*American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 268. Carrington, p. 307, makes the total 7,863,

by his naval armament, sailed up Lake Champlain, in a few days landing and camping near Crown Point. While at this place, Burgoyne gave the Indians a war-feast and spoke long and earnestly to them. Among others things, he said: "Go forth in the might of your valor; strike at the common enemies of Great Britain and America, disturbers of public order, peace, and happiness, destroyers of commerce, parricides of the state."* He praised the Indians for their constancy and perseverance, and patient endurance of privation, and artfully flattered them by saying that in these respects the British army could well imitate them. He also entreated them to adopt a more civilized mode of warfare, such as was used by the whites. He then added:

"I positively forbid bloodshed when you are not opposed in arms. Aged men, women, children and prisoners must be held sacred from the knife and hatchet even in the time of actual conflict. You shall receive compensation for the prisoners you take, but you shall be called to account for scalps. In conformity and indulgence of your customs, which have affixed an idea of honor to such badges of victory, you shall be allowed to take the scalps of the dead when killed by your fire and in fair opposition; but on no account, or pretense, or

Lowell in his *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 137-138, says 3,891 German troops accompanied Burgoyne, in addition to the Hauden Chasseurs attached to St. Leger's expedition. Roberts (*New York*, vol. ii., p. 418 following Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 98) divides the forces as follows: 3,724 British rank and file; 3,016 German auxiliaries; 400 Indians; 473 artillerymen; 250 Canadians; total 7,863. The exact numbers in themselves are immaterial, save that the various figures show the difficulty in procuring accurate data.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 159-160.

subtlety, or prevarication, are they to be taken from the wounded, or even the dying; and still less pardonable, if possible, will it be held to kill men in that condition on purpose, and upon a supposition that this protection to the wounded would thereby be evaded."*

The Indians accordingly promised to accede to his wishes, but no reliance could be placed on their promises, and the English name, by letting loose upon the Americans the savage fury of their Indian confederates, received a stain which was not erased for many years.†

On July 2, upon his arrival at Ticonderoga, Burgoyne issued a proclamation addressed to the people of the country in which he held out promises of protection to those who would submit to the British authority and threatening condign punishment to those who refused.‡ This proclamation, however, was ill-judged, for Burgoyne could neither frighten nor cajole the Americans into submitting to the royal authority. At this time a large number of the northern troops had been sent southward to join Washington, and Ticonderoga contained a garrison of only about 2,000 men under the command of General Arthur St. Clair, though the works

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 99, note. See also Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 85-86; Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, pp. 179-180.

† Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 158-159.

‡ See Niles, *Principles and Acts of the Revolution*, pp. 262-264. On Hopkinson's burlesque of Burgoyne's proclamation, see Tyler, *Literary History of the American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 143-146; W. L. Stone, *Ballads and Poems relating to the Burgoyne Campaign*, App. iii. See also Appendix at the end of the present chapter.

were extensive enough to require 10,000 men to defend them against a strong invading force.* Opposite Ticonderoga on the east side of the channel, there about 400 yards wide, rises a high circular hill called Mount Independence. When they abandoned Crown Point, the Americans had fortified this hill, and at its summit had erected a fort well provided with artillery. Intrenchments had been raised at the foot of the mountain and a number of heavy guns placed in them, while about half way up the hill a battery had been established to cover the lower works. To maintain communication between the two posts, the Americans had erected a wooden bridge supported by twenty-two wooden pillars. The spaces between these pillars were filled by separate floats, fastened to each other and to the pillars by chains and rivets. The bridge itself was twelve feet wide, and the side next Lake Champlain was defended by a boom, formed of large pieces of timber bound together by strong iron chains. Thus an easy communication was established between Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and the passage of vessels up the strait absolutely prevented.† Above Ticonderoga the channel becomes wider, and on the southeast side receives a body of water from a stream, at that point

called South River, but higher up, named Wood Creek. The waters from Lake George flow in from the southwest and in the angle formed by the confluence of these two streams rises Sugar Loaf Hill, which overlooks both Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. This hill had been examined by the Americans with the view to fortifying it, but the forces under St. Clair were insufficient to occupy the extensive works of Ticonderoga, Mount Independence and Sugar Loaf Hill. In addition, St. Clair thought that the hill itself was so steep that the British would not attempt the difficult ascent, and he therefore neglected to take any measures for preventing the occupancy of the hill by the British, should they so desire.

Up to this time St. Clair had received no definite information as to the strength of the force advancing under Burgoyne.* Being ignorant of their numbers, he supposed that it would not be difficult to repulse any assault that might be made upon the fort. The British encamped about four miles from the forts, while the fleet anchored just beyond the reach of the guns. At Mount Hope, to the south of Ticonderoga, the Americans made but a slight resistance to the British, and after having taken possession of this post, Burgoyne extended his lines so as to completely in-

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution* vol. iv., p. 99; Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, pp. 187-188.

† Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 81; Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 174.

* Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 181.

vest the fort on the west side.* The eastern bank of the channel was occupied by the German division under Riedesel, and a detachment was sent forward to the vicinity of the rivulet which flows from Mount Independence. Having received information that Sugar Loaf Hill completely dominated the other fortresses, Burgoyne resolved to occupy it at once, and after five days of the most strenuous labor, succeeded in placing his artillery on the top of the hill, the name of which was changed to Mount Defiance.† St. Clair was thus nearly surrounded, the only space remaining open being that between the stream which flows from Mount Independence and the South River. It was necessary, therefore, that St. Clair decide upon an immediate course of action, for he must either defend the fort to the last extremity or abandon it at once to save as much as possible of his army and munitions of war. He called a council of war, at which it was unanimously decided that the fort should be evacuated; and preparations were immediately begun to carry this decision into effect.‡ As communication with

Lake George was now cut off by the British, escape in that direction was impossible, and a retreat could be effected only by the South River. The invalids and all stores easily movable were placed aboard 200 boats, and on the night of July 5-6, escorted by Colonel Long's regiment, these proceeded up South River toward Skeenesborough, while the garrison marched by land through Castleton in the same direction.* Orders had been issued that the troops should proceed in absolute silence and particularly that nothing should be set on fire that might reveal the movement to the British. But before the rearguard was in motion the house on Mount Independence, which had been occupied by General Fermoy, was set on fire, thus giving notice to the British of the evacuation. The latter thereupon entered the works and fired upon the rear of the American army.†

The retreat to Hubbardton was conducted in some confusion, and from this place the main army under St. Clair pushed forward to Castleton. The English under General Fraser immediately pursued by land upon the

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 308; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 34.

† Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 83; Fiske, *American Revolution* vol. i., p. 269; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., 134; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 101-102; Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, pp. 188-193; Robinson, *Vermont*, pp. 155-156.

‡ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 313; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 61.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 134-135.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 314; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 63; Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion of 1777*, pp. 42-44; Schuyler's letter to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 393-395 and St. Clair's letter to Schuyler, *ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 513. On the attacks on St. Clair and Schuyler provoked by the abandonment of Ticonderoga, see Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 184 et seq.

right bank of Wood Creek, the advance column of the British being supported by General Riedesel with his Brunswickers. Burgoyne pursued the Americans by water, but in order to do this, it was first necessary to destroy the boom and bridge which the Americans had constructed at Ticonderoga. These works, which had cost so much labor and expense on the part of the Americans, were easily and quickly demolished by the British engineers, and a clear passage was effected.* Burgoyne's ships now entered Wood Creek and rapidly proceeded in pursuit of the enemy.† By the afternoon the British ships came up with the American galleys near Skeenesborough Falls and attacked them. Meanwhile three regiments, which had been landed at South Bay, ascended the mountain in order to turn the enemy above Wood Creek or destroy the works at Skeenesborough Falls, and thus cut off the retreat to Fort Anne. The Americans fled too swiftly, however, to be caught in this trap. The American galleys were soon overpowered by the British gun-boats and two of them surrendered, while three were blown up. The other boats, together with mills and other works, were set on fire, and the Americans then fell back upon Fort Anne higher up Wood Creek.‡ They

lost all their baggage, however, together with a large quantity of provisions and military stores.*

Early on the morning of July 7, the British land forces overtook the American rear-guard, who, directly contrary to St. Clair's orders, had lagged behind and had posted themselves in a strong position near Hubbardton. Though the troops under Fraser numbered only about one-half their opponents, they were strengthened by the knowledge that Riedesel, with large reinforcements, was close behind. Fearing that the Americans would effect their escape, Fraser ordered an immediate attack. The troops under Seth Warner for a time made a vigorous resistance, but a large body of his militia fled from the field and Warner was left alone to bear the entire attack. Fraser, having now been reinforced by the troops under Riedesel, ordered an immediate bayonet charge, which was so vigorous that the Americans broke under the attack and fled, sustaining a severe loss. St. Clair, upon hearing the firing in the rear, endeavored to send back some assistance, but the discouraged militia refused to return and St. Clair continued the retreat to Fort Edward, where he could effect a junction with Schuyler.‡ Burgoyne immediately

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 104.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 135.

‡ Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 104-105.

* Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 83-84; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 314.

† Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 140-141; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 162-163; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 270; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 315-317; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 63-64;

sent a regiment to attack Fort Anne, which was then defended by a small party under Colonel Long. Here, however, the British met an entirely different reception. Long determined to ambush the British and placed his troops in a narrow ravine through which the British were compelled to pass. When they reached the place, the Americans poured such a destructive fire upon the British from the front, flank and rear that it was only with the greatest difficulty that they escaped to a neighboring hill. There they were again attacked by the Americans and would undoubtedly have been decisively defeated, had not the ammunition of the Americans at this moment given out. Unable to continue the fight, Long's troops fell back, and setting the fort on fire, retreated to Fort Edward.*

Consternation now reigned in the vicinity because of Burgoyne's successes.† There was also great exultation in England when the news of these victories arrived in that country; the glad tidings caused the greatest joy at court and were enthusiastically welcomed by all those who de-

sired the unconditional reduction of America.* These enthusiasts readily foresaw the quick termination of the whole war; they thought it impossible that the Americans should be able to recover from the shock of these recent losses; the old charges of cowardice against the Americans were renewed, and even their own partisans abated much of the esteem they had previously borne for them, being more than half disposed to pronounce the colonists unworthy to defend that liberty in which they had gloried with so much complacency.†

Had Burgoyne continued his campaign in the same dashing style in which it had been thus far prosecuted, undoubtedly success would have met his every effort; but there were still sixteen miles of forest to be traversed, and he made the mistake of delaying until his baggage and stores could come up. General Schuyler, then in command of the American forces, was thus afforded an opportunity to place impediments along the line of march. Schuyler opened up trenches, obstructed the roads and paths, destroyed the bridges, and, in the narrow defiles through which the British must pass, cut down trees in such a manner that they fell across the roadway and formed an almost insurmountable barrier. By such methods Schuyler rendered the pathways through the

Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*, pp. 45-55; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 145-146; Robinson, *Vermont*, pp. 157-159.

* Burgoyne, *State of the Expedition*, p. 81; William H. Smith, *The St. Clair Papers*, vol. i., p. 70 *et seq.*; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 64; St. Clair's letter to Washington, giving his reasons for abandoning Fort Independence, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 400-405; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 141-142.

† Botta, *History of the War of Independence*, vol. ii., p. 280.

* Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 271.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 108 *et seq.*

forest almost impenetrable.* He did not rest satisfied with these precautions, but removed the cattle to places of safety, and the stores and baggage from Fort George to Fort Edward, so that if the former place were captured, such necessities would not fall into the hands of the British. He urgently requested that such regular troops as were to be found in the adjacent States should immediately be dispatched to join him, and he also earnestly appealed to the New England States and New York to send such militia as they could enlist.† In the vicinity of Fort Edward and Albany, he also endeavored to secure recruits to his army, in which task he attained considerable success because of his influence with the people in that region.‡ He determined to harass the enemy as much as possible, and dispatched Colonel Warner with his regiment into Vermont with instructions to assemble the militia and make incursions toward Ticonderoga. In fact, Schuyler did everything possible under the circumstances, and while he did not reap the reward of his labors, still it is not too much to say that the measures he adopted paved the way to the victory at Saratoga, for which Gates received

the honor. Nevertheless, Schuyler was extremely despondent at the condition of affairs and his inability successfully to check the advance of the British, and his letters are filled with downheartedness and forebodings of impending disasters.*

Both Congress and Washington were greatly astonished at the disasters which befell the Americans in the North, for they supposed that Schuyler's force was much larger than it actually was, and the British much weaker.† But Washington waited until he should receive more correct information before pronouncing upon the conduct of General St. Clair. When that officer joined Schuyler, the whole force of the Americans did not exceed 4,400, about one-half of whom were militia, while all were poorly clothed, wretchedly equipped, and greatly dispirited by the recent reverses. Moreover, the militia were anxious to return home to reap their harvests; and, in order to prevent the desertion of the whole army, one-half of the militia was allowed to depart immediately, provided the other half remained three weeks—a condition the militia readily accepted.‡ When Congress received confirmation of the disasters in the North, it was proposed

* See Burgoyne's letter to Germaine in De Fonblanque, *Life of Burgoyne*, p. 268; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 318; Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*, pp. 64-66.

Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 112-113.

‡ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 41-42.

* Quotations from his letters are given in Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 164-167. See also his various letters in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 397-399.

† See his letter quoted in Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 202. See also Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 109 *et seq.*

‡ On the situation see Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 198 *et seq.*

to remove the generals responsible. An inquiry was instituted in reference to the conduct of Schuyler and his officers, but this resulted honorably for him and he was continued in charge of the forces in the northern department.* Washington then exerted all his energies to send reinforcements and supplies to Schuyler's army. From Massachusetts he sent artillery and ammunition; General Lincoln was sent to the New England States to enlist the militia; while Arnold was also dispatched to the North, as it was thought that his ardor and brilliant leadership might inspire the dejected troops.† In order to counterpoise the Indians who accompanied Burgoyne and of whom the American troops were in great dread,

* Washington, writing to General Schuyler, said: "Though our affairs have for some days past worn a gloomy aspect, yet I look forward to a happy change. I trust General Burgoyne's army will meet sooner or later an effectual check; and, as I suggested before, that the success he has had will precipitate his ruin. From your accounts, he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct, which of all others, is most favorable to us. I mean acting in detachment. This conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on our part, and expose his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them off, though it should not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspire the people, and do away with much of their present anxiety. In such an event, they would lose sight of past misfortunes, and urged on at the same time by a regard for their own security, they would fly to arms, and offer every aid in their power." See Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 130-131; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 319; also Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 90-96.

† See Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 146-148; Spark's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. iv., p. 487 et seq.

Washington also sent Colonel Morgan with 500 riflemen. "They are all chosen men," said he, "selected from the army at large, and well acquainted with the use of rifles and that mode of fighting. I expect the most eminent services from them, and shall be mistaken if their presence does not go far towards producing a general desertion among the savages.* These measures produced a good effect upon the army in the North and gradually their former spirit was recovered.†


Meanwhile Burgoyne was making every effort to open a passage from Fort Anne to Fort Edward, but though the whole army worked diligently at the task, their progress was exceedingly slow. Beside being forced to remove the fallen trees with which the Americans had obstructed the road, the British were compelled to construct no less than forty bridges and make repairs on a number of others.‡ Consequently, the British were so impeded that they did not reach the Hudson near Fort Edward until July 30. Because they considered themselves either too feeble successfully to oppose the enemy, or that Fort Edward was in no condition to be easily defended, or that Colonel St. Leger, after the reduction of Fort Stanwix, might descend the Mohawk

* Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 150-151.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 146 et seq.

‡ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 47. note; De Fonblanque, *Life of Burgoyne*, p. 268; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 122-123.

FEMALE PATRIOTISM.



1. MRS. SCHUYLER FIRING HER CORNFIELDS ON THE APPROACH OF THE BRITISH.
2. MRS. STEELE PRESENTING ALL HER SAVINGS TO GENERAL GREENE.

to the Hudson and thus cut off their retreat, the Americans retired lower down the river to Stillwater where they threw up intrenchments.* After the boats of the Americans had been burned and the road to Fort Edward obstructed as much as possible, Fort George was also evacuated.†

Though Burgoyne might have reached Fort Edward more readily by the way of Lake George, yet he thought it best to pursue the retreating Americans by land, despite the obstacles to be overcome, for his troops might become disgruntled if retrograde movements were made. Upon reaching Fort Edward, he was again compelled to pause, for a great many of his transportation vehicles had broken down and needed repairs. In addition, not more than one-third of the draught horses contracted for in Canada had been received, and none could be procured from the surrounding country, for all had been removed by Schuyler. It was also necessary to bring boats from Fort George for the navigation of the Hudson, and all provisions, stores, artillery and other necessities for the army. Though Fort George was only about ten miles from Fort Edward, yet the roads were in such a condition that great difficulty

was experienced in this task; consequently, by August 15, not more than a dozen boats had been launched on the Hudson and only four days' rations for the army had arrived. This was a very serious situation, because the further Burgoyne moved from the lakes the greater the possibility of having his base of supplies cut off. Should this occur, it would be necessary to sustain his army by supplies from the surrounding country.*

Burgoyne knew that at Bennington, about twenty-four miles east of the Hudson, the Americans had collected large quantities of supplies, including cattle, provisions, military stores, and transportation vehicles. Believing that the Tories in that neighborhood would aid him in an effort to capture these stores, Burgoyne determined to send Colonel Frederick Baum, with a force of about 600 of Riedesel's dragoons, to make an attack upon Bennington.† Baum was instructed "to try the affections of the country, to disconcert the counsels of the enemy, to mount Riedesel's dragoons, to complete Peter's corps [of Loyalists] and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses, and carriages." On August 13 Baum set forth on the expedition which was to result so unfortunately to himself and which entirely upset Burgoyne's plans and purposes.‡

* Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 91; Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 207.

† General Schuyler's unselfish patriotism was nobly shown in the direction which he gave to Mrs. Schuyler to set fire to his large and valuable fields of wheat, as well as to request his tenants and others to do the same, rather than suffer the enemy to reap them. See Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 41, note.

* Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*, pp. 69-70.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 129 and note.

‡ Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 91-92; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 327-330; Burgoyne, *State of the Expedition*, pp. 99-100, 134-139.

While at first the colonists had been alarmed at Burgoyne's invasion and had been thrown into a state of consternation upon his almost unobstructed advance, still when the final crisis arrived, they came forward and made a last effort to repulse the enemy. John Langdon, a merchant of Portsmouth and speaker of the New Hampshire Assembly, roused his despondent fellow-members to the necessity of defending the frontier, and in his speech said: "I have three thousand dollars in hard money; I will pledge my plate for three thousand more. I have seventy hogsheads of Tobago rum which shall be sold for the most it will bring. These are at the service of the state. If we succeed in defending our homes, I may be remunerated; if we do not, the property will be of no value to me. Our old friend Stark, who so nobly sustained the honor of our state at Bunker Hill, may be safely entrusted with the conduct of the enterprise, and we will check the progress of Burgoyne."* Stark, however, had become disgruntled because Congress had appointed a number of junior officers over his head and had resigned his commission, but was now persuaded to defend his native State by taking service against the enemy under State authority,† it being also

agreed that he should act independently in his movements against the enemy. Because of his popularity in the vicinity, he was able to collect a large force of militia who were ready to take field with him unhesitatingly.* Having gathered his troops, Stark went to Manchester, about twenty miles north of Bennington, where Colonel Seth Warner had taken post with his regiment. Here Stark met General Lincoln who had been sent by Schuyler to lead the militia to the west bank of the Hudson. Stark absolutely refused to accede to such a proposal,† and on August 19 Congress censured him for his conduct as being "destructive of military subordination and highly prejudicial to the common cause."‡ As news in those days travelled very slowly, Stark did not know of this vote of censure,|| and before the news arrived he had won a victory which paralyzed the entire operations of Burgoyne. He also had the satisfaction of knowing that the commander-in-chief fully approved of his plan of harassing the rear of the British.

Stark arrived at Bennington on the same day that Baum started for that place, but the latter had been impeded by the condition of the roads and made slow progress. When Stark re-

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 392-393; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 130-131.

† *Vermont Historical Society Collections*, vol. i., pp. 204, 206; Smith, *St. Clair Papers*, vol. i., p. 84.

* Robinson, *Vermont*, p. 165 *et seq.*

† Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*, pp. 74-75; Robinson, *Vermont*, pp. 168-169.

‡ Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 213; Lossing, vol. i., p. 394.


|| Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 131.



1. THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON.
2. GENERAL STARK AT THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON.

ceived information of their approach, he sent messages to Warner requesting the latter to join him immediately. He sent forward Colonel Gregg to reconnoitre the enemy* and then himself advanced against Baum, who, having found the entire country rising around him, entrenched himself in a strong position above the Walloomsac River. Baum sent an express to Burgoyne, informing him of the situation, and the latter immediately despatched Lieutenant-colonel Heinrich Chris-

following day, the 16th, however, was bright and sunny, and early in the morning Stark dispatched two columns to attack the entrenchments at different points. When he heard the firing, he threw himself on horseback and advanced with the rest of the troops. As soon as the British columns were seen forming on the hill, he exclaimed, "See, men! there are the red-coats; we must beat them to-day or Molly Stark's a widow."* The entire army replied



toph Breyman with a large body of reinforcements.†

No movements could be undertaken on August 15, as there was a continual downpour of rain, but the Germans and English pushed the work on their entrenchments so that they might mount a few pieces of artillery.‡ The

to Stark's appeal with a tremendous shout and the battle began. According to Stark, it "lasted two hours, and was the hottest I ever saw. It was like one continual clap of thunder." † At the very beginning of

* Robinson, *Vermont*, p. 171.

† *Vermont Historical Society Collection*, vol. i., p. 218.

‡ Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*, pp. 80-81.

* *Ibid*, p. 82. There are several versions of Stark's exclamation. Drake gives a different one than that quoted in the text; Lossing (p. 397) gives another.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 135.

the battle, the Indian allies of the British retreated; the Tories were then driven across the river, and finally the Germans, after being compelled to abandon the intrenchments, turned and fled, leaving the artillery and other equipment on the field.*

The retreating troops were met by Breymann and his corps, who, upon hearing the firing, hurried forward to the aid of their countrymen. Had they been an hour or two earlier, probably the fortune of the day would have rested with the British, but the heavy rains had delayed their progress. The fugitives, upon seeing the reinforcements, rallied and returned to the fray. After routing the Germans, Stark's troops had engaged in plunder and were greatly surprised at the return of the German troops. The victory might have been wrested from the Americans, had it not been that Seth Warner arrived with his regiment at the critical moment.† The battle continued until sunset, but at length the Germans, being overwhelmed by numbers, were compelled to abandon the field.‡ The British loss amounted to about 900 effective troops in killed, wounded and captured,

among the killed being Colonel Baum.* The American loss was 30 killed and 40 wounded.† Everett, in his *Life of Stark*‡ highly praises the conduct of Stark and his men in this action. It is probably the most conspicuous example of the manner in which militia conduct themselves when actually under fire, for as Stark expresses it, they had "fought through the midst of fire and smoke, mounted two breastworks that were well fortified and supported with cannon," and had done this in the face of an army of experienced veterans.||

The victory had a great effect not only upon the army, but also upon the people throughout the country. It wholly deranged Burgoyne's plans, as he found he could not rely upon lateral excursions to obtain supplies, but must procure the necessaries for his soldiers as best he could. The victory also roused the people, and the militia

* Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 145-147; Drake, pp. 83-84; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 394-397; Robinson, *Vermont*, pp. 173-175.

† Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 215; Robinson, *Vermont*, pp. 175-176.

‡ *Vermont Historical Society Collections*, vol. i., pp. 207, 223, 225; Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 93; Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*, pp. 84-85; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 147; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 136-139.

* The statements regarding the British loss vary greatly. Dawson (*Battles of the United States by Sea and Land*) and Gordon (*American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 538) place the loss at 207 killed and 700 prisoners. Irving places the captured at 564 privates and 32 officers, Bancroft at 692 and Lossing at 934 British killed and wounded and 150 Tories. Lincoln's report as submitted to Schuyler places the loss at about 936, but he says the number of killed is uncertain. See Schuyler's letter in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 425-426.

† On the entire campaign, see Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 196-205; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 331-333; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 80-83; the various documents in Eelking's *Life of Riedesel*, vol. iii., pp. 184-197, 210-214, 261; and histories of Vermont by Williams, Hall, Allen, Robinson, etc.

‡ *Life of John Stark*, p. 58.

|| Robinson, *Vermont*, p. 117.

flocked to the American standard.* Furthermore, the British rear was now exposed to any attack that might be made upon it, and Stark immediately stationed his troops so as to completely hem in Burgoyne, thus placing him in a position where he could neither advance nor retreat.

However, the defeat at Bennington was only one of the series of misfortunes which the British had met and were to meet. It will be remembered that Burgoyne sent St. Leger with a body of troops by way of Oswego to make a diversion in the Mohawk Valley, after which he was to join the main army at Albany. At Oswego St. Leger was joined by Sir John Johnson and Colonel John Butler and their Tory followers, and by Joseph Brant with a body of Mohawk, Iroquois, Cayuga and Seneca Indians.† On August 2 St. Leger reached the vicinity of Fort Stanwix (or Schuyler) situated near the source of the Mohawk river and garrisoned by about 600 Continentals, under the command of Colonel Peter Gansevoort. On the following day St. Leger began the investment of this fort, with an army of about 1,600 or 1,700 men, of whom about half were Indians and the rest British, Canadians, Tories and foreign troops. Upon being summoned to surrender, Gansevoort

asserted that he would defend the place to the last extremity.*

Meanwhile, General Nicholas Herkimer, who commanded the militia of Tryon County, having learned of the approach of St. Leger, assembled about 800 of the militia and marched to the relief of the garrison.† On August 6 Herkimer dispatched a messenger to Gansevoort, informing him he was only eight miles away and would endeavor to force a passage to the fort and join the garrison.‡ Gansevoort therefore determined to make a vigorous sally from the fort, and appointed Colonel Marinus Willett with 200 men at that service.|| St. Leger had also been informed as to Herkimer's movements and made plans to ambush the American forces. He placed a large body of troops, consisting of "Johnson Greens" and Brant's Indians, in an ambush near Oriskany. Herkimer was opposed to proceeding any further until reinforcements were received from the fort, but his officers accused him of being a coward and a Tory,§ and the old general was stung so deeply by these imputations that he gave the order to march forward, consequently the army fell into the snare prepared for it.¶

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 240-243.

† *The Public Papers of George Clinton*, vol. ii., p. 164 (pub. by New York State, 1900-2); Lossing, p. 243.

‡ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 323.

|| Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 287; Carrington, p. 324.

§ Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 150.

¶ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 243-244; Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 216.

* Baroness Riedesel, *Letters and Journals of the American Revolution*, p. 98 (Stone's ed., 1867).

† Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 285-286.

When the American troops had reached the place of ambush, they were subjected to a heavy discharge of musketry from the sides, which was immediately followed by an onslaught of the Indians with their tomahawks. Though some of the militia fled at the first attack, the largest portion behaved with great fortitude and spiritedly resisted the attack of the Indians and British. As a result, a scene of unutterable confusion and carnage ensued. Being accustomed to the Indian method of fighting, the militia closed with the royal troops and fought the battle hand to hand. Some of the militia made their escape, but about 100 retreated to some rising ground and there defended themselves until a relief party from the fort compelled the British and Indians to fall back. Early in the fight General Herkimer was wounded in the leg, but instead of being carried to the rear, he sat upon a log, and from there directed the movements of the troops as well as possible. He very soon succumbed, however, because of the loss of blood. The loss of the Americans in killed and wounded was about 400, but the British loss is unknown. Colonel Willett in his sally from the fort killed a large number of the enemy, destroyed their provisions, and carried off a large quantity of spoil.* St. Leger

now advanced toward the fort and again summoned it to surrender, but Gansevoort again refused to comply with his demand.*

Meanwhile, Colonel Willett, accompanied by Lieutenant Stockwell, had succeeded in passing through the British lines in an attempt to inform Schuyler of the position of the fort. Upon receiving this information, Schuyler determined to send aid to the Americans; and Arnold offered to take command of the relief column.† When within a short distance of the fort, Arnold put into practice an acute stratagem which struck consternation into the minds of the British and Indians. Among the Tory prisoners was Hon Yost Cuyler (or Schuyler). He had been condemned to death, but Arnold agreed to spare his life, if he would carry out Arnold's plan implicitly. Several holes such as made by bullets were cut in Cuyler's coat, and he was ordered to rush breathlessly into the British camp and inform the Indians that a large army of Americans was advancing to the relief of the fort.‡ For confirmation of

vasion, pp. 90-93. In this, as in other accounts of battles, the estimates of the losses vary greatly. St. Leger says that 400 Americans were killed and 200 captured, but Thacher says 160 were killed and a great number wounded, and the latter number is given by Gordon and other contemporary writers.

* Lossing, *Field Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 248-249.

† Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 154; *Clinton Papers*, vol. ii., p. 255; Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, pp. 218-219.

‡ See W. L. Stone, *The Campaign of Burgoyne and the Expedition of St. Leger*, p. 213. See also

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 141-142; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 150-152; Roberts, *The Battle of Oriskany*; Baucroft, vol. v., pp. 167-169; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 244-248; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 288-292; Drake, *Burgoyne's In-*

his statement, Cuyler was to point to his coat and if they should inquire as to numbers, he was to point to the leaves on the trees, indicating that the American troops were almost numberless. This stratagem worked with great success, for in addition to the news carried to the Indians by Cuyler, other scouts had arrived in the British camp with news that Burgoyne's army had been routed and was in full flight. All this made a deep impression on the red-men.* Furthermore, the Indians were dissatisfied with the general conduct of the campaign, for they had no desire to besiege fortresses, preferring instead to take scalps and other plunder. When St. Leger's attempt to capture Fort Stanwix proved abortive, the Indians became discouraged, and again, when the British failed to defeat Herkimer, the Indians became suspicious of the prowess of the British army. They had received nothing but hard service and little reward, and when they learned that a strong American force was advancing against them, they determined to seek safety in flight rather than again to bear the brunt of the fight. St. Leger used every argument and artifice to detain them, but in vain; a great part of the Indians deserted, the rest threatening to follow if the siege were maintained. Be-

ing confident that he would meet with no success without his Indian allies, St. Leger on August 22 raised the siege and retreated toward the north. There were many indications of great alarm. So hurried was the retreat that the tents were left standing; the artillery, ammunition, baggage, and provisions were abandoned to fall into the hands of the garrison; and, in fact, everything indicated that the British army was in a state of consternation. Their Indian allies also turned against them and acted in a very savage manner, robbing the officers of their baggage and the army of provisions and stores; they also murdered and stripped of accoutrements all those who were unable to keep up with the main body. This treatment continued until the royal troops reached the Lake on their way to Montreal.* Arnold did not arrive at Fort Schuyler until two days after the retreat of the British; and finding that his services were not needed, he shortly returned to camp.

The news of the defeat of the British and the successful defence of Fort Stanwix, together with the defeat at Bennington, greatly raised the spirit of the Americans. The Loyalists began to fear for the success of the royal arms, and a great portion of the people were now convinced that, if their exertions were concentrated

Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 89-90; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 250-251.

* Fiske, *American Revolution* vol. i., pp. 294-296; Lossing, pp. 251-252.

* Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 149-162; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 529-535; Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 215-218, 700.

against Burgoyne, the British would soon be driven from the territory. Before this could take place, however, the Continental Congress had taken a step both unjust and ungracious. That body removed from command one of the bravest and most patriotic officers in the American army. Schnyler, at this time and for some time past, had been unpopular with the New England members of Congress chiefly because of his attitude in the dispute between New York and New England regarding "Hampshire Grants."* He had vigorously asserted the claims of New York to this territory, but Massachusetts and the other New England colonies had strenuously fought against this claim, and the struggle finally became bitter. Consequently, the New England members were strongly prejudiced against Schnyler and were glad of a pretext on which he might be removed from command. The rapid progress of Burgoyne and the inability of the Americans to cope with the situation furnished the pretext sought by the New England congressmen. General Gates had also expressed a desire to be placed in command of the army in the North and, as he was a favorite with the New Englanders, the intrigue for the removal of Schnyler was finally successful. Consequently, on August 5 Congress removed

Schnyler from command and elevated Gates to that post.* This was particularly aggravating to Schnyler, because he had instituted the measures by which the progress of Burgoyne was to be effectually stopped. He therefore felt the disgrace of his displacement very keenly, and in a letter to Washington says:

"It is a matter of extreme chagrin to me to be deprived of the command at a time, when soon, if ever, we shall be enabled to face the enemy; when we are on the point of taking ground where they must attack to a disadvantage, should our force be inadequate to facing them in the field; when an opportunity will, in all probability, occur, in which I might evince that I am not what Congress have too plainly insinuated in taking the command from me."

According to Marshall, Schnyler's "removal from command was probably severe and unjust as respected himself, but perhaps wise as respected America. The frontier towards the lakes was to be defended by the troops of New England; and however unfounded their prejudices against him might be, it was prudent to consult them."

Gates arrived at the scene of conflict on August 19 and found everything in good condition for carrying on the campaign. Fresh troops had come in and, as the harvesting had now been completed, the people throughout that section of the country were clamoring to join the army.

* For the history of which see Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 73 *et seq.*; Robinson, *Vermont*, p. 57 *et seq.*; Williams, *History of Vermont*, vol. ii.; Thompson, *Vermont*, pt. ii.

* On the proceedings before this took place, see Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 149-151, 173. See also Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 253-258, 296-297; Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 223 *et seq.*; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 35-44, 61-71, 140-147.

Schuyler did not allow his personal considerations to interfere with his patriotism; he received Gates with great courtesy and aided him in every way possible. He said, "I have done all that could be done, as far as the means were in my power, to inspire confidence in the soldiers of our own army, and I flatter myself with some success, but the palm of victory is denied me, and it is left to you, general, to reap the fruit of my labors. I will not fail, however, to second your views, and my devotion to my country will cause me with alacrity to obey all your orders."*

Shortly after his arrival, Gates entered into a brief and by no means pleasant correspondence with Burgoyne. On August 30 the latter complained that the Loyalists who had been captured at Bemington were harshly treated by the Americans, and hinted that unless it were stopped, he would retaliate on the American prisoners. On September 2 Gates replied to this and recriminated by reciting the horrible atrocities committed by the Indians who accompanied the armies of Burgoyne and St. Leger.† One of the cases specially mentioned was the murder of Jane M'Crea. On July 27 this young lady,

who is described by Gates as "lovely to the sight, of virtuous character, and amiable disposition," and who was engaged to an officer of the British army, was seized in her father's house near Fort Edward by some Indians belonging to Burgoyne's army, dragged to the woods with several other young people of both sexes, and after she had been barbarously scalped was wantonly murdered. Thus, instead of being conducted to the altar by the British officer, she received an inhuman death at the hands of some allies of the very army in which her affianced husband was fighting. There are several different versions of this occurrence; the general account is as given above. Other authorities say that her affianced husband, fearing that some harm might come to her, because of the attachment of her father to the royal cause, had induced two Indians of different tribes by promises of large recompense to take her under their escort to the British camp. It is supposed that the two Indians carried out the first part of their contract faithfully and had conducted her nearly to the British camp when they fell into a dispute as to who should receive the reward, each contending that the entire sum belonged to himself. Working themselves into a fury in their dispute, they decided to settle the matter by killing the young lady herself, and with a brutal blow of his tomahawk one of the Indians laid the unfortu-

* See also Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 155-156; Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, pp. 234-235; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 165-166; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 199-201.

† See the letters in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii. pp. 522-523. See also Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 201-203.

nate maiden dead at his feet.* Such atrocities as these, Gates said, had very much embittered the people of the country against the British. Furthermore, whatever assistance the British might have received at the hands of their Indian allies was more than counterbalanced by the fury of the colonists when they fought against those who had disgraced themselves by the aid of such allies.

Because of the defeat of St. Leger and the disastrous result of the expedition against Bennington, Burgoyne was left to his own resources; yet there was one other hope to which he obstinately clung—that Clinton would be able to send him some assistance from New York. He was unwilling to abandon the enterprise, if there were the slightest reason to expect that reinforcements would arrive from the South. Should these reinforcements arrive, he anticipated little difficulty in accomplishing the great object of the campaign.† He

was now under the necessity of bringing the supplies for his army from Fort George; and yet, in spite of the difficulty of this task, he persevered in it until he had collected sufficient provisions for thirty days. Building a bridge of boats over the Hudson, he then entered upon what proved to be the last step of his disastrous campaign. On the 13th and 14th of September the army crossed the river and encamped on the heights and plains of Saratoga about twenty miles below Fort Edward and thirty-seven miles above Albany.* Gates in the meanwhile had been reinforced by all the Continental troops which could be spared for the northern department, and also by considerable bodies of militia. He evacuated the position taken by Schuyler at the confluence of the Mohawk and Hudson rivers, and proceeded sixteen miles up the river toward the enemy. Acting on the advice of Arnold and Thaddeus Kosciuszko, Gates established his camp at Behmus's (or Bemis's) Heights near Stillwater.† At this time the two armies were but twelve miles apart. But the roads were in poor condition and the bridges had been destroyed, so that the progress of both armies was practically cut short

* Mr. Lossing, in his *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 96-102, comes to the conclusion that this young lady was killed by a shot fired by a party of Americans in pursuit of the Indians, who had carried her off. See Thacher's *Military Journal*, p. 95; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 277-279; and the version by W. L. Stone in *Appleton's Cyclopædia of American Biography*. Trevelyan says that the latter version as given above has long been disproved and discredited.—*American Revolution*, pp. 127-128, note.

† Howe at this time was at Philadelphia with the British army, and Washington was keeping him busy. Clinton was only left enough men at New York to defend the town. For a review of the reasons for Howe's failure to support Burgoyne, see Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 67-76.


* J. M. Hadden, *Journal Kept upon Burgoyne's Expedition* (ed. by Rogers, 1884) p. 144; *Clinton Papers*, vol. ii., p. 431; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 336-337; Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*, pp. 101-105.

† Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 166-167; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 239; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 161.

and neither could make a direct attack upon the other. Small bodies were sent out by each to harass the other, and some skirmishing ensued.*

On the evening of September 17, Burgoyne had advanced to within four miles of the American army, where he was again halted in order to make repairs to bridges between the two camps. This having been accomplished, he advanced on the 19th of September at the head of the right wing of his army toward the left of the Americans. His right flank was covered by General Fraser and Colonel Breymann with the grenadiers and light infantry, while in front were the Canadians, Loyalists and Indians. Generals Phillips and Riedesel commanded the left wing and artillery which proceeded along the main road near the river.† According to modern military tactics, it would probably have been a wiser plan for Gates to have awaited the attack, assuming the defensive entirely, but his troops were eager for battle and the impetuous daring of Arnold could not be restrained. Consequently, Gates detached Morgan with his riflemen to the support of those who had gone ahead. Morgan, after a spirited skirmish, succeeded in driving the Canadians and Indians back upon the main army of the

English.* Meanwhile Fraser, with the British right, was pushing forward to attack the American left,‡ but was suddenly stopped short in his advance by Arnold, who with the American left had planned a similar attack on the British right. Arnold



could not be satisfied with planning the battle and giving orders, but he himself mounted his charger and with shouts led the men to the attack.‡ He

* Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*, p. 106; Arnold, p. 171; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 243.

† Baroness Riedesel, *Letters and Journals of the American Revolution* (ed. by Stone), p. 99; Drake, pp. 106-107.

‡ There is much difference of opinion as to whether Arnold actually led his forces or merely directed them from the rear. The evidence is sifted by Arnold, in his *Life of Arnold*, pp. 173-190, by Carrington in his *Battles of the Revolu-*

* Lossing's *Schuyler*, vol. ii., p. 343.

† Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 169-171; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 51-52; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 152.

was soon driven back by Fraser, but rallying his troops and having now received reinforcements, he made an attempt to cut off Fraser from the main body of the British army. Fraser, however, parried this attack by rushing new regiments to the scene of the fight, and Phillips also sent four pieces of light artillery to reinforce Fraser's division.* For a time the contest was almost suspended, the two armies being about equal, and the generals looked over the lay of the ground in order to devise a plan by which the opposing force could be defeated. About three o'clock the battle was renewed with greater fury than ever. The British artillery opened up a hot fire on the Americans, but because of the thickness of the woods it had little effect. The British troops then made a charge with the bayonet and succeeded in driving the Americans into the woods, but here the latter rallied and succeeded in regaining the lost ground. For some time the contest was carried on in this manner, each army alter-

nately losing and recapturing ground; the British guns were several times taken and re-taken. The British troops, however, were not accustomed to fighting in the woods, whereas the Americans were at home, and the American riflemen inflicted much damage by climbing into the trees and picking off the British officers one by one. Burgoyne, himself, had several narrow escapes from death in this manner.* When darkness put an end to the contest the Americans retreated to their camp, but the British lay all night on their arms near the field of battle. This battle is known as the battle of Freeman's Farm, the first battle of Saratoga, and sometimes as the first battle of Stillwater.†

In the action the American army lost about 325 men in killed and wounded, while the British loss was more than 500.‡ Each side claimed the victory, because each thought that with but a part of its own army it had defeated the whole of the opposing force. As it was, however, neither army was defeated. Burgoyne, technically speaking, was the victor for he had advanced a mile and a half in

tion, pp. 342-344, and by Lossing in his *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 55-56, and it seems so perfectly consistent with Arnold's nature to have been in the thickest of the fight that we have considered Stedman, Marshall, Irving, Schuyler, Dawson and others to have stated his actions correctly. See, however, the accounts by Gordon, Baneroft, Graham, Wilkinson and others and the article in the *Magazine of American History*, vol. iv., p. 186 (March, 1880).

* Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 244 et seq.; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 172; Baneroft, vol. v., p. 183; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 326-327; Drake, pp. 110-111; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 52-53.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 55.

† Graham, *Life of Morgan*, pp. 143-153; Riedesel, *Memoirs*, pp. 143-145; Baneroft, vol. v., p. 184; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 338-342; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 88-93; Wilkinson, *Memoirs*, vol. i., chap. vi.; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 547-553 (ed. 1788); Burgoyne, *State of the Expedition from Canada*, pp. 60, 69-70, 77, 102-103, 125, 162, Appendix 14.

‡ Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 98.



THE BATTLE OF SARATOGA — GENERAL ARNOLD WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK ON THE HESSIAN REDOUBT.

front of his camp and retained his ground, but broadly speaking, it was an American victory, for Burgoyne had failed in his attempt to dislodge the enemy and had been arrested in his progress.* His communication with the lakes was cut off by General Lincoln's troops under Major Brown, who had made a detour to the north, swooped down upon the British outposts at Sugar Loaf Hill and Ticonderoga and captured 300 prisoners, several gun-boats, and all the transportation barges.† Moreover, Burgoyne's resources were daily becoming more scarce, while on the other hand, the Americans, in addition to having the whole country to draw upon for supplies, were constantly being reinforced by the arrival of fresh troops possessed of an ardent desire to aid in repulsing the British. Under these circumstances, to fight without gaining a decisive victory was almost a defeat for the British, while to the Americans it was almost a victory to have fought the British army, simply without being defeated. Throughout the colonies the news of the British repulse was received with joy and exultation, and it was confidently expected that then and there the whole British army would be captured. At the time of the battle the army under the com-

mand of Gates numbered about 7,000 men, but when the news of the battle spread over the country, the militia began to take the field in large numbers and shortly afterwards Gates' army had increased to about 11,000 men.*

Early in October, while Burgoyne was thus leading the army to destruction, Clinton was laying plans to proceed up the Hudson immediately upon the arrival of reinforcements. Fortunately for the American army and the American cause, the ships transporting the troops consumed three months in the voyage to America, and did not arrive at New York until early in October. Clinton then made active preparations to attack Forts Clinton and Montgomery in the Highlands, for which purpose he dispatched 3,000 men, and some war ships under Commodore Hotham. Forts Clinton and Montgomery were situated about fifty miles above New York on the western bank of the Hudson, and separated only by a rivulet which emptied into the Hudson. To prevent the passage of any war ships up the river, a boom had been constructed across the river from bank to bank, strengthened by heavy iron chains in front and supported by chevaux-de-frise sunk behind it.‡ Above this protective boom were sta-

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 167.

† See Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 528-530; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 169; Robinson, *Vermont*, pp. 179-181.

* Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 204-207; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 94. Trevelyan estimates the force at "between thirteen and fourteen thousand."—*American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 174.

‡ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 355.

miles below on the opposite side of the river, stood Fort Independence, while six miles above the boom on an island on the eastern bank stood Fort Constitution. Just below Fort Independence on the same side of the river was Peekskill, headquarters of the commanding general. At this time General Putnam was in command here, his force consisting of about 1,500 men.*

On October 5 Clinton made a landing at Verplank's Point a little below Peekskill on the same side of the river. Believing that the intention was to attack Fort Independence and to march through the Highlands on the east side of the river toward Albany, Putnam retired to the heights in his rear. He had no suspicion as to the real point of attack, and consequently failed to strengthen the garrisons of the forts on the western bank.† In order to conceal the real object of their attack, the British fleet moved higher up the river, and on the evening of October 5 Clinton embarked more than 2,000 of his men, leaving the rest to guard Verplank's Point. Early on the morning of the 6th he landed at Stony Point on the west side of the river and then began his march over the mountains toward the forts, which he had originally in-

tended to attack. This part of Clinton's march was exceedingly careless, for if the Americans had been cognizant of the object of his attack, they could have concealed sufficient forces in the defiles of the mountains to have completely overwhelmed Clinton's troops. As it was, however, his progress was not discovered until he had reached the vicinity of the forts. There he encountered the pickets of the American army who immediately sounded a warning. The attack was made on both forts simultaneously; Fort Montgomery was quickly taken, but most of the garrison, under the cover of darkness, made their escape. An obstinate resistance was made by the troops at Fort Clinton, but the British stormed it and took a large portion of the garrison prisoners. As soon as he comprehended the real object of the British, Putnam endeavored to send reinforcements to the beleaguered garrison, but his efforts were too late to be of any avail. In this affray the British lost about 40 killed and 150 wounded; the American loss was about double that of the British.*

The forts having been taken, the boom and other obstructions in the river were useless and were easily destroyed. The American vessels, there-

* About 1,200 Continental troops and 300 militia.—Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 357. On his conduct of affairs, see Livingston, *Life of Putnam*, pp. 344-354.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 733. See also Putnam's letter to Washington, quoted in Livingston's *Life of Putnam*, p. 355.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 359. See also Putnam's reports to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 438-442; his letters to Gates in *ibid.*, vol. ii., pp. 538-539; the particulars in Sparks' ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., p. 471; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 733-736.

fore, being unable to make their escape were set on fire to prevent their capture by the British.* Stedman says: "The flames suddenly burst forth, and, as every sail was set, the vessels soon became magnificent pyramids of fire. The reflection on the steep side of the opposite mountain, and the long train of ruddy light which shone upon the waters for a prodigious distance, had a wonderful effect; while the air was filled with the continual echoes from the rocky shores, as the flames gradually reached the loaded cannons. The whole was sublimely terminated by the explosions, which left all again in darkness." The next morning the British fleet began the work of destroying the boom, after which Fort Constitution was easily taken and the road was clear along the river shore to Albany.† The British now despatched a predatory expedition into the contiguous territory; they destroyed everything in the neighborhood, and, sailing up the river as far as Esopus, burned it to the ground.

It must ever remain a matter of conjecture as to why Clinton failed to push forward to Albany with all possible speed. Had he done so, undoubtedly he could have fallen upon the rear of the American army under Gates, and if he did not defeat it, might at least have distracted the attention of a sufficient number of troops to enable Burgoyne either to

accomplish the defeat of the Americans or to make good his escape. But he failed to respond to Burgoyne's entreaties, and the latter was forced to surrender.*

While Clinton was engaged in capturing the forts on the lower river, Burgoyne was unable to extricate himself from his critical situation. He saw that it was a case of fight or starve, and he determined upon the former.† It was now the 7th of October and he dispatched a note to Clinton saying that it was impossible to hold out beyond the 12th, urging him, therefore, to use all possible speed in pushing up the river.‡ Burgoyne thought if he struck a decisive blow, he might find some means of escaping from the trap in which he had been caught. He deemed it unwise to detach a large body of

* Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 554-558, 579 (ed. 1788); Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 219, 704; Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 111, 129, 164; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 388-389. At this very time Gates was according honorable, and even courteous, consideration to Burgoyne and his army, and these outrages greatly aggravated the feelings of the Americans. Gates wrote a sharp letter to John Vaughan, the British general, concluding it as follows: "Is it thus that the generals of the king expect to make converts to the royal cause? Their cruelties operate a contrary effect: independence is founded upon the universal disgust of the people. The fortune of war has delivered into my hands older and abler generals than General Vaughan is reputed to be; their condition may one day become his, and then no human power can save him from the just vengeance of an offended people."

† Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*.

‡ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 59.

* Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 120 (Abbatt's ed.).

† Lamb, *City of New York*, vol. ii., p. 182.

troops from the main army, for fear that if he did so, these troops would be cut off by the Americans and his main force weakened just so much. On the other hand, his troops were insufficient to make any successful attack on the main body of the Americans, but as it was necessary for him to choose the lesser of the two evils, he decided on the 7th of October to make a forward movement. On the morning of that day, partly to cover a foraging party and partly to turn the American's left, which had been considerably strengthened since the first battle,* he set out, and after some preliminary skirmishing, engaged in a general conflict with the Americans. The centre of the British army was under Generals Phillips and Riedesel, the right under Earl Balcarres, the left under Major John D. Ackland (or Acland), and the artillery under Major Williams. General Fraser had command of 500 picked men, and at the critical moment was to fall upon the left flank of the American army. Perceiving this design, Gates detached Morgan with his rifle corps and other troops to the number of about 1,500 to overwhelm Fraser, while another large force attacked the British left.† The battle was fought by both sides with great bravery; throughout the whole day the conflict raged with unabated fury. Arnold,

like a spirit of war incarnate, seemed to be everywhere on the field of battle urging on the men.* General Fraser was mortally wounded, and perceiving that his forces were completely overpowered, and that if he did not retire the superior marksmanship of the Americans would result in a total rout, Burgoyne determined to withdraw his forces and regain his camp. He was obliged, however, to leave his field pieces on the scene of action and most of his artillery corps were lost.† Colonel Breymann was killed‡ and Major Williams and Major Ackland, the latter being wounded, were among the prisoners captured by the Americans.|| The American loss was

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 347-348; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 191-211; Sparks, *Life of Arnold*, p. 118 *et seq.*

† Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 330 *et seq.*; Lossing, vol. i., pp. 61-65; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 177 *et seq.*; Stone, *Campaign of General Burgoyne*, p. 324 *et seq.*

‡ Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 157-158.

|| Regarding the wife of Major Ackland, Lady Harriet Ackland, Thacher says: "This heroic lady, from conjugal affection, was induced to follow the fortune of her husband during the whole campaign through the wilderness. Having been habituated to a mode of life with which those of rank and fortune are peculiarly favored, her delicate frame was ill calculated to sustain the indescribable privations and hardships to which she was unavoidably exposed during an active campaign. Her vehicle of conveyance was, part of the time, a small two-wheeled tumbril, drawn by a single horse, over roads almost impassable. Soon after she received the affecting intelligence that her husband had received a wound, and was a prisoner, she manifested the greatest tenderness and affection, and resolved to visit him in our camp to console and alleviate his sufferings. With this view she obtained a letter from Burgoyne to General Gates, and not permitting the prospect of


* Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*, pp. 118-120; Lossing, p. 60.

† Baneroft, vol. v., p. 187; Lossing, p. 60; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 177.

comparatively small, considering the fury of the conflict. This battle is known as the battle of Behmus's (or Bemis's) Heights or the second

battle of Saratoga or the second battle of Freeman's Farm.*

The American army lay all night on their arms about a half mile dis-



being out in the night, and drenched in rain, to repress her zeal, she proceeded, in an open boat, with a few attendants, and arrived at our outpost in the night, in a suffering condition, from extreme wet and cold. The sentinel, faithful to his duty, detained them in the boat till Major Dearborn, the officer of the guard, could arrive. He permitted them to land, and afforded Lady Ackland the best accommodations in his power, and treated her with a cup of tea in his guard-house. When General Gates, in the morning, was informed of the unhappy situation of Lady Ackland, he immediately ordered her a safe escort, and treated her himself with the tenderness of a

parent from the British. It was their intention to finish the work so well

parent, directing that every attention should be bestowed which her rank, sex, character and circumstances required. She was soon conveyed to Albany, where she found her wounded husband." — *Military Journal*, pp. 110, 349 *et seq.* See also Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 66–68.

* For further details, see Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 207–210; Carrington, *Battle of the Revolution*, pp. 345–350; Wilkinson's *Memoirs*, vol. i., chap. vii.

begun the next morning, but during the night Burgoyne shifted his army from the untenable position he was then occupying and established a strong camp on the heights, extending his right up the river. While this movement was taking place, General Fraser was fast sinking; he had been carried to the house occupied by Baroness Riedesel, arriving there at the time when the Baroness was preparing to receive Generals Burgoyne, Phillips and Fraser at luncheon. Hardly had Fraser been brought in when other wounded officers began to arrive, until the house was almost filled with the wounded and dying. Fraser died the next morning, after having expressed a desire to be buried, at six o'clock in the evening in the great redoubt.* Although Burgoyne had decided to retreat and delay was dangerous, yet he determined to comply with the request of his fellow officer. The day was occupied with skirmishing between the two armies and in preparations on the part of the British for retreating. At the hour set by Fraser for his burial, the departed general was brought out and buried in full sight of both armies, after impressive burial services had been read.†

Immediately after this duty had been discharged, the British army was in motion. The sick and wounded were abandoned to the mercy of the

Americans, and all through the night, in spite of the rain, mud and poor condition of the roads, the British troops trudged along.* At six in the morning the army came to a halt, when the soldiers fell asleep in their wet clothes. Such were the general conditions that Saratoga, only six miles away, was not reached until evening of the following day. In the meanwhile, to cover the retreat, Burgoyne had ordered General Schuyler's house and mills to be set on fire.† Realizing it would be impossible to undertake further offensive operations, Burgoyne put forth all his efforts to make good his retreat to Fort George, sending forward the artificers connected with the army to repair bridges and open roads so as to make the passage of the army much easier, but this advance party was compelled to make a hasty retreat.

At this time the Americans themselves very nearly put their own heads in a noose. Gates had received what was supposed to be trustworthy information that a body of Burgoyne's army had marched off toward Fort Edward, leaving only a small rear-guard in the camp. This rear-guard was also to push on as fast as possible, leaving the heavy baggage behind. Gates therefore determined

* Baroness Riedesel's *Letters and Journals*, pp. 102-103; *Clinton Papers*, vol. ii., p. 384.

* Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 352-353; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 65.

† Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 347-349.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 72-73; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 185-186.

to send a portion of the American army to drive out this portion of the army and take possession of the camp. General John Nixon's brigade, being the eldest, was the first to cross Saratoga Creek. Unknown to the Americans, General Burgoyne had formed a line in the nearby woods to support the artillery where it was supposed the Americans would attack. General Glover with his brigade was on the point of joining Nixon, but as he entered the water he captured a British officer who told him that the whole British army was still in camp and had not departed. Expresses were immediately sent forward to Nixon to stop his further advance, and the information was also conveyed to Gates, who thereupon countermanded his orders for the assault and called back his troops. The loss was small.*

Burgoyne's situation was becoming more critical every hour, and he decided to retreat by night to Fort Edward, but the information regarding his intentions was somehow conveyed to the American army, who established a strong battery of artillery there.† Thus Burgoyne was left without a single avenue of escape. His troops were worn out by continuous fighting, his supplies were almost

exhausted, and there was no means of replenishing his stock. The soldiers bore their reverses with great fortitude, and the women with the army were equally brave.* According to Baroness Frederika von Riedesel,

"A terrible cannonade was commenced by the enemy against the house in which I sought to obtain shelter for myself and children, under the mistaken idea that all the generals were in it. Alas! it contained none but wounded and women. We were at last obliged to resort to the cellar for refuge, and in one corner of this I remained the whole day, my children sleeping on the earth with their heads in my lap, and in the same situation I passed a sleepless night. Eleven cannon balls passed through the house, and we could distinctly hear them roll away. One poor soldier, who was lying on a table, for the purpose of having his leg amputated, was struck by a shot, which carried away his other; his comrades had left him, and when we went to his assistance, we found him in a corner of the room, into which he had crept, more dead than alive, scarcely breathing. My reflections on the danger to which my husband was exposed, now agonized me exceedingly, and the thoughts of my children, and the necessity of struggling for their preservation, alone sustained me." †


The cellar was filled with wounded officers and terrified women, whom the Baroness tried in every way to relieve, and such was the condition in the house that General Phillips said, "I would not for ten thousand guineas come again to this place, my heart is almost broken." Conditions continued in this same state for several days longer, and finally a cessation of hostilities was agreed upon and the sufferings of the British re-

* See Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 103, note; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 351; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 75-76; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 188.

† Drake, *Burgoyne's Invasion*, pp. 130-133; Lossing, p. 74.

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 189-191.

† Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 356; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 89; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 172 et seq.



THE SURRENDER OF BURGUYNE'S ARMY.
(From the painting by John Trumbull.)

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lieved.* Burgoyne realized the futility of any further attempt at escape, and for the sake of the men under him decided to ask upon what terms he might surrender. On October 14 he sent the following message to the American commander:

"After having fought you twice, Lieutenant-General Burgoyne has waited some days in his present position, determined to try a third conflict against any force you could bring against him. He is apprized of your superiority of numbers, and the disposition of your troops to impede his supplies, and render his retreat a scene of carnage on both sides. In this situation, he is impelled by humanity, and thinks himself justified by established principles and precedents of state and war, to spare the lives of brave men upon honorable terms. Should Major-General Gates be inclined to treat upon that idea, General Burgoyne would propose a cessation of arms during the time necessary to communicate the preliminary terms, by which in any extremity he and his army mean to abide." †

In discussing the terms of surrender, two days were consumed, but finally on the morning of October 17 the terms of capitulation were agreed upon.‡ Gates had desired that the British army be surrendered as prisoners of war, but knowing that Clinton was using every endeavor to push up the Hudson in the hope of meeting Burgoyne, he finally gave way on this point, and the terms of sur-

render were as follows:* The British were to march out with all the honors of war, and its camp artillery, to a certain place, where they should deposit their arms and leave the artillery; they were to be given free passage to England, on condition that they would not again serve in America during the present conflict; the army was not to be divided, particularly the men from the officers; the officers admitted on parole and permitted to wear their side arms; roll-carrying and other regular duties were to be permitted; private property was to be retained; baggage was not to be searched nor molested; and the Canadians were to be sent back to their country, while all other persons, no matter what their nationality, appertaining to or following the camp, were to be fully comprehended in the terms of capitulation.† The total force surrendered was 5,763.‡

* See the resumé in Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 78-79.

† Wilkinson, who was adjutant-general, in his *Memoirs*, gives an account of the first interview between the conquerer and the conquered: "General Burgoyne proposed to be introduced to General Gates, and we crossed the Fishkill, and pro-

‡ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 352. Lowell, in his *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 169 makes the number 5,791, as does Lossing. See also Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., chap. lxii.; Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 172 *et seq.* (Abbatt's ed.). On Burgoyne's reception in England and his efforts to obtain a hearing to settle the responsibility for his defeat, see Fisher, vol. ii., chap. lxiii. and authorities cited. On the entire campaign, see also John A. Stevens, *The Burgoyne Campaign*; John Watts De Peyster, *Major-General Philip Schuyler and the Burgoyne Campaign*; Douglas Campbell, *Central New York in the Revolution*; William L. Stone, *Burgoyne's Surrender*.

* Thaeher, *Military Journal*, p. 358; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 177.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution* vol. i., p. 78; Thacher, p. 106.

‡ *Clinton Papers*, vol. ii., pp. 439-448. See also Burgoyne's defence of his campaign in his *A State of the Expedition from Canada as Laid before the House of Commons* (1780); Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 162-169; De Fonblanque's *Burgoyne*, p. 306 *et seq.*

When the British army left Ticonderoga, it numbered about 10,000 men, exclusive of Indians, but through the casualties of war, desertion, etc., it had been reduced at the time of surrender to less than 6,000, including among the soldiers six members of Parliament. At this time the army under General Gates amounted to more than 9,000 regular troops and 4,000 militia. Upon the surrender, the Americans secured a fine train of brass artillery, consisting of 40 pieces of various sizes and descriptions, and all the arms and baggage of the British troops.* When the British,

ceeded to headquarters on horseback, General Burgoyne in front, with his Adjutant-general Kingston, and his aids-de-camp, Captain Lord Petersham and Lieutenant Wilford behind him; then followed Major-general Phillips, the Baron Riedesel, and the other general officers, and their suites, according to rank. General Gates, advised of Burgoyne's approach, met him at the head of his camp, Burgoyne, in a rich royal uniform, and Gates, in a plain blue frock. When they approached nearly within sword's length, they reined up and halted. I then named the gentlemen, and General Burgoyne, raising his hat most gracefully, said, 'The fortune of war, General Gates, has made me your prisoner:' to which the conqueror, returning a courtly salute, promptly replied, 'I shall always be ready to bear testimony, that it has not been through any fault of your excellency.' Major-general Phillips then advanced, and he and General Gates saluted, and shook hands with the familiarity of old acquaintances. The Baron Riedesel and other officers were introduced in their turn." Doctor Ramsey, also, in his *History of American Revolution*, p. 368, says, that "the conduct of General Burgoyne in his interview with General Gates, was truly dignified, and the historian is at a loss whether to admire most, the magnanimity of the victorious, or the fortitude of the vanquished general." See also Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 211-215; Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 107; Lossing, pp. 80-81.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 81-82.

who had possession of the forts on the lakes, learned of Burgoyne's surrender, they destroyed everything in the vicinity, threw their artillery into the lake, and retreated toward the north. This was the culmination of the British attempt to divide the colonies.* At the outset its successes seemed to presage ultimate victory, but the obstacles were too great to be overcome, and the British, who expected such brilliant results, fell victims. Undoubtedly the campaign had been planned with great ability, but its execution had been in the hands of those who could not force matters to their own liking. Throughout the entire campaign, the British generals seemed to have been working at opposites. Instead of moving in concert, when one advanced, the other retreated. When Carleton had obtained command of the lakes, Howe, instead of going up the Hudson toward Albany, made a movement into Jersey and advanced toward the Delaware. Again, when Burgoyne began his triumphant march toward the south, Howe began his expedition against Philadelphia, thus depriving the northern army of the aid to be expected from that of the south. To this want of coöperation may possibly be attributed the ruin of the whole enterprise.

Immediately after the surrender, Gates, instead of reporting the victory to the commander-in-chief, as was his

* Botta, *History of the War of Independence*, vol. ii., p. 328.

duty, sent his aide, Wilkinson, with the news directly to Congress, thereby slighting Washington. When Wilkinson was introduced into the Hall of Congress, he said "The whole British army has laid down arms at Saratoga; our own, full of vigor and courage, expect your orders; it is for your wisdom to decide where the country may still have need of their services." Congress thereupon passed a vote of thanks to Gates and his army, and Wilkinson was brevetted brigadier-general; a gold medal was also ordered to be struck in commemoration of the event and to be presented to Gates.* The victorious Americans treated their vanquished foes with every degree of kindness and consideration. The sick and wounded were carefully nursed, and in every way the officers and troops were made to feel that the conquerors were as generous as they were brave. Baroness Riedesel particularly mentions General Schuyler's courtesy and politeness to herself and others who accompanied the army. She says:

"Some days after this we arrived at Albany, where we so often wished ourselves; but we did not enter it as we expected we should — victors! We were received by the good General Schuyler, his wife, and daughters, not as enemies, but kind friends, and they treated us with the most marked attention and politeness, as they did General Burgoyne, who had caused General Schuyler's beautifully finished house to be burned. In fact, they behaved like persons of exalted minds, who determined to bury all recollection of *their own* injuries in the contemplation of *our* misfortunes. General Burgoyne was struck with General Schuy-

ler's generosity, and said to him, 'You show me great kindness, though I have done you great injury.' 'That was the fate of war,' replied the brave man, 'let us say no more about it.' " *

After the army reached Boston, however, it was not long before trouble arose. Congress was suspicious that the British would not hesitate to reinlist the paroled soldiers immediately upon their arrival in England, and the committee of Congress having this in charge sought a pretext upon which they might hold the troops in this country. The British committed a number of minor disturbances in Boston, as is only natural when a large body of men are congregated together, and Congress seized upon this and some similar pretexts as justifying them in refusing to allow the embarkation of the troops at all.† Consequently, the troops were long detained in Massachusetts and were afterward sent to the back woods of Virginia, none of them being released except through exchange. It was obviously the intention of Congress to keep 5,000 men out of the field, and by some it is considered that the means employed by Congress to accomplish their ends were dishonorable and lost them more in character than they gained in strength. Some claim that the allegations by which Congress attempted to justify their actions in affecting to distrust the British faith and honor, were false

* See Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 112, 360; Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, pp. 238-241.

† See Marshall, *Life of Washington*, vol. i., pp. 230-232; *Clinton Papers*, vol. ii., pp. 660-665.

* Lossing, *Field Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 83, where a facsimile of the medal is given.

and frivolous. Probably this was entirely uncalled for and the British were perfectly honorable in their intentions. At any rate, these were the terms made by the American commander, and for the honor of America they should have been carried out to the letter. An historian says, "We shall not undertake to decide whether the fears manifested by Congress had a real foundation, and we shall ab-

stain as well from blaming the imprudence of Burgoyne, as from praising the wisdom, or condemning the distrust of Congress. It is but too certain, that in these civil dissensions and animosities, appearances become realities and probabilities demonstration. Accordingly, at that time, the Americans complained bitterly of British perfidy, and the English of American want of faith."*

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI.

BURGOYNE'S PROCLAMATION.

By JOHN BURGOYNE, ESQ., lieutenant-general of his majesty's armies in America, colonel of the queen's regiment of light dragoons, governor of Fort William, in North Britain, one of the representatives of the Commons of Great Britain, and commanding an army and fleet employed on an expedition from Canada, etc., etc.

The forces entrusted to my command, are designed to act in concert, and upon a common principle, with the numerous armies and fleets which already display in every quarter of America, the power, the justice, and, when properly sought, the mercy of the king.

The cause in which the British arms is thus exerted, applies to the most affecting interests of the human heart; and the military servants of the crown, at first called forth for the sole purpose of restoring the rights of the Constitution, now combine with love of their country, and duty to their sovereign, the other extensive incitements, which form a due sense of the general privileges of mankind. To the eyes and ears of the temperate part of the public, and the breasts of suffering thousands, in the provinces, be the melancholy appeal, whether the present unnatural rebellion has not been made a foundation for the completest system of tyranny that ever God, in his displeasure, suffered for a time to be exercised over a froward and stubborn generation.

Arbitrary imprisonment, confiscation of property, persecution, and torture, unprecedented in the inquisition of the Romish church, are among the palpable enormities that verify the affirmative. These are inflicted, by assemblies and committees, who dare to profess themselves friends to liberty, upon the most quiet subjects, without dis-

tinction of age or sex, for the sole crime, often for the sole suspicion, of having adhered in principle to the government under which they were born, and to which, by every tie, divine and human, they owe allegiance. To consummate these shocking proceedings, the profanation of religion is added to the most profligate prostitution of common reason; the consciences of men are set at naught; and multitudes are compelled not only to bear arms, but also to swear subjection to an usurpation they abhor.

Animated by these considerations; at the head of troops in the full powers of health, discipline, and valor; determined to strike where necessary,

* See also Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 339-344; Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 210-214, 698; Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 175, 190, 225, 234, 246-247, 283, 293, 369, vol. vii., pp. 222, 276; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 44-49, 117 (ed. 1788); Wilkinson's *Memoirs*, vol. i., chap. viii.; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 202 *et seq.*; Lamb, *Journal of the American War*, chap. x.; De Fonblanque, *Life of Burgoyne*; Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 129 *et seq.* (Abbatt's ed.); Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 180 *et seq.*; Ford's ed. of *Jefferson's Writings*, vol. ii., pp. 167-180.

and anxious to spare where possible. I, by these presents, invite and exhort all persons, in all places where the progress of this army may point, — and by the blessing of God, I will extend it far — to maintain such a conduct as may justify me in protecting their lands, habitations, and families. The intention of this address is to hold forth security, not depredation to the country. To those whom spirit and principle may induce to partake the glorious task of redeeming their countrymen from dungeons, and re-establishing the blessings of legal government, I offer encouragement and employment; and, upon the first intelligence of their association, I will find means to assist their undertakings. The domestic, the industrious, the infirm, and even the timid inhabitants, I am desirous to protect, provided they remain quietly at their houses; that they do not suffer their cattle to be removed, nor their corn or forage to be secreted or destroyed: that they do not break up their bridges or roads; nor by any other act, directly or indirectly, endeavor to obstruct the operations of the king's troops, or supply or assist those of the enemy.

Every species of provision, brought to my camp will be paid for at an equitable rate, and in solid coin.

In consciousness of Christianity, my royal master's clemency, and the honor of soldiership, I have dwelt upon this invitation, and wished for more persuasive terms to give it impression. And let not people be led to disregard it, by considering their distance from the immediate situation of my camp. I have but to give stretch to the Indian forces under my direction — and they amount to thousands — to overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain and America. I consider them the same, wherever they may lurk.

If, notwithstanding these endeavors, and sincere inclinations to effect them, the frenzy of hostility should remain, I trust I shall stand acquitted in the eyes of God and men, in denouncing and executing the vengeance of the state against the wilful outcasts. The messengers of justice and of wrath await them in the field: and devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror, that a reluctant, but indispensable prosecution of military duty must occasion, will bar the way to their return.

JOHN BURGOYNE.

Camp, at Ticonderoga, July 2, 1777.

By order of his Excellency, the lieutenant-general.

ROBERT KINGSTON, Secretary.

CHAPTER XVII.

1777.

HOWE'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST PHILADELPHIA.

The plan of campaign — Washington perplexed as to Howe's movements — Arrival of Marquis de Lafayette — Other foreign officers — Howe lands at head of Elk River — Battle of the Brandywine — Retreat of the American Army — Battle near White Horse Tavern — Congress abandons Philadelphia — Navigation on the Delaware obstructed — Battle of Germantown — Attack on Forts Mifflin and Mercer — Final reduction of the Delaware fortifications — Washington retires to White Marsh — Howe's attempt to draw him into battle — Washington goes to winter quarters at Valley Forge.

Undoubtedly, had Howe carried out the plans he had formulated with promptitude and vigor, and had he received sufficient reinforcements of troops, he would have been able to conduct the campaign with a greater degree of success. But reinforcements did not arrive and he remained singularly inactive until late in the spring. This inactivity allowed Washington

time to recruit his army so as to be better able to sustain the contest. But he was unable to penetrate the designs of Howe and was exceedingly perplexed as to the direction in which the British commander intended to strike the first blow. He was therefore under the necessity of distributing his forces over a large territory, so as to be better able to meet any

emergency that might arise. This he did rather than concentrate all his forces in one place, for it would be far easier to move a small body rapidly than a large one. Accordingly, such troops as he could raise in the Northern provinces were stationed partly at Ticonderoga and partly at Peekskill. Those from the Middle and Southern provinces were stationed in New Jersey, and a few-corps were sent for the protection of the most Western provinces. Thus, if Howe moved in the direction of Philadelphia, he would be opposed by the forces in New Jersey, while the troops toward the North could be sent against his right flank. If, on the other hand, he should move toward the North, the troops at Peekskill would be able to dispute his passage, while the Southern forces in New Jersey would attack his left flank. Again, if the forces in Canada should come by sea to join General Howe upon the shores of New Jersey, the troops in the North could immediately unite with those in Jersey and thus present a united front against the combined British armies. Again, if the British troops in Canada should make a descent upon Ticonderoga, the forces at Peekskill could be immediately rushed to the aid of the American troops at the former position. Thus the American commander seems to have laid his plans to oppose Howe with the greatest number of troops, no matter what direction the English commander might take. At the same time Congress felt that it

was exceedingly important that the city of Philadelphia should continue in the power of the United States, as its loss would operate powerfully to change the sentiment in America as to the chances of success of the Continental forces. Therefore, Congress ordered a camp to be formed on the western bank of the Delaware, with the double object of receiving such troops as might arrive from the South and West, and of serving in case of need as a reserve. Recruits from Pennsylvania were also to assemble here together with several regiments of Continental troops, the camp being placed in command of Arnold, who at that time was in Philadelphia.

Fortunately, before Howe began active operations Washington received from France a much needed supply of 25,000 muskets.* He then left Morristown, and toward the end of May took a strong position at Middlebrook, nine miles from New Brunswick.† On June 13, 1777, Howe marched out of New Brunswick, evidently with the purpose of attacking Philadelphia, but undoubtedly the real object was to draw Washington from his defences and to bring on a general engagement. Washington, however, was determined to avoid this and Howe was forced to make a movement in another direction. After

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 10.

† Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. v., pp. 444, 450; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 58 *et seq.*; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 78.

remaining in this position for six days, Howe made a retrograde movement toward Amboy, which drew Washington down from the high ground as far as Quibbletown, whereupon Howe suddenly reversed and endeavored to cut him off from the hills; but Washington beat a hasty retreat to Middlebrook and thus again foiled the British commander. Howe thereupon crossed over to Staten Island and evacuated the Jerseys.*

Again Washington was in a perplexed state of mind as to the meaning of the several movements of the British. It was well known that Burgoyne was advancing toward the South with a large force. In New York the British were making preparations for some expedition by sea, which might be for the purpose of attacking either Philadelphia or New England, in order to create a diversion in favor of Burgoyne.† It might also be that these preparations were being made for the purpose of ascending the Hudson and placing the American army near Saratoga between two fires, and after its defeat, of joining Burgoyne and then pro-

ceeding in full force against Washington in New Jersey.* Thinking that this latter plan was the most likely, Washington was very slow in his movements, but in July, when the British fleet went to sea, he took the main body of his force across Jersey to the Delaware, so as to be prepared should the British make an attempt upon Philadelphia.‡

While awaiting definite news as to the designs of the British, Washington went to Philadelphia to confer with the members of Congress, and while there he met the Marquis de Lafayette for the first time.‡ This young French noble had been greatly aroused by the story of the gallant fight made by the Americans against British oppression, and though he had only recently been married, signified his desire to aid the Americans in their contest. The French minis-

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 211.

† Shortly before this time Charles Lee, then a prisoner in New York, began an intrigue with the Howes for the purpose of ingratiating himself and obtaining his liberty. He drew up a plan of operations (dated March 29, 1777) for a summer campaign against the American army and in every way endeavored to give the British generals such information as they could use to their profit. See Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 299-308. Carrington (*Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 410-411) gives extracts from Lee's letter to the Howes. See also George H. Moore, *Treason of Charles Lee*, *New York Historical Society Collections*, vol. iv. (1874); Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. i., p. 544, vol. ii., p. 75; Johnson, *General Washington*, pp. 148-149, and App. A., pp. 325-330.

‡ His full name was Marie Jean Paul Yves Roch Gilbert Motier. Marquis de Lafayette (often spelled La Fayette).

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 60-64; Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 190-191; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 298-301; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 11-13; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 77-78; Brooks, *Life of Knox*, pp. 97-101; Sparks, *Life of Washington*, pp. 227-228.

† See the various notes regarding this in Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., pp. 435-455; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 469-474 (ed. 1788); Drake, *Life of Knox*, p. 44; Stedman, *American War*, vol. i., p. 238; Graham, *Life of Morgan*, p. 124.

try, however, fearing international complications if the expedition should leave the shores of France, absolutely forbade him to fit out a vessel for this purpose in France. But Lafayette was not to be turned from his purpose, and having secretly fitted out a vessel and persuaded a number of his friends to accompany him to America, he embarked, reaching the shores of America in safety, and subsequently presenting his credentials to the Committee of Foreign Affairs.* At this time, however, there were a large number of applications from foreign officers for employment in the American army, and as Congress could not give them the positions they desired without creating jealousy and dissatisfaction among the American officers, Lafayette in company with the others found it almost impossible to secure the coveted positions. The failure to receive high rank, however, did not discourage Lafayette, and he immediately offered his service as a volunteer without pay, whereupon his request for service was granted and he received the rank of major-general.†

* On his early life and his adventures before he succeeded in reaching America see Charlemagne Tower, Jr., *The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution*, vol. i., chap. i.

† Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 231. The language of Congress, July 31st 1777, was:—

“Whereas, the Marquis de Lafayette, out of his great zeal to the cause of liberty, in which the United States are engaged, has left his family and connections, and, at his own expense, come over to offer his services to the United States without pension, or particular allowance, and is anxious to risk his life in our cause:

“Resolved, That his service be accepted, and

At this time he was not yet 20 years of age, but Lafayette's personality and the romantic manner in which he came to America immediately predisposed Washington in his favor, and the attachment which sprang up between the two continued throughout their lifetime. Washington requested Lafayette to consider headquarters as his home, a privilege of which Lafayette immediately availed himself.* At the same time there were a number of other foreign officers in America who had come to aid the patriotic cause, among them being Thaddens Kosciusko, Casimir Pulaski, Johann De Kalb, Steuben.† All rendered valuable services in the American cause.

Meanwhile, Washington had been receiving all manner of contradictory reports as to the course taken by Howe's fleet, one report stating that he had returned to the Hudson, another stating that he was now entering the Delaware, while still another imparted the information that he had taken a southerly course toward Charleston. Finally, late in August, it was ascertained that the fleet had

that, in consideration of his zeal, illustrious family and connections, he have the rank and commission of major-general in the army of the United States.”—*Journals of Congress*, vol. iii., p. 303. See also Lafayette's letter of thanks to Hancock, in Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., pp. 184-185.

* Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., pp. 214-215; Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. v., p. 454; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 152-153.

† Whose full name was Friedrich Wilhelm August Heinrich Ferdinand, Baron von Steuben.

FOREIGN OFFICERS IN THE REVOLUTION.



1. LAFAYETTE.
3. STEUBEN.
5. PULASKI.

2. ROCHAMBEAU.
4. DEKALB.
6. KOSCIUSKO.

TO THE
PUBLIC
AS OF THE
TILBURY COMPANY

entered the Chesapeake (Howe's officers having persuaded him not to disembark in the Delaware*) and that the troops were being landed at the head of the Elk River, from which point it was Howe's intention to make a direct descent upon Philadelphia.† The place of debarkation was but a few days' march from Philadelphia, and the country was fairly good for a rapid advance; there were no large rivers to cross, and no strong position which the opposing American army could take to dispute Howe's progress. Shortly after he had landed, Howe issued a proclamation promising to pardon and protect all those who would submit to British authority;‡ but even those who were most disposed to heed this warning, as well as those who were lukewarm in their attachment to the American cause, preferred to await the outcome of the campaign before deciding to which cause they would ultimately adhere.

Washington was too well versed in military strategy and science not to understand that much depended upon the manner in which this campaign was conducted. As his troops consisted chiefly of raw and undisciplined men, he realized that it would be

better to avoid a general engagement with the veterans under Howe, but fearing the adverse effect upon the minds of the great body of the people if Philadelphia should fall, he determined to obstruct Howe's progress as much as possible and defeat his plan for the capture of that city. Accordingly, he marched to meet the British commander and disposed his troops so as to be better able to defeat the army under Howe. Howe had suffered from a lack of horses, because a large number of those he carried had perished on the voyage, and consequently his progress from the head of the Elk was delayed until September 3. "Two years," said he, "have we maintained the war and struggled with difficulties innumerable, but the prospect has brightened. Now is the time to reap the fruits of all our toils and dangers; if we behave like men, this third campaign will be our last."* As the royal army advanced, Washington retreated across the Brandywine, a small stream which flows into the Delaware at Wilmington. Washington supposed that the British would attempt a passage at Chad's (or Chadd's) Ford, and with his main army he took post opposite this ford.† Ordering General Sullivan with a detachment to watch the fords above, in order to harass the British and retard their progress as

* Fortescue, *The British Army*, vol. iii., p. 212; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 363-365.

† On the manœuvres of the fleet, see Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 17-19. See also Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 213-214; Brooks, *Life of Knox*, p. 103; Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., pp. 189-191.



‡ Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 206-207.

* *Ibid.*, p. 212.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 367; Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., pp. 222-223; Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. v., pp. 55-56.

much as possible, he sent General Maxwell, with about 1,000 light troops, to occupy the other side of the Brandywine.* The formation of the American army was as follows: The right wing was commanded by General Sullivan with six brigades, including those of Lord Stirling and General Stephen; the extreme left was guarded by John Armstrong with the Pennsylvania militia; Wayne's division with Thomas Proctor's artillery guarded the ford; and

advanced to the attack, the right under command of General Knyphausen marching straight to Chad's Ford, and the left under Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by Generals Howe, Sir Charles Grey, Grant and James Agnew, endeavoring to turn the right of the Americans and to gain their rear by making a circuit toward a point named the Forks, where the two branches of the Brandywine unite. Knyphausen's column soon came in conflict with the light troops



The Battle of Brandywine.

Greene's division, consisting of George Weedon's and Peter Muhlenberg's brigades, accompanied by Washington, formed a reserve and took a position in the centre between the right and left wings.†

Early on the morning of September 11, the British army in two columns

under General Maxwell, and by reinforcing his advance Knyphausen succeeded in driving the Americans across the river, where they sheltered themselves under their batteries on the north bank. Knyphausen then brought up his artillery which was placed in the most advantageous points, and a sharp artillery duel was carried on between the two forces.*

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 23; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 226; Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., p. 224.

† Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., p. 225; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 169-170.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 369-370; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 197-198; Lossing, pp. 171-173; Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 233.

Meanwhile the British left wing under Cornwallis crossed the Ford above the Forks. The information given to Washington regarding this movement seems to have been very conflicting, coming as it did from several different quarters and through unpracticed scouts. Consequently, his movements were much embarrassed.* Having passed the fords, Lord Cornwallis took the road toward Dilworth, which led him to the American right.† General Sullivan, who had been appointed to command the troops in that quarter, occupied the heights above Birmingham church, his right flank covered by the woods and his left flank extending to Brandywine, the artillery being placed at advantageous points. Lord Cornwallis formed his troops in battle order about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and shortly afterward began the attack. The resistance was intrepidly sustained by the Americans for some time, but at length they were compelled to give away.‡ Upon hearing the firing from that quarter, Washington ordered General Greene, with the brigades under Weedon and Muhlenberg, to support Sullivan. Greene covered the four miles in about 42 minutes, but upon reaching the scene of battle found Sullivan's division completely

defeated and in full flight. Greene covered the retreat and shortly afterward, finding an advantageous position, he renewed the battle and put a stop to the progress of the enemy.* As soon as Knyphausen was informed that Cornwallis' division was in action, he immediately forced a passage at Chad's Ford, attacked Wayne's troops opposite him, and drove them into headlong flight.† Consequently, as both divisions of the army had been decisively defeated, Washington, with such of the troops as he had been able to keep together, retired with his artillery to Chester. There a halt was made within eight miles of the British army until the next morning, when the retreat was continued to Philadelphia. The British troops were so exhausted from fighting that they did not continue the pursuit during the night, which fact probably saved the American army from total annihilation.‡

The losses on the American side in this battle were severe, amounting to 300 killed, 600 wounded, and about 400 captured by the British. The British loss is supposed to have been much less, probably not exceeding 600

* Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 215-216; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 228; Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 192; Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., pp. 226-228; Lossing, pp. 173-174.

† Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., p. 226.

‡ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 175-176.

* Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. v., pp. 56-59; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 80-83; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 312-316; Knox, *Life of Knox*, pp. 104, 267-269; Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, pp. 77-80; Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., pp. 229-231.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 230-231.

‡ Baneroft, vol. v., pp. 174-179; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 370-381; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 199; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 220-222.

killed and wounded. Among the Americans wounded was Lafayette, who received a bullet in the leg, from which he was laid up for several months.† The troops under Count Pulaski displayed great bravery in this action, and for meritorious conduct on the field of battle Pulaski was raised to the rank of brigadier-general in command of the cavalry. Subsequently an investigation of General Sullivan's conduct was made, but he was exonerated from any blame connected with the retreat.‡

After allowing his army a day of complete rest, Washington recrossed the Schuylkill and proceeded by the Lancaster Road with the full intention of meeting and engaging the British army. The night after the battle of Brandywine, Sir William Howe encamped his army on the field of the conflict, and on the two succeeding days marched by easy stages toward Chester, also occupying Wilmington, to which place the sick and wounded were carried. On the 15th, in an effort to gain the left of the British, the American army reached the

Warren Tavern on the Lancaster Road, about twenty-three miles from Philadelphia. Early the next morning Washington was apprized that the British were approaching in two columns, and therefore determined to hasten his march and to engage Howe in front.* Both armies made hasty preparations for the battle, and the advance guards had even begun to skirmish when a terrific thunder storm arose which absolutely prevented fighting by either army except with the bayonet. The gunlocks were not well secured and the muskets soon became unfit for use; in addition the cartridge boxes had not been well made so as to protect the ammunition, and more than 400,000 were ruined. The American soldiers were without bayonets, and as the British were well equipped with these instruments and well trained in their use, Washington perceived that they possessed a great superiority over his army, and that a retreat was absolutely necessary.† The attempt to engage the British army was therefore abandoned, the retreat continuing all day and a greater part of the night, in the midst of a heavy downpour and over very poor roads.‡ One of Washington's

* Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 509 (ed. 1788); Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., p. 447; Drake, *Life of Knox*, p. 48; Reed, *Life of Joseph Reed*, vol. i., pp. 305-307; Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. vi., p. 71; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 232; Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 235.

† Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., pp. 232-233.

‡ Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 218-219; *American Historical Magazine* (December, 1866); *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* (1866-1867). See also W. D. Stone, *The Battle of Brandywine* (1895).

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independenc*, vol. ii., pp. 30-31. See also Washington's letter in Sparks, *Life of Washington*, pp. 237-238.


† Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 193. See also Knox's letter of September 24 to his wife, in Brooks, *Life of Knox*, p. 105; Kalb's letter of September 24, 1777, quoted in Friedrich Kapp, *Life of John Kalb*, p. 125.

‡ Bancroft, vol. v., p. 180; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 383; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 179-180.

officers writes: "The hot-headed politicians will no doubt censure this part of his conduct, while the more judicious will approve it, as not only expedient, but in such a case highly commendable. It was, without doubt, chagrining to a person of his fine feelings to retreat before an enemy not

ammunition, it was ascertained that there was scarcely a musket that could be discharged and hardly one cartridge that was fit for use.* The army then retired to Warwick Furnace, on the south branch of the French Creek, where a supply of muskets and ammunition could be obtained in suffi-

Battle near White Horse Tavern, September 20, 1777.



AA, AA. March of Grey's Detachment in two columns to attack the Americans (B). C. Light infantry attacking Americans in flank. D. Light infantry pursuing American artillery (EE) which was carried off on first alarm. F. Light infantry after routing Americans. G. 44th regiment supporting light infantry. H. 42d regiment in reserve. IIII. Americans in disorderly retreat. The two regiments under Colonel Musgrave were not engaged.

more in number than himself; yet, with a true greatness of spirit, he sacrificed them to the good of his country."* Early the next morning a halt was made at Yellow Springs, and upon examining the muskets and am-

munition, it was ascertained that there was scarcely a musket that could be discharged and hardly one cartridge that was fit for use.* The army then retired to Warwick Furnace, on the south branch of the French Creek, where a supply of muskets and ammunition could be obtained in suffi-

cient time to dispute the passage of the Schuylkill River. At Paoli Inn, in the vicinity of White Horse Tavern, a detachment of 1,500 troops, under General Wayne,

* Josiah Quincy, *Memoir of Major Samuel Shaw*, quoted by Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 227.

* G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., p. 461; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 84; Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. vi., pp. 77, 81, 83; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 515 (ed. 1788).

had been stationed in the woods on the left of the British army for the purpose of harassing the latter as much as possible. Upon learning of this, Howe dispatched General Grey on the night of September 20, with a sufficient body of troops completely to overwhelm Wayne. Grey was almost successful in the task assigned him, but Wayne had been warned of the attack and was prepared for it. His troops resisted bravely and he was able to save his artillery and stores. The British finally conquered, however, killing or wounding about 300 men and taking nearly 100 prisoners. The British loss amounted to only 4 killed and 4 wounded.* Wayne was sharply censured for his apparent neglect in allowing the British to surprise him, and he demanded a court-martial to determine his responsibility, but he was acquitted with honor.†


The result of the campaign thus far had been all in favor of the British, and it was seen, unless some notable event should occur, that Philadelphia would soon be in the possession of the British. Congress therefore determined to move from the city to a place of safety as soon as it should become absolutely necessary. The magazines and public stores were removed, but the members

themselves continued to hold their sittings in the city and to maintain their authority until the very last moment. They did not, however, lose confidence in Washington's ability, but gave him still greater authority. He had been invested with power to seize whatever provisions were necessary for the maintenance of the troops, paying for such provisions in public certificates. He was also empowered to try by court-martial, and immediately upon conviction to execute such persons as should assist the British in any way or furnish them with provisions, arms, and stores. The citizens of Philadelphia were levied upon for blankets, shoes, and clothing, before the British captured the city. These measures were considered an absolute necessity in the face of an advancing British army, and with the knowledge that there was a large body of sympathizing Tories or lukewarm neutrals in the vicinity.* To Alexander Hamilton, at this time a lieutenant-colonel, was entrusted the work of carrying out the terms of these provisions, and he executed the task with energy, judgment and with a great measure of success. On September 18, the British now being very near Philadelphia, Congress decided it most prudent to abandon the city. They first went to Lancaster and later to Yorktown, where they continued to transact business for the

* Carrington, p. 383; Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, pp. 82-91; Reed, *Life of Joseph Reed*, vol. i., pp. 312-313; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 232-234; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 163-164.

† Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 220-230.

* Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 220-221.



Map of the Country from the Raritan River in East Jersey to Elk Head in Maryland, showing the various operations of the American and British Armies in 1776 and 1777.

next eight months, when Howe finally evacuated Philadelphia.*

On September 22-23, contrary to Washington's expectations, Howe crossed the Schuylkill at Fatland and Gordon's Ford.† The main body of the army was placed in camp at Germantown, about seven miles from Philadelphia, and on the 26th a detachment of British troops took possession of Philadelphia, where shortly afterward Howe himself was received by the Quakers with great manifestations of joy.‡ Upon receiving information of the success of his brother at the battle of Brandywine, Lord Howe left the Chesapeake and sailed for the Delaware where he arrived on October 8.

Immediately upon securing possession of Philadelphia, Sir William Howe instituted measures to clear the river of obstructions, fortifications, etc., in order to open up the river for a clear passage by the fleet. As before stated, the Americans made every effort to obstruct the navigation of the Delaware, having sunk three rows of chevaux-de-frise a little below the confluence of the Schuylkill and the Delaware. These obstructions consisted of large beams of timber bolted together with strong projecting iron spikes. The upper and lower rows were commanded by fortifica-

tions on the banks and the islands of the river and by floating batteries.

Washington was now encamped at Skippack Creek on the north side of the Schuylkill, and when he received information that the British had detached small bodies of troops to clear the river, he perceived that, as the British main army was thus considerably weakened, it was an opportune time to make an attack upon the forces at Germantown.* This place consisted of one street about two miles long; the line of the British encampment bisected the village almost at right angles with its left covered by the Schuylkill. "It was arranged that the divisions of Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by [Thomas] Conway's brigade were to enter the town by the way of Chestnut Hill, while General [John] Armstrong,† with the Pennsylvania militia, should fall down the Manatawny road by Van Deering's mill and get upon the enemy's left and rear. The divisions of Greene and Stephen, flanked by [Alexander] McDougall's brigade, were to enter by making a circuit by way of the Limekiln road, at the market house, and to attack the enemy's right wing; and the Maryland and Jersey militia under Generals [William] Smallwood and Forman, were

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 235-236.

† Drake, *Life of Knox*, p. 50; Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 82-84.

‡ Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 236-237.

* See the "Plan" in the *Pennsylvania Magazine of History*, vol. xxvi., p. 387. See also Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, p. 93 et seq.

† The hero of several expeditions during the French and Indian Wars and father of Major John Armstrong, author of the "Newburg Addresses."

to march by the old York road and fall upon the rear of their right. Lord Stirling, with the brigades of [Francis] Nash and Maxwell, were to form a reserve corps." * On the evening of October 3, having been reinforced by 1,500 troops from Peekskill and 1,000 Virginia militia, Washington marched from Skippack Creek and at dawn of the next morning attacked the British army. After a short skirmish the advance guard of the British was driven in, and with his army in five columns Washington began the onslaught. Lieutenant-Colonel Musgrave of the 40th regiment, however, who had been driven in but had been able to keep five companies of the regiment intact, now threw his forces into the large stone dwelling house of Benjamin Chew, chief justice of Pennsylvania, which stood in front of the main column of the Americans. Instead of leaving a small detachment to coop up the British in the Chew house, almost half of Washington's army was detained in an attempt to kill or capture this force.† Instead of advancing with the main body and masking Chew's house with a sufficient force, Knox ordered the house to be attacked. The British obstinately defended themselves, so that, according to Brooks, an unfortunate delay occurred.‡ The critical moment of the

entire action was thereby lost in a fruitless attempt to take the house, for while the Americans were wasting time with this little detachment the whole British army was preparing for battle.

Meanwhile Greene attacked the right wing, routed the battalion of light infantry and the Queen's Rangers, then turned to the right and fell upon the left flank of the enemy's right wing in an attempt to enter the village, thinking that the Pennsylvania militia under Armstrong and the Maryland and New Jersey militia under Smallwood and Forman, would aid him as ordered by attacking the British posts opposed to them. But Armstrong's detachment failed to attack and the troops under Smallwood and Forman arrived too late to be of service. The British general, Grey, finding his left flank secure, now threw the whole of the left wing under Knyphausen to the assistance of the centre, then hard pressed in the village where the Americans were gaining ground. Colonel Thomas Matthews, with a detachment of Greene's column consisting of a part of Muhlenberg's and Charles Scott's brigades from the left wing, advanced to the eastward of Chew's house, took 110 British prisoners and drove the remainder into the town. A thick fog now completely enveloped everything, and neither of the contending parties was able to discern the movements of

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 109-110. See also Johnson, *General Washington*, p. 168.


† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 241-244.

‡ Brooks, *Life of Knox*, p. 108 *et seq.* See,

however, Reed, *Life of John Reed*, vol. i., p. 322; Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 29.

the other. Under cover of the fog, the right wing of the enemy, consisting of the 4th brigade under Agnew and three battalions of the 3d, having discovered that they had nothing to fear from the Jersey and Maryland militia, fell back and completely surrounded Matthews, and, after a desperate struggle, succeeded in captur-

wing then engaged with the left of Greene's column, and finally compelled Greene to retreat. The divisions under Greene and Stephen were the last that retreated and were covered by Pulaski and his legion. As Lossing says: "The prize of victory was abandoned at the moment when another effort might




ing him and about 100 men. This done, two regiments of Agnew's division went to the relief of Musgrave in Chew's house, compelling a party of Americans, who had entered Germantown in flank, to retreat precipitatedly, leaving many dead and wounded. The village was now in control of the British, and Grey hastened to the assistance of the right

have secured it."* Almost without exception, the American soldiers had acted with great valor and bravery and Congress passed a resolution of thanks, but General Stephen was accused of "unofficerlike conduct," was found guilty of being intoxicated and was dismissed from the army,

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 112.



THE BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN. ATTACK ON JUDGE CHILDS HOUSE.



Lafayette subsequently being assigned to the command of Stephen's division.* In this engagement the American army lost 673 killed and wounded and about 400 taken prisoners, while the British loss was 535 killed and wounded, among the slain being General Agnew and Colonel Bird.† Among the Americans killed was General Nash of North Carolina. After the battle, Washington returned to his encampment at Skip-pack Creek.‡

* See the accounts of the battle by C. Lambdin in *Pennsylvania Magazine of History*, vol. i., pp. 368-403, also vol. ii., p. 112 *et seq.*, vol. xvi., p. 197 *et seq.*; Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, pp. 94-98; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 521-527 (ed. 1788); Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 318-322; G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., pp. 472-481; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., p. 83; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 85 *et seq.*; Hildreth, *History of the United States*, vol. iii., pp. 222-224; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 201-203; Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 93-100, 113, 126-127; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 297-305; Baneroft, vol. v., pp. 192-195; Reed, *Life of Joseph Reed*, vol. i., pp. 319-323; Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. i., pp. 27-30; Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 117-118; Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 238 *et seq.*; Stedman, *American War*, vol. i., p. 299; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 37-41.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 390-391; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 112.

‡ Mr. Sparks, in recording this battle, speaks of the good effect of it upon the views of the Count de Vergennes, who remarked to the American commissioners in Paris, "That nothing struck him so much as General Washington's attacking and giving battle to General Howe's army; that to bring an army, raised within a year, to this, promised every thing."—*Life of Washington*, p. 241. From this, as well as from other occurrences, it was evident that the French government narrowly scanned the military movements of Washington, and also, that his being the commander-

While the British had been successful in this battle, their position was by no means comfortable, for it was certain that they could not maintain themselves for any great length of time in Philadelphia, unless the Delaware were opened and free communication established between the fleet and the army.* As a large part of the inhabitants of the surrounding country were favorable to the British cause, Washington sent out foraging parties and other detachments of troops to prevent the British from securing the necessary supplies from the adjacent territory, thus compelling the British to procure their supplies from the fleet or go without. Howe therefore determined to proceed with all despatch against the fortifications on the Delaware. The under line of chevaux-de-frise was protected by a work named Fort Mifflin, situated on Mud Island, a marshy island near the Pennsylvania bank of the river. On the Jersey side, at Redbank, was a redoubt known as Fort Mifflin. A short distance below Mud Island and nearly in a line with it was Hog Island, and between this and the Pennsylvania bank of the river was a narrow channel of sufficient depth to admit ships of moderate draught.† If Howe

in-chief had an important bearing upon their final decision to give aid to the American cause.


* See Worthington C. Ford, *The Defence of Philadelphia*, in *Pennsylvania Magazine of History* (October, 1895, to January, 1897).

† On the obstructions placed in the river, see Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol.

wished to continue long at Philadelphia, it was therefore necessary that Forts Mifflin and Mercer be reduced.*

On October 19, therefore, so that he might be able to more conveniently assist in these operations, Howe withdrew his army from Ger-

reduce Fort Mercer.* Crossing the Delaware at Philadelphia on the night of October 21, Donop with his detachment advanced to the attack. Upon approaching the fort, he summoned the commander to surrender with the threat that "if they stood



mantown and stationed it in the vicinity of Philadelphia. He then sent Count Donop, with 2,000 Hessians, to

ii., pp. 42-43; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 86.

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 252. In his instructions to Christopher Greene, Washington said: "The post with which you are entrusted is of the utmost importance to America. The whole defence of the Delaware depends upon it; and consequently, all the enemy's hopes of keeping Philadelphia, and finally succeeding in the present campaign."—Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 310.

battle no quarter whatever would be given."† Colonel Christopher Greene, of Rhode Island, who commanded the troops in the redoubt, answered that he would defend the post to the best of his ability. Donop then ordered the assault to begin, he himself leading the troops in the face

* Regarding the numbers, see the note in Trevelyan, p. 256.

† Trevelyan, p. 257; Lossing, vol. ii., p. 87.

of a close fire from the fort and from the American war vessels and floating batteries on the river. He succeeded in capturing an extensive and unfinished outwork, but was unable to make any impression on the redoubt. The count himself now fell mortally wounded; shortly afterward the second officer in command was disabled; and, after suffering a severe loss, the British beat a hasty retreat under a fire similar to that which had met them in their advance. Count Donop was captured and soon died of his wounds. The British loss was about 400, but the American loss was only 8 killed and 29 wounded.*

The British fleet had also participated in the attack, and was equally unfortunate. Through an opening in the lower line of chevaux-de-frise the *Augusta*, *Roebuck*, *Liverpool*, *Pearl*, and *Merlin* had succeeded in passing, and with the flowing tide moved up the river. But the obstructions in the river had altered the course of the channel and raised up sand banks where none had previously existed. Unaware of this, the *Merlin* and *Augusta* grounded a short distance below the second row of chevaux-de-frise, and every effort made to free them resulted in failure. In

the morning the Americans perceived the precarious situation of the British ships and began to fire on them, also sending fire ships against them. The *Augusta* caught fire but the crew after the greatest difficulty succeeded in escaping, though some of the officers and men perished in the flames. The *Merlin* was abandoned and destroyed.*

Howe, nevertheless, did not abandon his effort to reduce the forts. On the Pennsylvania bank opposite Mud Island, he ordered batteries to be erected, but because of the marshy ground and the difficulty in transporting heavy artillery through the swamps, it was a long time before the batteries were in working order. Province Island was also occupied by the British and other works erected upon it.† On November 15 everything was ready for the attack upon Fort Mifflin. Three British ships, the *Isis*, *Somerset*, and *Roebuck*, went up the main channel as far as the second line of chevaux-de-frise and stationed themselves in front of the fort. The *Vigilant*, an armed ship, and a hulk, both mounted with heavy cannon, were sent up the strait between Hog and Province Islands and the Pennsylvania bank, stationing themselves

* Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 203-208; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 195-197; Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 118; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 393-395; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 46-47; Ward's letter in Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. v., p. 112; Heath's *Memoirs*, pp. 127-128 (Abbott's ed.); Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 87-88.

* See Commodore Hazelwood's letter in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 12-13; Heath's letter of October 25, in *ibid.*, vol. ii., pp. 18-20; Washington's letter of November 13 to Patrick Henry, in Henry, *Life of Patrick Henry*, vol. iii., p. 118.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 90.

so as to be able to sweep the weakest part of the fortification. At this time the garrison at Fort Mifflin consisted of not more than 300 men, under command of Colonel Samuel Smith. They had put forth every exertion to retard the operations of the British fleet and army against them; and when the British finally succeeded in completing their works, the little garrison still kept up its courage and determined to defend themselves as best they could. The British batteries and ships now opened a terrific cannonade against the fort, which was answered by the fort, the works on the Jersey banks, and the galleys and floating batteries on the river. At the end of the day, the fort was almost demolished and many of the guns had been dismounted. Finding their position untenable, therefore, the garrison retired during the night.* Two days after, Lord Cornwallis marched against Fort Mercer at Redbank, but the garrison having evacuated the fort some time previously, he occupied it without opposition.† Being now unprotected

by land batteries, the American shipping retired up the river. By keeping close to the Jersey side, a few of the ships were able to pass the batteries at Philadelphia and thereby escape, but the rest were set on fire and abandoned.* The ships that escaped at this time were shortly afterward destroyed. Thus the British succeeded in opening navigation on the Delaware and in establishing free communication between the fleet and the army.

After receiving reinforcements from the northern army,‡ Washington left his encampment at Skippack Creek and took up a position at White Marsh, twelve miles from Philadelphia and nearer the British.‡ In front was a valley and a rivulet, while his right was protected by an abattis, or a fence of trees cut down with their branches sharpened and pointed outward. Believing that, because of his reinforcements, Washington would hazard a battle to retake the capital of Pennsylvania, Howe, on the evening of December 4, marched from Philadelphia and on the next morning took a position on Chestnut Hill in front of the right

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 395; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 262-265; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 47-50; Lossing, pp. 91-93. See also Smith's reports in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 7-8.

† Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 198-199; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 58; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 93. See also Reed, *Life of Joseph Reed*, vol. i., pp. 335-341; Stedman, *American War*, vol. i., p. 301; Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 131, 137, 143-148, 157-159, 168-169, 176-177, 187-188, 190-206, 217-218, 220, 224, 227-228, 373-

374. See also Wayne's plan for the relief of the fort, in Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, pp. 103-107.

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 265-266.

‡ For the difficulties of Hamilton in persuading the northern generals to send aid, see Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 330 *et seq.*

‡ Baker, *The Camp of the Old Gulph Mill*, p. 4.

wing or the American army.* For two days Howe made various movements in front of Washington's camp in an endeavor to draw him out. Some skirmishing took place but Washington remained within his lines, and Howe, seeing no immediate prospect of an engagement, and deeming it inadvisable to attack Washington in the position he then

occupied, returned to Philadelphia on December 8.* At that time the armies were about equal numerically, each consisting of slightly more than 14,000 troops. After Howe's return to Philadelphia, Washington determined to leave White Marsh and go into winter quarters at Valley Forge, about twenty miles from Philadelphia.†

CHAPTER XVIII.

1778.

VALLEY FORGE: CONWAY'S CABAL.

The army encamps at Valley Forge — Sufferings of the soldiers — Scarcity of food and clothing — Washington remonstrates to Congress and the States — Trouble in the Commissary Department — Washington urges half pay system — Opposition of delegates in Congress — Attempt of Conway, Gates and Mifflin to ruin Washington's reputation — Anonymous letters circulated — Washington's reply — Projected expedition to Canada — Lafayette refuses to join the Cabal — Conway's confession.

It will be remembered that Washington had been clothed with large powers by Congress so that, if it became necessary, he could use forcible means to obtain supplies for the army, but these powers he was loath to use.‡ Instead of acting in an arbitrary manner, he always first attempted to gain his ends by peaceable means, and while he never failed to display firmness and decision, yet every act was characterized by great prudence

and discretion.§ After Howe had occupied Philadelphia and had failed

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 397-398; Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 238-240; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 348-351; Stedman, *American War*, vol. i., pp. 305-306; Reed, *Life of Joseph Reed*, vol. i., pp. 350-351; Greene, *Life of Nathaniel Greene*, p. 534; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 115-116; Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, pp. 133-134.

‡ Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 10-12 (ed. 1788); Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 243-245; Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., p. 255.

§ It was in December, 1777, that Mr. Bushnell, the inventor of the American torpedo and other submarine machinery, set afloat in the Delaware a contrivance which frightened the British not a little. This was a squadron of kegs, charged with powder, to explode on coming in contact with anything. The ice prevented the success of this contrivance, but as a boat was blown up, and some of the kegs exploded, the British at Philadelphia, not knowing what dreadful affairs might be in

* On the manner in which Washington was warned of Howe's attempt to surprise him, see Lossing, *Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 95-96; Mrs. Ellett, *Women of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 170 *et seq.*

† See his letter of December 15 to the President of Congress, quoted in Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 243.

to draw Washington into a general battle, winter came on and practically put a stop to any further operations for the season. Washington therefore called a council of his officers to determine upon the most suitable place as winter quarters for the army. Many different opinions were expressed, but finally Washington was compelled to decide for himself, selecting Valley Forge. This was a deep and rugged valley situated about twenty miles from Philadelphia. On one side it was bounded by the Schuylkill, and on the other by ridges of hills. Shortly after the army arrived at Valley Forge, General Greene, much against his will, was appointed Quartermaster-General.* The army was lacking in almost everything—food, clothing, tents, supplies, etc. As the clothing of the soldiers was so miserably deficient, it were inhuman to consign them to exposure to the inclement weather merely under tents, and it was therefore determined that a sufficient number of huts should be built of logs filled in with mortar.† The dimen-

sions of the huts were 16 x 14 feet, and 12 privates were assigned to each or a smaller number of officers according to rank. A general officer was the sole tenant of a hut.* Toward the middle of December, the army began its march toward Valley Forge, and such was the condition of the troops that numbers were seen to drop dead with the cold, while those who remained alive, being without shoes, had their feet cut by the ice, and left their tracks in blood. At length, after the most painful experience, the troops reached Valley Forge and immediately set about constructing their habitations according to the plan. In a short time the

drew from him some pretty plain words on this point: "We find gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going into winter-quarters or not, reprobatng the measure as much as if they thought that the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours to be, which are by no means exaggerated, to confine a superior one, in all respects well appointed, and provided for a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to cover from depredation and waste, the States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. * * * I can assure these gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing thing, to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room, by a good fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and from my soul I pity those miseries, which it is neither in my power to relieve or prevent." Sparks, *Life of Washington*, pp. 256-257. The whole letter is in Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 355-358. See also Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 303; Johnson, *General Washington*, pp. 180-182.

* Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 245.

the water, fired at everything they saw in the ebb tide. Bushnell's own account of this affair is in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. iv., p. 312. See also Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 63-64, 121-124. Mr. Hopkinson's *Battle of the Clouds* is reprinted in Frank Morse, *Diary of the American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 5-6; Thacher, pp. 361-362. See also the review in Tyler's *Literary History of the American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 146-149.


* F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 96 *et seq.*

† At the time the legislature of Pennsylvania, vexed at the loss of Philadelphia, complained because Washington went into winter-quarters. This

barracks were completed and the troops were lodged therein with some degree of comfort.*

The army was soon called upon to endure intense suffering which can hardly be described in words. Tattered, half naked, and utterly destitute of everything necessary to support life; some of the sol-

ing any blankets;—it is small wonder that the greater part of the army was soon unfit for service. As a result, large numbers sickened; while others, being unfit for duty because of nakedness, were excused from military duty by their officers and remained in their barracks or were lodged in the houses of neighboring farmers; so



diers having only one shirt while a large majority had none at all; large numbers being compelled to walk over the frozen ground barefooted for want of shoes;†; few hav-

ing any blankets;—it is small wonder that the greater part of the army was soon unfit for service. As a result, large numbers sickened; while others, being unfit for duty because of nakedness, were excused from military duty by their officers and remained in their barracks or were lodged in the houses of neighboring farmers; so

* On the disposition of the troops, see Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 128.

† Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 68 et seq.; Hart, *American History Told by Contemporaries*, vol. ii., p. 570; Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. vi., p. 260; Brooks, *Life of Knox*, p. 115; Kapp, *Life of Steuben*, p. 118;

Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, p. 115 et seq.

so contrary to the common opinion of people distant from the Army, would scarcely be thought credible. I fear I shall wound your feelings by telling you that by a Field Return of the 23d Instant, we had in camp no less than 2898 men unfit for duty by reason of their being barefoot and otherwise naked. Besides these there are many others detained at the Hospitals and Farmers houses for the same causes.”* Even the miserable huts erected for the soldiers were without straw, and the soldiers, overwhelmed with lassitude, benumbed with cold, and enfeebled by hunger, were compelled to sleep on the humid ground.† In conjunction with other causes, this condition propagated disease, and the hospitals were replenished as soon as death evacuated them. The administration of the hospitals was no less defective in its organization than that of the camp.‡ Hospital fever soon broke out because of the unsuitableness of the building in which the patients had been lodged, and the crowding of the sick, with the natural result that large numbers of those who otherwise would probably have survived, succumbed.||

Fiske says that while these sufferings have drawn forth unlimited pity, we should not lose sight of the fact that this misery was caused

chiefly by gross mismanagement rather than by the poverty of the country.* Sumner also points out that there was plenty all about and that the people were not paying any war taxes. Distress and poverty were not general and, except at the very seat of military operations for the time being, the war did not press on the people in any way. The whole trouble lay in the lack of organization and system. The commissariat was in wretched working condition throughout the entire war, and while we probably have heard more of the sufferings at Valley Forge than those of any other period during the war, still the sufferings during the next two or three winters were no less severe. Greene often complained of the nakedness and distress of the Southern army during the campaigns of 1780–81.† However, the sufferings of the soldiers were not in the least alleviated by saying that the commissariat was at fault, for no matter where the fault lay, the facts still remained that the soldiers suffered and that under the present management there was no possible way to remedy the sad condition. There was no clean linen to be secured; even the coarsest diet was scarcely obtainable; while the little medicine the army had was so adulterated through the shameless cupidity of contractors as to be almost worthless. This corruption among

* Henry, *Life of Patrick Henry*, vol. iii., p. 137. See also his letter of February 19, 1778, p. 148.

† See Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 295 *et seq.*

‡ See Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, p. 137 *et seq.*


|| Trevelyan, p. 298 *et seq.*

* *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 28–29.

† *Life of Alexander Hamilton*, pp. 87–88.



WASHINGTON AND LAFAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE.



contractors had prevailed for some time and finally became so notorious as to constitute a scandal. As far back as 1776, John Adams had written to his wife: "There is too much corruption even in this infant age of our republic. Virtue is not in fashion. Vice is not infamous. * * * The spirit of venality you mention is the most dreadful and alarming enemy America has to oppose. It is as rapacious and insatiable as the grave. * * * This predominant avarice will ruin America if she is ever ruined. * * * I am ashamed of the age I live in." * Hence it was that the hospital resembled more a morgue than a refuge for the sick, for those who entered were more likely to emerge dead than cured. Consequently, the hospital became the terror of the army, the soldiers preferring to take their chances in the cold open air rather than to be buried alive in the midst of the dead.

Probably few can imagine the hardships through which the American army passed in the course of this winter, and the soldiers are to be much admired for the firmness with which they bore their sufferings. It could hardly be hoped that under the circumstances there would be no desertion, and considering the fact also that the Loyalists were holding out large inducements to those who would abandon the American cause. Consequently, a small number, driven

to despair by their long continued sufferings, deserted their colors and joined the British at Philadelphia. The majority of these, however, were foreigners who had entered the American service,* the Americans persevering and preferring starvation rather than violate the faith they had pledged to their country.†

Undoubtedly, had Howe not remained inactive at this time and had he been of an enterprising nature, the American army could easily have been annihilated. Without military stores, in a half-starved condition, most of the troops sick and in the hospital, and the other half hardly able to stand because of frost-bitten feet, the army could have offered little resistance to Howe's well-fed, well-clothed, and well-equipped veterans. Howe said that he "did not attack the intrenched situation at Valley Forge, a strong point during the severe season, although everything was prepared with that intention, judging it imprudent until the season should afford a prospect of reaping the advantages that ought to have resulted from success in that measure, but having good information in the spring that the enemy had

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 300.

† See *The Examination of Joseph Galloway* (Balch's' ed.); Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vi. pp. 253, 257-258, 261-262, 267, 286, 358, 361, 379, 381, 436, 437; Bolton, *The Private Soldier under Washington*, p. 240; Drake, *Life of Knox*, pp. 55-56; Van Tyne, *Loyalists of the American Revolution*, p. 157; Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., pp. 536-541.

* C. F. Adams (ed.), *Letters of John Adams Addressed to his Wife*, vol. i., pp. 166, 171.

strengthened the camp by additional works, and being certain of moving him from thence when the campaign should open, he dropped thoughts of an attack.”* Washington said that if Howe had attacked the army, the Americans could not even have retreated, because means of transportation were lacking.† On February 1, 1778, more than 4,000 troops were incapable of any kind of service for lack of clothing, and the condition of the balance was but little better, so that out of 11,000 or 12,000 men in the camp, Washington could have mustered 5,000 fit for duty only with the greatest difficulty.

Washington therefore addressed energetic remonstrances to Congress and to the various States, and these had some effect, though not in the measure that Washington expected. The convention of the eight Northern States that Congress had recommended met at New Haven and agreed upon a scale of prices at which provisions and clothing should be furnished to the army. “Some of the states attempted, by legislation, to enforce the New Haven scale of prices generally; but these attempts proved no more successful than former ones of the same sort. Recourse was also had, with the same object in view, to internal embargoes, which proved a great embarrassment to

commerce.” Pennsylvania passed an act against forestalling and another regulating the supply of wagons for transporting impressed provisions to camp.*

Probably the chief reason for the deficiency of food and other supplies in a country abounding with provisions was the confusion prevailing in the commissary department. In the earlier stages of the war, the office of commissary-general had been conferred upon Colonel Joseph Trumbull of Connecticut, who was undoubtedly well fitted for that position, but so difficult was the task of arranging this complicated department that even before the Valley Forge experience the army was compelled to go without much needed supplies. Congress had early considered the subject, but the remedy applied served only to increase the disease, and when the system suggested by Congress was instituted, its arrangements were such that Colonel Trumbull resigned his position in that department and retired to private life.† This was due chiefly to the fact that subordinate officers were accountable to Congress, and not to the head of the department, that officer having no authority over them. Though Washington had opposed the establishment of such a system, Congress persisted, and it was not long

* See Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 402; General Howe's *Narrative*, p. 30.

† Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. viii., p. 504.

* Hildreth, *History of the United States*, vol. iii., p. 232.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 292-293.

before difficulties began to unfold themselves. This was manifested in every military division on the continent. Never had the armies been able to operate as Washington wished, because their movements were always hampered by a lack of supplies, provisions, ammunition, etc. The sufferings at Valley Forge were simply the inevitable outcome of a totally inefficient system.

Matters finally came to such a pass that even meat unfit to be eaten was issued, and soon no meat at all was to be had. On one occasion Washington wrote: "For several days there has been little less than a famine in camp. A part of the army have been a week without any flesh, and the rest three or four days. Naked and starving as they are, we cannot enough admire the incomparable patience and fidelity of the soldiers, that they have not been ere this excited by their sufferings to a general mutiny and dispersion. Strong symptoms, however, of discontentment have appeared in particular instances; and nothing but the most active efforts everywhere can long avert so shocking a catastrophe."* Washington, on a number of occasions, made representations on this subject to Congress, and that body had authorized him to seize provisions for the use of the army within seventy miles of headquarters and to pay for

such requisitioned provisions in money if he had it, or, if not, in public certificates. But Washington experienced much difficulty in obtaining these provisions, because Congress failed to provide funds to take up these certificates when presented. On the other hand, the British in Philadelphia were only too willing to pay a fair price in specie for such goods as the people in the surrounding country brought in. As a result, the temptation was too great for the country people to resist,* and they eluded the troops which Washington sent out to gather these provisions, and instead conveyed them to Philadelphia. Washington, therefore, at the urgent request of Congress, issued a proclamation requiring all farmers within seventy miles of Valley Forge to thresh out one-half of their grain by the 1st of February and the other half by the 1st of March, under the penalty that unless this were done, the whole would be seized as straw. Many of the farmers, however, refused to accede to this demand and in many cases defended their grain and their cattle with their rifles, in some instances even going so far as to burn the grain then ripening in the fields.

Washington was filled with anguish at the condition of the army, but what gave him more pain was the example set by some of the officers, who openly declared that they would resign their

* Sparks, *Life of Washington*, pp. 255-256; Irving, vol. iii., p. 400; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 294-295.

* Van Tyne, *Loyalists in the Revolution*, pp. 205-206.

commissions unless conditions were soon remedied. Many of them had already left the army to enter upon more lucrative employment,* chiefly because the paper money had so depreciated that the officers were not only unable to live up to their station, but could not even provide the necessities of life. Their private resources had become exhausted; many had become involved in debt; and it was evident that unless this situation were remedied, the army would be deprived of the majority of its most efficient officers. Washington put forth every effort to bring about a change in the affairs of the army, exerting all his influence to persuade the officers to remain in the service. He also urged Congress to take some step to meet the emergency. In reply to one of Washington's letters regarding the resignations of officers under these trying circumstances, Gouverneur Morris said:

"We are going on with the regimental arrangements as fast as possible, and I think the day begins to appear with respect to that business. Had our Saviour addressed a chapter to the rulers of mankind, as he did many to the subjects, I am persuaded his good sense would have dictated this text: *Be not wise over much.* Had the several members who compose our multifarious body been only wise *enough*, our business would long since have been completed. But our superior abilities, or the desire of appearing to possess them, lead us to such exquisite tediousness of debate that the most precious moments pass unheeded away. * * * As to what you mention of the extraordinary demeanor of some gentlemen, I cannot but agree with you that such conduct is not the most *honorable*. But, on the other hand, you must allow that it is the most *safe*, and certainly you

are not to learn that, however ignorant of that happy art in your own person, the bulk of us bipeds know well how to balance solid pudding against empty praise. There are other things, my dear sir, beside virtue which are their own reward." *

Washington urged that Congress grant half pay to the officers after the war, either for life or for a certain specified time.† In doing so, he disclaimed any personal interest as to how this matter might be settled, but he said that it was easy to talk about patriotism and to cite a few examples from ancient history of great enterprises carried to a successful conclusion by patriotism alone; but those who thought that a long and bloody war could be carried on for any great length of time simply by individual sacrifices were laboring under a great delusion; that it was necessary to deal with men as they are and not as they ought to be; that love of country had been a strong point in the greater part of the operations up to the present time, but that to continue the contest on this basis was utterly impossible; and that it would be necessary to give the officers and soldiers some incentive for a continuance of their services so that they might not altogether abandon the cause.‡

At first the members of Congress were much opposed to granting Washington's requests, many deeming them not only extraordinary and

* Roosevelt, *Gouverneur Morris*, p. 84.

† See Sparks, *Life of Washington*, pp. 258-263.

‡ Sparks' ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., p. 323.

* Sparks' ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., pp. 305, 312, 313, 322, 351, vol. vi., p. 168.

presumptuous, but calculated to burden the country with an enormous debt*—a bogey which haunted the minds of many for long years to come. Some members thought that the lands to be granted to the soldiers, concerning which we have already spoken, ought to be sufficient to satisfy any moderate man. Gouverneur Morris, however, undertook to push the measure through Congress, but he was fought tooth and nail by a large number of the delegates, including every delegate from New England, to their everlasting discredit be it said. The early leaders had done admirable service in exciting the patriots to make the struggle, but once the struggle began their function was ended, and thereafter they became more of a hindrance in the operations of the government and army than any good to the service. The New Englanders were as resolute as ever, but the scene of the war was transferred to a remote part of the country, and, without the spur of any immediate necessity, New England moved sluggishly. In their opposition the New England delegates were joined by those from South Carolina, while Morris received the support of the delegates from New York, Virginia and the other States, and he was ultimately successful.† In the spring of 1778, yielding to the insistent demands of those who had the

interest of the country at heart, Congress agreed to allow the army officers half pay for life, reserving to the government, however, the power to commute it, if it became necessary or expedient, to six years' half pay. Shortly after, this resolution was reconsidered, and another adopted which allowed officers half pay for seven years only, dating from the end of the war.* While these measures were salutary, still they were adopted too late, and were not sufficiently spontaneous on the part of the members of Congress to create the good feeling which would have resulted had these measures been considered and adopted some time previously. Already more than 200 officers had resigned their commissions and the greater part of the others were fast becoming lukewarm.

It would seem as though Washington were already laboring under a sufficiently heavy burden without being called upon to suffer imputations against his character. As is generally the case with a man in his position, his appointment had created jealousy, and his conduct of the war could not possibly satisfy everyone. Up to this time his military exploits had been attended with very little success. He had been compelled to retreat continually before the enemy, but few took into consideration the fact that this enemy was more powerful numerically, better

* See Elbridge Gerry's letter, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 66-68.

† Roosevelt, *Gouverneur Morris*, pp. 79-80.

* See *Journals of Congress*, vol. iv., pp. 228, 229, 243, 244, 288.

equipped, better supplied, and in every way better fitted to drive the half starved Continental army before them. While the latter had compelled the British to evacuate Boston, they had lost the battle of Long Island, had been driven out of New York, compelled to retreat across Jersey, had lost Philadelphia and the fortifications on the Delaware, had been beaten at Brandywine; and, to offset these latter operations, had won one decisive victory at Trenton and the very indecisive action at Princeton. On the other hand, Gates, though undoubtedly much of the honor of winning the victory at Saratoga belongs to others, had been hailed as the victor of Saratoga. For a time his renown far outshone that of Washington, because it was the first great victory of the war—a victory which necessarily greatly affected the subsequent conduct of the war and the future prospects of the whole country. Therefore, not only the members of Congress, but the people throughout the colonies began to make comparisons between the hero of Saratoga and the man who occupied the chief command over all the army. Jealousies also contributed their part to detract from Washington's fame, and schemers endeavored by intrigue to question his integrity to further their own evil designs and selfish ends, but with little success. Hildreth says:

"Every biographer has been very anxious to

shield his special hero from the charge of participation in this affair [Conway's Cabal], indig-
nantly stigmatized, by most writers, as a base
intrigue. Yet doubts, at that time, as to Wash-
ington's fitness for the chief command, though they
might evince prejudice or lack of sound judgment,
do not necessarily imply either selfish ends or
a malicious disposition. The Washington of that
day was not the Washington as we know him,
tried and proved by twenty years of the most
disinterested and most successful public serv-
ice. As yet, he had been in command but little
more than two years, during which he had suf-
fered, with some slight exceptions, a continued
series of losses and defeats. He had recovered
Boston, to be sure, but had lost New York, New-
port and Philadelphia. He had been completely
successful at Trenton, and partially so at Prince-
ton, but had been beaten, with heavy loss, on Long
Island and at Fort Washington, and lately in two
pitched battles on ground of his own choosing, at
Brandywine and Germantown. What a contrast
to the battle of Belmus's Heights, and the cap-
ture of Burgoyne's whole army! Want of success,
and sectional and personal prejudices, had created
a party in Congress against Schuyler and against
Sullivan. Could Washington escape the common
fate of those who lose?"*

At this time a systematic attack
was made upon Washington's repu-
tation, known as Conway's Cabal,
from the name of the one principally
concerned in it, Thomas Conway,
though Gates, Mifflin, Samuel Adams,
and other members of Congress were
equally as guilty for countenancing
any such scheme.† Gates and Mif-
flin had never been well disposed
toward Washington; Conway was
angered and disappointed because he
had not been appointed inspector-
general; while Adams and some of
the New England members were
never cordial to Washington from

* Hildreth, *History of the United States*, vol. iii., p. 233.

† On the opposition of Samuel Adams, see Hos-
mer, *Samuel Adams*, p. 377 *et seq.*

the time of his appointment as commander-in-chief, principally because he was a Virginian. Now, therefore, when it was possible to make an unfavorable contrast between the operations under Gates and Washington, the discontented persons forming the Cabal began to assume a more openly defiant attitude. They widely distributed anonymous letters which insinuated that the continued failure attendant upon Washington's operations was due to incapacity and a vacillating policy. These missives were filled with insinuations against his character and conduct. While Washington had for some time been aware that there was strong opposition to him, not only in Congress but elsewhere, still he probably had no idea that this opposition would lead to a malicious circulation of false statements. As it was not until after the victory at Saratoga that these actions assumed definite shape, Washington, as was his custom, paid little attention to them. Trevelyan says: "The Commander-in-chief of the national armies was well aware that some of the cleverest, and all the least estimable, Congressmen were plotting his downfall with adroitness and unscrupulous assiduity. They calumniated his motives. They disparaged his abilities. They deliberately withheld from him absolute necessities, while demanding of him utter impossibilities." * However,

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 301.

when the conspirators assumed such a bold attitude that he could not possibly overlook it, Washington was not slow to take the matter into consideration. When Wilkinson was on his way to Congress to notify that body of the victory of Saratoga, he divulged a part of a letter written by Conway to Gates and the statements he made at that time were communicated to Washington by Lord Stirling.* On the 9th of November, Washington wrote to Conway as follows:

"A letter which I received last night contained the following paragraph — 'In a letter from General Conway to General Gates he says, "*Heaven has determined to save your country, or a weak General and bad counsellors would have ruined it.*"' I am, sir, your humble servant," etc.†

This curt note fell upon Conway with stunning effect and a long correspondence ensued which, on Washington's part, was conducted with great dignity.‡ The result of the whole affair showed what a deep hold he had on the confidence, the love, and the veneration of his country.|| One of the anonymous letters written by the conspirators had been sent to Henry Laurens, at that time Presi-

* Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. v., p. 492; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 131-132; Johnson, *General Washington*, pp. 187-189.

† Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 215; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 321-322.

‡ See Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 312 *et seq.*; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 362 *et seq.*

|| See also LaFayette's letter, in Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., p. 260 *et seq.* See also John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., p. 265.

dent of Congress, and was intended to be read to that body, in the hope that some of the members might be influenced. Another letter was sent to Patrick Henry, governor of Virginia, but these men, being warm personal friends of Washington, sent the letters to him without allowing their contents to become known to others.* The letter to Henry was as follows:

YORKTOWN, 12 January, 1778.

"DEAR SIR,—The common danger of our country first brought you and me together. I recollect with pleasure the influence of your conversation and eloquence upon the opinions of this country in the beginning of the present controversy. You first taught us to shake off our idolatrous attachment to royalty, and to oppose its encroachments upon our liberties, with our very lives. By these means you saved us from ruin. The independence of America is the offspring of that liberal spirit of thinking and acting, which followed the destruction of the sceptres of kings and the mighty power of Great Britain.

"But, sir, we have only passed the Red Sea. A dreary wilderness is still before us, and unless a Moses or a Joshua are raised up in our behalf, we must perish before we reach the promised land. We have nothing to fear from our enemies on the way. General Howe it is true has taken Philadelphia; but he has only changed his prison. His dominions are bounded on all sides by his out-sentries. America can only be undone by herself. She looks up to her councils and arms for protection; but alas! what are they? Her representation in Congress dwindled to only twenty-one members; her Adams, her Wilson, her Henry, are no more among them. Her councils weak, and partial remedies applied constantly for universal diseases. Her army, what is it? A major-general belonging to it called it a few days ago in my hearing, a mob. Discipline unknown or wholly neglected. The quarter-master's and commissary's departments filled with idleness, ig-

norance and peculation; our hospitals crowded with six thousand sick, but half provided with necessaries or accommodations, and more dying in them in one month than perished in the field during the whole of the last campaign. The money depreciating without any effectual measures being taken to raise it; the country distracted with the Don Quixote attempts to regulate the price of provisions, an artificial famine created by it, and a real one dreaded from it; the spirit of the people failing through a more intimate acquaintance with the causes of our misfortunes; many submitting daily to General Howe; and more wishing to do it, only to avoid the calamities which threaten our country. But is our case desperate? By no means. We have wisdom, virtue and strength enough to save us, if they could be called into action. The northern army has shown us what Americans are capable of doing with a general at their head. The spirit of the southern army is no way inferior to the spirit of the northern. A Gates, a Lee, or a Conway, would in a few weeks render them an irresistible body of men. The last of the above officers has accepted the new office of inspector-general of our army, in order to reform abuses; but the remedy is only a palliative one. In one of his letters to a friend, he says 'A great and good God hath decreed America to be free, or the [General] and weak counsellors would have ruined her long ago.' You may rest assured of each of the facts related in this letter. The author of it is one of your Philadelphia friends. A hint of his name, if found out by the handwriting, must not be mentioned to your most intimate friend. Even the letter must be thrown in the fire. But some of its contents ought to be made public, in order to awaken, enlighten, and alarm our country. I rely upon your prudence, and am, dear Sir, with my usual attachment to you, and to our beloved independence,

"Yours, sincerely,"*

"His Excellency P. Henry."

Washington replied to Laurens January 31, 1778, as follows:

"I cannot sufficiently express the obligation I feel to you, for your friendship and politeness upon an occasion in which I am so deeply interested. I was not unappreciated, that a malignant faction

* In his letter of March 28, 1778, Washington says that the letter "was written by Dr. Rush, so far as I can judge from a similitude of hands."—Sparks' ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., pp. 495-497, 512-515. See also Tyler, *Life of Patrick Henry*, pp. 222-223.

* Tyler, *Life of Patrick Henry*, pp. 215-217. See also Henry's letters enclosing this epistle to Washington, pp. 218-220; Henry, *Life of Patrick Henry*, vol. i., pp. 544-549.

had been for some time forming to my prejudice; which, conscious as I am of having ever done all in my power to answer the important purposes of the trust reposed in me, could not but give me some pain on a personal account. But my chief concern arises from an apprehension of the dangerous consequences which intestine dissensions may produce to the common cause.

"As I have no other view than to promote the public good, and am unambitious of honors not founded in the approbation of my country, I would not desire in the least degree to suppress a free spirit of inquiry into any part of my conduct, that even faction itself may deem reprehensible. The anonymous paper handed to you, exhibits many serious charges, and it is my wish that it should be submitted to Congress. This I am the more inclined to, as the suppression or concealment may possibly involve you in embarrassments hereafter, since it is uncertain how many, or who, may be privy to the contents.

"My enemies take an ungenerous advantage of me. They know the delicacy of my situation, and that motives of policy deprive me of the defence I might otherwise make against their insidious attacks. They know I cannot combat their insinuations, however, injurious, without disclosing secrets, which it is of the utmost moment to conceal. But why should I expect to be exempt from censure, the unfailing lot of an elevated station? Merit and talents, with which I can have no pretensions of rivalry, have ever been subject to it. My heart tells me, that it has been my unremitted aim to do the best that circumstances would permit; yet I may have been very often mistaken in the judgment of the means, and may in many instances deserve the imputation of error." *

Thus it was evident, not only from the operations of the Cabal, but also from the proceedings of Congress for some time prior to this, that a large number of the members of that body had in some way loaned their influence to the disgraceful conspiracy against Washington's name. Furthermore, the appointment of a new

Board of War, of which Gates and Mifflin were members, was not calculated to allay Washington's distrust as to the sentiments of Congress; for, as we have said before, Washington knew that both of these officers were his enemies, and that if they possessed supreme power over the Continental armies he was likely to be removed. One of the first steps in their plan thoroughly to disgust Washington was to make preparations for future operations without consulting the commander-in-chief. They proposed also an expedition to subjugate Canada, probably more to separate Lafayette and Washington than for any other purpose, because while Lafayette was near the commander-in-chief, there was little hope that any of their bold designs could be successfully consummated without his knowledge. In order to separate the two, therefore, Lafayette was placed in command of this expedition upon rosy promises of large reinforcements. After a long and earnest consultation with Washington, Lafayette accepted the commission, but much to his disgust he found the army in a wretched condition, while the aid promised by Congress failed to materialize. The expedition was therefore abandoned and after several months of comparative idleness, Lafayette returned to headquarters at Valley Forge in April, 1778.* The

* Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 233. See also Washington's reply to Patrick Henry, who also sent him a copy of this letter. Henry, *Life of Patrick Henry*, vol. i., pp. 549-551.

* For details, see Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., pp. 271-291. See also Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 133 *et seq.*

purpose of the Cabal to place Washington in such a position that he would become disgusted and resign, was now clearly evident. Washington, however, was not to be thrust aside thus easily.* Writing to William Gordon, he said:

"I can assure you that no person ever heard me drop an expression that had a tendency to resignation. The same principles that led me to embark in the opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain, operate with additional force at this day; nor is it my desire to withdraw my services, while they are considered of importance in the present contest: but to report a design of this kind, is among the arts which those who are endeavoring to effect a change, are practicing to bring it to pass. I have said, and I still do say, that there is not an officer in the United States, that would return to the sweets of domestic life with more heart-felt joy than I should. But I would have this declaration accompanied by these sentiments, that while the public are satisfied with my endeavors, I mean not to shrink from the cause; but the moment her voice, not that of faction, calls upon me to resign, I shall do it with as much pleasure as ever the weary traveller retired to rest." †

Lafayette also could not be flattered or cajoled into joining the Cabal. He absolutely refused to have anything to do with it. Writing to Washington, he said: "I am now fixed to your fate, and I shall follow it, and sustain it, as well by my sword, as by all the means in my power." ‡ The army as a whole was highly indignant at the designs of the Cabal against Washington.

Realizing that Washington knew of their designs, the members of the Cabal denied any such intentions, Gates and Mifflin being particularly strong in their denials. Their letters are quoted by Gordon.* Conway also made an attempt to exonerate himself, but it seems a well-established fact that Gates and Mifflin were cognizant of the Cabal's machinations and were prepared to profit by it. At a conference between Gates and General Morgan after Burgoyne's surrender, Gates asserted confidentially that the army was becoming dissatisfied with Washington's conduct, that Washington's reputation was rapidly declining, and that a number of the chief army officers were threatening to resign unless a change were made in that department. Morgan instantly understood the intention of Gates, and as he thought highly of Washington, replied as follows: "Sir, I have one favor to ask. Never again mention to me this hateful subject; under no other man but General Washington, as commander-in-chief, will I ever serve." From that time a coolness existed between Morgan and Gates, and in the final account of the victory at Saratoga Gates failed to mention Morgan's name, though

Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, p. 149 *et seq.*; Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 250 *et seq.*; Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 216 *et seq.*

* See the letter to James Lovell, quoted in Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 336-337.

† Bancroft, vol. v., p. 216.

‡ Tower, *Marquis de La Fayette*, vol. i., p. 263.

* Gordon, however, was on terms of intimate friendship with Gates, and this may, in some way, account for his unwillingness to believe his friend guilty of such dishonorable conduct and his desire to quote letters favorable to Gates. See also the footnote in Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 134.

undoubtedly that officer had contributed largely to the result of the battle.*

General Conway was soon brought to a realization that the army would not countenance his actions. He had never been popular with the majority of the soldiers, and when it became known that he had endeavored to displace Washington, he was challenged to a duel by General Cadwalader. Despite Washington's remonstrances, this duel was fought July 4, 1778, and Conway was wounded.† Supposing that his wound was mortal, Conway was struck with sudden remorse, and wrote the following letter to Washington:

"I find myself just able to hold the pen during a few minutes, and take this opportunity of expressing my sincere grief for having done, written, or said any thing disagreeable to your Excellency. My career will soon be over; therefore, justice and truth prompt me to declare my last sentiments. You are, in my eyes, the great and good man. May you long enjoy the love, veneration,

and esteem of these States, whose liberties you have asserted by your virtues."*

Thus Conway's Cabal came to an end which was not only timely, but also fortunate to the patriotic cause. Washington's conduct throughout the whole affair was marked with moderation, self-command, and nobility.†

* See Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 129, note; Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 232-237; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 210-217; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 32-46; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., pp. 154, 166; Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. ii., pp. 1-40; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 44, 54 (ed. 1788); Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 127-132; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, pp. 307-319.

† Mr. Irving gives the following anecdote, furnished to him by Judge Jay: "Shortly before the death of John Adams, I was sitting alone with my father, conversing about the American Revolution. Suddenly he remarked, 'Ah, William! the history of that Revolution will never be known. Nobody now alive knows it but John Adams and myself.' Surprised at such a declaration, I asked him to what he referred: He briefly replied: 'The proceedings of the old Congress.' Again I inquired, 'What proceedings?' He answered, 'Those against Washington; from first to last there was a most bitter party against him.'" As the old Congress held its sessions with closed doors, nothing was made public but what that body saw fit to disclose. Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 397.

* See Graham, *Life of General Morgan*, pp. 172-173.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 134.

CHAPTER XIX.

1776-1778.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: FRENCH ALLIANCE: CONCILIATION ATTEMPTED.

Committee of Secret Correspondence appointed — Franklin's letter to Dumas — Views in Congress regarding foreign intercourse — The Department of Foreign Affairs organized — Deane sent to France — Attitude of France toward the United Colonies — Vergennes declines to commit himself — Aid given by Beaumarchais — Great Britain protests at conduct of France — Formal treaty with France drafted — Commissioners to France appointed — Their letter of credence and instructions — Commissioners sent to other foreign countries — Inducements held out to France — The Situation in England — King's speech to Parliament — Effect of victory at Saratoga upon sentiment in Europe — Ministerial measures carried in Parliament — Conciliation bills introduced — Treaty of commerce and alliance with France signed — Joy caused by treaty — Address of Congress to the inhabitants of the United States — British peace commissioners arrive in America — The failure of their mission.

By the terms of the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress was empowered to make peace, to declare war, to send and receive ambassadors, and to make treaties and alliances, but it could only enter upon the latter with the assent of nine of the thirteen States. Originally the Confederation had no executive officers, and its business was conducted through committees. For the purpose of conducting foreign intercourse, on November 29, 1775, a "Committee of Secret Correspondence" was appointed, consisting of Benjamin Harrison, John Jay, Johnson, Dickinson, and Franklin; this committee being appointed for the purpose of holding secret correspondence with the friends of America, "in Great Britain, Ireland and other parts of the world."* The chief

object in view was to sound the principal nations of Europe, particularly France and Spain, in regard to American affairs. Shortly after his appointment, Franklin wrote a letter to Charles W. F. Dumas* in Holland as to the prospect of obtaining aid in that country for the American cause. He said:

"That you may be better enabled to answer some questions which will probably be put to you, concerning our present situation, we inform you, that the whole continent is firmly united — the party for the measures of the British ministry being very small, and much dispersed; that we had on foot the last campaign, an army of nearly twenty thousand men, wherewith we have been able, not only to block the king's army in Boston, but to spare considerable detachments for the invasion of Canada, where we have met with great success, as the printed papers sent herewith will inform you, and have now reason to expect the whole province may be soon in our possession; that we purpose greatly to increase our force for the ensuing year; and thereby we hope, with the assistance of a well disciplined militia, to be able

* Bancroft, vol. iv., p. 362; John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., pp. 202-203, vol. iii., p. 3; Weld, *Life of Franklin*, p. 475; Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., p. 111; John Bassett Moore, *American Diplo-*

macy, Its Spirit and Achievements, pp. ix., 5; Hart, *Foundations of American Foreign Policy*, p. 15; Pellet, *John Jay*, p. 49.

* For the services of this man see Moore, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 23-25.

to defend our coast, notwithstanding its great extent; that we already have a small squadron of armed vessels, to protect our coasting trade, who have had some success in taking several of the enemy's cruizers, and some of their transport vessels and stores." *

It was certain that the Declaration of Independence would involve an appeal to the nations of Europe for countenance and aid. It was not only a challenge to Great Britain, but an assertion by the colonies of their right to an independent place among the world's powers, and an appeal to the powers to recognize the justice of their claim. A new field was therefore opened for the energies of Congress beside the contest of arms in which the colonies had engaged with the mother country, and a new relation was to be sustained toward the governments of Europe. Among the members of Congress there were two views regarding foreign intercourse. One was that no minister should be sent to foreign courts until assurances were given by the latter that our ministers would be well received; and the other, that for attaining independence we should seek to establish good relations, if not alliances, with the nations unfriendly to England. Franklin had said "A virgin state should preserve a virgin character, and not go abroad suitoring for alliances; but wait with decent dignity for the application of others." On the other hand, John Adams said, "I think we have not meanly solicited for friendships

anywhere. But to send ministers to any great court in Europe, especially the maritime courts, to propose an acknowledgment of the independence of America and treaties of amity and commerce, is no more than becomes us, and in my opinion is our duty to do." *

The conduct of foreign relations through a committee, however, did not prove satisfactory, chiefly because the members did not attend to their business. One of the members said: "There is really no such thing as a Committee of Foreign Affairs existing—no secretary or clerk further than I persevere to be one and the other. The books and the papers of that extinguished body lay yet on the table of Congress, or rather are locked up in the secretary's private box." Congress thereupon appointed a committee to prepare a plan for the organization of the department, and in this plan the committee states: "That the extent and rising power of the United States entitle them to a place among the great potentates of Europe, while our political and commercial interests point out the propriety of cultivating with them a friendly correspondence and connection. That, to render such an intercourse advantageous, the necessity of competent knowledge of the interests, views, relations and systems of those potentates, is obvious. * * *

* See also Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., p. 112.

* Treseot, *Diplomacy of the Revolution*, pp. 16-17. See also John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., pp. 199-201.

That to answer those essential purposes the committee are of opinion that a fixed and permanent office for the Department of Foreign Affairs ought forthwith to be established as a remedy against the fluctuations, the delays, and indecision to which the present mode of managing our foreign affairs must be exposed.”* The committee recommended that a Secretary of Foreign Affairs be appointed, and proceeded to set forth his duties. Thereafter the management of foreign affairs ran more smoothly.

The first representative sent abroad was Silas Deane. Franklin had received information through friends that France seemed favorably disposed toward America, and, while she could not publicly display her friendship, she was inclined to render aid to the American cause in a surreptitious manner. Deane, therefore, was sent to ascertain the exact position of the French government and to obtain much needed supplies and material for the army.† His letter of instructions, dated March 3, 1776, orders him to assume the character of a merchant engaged in the West India trade, and instructs him to state to the French ministry that clothing and arms for about 25,000 men, as well as ammunition, and field pieces, were needed by the Americans. He was to secure an audience at the earliest possible moment with the French minister of for-

ign affairs, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes. Deane secretly departed from the United States, traveling under the assumed name of “Timothy Jones,” and many state that he carried with him a supply of invisible ink with which to write his reports.‡ Deane arrived in Paris early in July and immediately set about the fulfillment of the task assigned him.¶ He soon succeeded in obtaining an interview with Comte de Vergennes in which he stated the purpose of his mission, and was informed that the importance of American commerce was well known in France, and that no country could so well supply the American colonies and in return receive their produce, as France. For this reason, therefore, it was to the interest of both to maintain uninterrupted intercourse, and with this object in view, the court had ordered French ports to be kept open, not only to America but also to England. But, he said, considering the friendly relations existing between the latter country and France, the French court could not openly encourage the shipping of warlike stores to America. As a manifestation of their friendli-

* See Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 334, vol. ii., p. 78; Par-ton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., p. 113 *et seq.*; Moore, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 5-6. On the relation of the French government with the colonies, see Tower, *The Marquis de LaFayette in the American Revolution*, vol. i., chap. iii.

† Foster, *A Century of American Diplomacy*, p. 11.

‡ For details see Tower, vol. i., p. 142 *et seq.*; Wharton, vol. ii., p. 78 *et seq.*

* *Secret Journals of Congress*, vol. ii., p. 580.

† As to his fitness for this mission, see John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., p. 248 *et seq.*

ness for the American cause, however, no obstructions of any kind would be placed in the way of such shipments. He said that the custom-house officials had not been informed as to the secret intentions of the court, and if Deane experienced any difficulty whatever in transporting his merchandise through the custom-houses, he should report it immediately to the court and such obstructions would be removed immediately. Deane was to consider himself under the immediate protection of the ministry, and if the police or any other officials should in any way, shape or manner interfere with his movements, such interference should be reported to the ministry and everything would be immediately cleared away. Deane was to be perfectly free to carry on any kind of commerce in the kingdom which was permissible to the subjects of any other nation of the world, for the court had resolved to remain strictly neutral and to allow the ports to be free and open to both parties alike, excepting, of course, in contraband of war. On the subject of independence, however, Vergennes declined to commit himself definitely, as he deemed this matter too uncertain at the present time for consideration, and that it was a subject which might be considered in the far distant future.*

* See Deane's letter of August 18, 1776, to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, in Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, vol. ii., p. 112, and Franklin's and Deane's letters of March 12, 1777, in *ibid*, vol. ii., p. 283; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 144 *et seq.*, 298 *et seq.*; Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., p. 189 *et seq.*

When Deane arrived in Paris, he found that the Revolutionary cause was in a fair way to receive aid of a substantial nature. Through his untiring efforts Franklin's friend, Dr. Duborg, had secured about 15,000 stand of arms from the royal arsenals, and probably would have been able to secure some brass cannon by the same method, had not "the circumstance of their bearing the king's arms and cipher * * * made them too discoverable." The most important of the early friends of the colonies, however, was Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais, one of the most unique characters in French history of that time. Originally of low birth and by occupation a watchmaker, he had developed great business talents, and by several important operations had become possessed of a fortune and secured a standing among the nobility. He had a talent for music and was well known as an operative composer and author. His various accomplishments, both in finance and literature, together with his daring as a speculator, highly recommended him to the court and he soon became a favorite of the king. He early suggested that he be appointed secret agent of the French government to furnish material aid to the revolted colonies of the traditional enemy of France, and to further his plans went to London to enlist the aid of Arthur Lee of Virginia, who had

succeeded Franklin as agent for the colony of Massachusetts.* The secret nature of the scheme of Beaumarchais is witnessed by the following letter from Count de Vergennes to the king, dated May 2, 1776, two months before the arrival of Deane:

"Sire: I have the honor of laying at the feet of your Majesty the writing authorizing me to furnish a million of livres for the service of the English colonies. I add also the plan of an answer I propose to make to the Sieur Beaumarchais. I solicit your approbation to the two propositions. The answer to M. de Beaumarchais will not be written in my hand, nor even that of either the clerks or secretaries of my office. I shall employ for that purpose my son, whose handwriting cannot be known. He is only fifteen years old, but I can answer in the most positive manner for his discretion. As it is important that this operation should not be suspected, or at least imputed to the government, I entreat Your Majesty to allow me to direct the return of the Sieur Montaudoin to Paris. The apparent pretext for that proceeding will be to obtain from him an account of his correspondence with the Americans, though in reality it will be for the purpose of employing him to transmit to them such funds as Your Majesty chooses to appropriate to their benefit, directing him, at the same time, to take all necessary precautions, as if, indeed, the Sieur Montaudoin made the advance on his own account. On this head, I take the liberty of requesting the orders of Your Majesty. Having obtained them, I shall write to the Marquis de Grimaldi [Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs], inform him in detail of our proceedings, and request his coöperation to the same extent."

Having obtained the assent of the king to his scheme, the pathway was made smooth for Beaumarchais. When Deane arrived in Paris, Beaumarchais immediately put himself into communication with Deane and thus

relief for the American army was obtained much sooner than had Deane been compelled to conduct the negotiations alone.* In September, 1776, Deane wrote to Robert Morris, "I shall send you in October clothing for 20,000 men, 30,000 muskets, 100 tons gunpowder, 200 brass cannon, 24 mortars, with shot, shell, etc. in proportion."† Furthermore, he obtained credit to the amount of \$2,500,000. Meanwhile, after the king had definitely given his approval to the scheme of Beaumarchais, it was agreed that a mercantile house, under the name of "Roderique Hortalez et Cie.," should be established to "sell" to the colonies military supplies which France could not send them, without violating the rules of neutrality. This firm established itself on a prominent street in Paris in a house formerly occupied as an embassy of the Netherlands government. The head of the house was supposed to have been a Spanish banker, but he was never seen, and all confidential inquiries were answered by Beaumarchais. The French government supplied 1,000,000 livres, and on its endorsement, the Spanish government advanced 1,000,000, more, chiefly because of her hatred to the British. When Deane arrived, therefore, he was officially refused any assistance, but was semi-officially referred to Beaumarchais who imme-

* For details see Hale, *Franklin in France*, vol. i., chap. iii.; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 424-432; Pitkin, *Political and Civil History of the United States*, vol. i., pp. 402-422.

* John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., p. 307.

† Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 148.

diately delivered to Deane whatever he wished upon security of the shipment of cargoes of tobacco or other American produce.* It is estimated that during the existence of this firm, from 1776 to 1783, its disbursements amounted to more than 21,000,000 livres, the greater part of which was advanced for the American cause. Beaumarchais, however, had much difficulty in securing a settlement of his accounts from the Continental Congress, which was probably due to the enmity of Arthur Lee, who, because of his hatred of both Beaumarchais and Deane, sent to Congress reports which cast doubt upon the correctness of the accounts rendered. Consequently, Beaumarchais was unable to effect a settlement up to the time of his death (1779), and for many years after the subject was discussed at length in Congress, but finally, by the treaty of 1831, it was agreed that out of the sum to be paid by the United States, 800,000 francs should be given to the heirs of Beaumarchais.

The fictitious nature of the business of this firm was too thin to remain long unpenetrated by the British ambassador in France, but it served its purpose as a temporary expedient of the French government before an open alliance with the colonies could be effected and made public.

It had become apparent to Congress early in the war that France must ere

long openly espouse its cause. John Adams had urged that steps should be immediately taken to effect a treaty with that nation, and was very persistent in advocating this policy, saying, "Some gentlemen doubted of the sentiments of France, though she would frown upon us as rebels, and be afraid to countenance the example. I replied to these gentlemen, that I apprehended they had not attended to the relative situation of France and England; that it was the unquestionable interest of France that the British continental colonies should be independent; that Britain, by the conquest of Canada and her naval triumphs during the last war, and by her vast possessions, * * * was exalted to a height and preëminence that France must envy and could not endure. But there was more than pride and jealousy in the case. Her rank, her consideration in Europe, and even her safety and independence, were at stake." Congress finally yielded to the arguments of Adams, and in June, 1776, appointed Franklin, Adams, Robert Morris, Dickinson and Harrison a committee to prepare a formal treaty to be proposed to foreign powers. On July 10 the committee reported a plan, which, after being submitted and approved by Congress, was adopted September 17. This was chiefly the work of John Adams and consisted of thirty articles.* It was almost exclusively a

* Foster, *A Century of American Diplomacy*, p. 15.

* For text see Freeman Snow, *Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy*, pp. 12-24. See

commercial treaty and called for no military aid or support. In his report Adams said: "Our negotiations with France ought to be conducted with great caution, and with all the foresight we could possibly obtain; we ought not to enter into any alliance which should entangle us in any future wars in Europe; * * * it would never be to our interest to unite with France in the destruction of England. * * * Therefore, in preparing treaties to be proposed to foreign powers, and in the instructions to be given to our ministers, we ought to confine ourselves strictly to a treaty of commerce; such a treaty would be ample compensation to France for all the aid we should want from her."*

Immediately after approving this plan, Congress appointed Franklin, Deane, and Thomas Jefferson commissioners to France.† But Jefferson, because of the illness of his wife, was unable to leave America.‡ Arthur Lee, then in London, was named in his place. Their letter of credence is interesting and was as follows:

"The Delegates of the United States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to all who shall see these presents; send greetings;—Whereas a trade, upon equal terms, between the sub-

also Moore, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 6-8; John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., p. 242.

* *Secret Journals of Congress*, vol. ii., p. 7.

† Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., pp. 166-167.

‡ His reply to the President of Congress is given in Parton, *Life of Thomas Jefferson*, pp. 197-198. See also Ford's ed. of *Jefferson's Writings*, vol. i., p. 71, vol. ii., pp. 91-92.

jects of his most Christian Majesty, the King of France, and the people of these States, will be beneficial to both nations;—Know ye, therefore, that we, confiding in the prudence and integrity of Benjamin Franklin, one of the Delegates in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania, and President of the Convention of the said State, etc., Silas Deane, now in France, late a Delegate from the State of Connecticut; and Arthur Lee, barrister at law, have appointed and deputed, and by these presents do appoint and depute them, the said Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee, our Commissioners, giving and granting to them, the said Franklin, Deane, and Lee, or any two of them, and in the case of death, absence or disability of any two, or any one of them, full power to communicate, treat, agree and conclude with his most Christian Majesty, the King of France, or with such person or persons, as shall by him be for that purpose authorized, of and upon a true and sincere friendship, and a firm, inviolable and universal peace for the defense, protection and safety of the navigation and mutual commerce of the subjects of his most Christian Majesty, and the people of the United States, and to do all other things, which may conduce to those desirable ends, and promising in good faith to ratify whatsoever our said Commissioners shall transact in the premises. Done in Congress, in Philadelphia, the thirtieth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-six."*

In addition to the letter of credence special instructions were prepared for the commissioners relative to their duties;† among the more important paragraphs being the following:

"You will solicit the court of France for an immediate supply of twenty or thirty thousand muskets and bayonets, and a large supply of ammunition, and brass field-pieces, to be sent under a convoy by France. The United States engage for the payment of the arms, artillery and ammunition, and to indemnify France for the convoy.

* *Secret Journals of Congress*, vol. ii., p. 32.

† Morse, *Life of Franklin*, p. 229; Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 178. See also the *Secret Journals of Congress*, vol. ii., pp. 6, 31, 35; Force, *American Archives*, 5th series, vol. ii., pp. 1198, 1212-1216, 1237; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 161-162.

"Engage a few good engineers in the service of the United States.

"It is highly probable that France means not to let the United States sink in the present contest. But as the difficulty of obtaining true accounts of our condition may cause an opinion to be entertained that we are able to support the war on our own strength and resources longer than, in fact, we can do, it will be proper for you to press for the immediate and explicit declaration of France in our favor, upon a suggestion, that a *re-union* with Great Britain, may be the consequence of a delay.

"Should Spain be disinclined to our cause, from an apprehension of danger to her dominions in South America, you are empowered to give the strongest assurances, that that crown will receive no molestation from the United States, in the possession of those territories."*

At the time of these appointments, Deane was already in Paris discharging the duties of private agent, and Lee soon after went from London to join him. Franklin started from America at the earliest possible moment, and when the news of his landing reached Paris, Lord Stormont, the British ambassador, threatened to leave the country if the "chief of the American rebels" were permitted to enter the city. Vergennes pacified Stormont by saying that a messenger would be sent to forbid Franklin to enter the capital, but should this messenger perchance miss Franklin, the government would not send him away "because of the scandalous scene this would present to all France, should we respect neither the laws of nations nor of hospitalities." Vergennes saw to it that Franklin and the

messenger did not meet, and soon the three commissioners were hard at work at the task before them. Soon after Franklin arrived the commissioners were received in private audience by Vergennes at which time they presented the first formal diplomatic communication made on behalf of the United States to a foreign power.* Regarding this interview, they said: "It was evident that this court, while it treated us privately with all civility, was cautious of giving umbrage to England, and was, therefore, desirous of avoiding open reception and acknowledgment of us, or entering into any formal negotiations with us, as ministers from Congress."† In October these commissioners were instructed to purchase from the French government eight line-of-battle ships and to equip them at the earliest possible moment.

On arriving in Paris in December, Franklin and Lee immediately put themselves into communication with Vergennes,‡ but for some time their labors availed little. The French were not yet ready to acknowledge the independence of America or openly to espouse the American cause. It was evident that the French had

* Moore, *American Diplomacy*, p. 8.

† Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 283.

‡ Hale, *Franklin in France*, vol. i., pp. 48 *et seq.*, 142; Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, vol. ii., p. 239; Weld, *Life of Franklin*, pp. 492-493; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 162-165. For the results, see Baneroft, vol. v., p. 126 *et seq.* On Lee's conduct see Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 442 *et seq.*

* The instructions are given in full in E. E. Hale, *Franklin in France*, vol. i., pp. 61-65; Snow, *Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy*, pp. 24-26.

determined to follow a cautious and prudent course and wished to obtain concessions from the Americans in proportion to the benefits they bestowed.* By this time Vergennes had obtained the consent of Spain to join her in a war against England, but just at this moment came news of the defeat on Long Island, and this unexpected announcement dashed the hopes of Vergennes and completely disarranged his plans.† Because of the discouragements consequent upon the failure of the campaign of 1776, Congress redoubled its efforts to secure aid from foreign nations, appointing a committee to prepare a plan for this purpose. When the plan proposed by this committee was taken under consideration, a heated debate followed. Some of the members wished to sacrifice almost everything to obtain the aid of France, and were willing to offer her almost the same monopoly of American commerce as Great Britain had enjoyed prior to the outbreak of the war. On December 30, 1776, a resolution was adopted in Congress to send commissioners to the courts of Vienna, Spain, and Prussia, and to the grand duke of Tuscany. These commissioners were instructed to assure these courts that the Americans would persist in the contest until independence had been attained. They were also to use their utmost endeavors to procure assist-

ance from the Emperor of Germany and the Kings of France, Spain, and Prussia in preventing the employment by England of German and other foreign troops in the conflict with America.

To induce France to lend her aid, the American commissioners were authorized to guarantee that all trade between the United States and the West India Islands should be carried on either in American or French vessels; they should assure the French king that, if by any means the British should be excluded from the American cod-fisheries by the reduction of Newfoundland and Cape Breton, ships of war should be furnished at the expense of the United States for the purpose of reducing Nova Scotia, and the cod-fishery would be equally enjoyed by France and America to the exclusion of other nations; and that one-half of Newfoundland should belong to France, while the other half, together with Cape Breton and Nova Scotia, should belong to the United States.* In the event of these offers being insufficient to obtain the coöperation of France, the commissioners were authorized to assure the French king that if any of the West Indies should be conquered during the course of the war, these islands would be given to him in absolute property, the United

* Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., p. 166 *et seq.*

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 155.

* See John Bassett Moore, *The Beginnings of American Diplomacy*, in *Harper's Magazine*, vol. cviii., p. 500 *et seq.*

States engaging to furnish sufficient help in the way of armed vessels and supplies for this purpose. Offers of a similar nature were to be made to the king of Spain. Franklin was also appointed commissioner to Spain, but affairs in France consumed his entire time and Arthur Lee was afterward sent to that country in his place. Ralph Izard was appointed commissioner to the Duke of Tuscany, and William Lee to the courts of Berlin and Vienna.

The French court, however, could not be induced to depart from the line of policy it had adopted, for at the present time it was awaiting the outcome of the efforts of the Americans for independence, and was unwilling to lend aid until assurance was given by the conduct of the war that ultimate success would be attained.* Nevertheless, the American commissioners were allowed to fit out a number of privateers to capture British vessels, and the prizes captured by these vessels were openly carried to and sold in France. This aroused the resentment of the British minister, Lord Stormont, and he indignantly complained of the course adopted by the French ministry. His remonstrances, however, only produced assurances that similar occurrences would not happen again, which in reality meant little or nothing.†

Negotiations dragged on day after day and week after week with little or no result, the commissioners being chiefly occupied in denying and contradicting the false statements regarding affairs in America circulated in every direction by the English emissaries.*

The English ministry was supported in both houses of Parliament by large majorities, the great body of people seeming to favor the further continuance of the attempt to subjugate the Americans. There was a small minority, however, including several men of distinguished talents, who vigorously opposed the measures of the administration, because they feared for the liberty of England in general should the court succeed in establishing its claim against the colonies. But the failure of the Americans to maintain their ground during the campaign of 1776 completely discouraged the opposition, and on the other hand, highly elated the court party. Nevertheless, the difficulties surrounding the ministry soon began to multiply; the war with America had shut off a large portion of the commerce with the West Indies, which brought on a scarcity of the necessities of life in those islands. The British forces there had been reduced to augment the forces in America, and when the British West India fleet was

* For the attitude of the French court see Tower, *The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 60-89.

† Baneroft, vol. v., p. 133; Tower, vol. i., p. 89

et seq.; Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., pp. 189-199.

* The reader will find this subject more fully treated by Pitkin, vol. i., pp. 384-395.

ready to sail under convoy for England, it was discovered that, because of the weakness of the military forces in the islands, the negroes of Jamaica were planning an insurrection to overthrow the British power. Consequently, the ships of war were detained to suppress this insurrection, which gave the Americans time to equip their privateers. After the fleet had sailed, it was dispersed by stormy weather, and a large number of richly laden vessels fell into the hands of the American privateers, which, because of their sailing capacities, were able to dart in and seize the merchantmen and escape with the prize before the British men-of-war could intercept them. As already stated, these prizes were carried into the French and other continental ports and sold. The unfriendly attitude of the French was highly irritating to the British court, and finally a remonstrance was sent to the French ministry. The latter replied in high sounding terms, but did nothing to prevent the sailing of privateers from their ports; however, the traffic in British prizes was carried on somewhat more secretly. It was now plainly evident that France and Spain were making active preparations for a general war with England, and as the British ministry could not close their eyes to the actual facts in the case, about the middle of October, 1776, an additional fleet of sixteen ships was placed in commission.*

Upon the opening of Parliament October 21, 1776, the king in his speech from the throne regretted his inability to give a better account of the war in America and to say that the insurrection had been stopped and the people of the revolted colonies once again returned to their allegiance to the crown. But such was not the case for the colonists had openly abjured all connection and communication with the mother country and had refused to consider any proposal for reconciliation. He said that if the rebellion were not immediately stopped, much harm would come to British commerce, and if Parliament wished to end the rebellion at once, preparations should be promptly made for another campaign. He also expressed a hope that general conditions in Europe would remain tranquil, though he considered it wise to increase the defenses at home. The replies to this speech were drafted in the usual form, but amendments were suggested in both houses; in the Lords by the Marquis of Rockingham, and in the Commons by Lord John Cavendish. In the Commons the amendment was rejected by a vote of 242 against 87, and in the Lords, by a vote of 92 against 26. During this session of Parliament several attempts were made to secure the passage of conciliatory measures, but so great was the influence of the ministry that such

1776, see Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 148 *et seq.*

* On the situation in England at the end of

schemes were decisively defeated, and the ministerial plan was adopted without great opposition.*

The victory of Saratoga, however, greatly changed the sentiment of Europe. It was evident that the colonies were determined to achieve independence of England and were not to be discouraged by reverses no matter how many or how severe. The victory, therefore, placed them in a better position to enter into foreign alliances in accordance with the dignity and importance of a free people. As previously stated, France had only been awaiting the positive assurance that the Americans would be able to continue the conflict before she openly became the ally of the new republic.† But even the victory of Saratoga did not give them this positive assurance, as the issue in America was still somewhat uncertain. It was feared by the French court that the colonies might be induced to accept terms of reconciliation with the mother country, even if they could not be subdued by arms; hence, if France should join the Americans and England should once concede the point in dispute with the colonies, France alone would be engaged in a war with England, and, in addition, would have the colonies to reckon with. Besides, there would be no special object to be gained in

such a struggle.* Consequently, France shaped her negotiations with the American commissioners so that the encouragement she held out was in proportion to the news of success or failure in America. While she protested her friendship to England, she secretly encouraged the Americans with aid and inflamed their ardor by continually promising future coöperation. Thus France was playing a double game—being pledged to neither party but simply awaiting the course of events.‡

The American commissioners, in every way possible, urged the court of France to come to some decision, but the French ministers, as usual, procrastinated, advancing a variety of excuses, and thereby keeping the Americans in constant uncertainty. Finally, about the middle of August, 1777, the commissioners drew up a strongly worded memorial suggesting that America might, after all, despairing of aid from France, abandon the conflict and yield to the demands of England, thus depriving France of those advantages which she would gain if England lost her rich and valuable colonies in America.§ But this

* Trevelyan, p. 414; John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., p. 310.

† On European political conditions in general at this time see Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 226-243. On the French policy see also Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 113-115.

‡ Writing to Vergennes, Adams says: "America is now known all over Europe to be such a magazine of raw materials for manufactures, such a nursery of seamen, and such a source of commerce and naval power, that it would be dangerous to all the maritime powers to suffer any one of

* Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 53-58.

† On the state of European public opinion in general, see Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 387 *et seq.*

memorial failed to produce the desired results, and England was again approached with a proposition to recognize the independence of the United States. It was represented that if the British ministry were capable of profiting by the occasion, it depended on them to stipulate an arrangement so conducive to the prosperity of Great Britain, that she would seek in vain to secure herself similar advantages by any other means. At this time, however, news of Burgoyne's first successes had just arrived in England, and being certain that Burgoyne would eventually conquer the American army opposing him, the British ministry rejected this proposition.

When news of the victory of Saratoga and the capture of Burgoyne's army reached Europe, a new aspect was given the American affairs.* †The same express that carried to England the news of the surrender of Burgoyne† bore dispatches which insinuated that the Americans were becoming discouraged at the procrastinations of the French and were indignant that they had not received from the French court greater

succor in the midst of their various reverses. ✓It was intimated that they were equally desirous of an accommodation with England and would conclude with her a treaty of commerce, if she in turn would acknowledge the independence of the colonies. It was suggested also that the colonies would be gratified at a reconciliation with the mother country, but if England should not see fit to yield to her demands, the colonies would enter into an alliance with the most inveterate and implacable enemies of England — France.

In November, 1777, Parliament prepared their addresses in answer to the royal speech. ✓In the House of Lords, the Earl of Chatham introduced a resolution recommending that hostilities with America be stopped at once and a treaty of conciliation be drafted "to restore peace and liberty to America, strength and happiness to England, security and permanent prosperity to both countries." He very severely criticised the employment of savages as auxiliaries in the war, although it was true that their aid had not been disdained under his own administration,* but these proposals were rejected. On the other hand the ministerial measures were carried with large majorities. When Parliament received news of the victory of Saratoga, however, astonishment and dismay were everywhere plainly evident. The opposition at-

them to establish a domination and a monopoly again in America."—John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., p. 325.

* Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 452; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., p. 309.

† The text of the dispatch from the Massachusetts Council, together with excerpts from the journal of the messenger, the note from Gates enclosing a copy of the convention, etc., are given in Hale, *Franklin in France*, vol. i., p. 155 *et seq.*

* Baneroft, vol. v., p. 224; Green, *William Pitt*, p. 356 *et seq.*; Harrison, *Chatham*, pp. 231–232.

tacked Lord North and the ministry,* who endeavored to shift the blame from themselves to the shoulders of the commanders in America. It was asserted that the ministry had taken every step to insure success, and deprecated condemnation of the position without full inquiry. Before anything could be done in this matter, however, Parliament adjourned to January 20, 1778.†

At this time the British ministry was anxious to terminate the conflict with America before hostilities should commence with France. Consequently, on February 17, 1778, two bills were introduced in Commons. The first declared that Parliament would impose no duty or tax whatever, payable within any of the American colonies, with the exception of such duties as might be imposed for commercial purposes, but the net produce of which should always be paid and applied to and for the use of the colonies in which such duties were levied. The second authorized the appointment by the crown of commissioners to treat with the colonies or with individuals in the colonies with the object of settling the differences, the stipulation being made, however, that nothing they should do would be binding until Parliament had ap-

proved their acts. The commissioners were empowered to proclaim a cessation of hostilities and to suspend the operation of the Non-Intercourse Act; during the continuance of the act to suspend all or any parts of the acts of Parliament passed since February 10, 1763, relating to the colonies; to grant pardons; and to appoint a governor in any colony wherein the king had heretofore exercised the power of making such appointments. This act was to remain in force until June 1, 1779.* The bills were passed and on March 11 received the royal signature.†

When news of the introduction of Lord North's conciliatory bill reached France, the French government realized that the time had come when they must act with some decision. Accordingly, on December 17, Conrad Alexander Gérard notified the American commissioners "that after a long and mature deliberation upon their propositions, his majesty had

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 356-357; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 247-248; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 7 *et seq.*; Reed, *Life of Joseph Reed*, vol. i., pp. 371-399.

† Writing to the President of Congress, July 27, 1778, John Adams says: "The King of Great Britain and his council have determined to send instructions to their commissioners in America to offer us independency, provided we make peace with them, separate from France. This appears to me to be the last effort to seduce, deceive, and divide. They know that every man of honor in America must receive this proposition with indignation. But they think they can get the men of no honor to join them by such a proposal, and they think the men of honor are not a majority. What has America done to give occasion to that King and council to think so unworthily of her." — John Adams, *Works*, vol. vii., p. 21.

* See the quotations from Chatham's speech in Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 84. See also the excerpt from the Journal of Austin in Hale, *Franklin in France*, vol. i., p. 163 *et seq.*

† Pitkin, vol. i., p. 397; *Annual Register*, 1778, p. 74.

determined to recognize the independence of, and to enter into a treaty of commerce and alliance with, the United States of America; and that he would not only acknowledge their independence, but actually support it with all the means in his power, that perhaps he was about to engage himself in an expensive war upon this account, but that he did not expect to be reimbursed by them; in fine, the Americans were not to think that he had entered into this resolution solely with a view of serving them, since, independently of his real attachment to them and their cause, it was evidently the interest of France to diminish the power of England by severing her colonies from her."* Therefore, on February 6, 1778, Franklin, Deane, and Lee on behalf of the United States, and Gérard for France, signed a treaty of commerce and a treaty of defensive alliance in case war should be the consequence of this commercial connection.† The direct end of this alliance was "to maintain the liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, of the United States, as well in matters of government as of commerce."‡ The French government then sent notice of this

treaty to London, the notice closing with the following paragraphs:

"In making this communication to the Court of London, the king is firmly persuaded, that it will find in it fresh proofs of his majesty's constant and sincere dispositions for peace; and that his Britannic majesty, animated by the same sentiments, will equally avoid every thing that may interrupt good harmony; and that he will take, in particular, effectual measures to hinder the commerce of his majesty's subjects with the United States of America from being disturbed, and cause to be observed, in this respect, the usages received between trading nations and the rules that may be considered as subsisting between the crowns of France and Great Britain.

"In this just confidence, the underwritten ambassador might think it superfluous to apprise the British ministry, that the king, his master, being determined effectually to protect the lawful freedom of the commerce of his subjects, and to sustain the honor of his flag, his majesty has taken in consequence eventual measures, in concert with the United States of North America."

Meanwhile copies of Lord North's conciliatory bills had been sent to America, where they arrived about the middle of April, 1778. Governor Tryon caused them to be printed and sent copies to Washington, requesting in the letter that he aid in circulating them, "that the people at large might be acquainted with the favorable disposition of Great Britain toward the American colonies."* Washington forwarded the papers to Congress. Had the British been disposed to offer the same terms prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it is probable that

* See Franklin's report to Congress, in Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, vol. ii., p. 452; also Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 313-315; Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., p. 288 *et seq.*

† See *Treaties and Conventions of the United States*, pp. 296-310; Snow, *Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy*, pp. 26-35. See also the letter from Franklin and Deane in Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, vol. ii., p. 490.

‡ See Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 244-246; Fisher,

Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., p. 115 *et seq.*; Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., p. 293 *et seq.*; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 472 *et seq.*; Morse, *Life of Franklin*, pp. 267-276; Hale, *Franklin in France*, vol. i., p. 175 *et seq.*

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 360-361; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 422.

great satisfaction would have resulted, but at the present juncture the condition of affairs was very different. The colonies had declared themselves to be independent and were now determined to fight for their independence. Washington himself urged that nothing less than independence would be satisfactory, and no terms short of this would be considered — “a peace on other terms, if I may be allowed the expression, would be a peace of war.”* The majority of the members of Congress held the same view, and on April 22 it was unanimously resolved that the offers of the British ministry be rejected. At the same time bills regarding the proceedings in connection with the rejection of these offers were ordered to be printed and widely circulated.† This action had been taken ten days before news arrived that a treaty had been concluded between France and the United States.

When the conclusion of the treaty became known, May 2, there was great rejoicing throughout the land.‡ The treaties were immediately ratified by Congress, and on May 6 Wash-

ington issued orders that the whole army in camp at Valley Forge should participate in the general joy and satisfaction; and a celebration in honor of the event concluded with an entertainment, music, toasts, etc.† In a few days Congress prepared an “Address to the Inhabitants of the United States” recommending that it be read in churches of all denominations. We quote a paragraph or two from the address:

“The haughty prince who spurned us from his feet with contumely and disdain, and the Parliament which proscribed us, now descend to offer terms of accommodation. Whilst in the full career of victory, they pulled off the mask, and avowed their intended despotism. But having lavished in vain the blood and treasure of their subjects in pursuit of this execrable purpose, they now endeavor to ensnare us with the insidious offers of a reconciliation. They intend to lull you with fallacious hopes of peace, until they can assemble new armies to prosecute their nefarious designs. If this is not the case, why do they strain every nerve to levy men throughout their islands? why do they meanly court every little tyrant of Europe to sell them his unhappy slaves? why do they continue to embitter the minds of the savages against you? Surely this is not the way to conciliate the affections of America. Be not, therefore, deceived. You have still to expect one severe conflict. Your foreign alliances, though they secure your independence, cannot secure your country from desolation, your habitations from plunder, your wives from insult or violation, nor your children from

glory in a particular manner, belongs to the Count de Vergennes, who, as his Most Christian Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, conducted the conferences which terminated in these treaties.” — Ramsay, *History of the American Revolution*, p. 379.

* Sparks' ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., p. 355.

† Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 124 *et seq.*; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., p. 318 *et seq.*; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 140; Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, p. 157 *et seq.* and *Life of Steuben*, p. 139 *et seq.*; Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., pp. 317-319.

* Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 265; Irving, p. 422.

† See Washington's ironical letter forwarding copies of these bills to Tryon, in Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 423-424.

‡ “In national events, the public attention is generally fixed on the movements of armies and fleets. Mankind never fail to do homage to the able general and expert admiral. To this they are justly entitled; but as great a tribute is due to the statesman, who, from a more elevated station, determines on measures in which the general safety and welfare of empires are involved. This

butchery. Foiled in their principal design, you must expect to feel the rage of disappointed ambition. Arise then! to your tents! and gird you for battle! It is time to turn the headlong current of vengeance upon the head of the destroyer. They have filled up the measure of their abominations, and like ripe fruit, must soon drop from the tree. Although much is done, yet much remains to do. Expect not peace, whilst any corner of America is in possession of your foes. You must drive them away from this land of promise, a land flowing indeed with milk and honey. Your brethren at the extremities of the continent, already implore your friendship and protection. It is your duty to grant their request. They hunger and thirst after liberty. Be it yours, to dispense to them the heavenly gift. And what is there now to prevent it?"

Early in June Frederick Howard, the Earl of Carlisle, George Johnstone and William Eden, afterward Lord Auckland, the British commissioners, arrived in Philadelphia.* For the secretary of the commissioners, Dr. Adam Ferguson, Sir Henry Clinton, who had now succeeded Howe as commander-in-chief, requested a passport to go to Yorktown so that he might lay certain papers before Congress. Washington thought that this matter was not within his province and declined until he should receive advice from Congress, who sustained him in refusing the passport.† Thereupon the commissioners sent the papers, addressed to the president of Congress,

through the ordinary medium of a flag of truce.* In their letter, the commissioners offered to discontinue hostilities immediately, to agree that no military force should be maintained in the colonies, unless by the consent of Congress, and also that the right of taxation of tea would be relinquished and representation of the colonies in Parliament be provided. They promised also to pay off at the earliest possible date such paper money as had been issued and was then in circulation. Although the commissioners offered every inducement, the terms fell short of giving independence, and consequently, having so long sustained the struggle alone, the colonists were not likely to submit now that the support of France was assured.† Congress, therefore, directed the president of that body to write the British commissioners, which he did as follows:

"I have received the letter from your Excellencies, dated the 9th instant, with the enclosures, and laid them before Congress. Nothing but an earnest desire to spare the further effusion of human blood could have induced them to read a paper containing expressions so disrespectful to his Most Christian Majesty, the good and great ally of these States, or to consider propositions so

* Mahon, *History of England*, vol. vi., p. 246 (ed. of 1853). For their instructions see Reed, *Life of Joseph Reed*, vol. i., pp. 430-436.

† See Laurens' letter to Johnstone in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 136-137; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 437-438; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 365; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 143-144.

* Acting under a strong impulse, Lafayette sent a challenge to the Earl of Carlisle, who, as he thought, had impeached the honor of France in the communications made by the commissioners to Congress. The Earl declined a resort to this barbarous mode of settling the points in dispute. See Lafayette's and D'Estaing's letters to Washington asking his advice as to Lafayette's course regarding this. Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 209-210, 213-214, 224-226; also Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., p. 31 *et seq.*

† See Ramsey, *American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 395-400.

derogatory to the honor of an independent nation. The acts of the British Parliament, the commission from your sovereign, and your letter, suppose the people of these States to be the subjects of the crown of Great Britain, and are founded on the idea of dependence, which is utterly inadmissible. I am further directed to inform your Excellencies, that Congress are inclined to peace, notwithstanding the unjust claims from which this war originated, and the savage manner in which it hath been conducted. They will therefore be ready to enter upon the consideration of a treaty of peace and commerce, not inconsistent with treaties already subsisting, when the king of Great Britain shall demonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose. The only solid proof of this disposition will be an explicit acknowledgment of these States, or the withdrawing of his fleet and armies." *

On October 3 the commissioners published a final manifesto to the American people, to which on the 10th Congress replied by a cautionary declaration. Thacher in his *Military Journal* (p. 139) says that "Governor Johnstone, one of the commissioners, with inexcusable effrontery, offered a bribe to Mr. Reed, a member

of Congress. In an interview with Mrs. Ferguson at Philadelphia, whose husband [Hugh Ferguson] was a royalist, he desired she should mention to Mr. Reed, that if he would engage his interest to promote the object of their commission, he might have any office in the colonies, in the gift of his Britannic majesty, and ten thousand pounds in hand. Having solicited an interview with Mr. Reed, Mrs. Ferguson made her communication. Spurning the idea of being purchased, he replied, 'that he was not worth purchasing, but such as he was the king of Great Britain was not rich enough to do it.' " *

No overtures, however, were made to the commissioners from any quarter, and though they made many and various attempts to accomplish the object of their mission, they were finally compelled to return to England baffled and disappointed.†

* *Journals of Congress*, vol. ii., pp. 345, 521-524, 588-592; Ramsey, *American Revolution*, vol. i., p. 402; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 165-168. Patrick Henry in a letter to Richard Henry Lee on June 18 says: "Surely Congress will never recede from our French friends. Salvation to America depends upon holding fast our attachment to them. I shall date our ruin from the moment that it is exchanged for anything Great Britain can say or do. She can never be cordial with us. Baffled, defeated, disgraced by her colonies, she will ever meditate revenge. We can find no safety but in her ruin, or, at least, in her extreme humiliation; which has not happened and cannot happen, until she is deluged with blood, or thoroughly purged by a revolution, which shall wipe from existence the present king with his connections, and the present system with those who aid and abet it."—Tyler, *Life of Patrick Henry*, p. 227; Lee, *Life of Richard Henry Lee*, vol. i., pp. 195-196; Henry, *Life of Patrick Henry*, vol. i., p. 565.

* See Reed, *Life of Joseph Reed*, vol. i., p. 384 *et seq.*; Mrs. Ellett, *Women of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 196; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 144-145.

† Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 170 *et seq.*. Lord Carlisle, in writing to a friend, said: "I enclose you our manifesto which you will never read. 'Tis sort of a dying speech of the commission: an effort from which I expect little success. * * * Everything is upon a great scale upon this continent. The rivers are immense; the climate violent in heat and cold; the prospects magnificent; the thunder and lightning tremendous. The disorders incident to the country make every constitution tremble. We have nothing on a great scale with us but our blunders, our misconduct, our losses, our disgraces and misfortunes, that will mark the reign of a prince, who deserves better treatment and kinder fortunes."—Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 440-441.

CHAPTER XX.

1777-1778.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND FINANCES.

Franklin's plan of confederation between the colonies — Debates upon it in Congress — Need of confederation evident — Articles finally adopted for recommendation to States — Circular letter of Congress — Its adoption by the States — Loans authorized — Depreciation of currency — Attempt to regulate prices — Loyalists' property sold — Returns meagre — Cause of high prices. — Appendix to Chapter XX — Articles of Confederation.

Meanwhile Congress had taken a step of the highest importance. It had long since become plainly evident that some form of confederation between the States was necessary; and immediately after declaring independence, Congress took the matter under consideration. As early as July 12, 1775, Franklin had introduced in Congress a sketch of some articles of confederation between the colonies which he thought ought to be adopted. "His plan was perfectly simple; it proposed little more than to make the existing state of things perpetual; each colony to retain its internal independence, but to confide to a Congress, annually elected, its external affairs, particularly the measures of resistance to ministerial oppression. The supreme executive authority of the confederacy, he proposed, should be vested in a council of twelve, elected by the Congress. All the British colonies, including *Ireland*, Canada, the West Indies, Bermuda, Nova Scotia, Florida, and the thirteen already represented, should be invited to join. The Union

was to last until Great Britain should cease to oppress, and make restitution for past injuries; failing which, it should endure forever. This Plan of Union, it appears, was referred to a Committee, and it may have been discussed by the House. It was not acted upon; the time was not ripe for it, and the conservative members were aware that the very idea of a union of the colonies was, of all things, the most abominable in the eyes of George III., whom the House had just humbly petitioned."* On June 7, 1776, a committee consisting of one member from each colony was appointed to prepare a plan of confederation and report it to Congress. On July 12, eight days after the Declaration of Independence, this committee reported, and the scheme they proposed was debated in Committee of the Whole almost daily until August 20, when a new draft was reported.† Nothing was done at this

* Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., p. 86.

† See the *Secret Journals of Congress*, vol. i., pp. 290-315; Jefferson's *Works*, vol. i., pp. 26-35; John Adams, *Works*, vol. ii., pp. 492-502, vol. iii., p. 61 *et seq.*; Curtis, *Constitutional History*, vol.

time, however, and the entire matter was dropped, not being taken up again until April of the following year (1777). To agree upon any set form by which the colonies could operate together was difficult, chiefly because of the variety of interests involved and the tenacious regard for State rights and State sovereignty entertained by the various colonies.* Nevertheless, it was plain that something must be done, for under the present conditions Congress had no powers or rights for carrying out its resolves, except in so far as the States themselves chose to recognize them. Congress could not efficiently discharge the duties expected of it, and interest in its affairs was gradually declining, so that if something were not done immediately, it would soon become a negligible quantity in the affairs of the country.

Consequently, in October, 1777, after Congress had been compelled to retire to Yorktown, the Articles of Federation were taken under consideration and debated day after day until the middle of November.† After

the various provisions of the Articles had been scrutinized and discussed from every viewpoint, they were adopted for recommendation to the States,* and the following circular letter was sent out, urging that the various legislatures adopt them:

"In Congress, Yorktown, November 17th, 1777.

"Congress having agreed upon a plan of confederacy for securing the freedom, sovereignty, and independence of the United States, authentic copies are now transmitted for the consideration of the respective legislatures.

"The business, equally intricate and important, has in its progress been attended with uncommon embarrassments and delay, which the most anxious solicitude and persevering diligence could not prevent. To form a permanent union, accommodated to the opinion and wishes of the delegates of so many states differing in habits, produce, commerce, and internal police, was found to be a work which nothing but time and reflection, conspiring with a disposition to conciliate, could mature and accomplish.

"Hardly is it to be expected that any plan, in the variety of provisions essential to our union, should exactly correspond with the maxims and political views of every particular state. Let it be remarked that, after the most careful inquiry and the fullest information, this is proposed as the best which could be adapted to the circumstances of all, and as that alone which affords any tolerable prospect of general satisfaction.

"Permit us, then, earnestly to recommend these articles to the immediate and dispassionate attention of the legislatures of the respective states. Let them be candidly reviewed under a sense of the difficulty of combining in one general system the various sentiments and interests of a continent divided into so many sovereign and independent communities, under a conviction of the absolute necessity of uniting all our counsels and all our strength to maintain and defend our common liberties; let them be examined with a liberality becoming brethren and fellow-citizens surrounded by the same imminent dangers, contending for the same illustrious prize, and deeply interested in

i., pp. 36-37; Ford's ed. of *Jefferson's Writings*, vol. i., p. 38 *et seq.*

* Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 10-15. See also Thorpe, *The Story of the Constitution*, p. 75 *et seq.*

† On the debates, the duties and work of Congress, and State sovereignty in general, see the illuminating chapter on "State Sovereignty and Confederation" in Van Tyne, *American Revolution*, pp. 175-202. See also Morse, *John Adams*; A. W. Small, *The Beginning of American Nationality*, in *J. H. U. Studies*, 8th series, nos. i.-ii.; the *Journals of Congress*; John Adams, *Familiar Letters*; Harley, *Life of Charles Thomson*; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 199-208; Curtis, *Constitutional*

History, vol. i., pp. 78-79. See also Justice Story, *Commentaries on the Constitution*, vol. i., p. 162 *et seq.* (5th ed., 1891).

* See Appendix at the end of the present chapter.

being forever bound and connected together by ties the most intimate and indissoluble; and, finally, let them be adjusted with the temper and magnanimity of wise and patriotic legislators, who, while they are concerned for the prosperity of their more immediate circle, and capable of rising superior to local attachments when they may be incompatible with the safety, happiness, and glory of the general confederacy.

"We have reason to regret the time which has elapsed in preparing this plan for consideration; with additional solicitude, we look forward to that which must be necessarily spent before it can be ratified. Every motive loudly calls upon us to hasten its conclusion.

"More than any other consideration, it will confound our foreign enemies, defeat the flagitious practices of the disaffected, strengthen and confirm our friends, support our public credit, restore the value of our money, enable us to maintain our fleets and armies, and add weight and respect to our counsels at home and to our treaties abroad.

"In short, this salutary measure can no longer be deferred. It seems essential to our very existence as a free people, and without it, we may soon be constrained to bid adieu to independence, to liberty, and to safety—blessings which, from the justice of our cause, and the favor of our Almighty Creator visibly manifested in our protection, we have reason to expect, if, in a humble dependence on his divine providence, we strenuously exert the means which are placed in our power.

"To conclude, if the legislature of any state shall not be assembled, Congress recommend to the executive authority to convene it without delay; and to each respective legislature, it is recommended to invest its delegates with competent laws ultimately, in the name and behalf of the state, to subscribe Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union of the United States; and to attend Congress for that purpose on or before the tenth day of March next [1778]."

The Articles were then adopted by the various State legislatures. For some time the smaller States, such as

Rhode Island,* Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey, hesitated to adopt them, principally because the question as to whom the western territory of the United States belonged was not yet settled. Finally, however, this question was settled to the satisfaction of all concerned as will be explained later, chiefly through the obstinate course of Maryland, which State refused to ratify the Articles until the western claims had been ceded to the Confederation. All the States had ratified the Articles by March 1, 1781.

The condition of the finances at this time was a subject for most earnest deliberation. Early in the year, \$10,000,000 of new bills had been authorized and \$2,000,000 were added in August. Anxious to maintain a surplus in the treasury without further issues, Congress had pressed the subject of loans, and in order to induce lenders to bring forth money, had offered to pay the interest on all money advanced before March, 1778, in bills drawn on their commissioners in France. This inducement, however, availed little, and in November, 1777, it became necessary to authorize \$1,000,000 in Continental bills, and in December \$1,000,000 more, thus making the total amount issued up to the end of the year \$34,000,000. Meanwhile the depreciation had become alarming, the bills which in the early part of the year had been

* Curtis, *Constitutional History*, vol. i., pp. 699-700. For the articles themselves see pp. 713-719. See also for text of articles MacDonald, *Select Documents*, pp. 6-15; Thorpe, *Federal and State Constitutions*, vol. i., pp. 9-17.

* See Bates, *Rhode Island in the Formation of the Union*, pp. 67-71.

nearly at par, now sinking to three or four for one.* Congress therefore looked abroad for aid, instructing their commissioners in France and Spain to exert their utmost endeavors to obtain loans.†

In addition, the scheme for regulating prices by law also proved a failure, and a convention of delegates from New England and New York, which had met at Springfield in July to adopt measures for the defence of Rhode Island and for an attack on Newport, recommended that the acts regulating prices be repealed. It was urged that laws be enacted as substitutes prohibiting the accumulation of stocks in the hands of merchants and speculators. The convention suggested also the redemption of all State issues, and the levying of taxes for the support of the war. Upon receiving the proceedings of this convention, Congress acknowledged that the issues of paper were excessive and urged the several States to raise \$5,000,000 by taxation for the use of the Continental treasury during the ensuing year.‡ Congress recommended also that the States refrain from issuing more bills of credit; that they redeem those already issued; and that in future the State expenses be met by taxes levied within the year. It was proposed, too, that early in the

next year three committees should meet (one for the eight northern States, another for Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, and the third for South Carolina and Georgia) for the purpose of fixing a new scale of prices, which would be enforced by the several State legislatures, the Continental commissaries being allowed to seize goods at those prices when those who held superfluous stocks refused to sell them.*

Congress further recommended that all property belonging to persons "who had forfeited the right to the protection of their several states" be sold and that the proceeds be invested in loan-office certificates. Several of the States followed this advice, but the financial returns were meagre and the loans operated chiefly to enrich speculators and to allow some to gratify their desire for personal vengeance.

The condition of the army also compelled Congress to recommend that acts be passed authorizing the seizure of all woollens, blankets, stockings, shoes, hats, and all stock and provisions that were for sale, for which receipts were to be given, and to inflict penalties upon all persons who refused to allow such seizure. In order to prevent any from procuring "enormous gains," it was recommended that the number of retail traders be limited and that these be bonded for the proper observance of

* Early in 1777, Pennsylvania by law recognized the depreciation to the extent of 33½ per cent. Phillips, *American Paper Currency*, vol. i., p. 33.

† Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 227.

‡ Baneroft, vol. v., p. 291.

* Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 227-228; Baneroft, vol. v., p. 291.

the laws made for their regulation. Congress was conscious of the arbitrary harshness of these measures, but recently it had been ascertained that some traders were reaping enormous profits from their sales to the hard pressed and needy government, and Congress felt that "laws unworthy the character of infant republics are become necessary to supply the defects of public virtue, and to correct the vices of some of her sons." *

Probably the chief causes of the high prices were the increased expenditures of the government, the great depreciation in the value of

paper money, and the scarcity of manufactured goods, particularly blankets and clothing, due to the interruption of commerce and the non-arrival of expected goods from France. The Continental treasury had been depleted by the sum of about \$25,000,000, in specie value, which was larger by \$5,000,000 than the total for the two preceding years. The States had made large advances in paper money, and otherwise, which more than balanced the outgo from the Continental treasury, but these advances burdened the States with heavy debts, and they were unable to continue them.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.

To all whom these presents shall come, we, the undersigned, delegates of the states affixed to our names send greeting.

WHEREAS, the delegates of the United States of America in Congress assembled, did, on the fifteenth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-seven, and in the second year of the independence of America, agree to certain Articles of Confedera-

tion and perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, in the words following, viz.:—

Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.

ARTICLE 1. The style of this confederacy shall be, "The United States of America."

ARTICLE 2. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.

ARTICLE 3. The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each

other, for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare; binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever.

ARTICLE 4. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship, and intercourse among the people of the different states in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice, excepted, shall

* Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 229-230. See also Oberholtzer, *Life of Morris*, pp. 48-51.

be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any state to any other state, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction, shall be laid by any state on the property of the United States or either of them.

If any person guilty of or charged with treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor, in any state, shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the governor or executive power of the state from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the state having jurisdiction of his offence.

Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other state.

ARTICLE 5. For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each state to recall its delegates or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year.

No state shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor by more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emoluments of any kind.

Each state shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of the states, and while they act as members of the committee of the states.

In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each state shall have one vote.

Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress; and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from and attendance on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.

ARTICLE 6. No state, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty, with any king, prince, or state; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the United States in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility.

No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever, between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into and how long it shall continue.

No state shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the courts of France and Spain.

No vessel of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any state, except such number only as shall be deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled for the defence of such state or its trade; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any state in time of peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such state; but every state shall always keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and have constantly ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field-pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage.

No state shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless such state be actually invaded by enemies or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such state, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in Congress assembled can be consulted; nor shall any state grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled and then only against the kingdom or state, and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States in Congress as-

sembled, unless such state be infested by pirates in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine otherwise.

ARTICLE 7. When land forces are raised by any state for the common defence, all officers of or under the rank of colonel, shall be appointed by the legislature of each state respectively, by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such state shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the state which first made the appointment.

ARTICLE 8. All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the value of all land within each state granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled shall from time to time direct and appoint.

The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states, within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled.

ARTICLE 9. The United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article; of sending and receiving ambassadors; entering into treaties and alliances—provided, that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever; of establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated; of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace, appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures—provided, that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said courts.

The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes

and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever; which authority shall always be exercised in the manner following: whenever the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent of any state in controversy with another shall present a petition to Congress, stating the matter in question, and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative or executive authority of the other state in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties, by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent commissioners or judges, to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question; but if they cannot agree, Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of Congress, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges, who shall hear the cause, shall agree in the determination: and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing reasons which Congress shall judge sufficient, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each state, and the secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing; and the judgment and sentence of the court to be appointed in the manner before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive, and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to appear, or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence or judgment, which shall in like manner be final and decisive, the judgment or sentence and other proceedings, being in either case transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress for the security of the parties concerned: provided, that every commissioner, before he sits in judgment, shall take an oath, to be administered by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of the state, where the cause shall be tried, "well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of reward:" provided also, that no state shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States.

All controversies concerning the private right of soil, claimed under different grants of two or more states, whose jurisdictions, as they may respect such lands and the states which passed such grants are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction, shall, on the petition of either party to the Congress of the United States, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between different states.

The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective states—fixing the standard of weights and measures throughout the United States—regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians not members of any of the states; provided that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated—establishing and regulating post-offices from one state to another throughout all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers passing through the same, as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said office—appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of the United States excepting regimental officers—appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United States—making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their operations.

The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee to sit in the recess of Congress, to be denominated “a committee of the states,” and to consist of one delegate from each state; and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States, under their direction—to appoint one of their number to preside, provided that no person be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one year in any term of three years—to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses—to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half-year to the respective states an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted—to build and equip a navy—to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each state for its quota, in pro-

portion to the number of white inhabitants in such state; which requisition shall be binding, and thereupon the legislature of each state shall appoint the regimental officers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip them, in a soldier-like manner, at the expense of the United States; and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled: but if the United States in Congress assembled, shall, on consideration of circumstances, judge proper that any state should not raise men or should raise a smaller number than its quota, and that any other state should raise a greater number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped, in the same manner as the quota of such state, unless the legislature of such state shall judge that such extra number cannot safely be spared out of the same; in which case they shall raise, officer, clothe, arm, and equip, as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared. And the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled.

The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defence and welfare of the United States or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army or navy, unless nine states assent to the same; nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the United States in Congress assembled.

The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the space of six months; and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each state on any question shall be entered on the journal, when it is desired by any delegate; and the delegates of a state or any of

them, at his or their request, shall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal, except such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the several states.

ARTICLE 10. The committee of the states, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United States in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine states, shall from time to time, think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be delegated to the said committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine states in the Congress of the United States assembled is requisite.

ARTICLE 11. Canada, acceding to this confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to, all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same unless such admission be agreed to by nine states.

ARTICLE 12. All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, and debts contracted, by or under the authority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged.

ARTICLE 13. Every state shall abide by the decision of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which, by this confederation, are submitted to them. And the articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterward confirmed by the legislature of every state.

And whereas it has pleased the great Governor of the world to incline the hearts of the legislatures we respectively represent in Congress, to approve of and to authorize us to ratify the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union: *know ye*, that we, the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given for that purpose, do, by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, and all and singular the matters and things therein contained; and we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which, by the said con-

federation, are submitted to them; and that the articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by the states we respectively represent; and that the Union be perpetual.

In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands, in Congress. Done at Philadelphia, in the state of Pennsylvania, the ninth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight, and in the third year of the independence of America.

New Hampshire.

JOSIAH BARTLETT, JOHN WENTWORTH, JR.

Massachusetts Bay.

JOHN HANCOCK, FRANCIS DANA,
SAMUEL ADAMS, JAMES LOVELL,
ELBRIDGE GERRY, SAMUEL HOLTEN.

Rhode Island.

WILLIAM ELLERY, JOHN COLLINS.
HENRY MARCHANT,

Connecticut.

ROGER SHERMAN, OLIVER WOLCOTT,
SAMUEL HUNTING- ANDREW ADAMS.
TON, TITUS HOSMER,

New York.

JAMES DUANE, WILLIAM DUER,
FRANCIS LEWIS, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS.

New Jersey.

JOHN WITHER- NATH. SCUDDER.
SPOON,

Pennsylvania.

ROBERT MORRIS, WILLIAM CLINGAN,
DANIEL ROBER- JOSEPH REED.
DEAU,
JONATH. BAYARD
SMITH,

Delaware.

THOMAS M'KEAN, NICHOLAS VAN DYKE.
JOHN DICKINSON,

Maryland.

JOHN HANSON, DANIEL CARROLL.

Virginia.

RICHARD HENRY JOHN HARVIE,
LEE, FRANCIS LIGHTFOOT
JOHN BANISTER, LEE.
THOMAS ADAMS,

South Carolina.

HENRY LAURENS, JOHN MATTHEWS,
WILLIAM HENRY RICHARD HUTSON,
DRAYTON, THOMAS HEYWARD, JR.

North Carolina.

JOHN PENN, JOHN WILLIAMS.
CONSTABLE HARNETT,

Georgia.

JOHN WALTON, ED. LANGWORTHY.
EDWARD TELFAIR,

CHAPTER XXI.

1778.

CLINTON EVACUATES PHILADELPHIA AND RETREATS ACROSS JERSEY.

Straitened conditions of the British army at Philadelphia — Mawhood's foraging expedition — Howe succeeded in command by Clinton — Lafayette's escape at Barren Hill — Clinton ordered to evacuate Philadelphia — Arnold takes possession — Comparison of the two armies — Washington at Hopewell — The battle of Monmouth — Retreat of the British to New York — Losses in the battle — Court-martial of General Lee.

The position of the British army in Philadelphia had not been the most comfortable, for during the winter and spring of 1778 Washington had been quite active in cutting off forage and fresh provisions. A large number of the people of Pennsylvania favored the British cause and were desirous of supplying the troops with fresh provisions; others, though favoring the patriot cause, were only too willing to take their produce to the British camp, where they received gold and silver in payment, rather than to the American camp, where nothing but certificates of uncertain value could be had.* But because of Washington's activities, it was not easy nor safe to go to Philadelphia. Several bodies of troops, chiefly the light cavalry under Henry Lee, and

the troops under Wayne, were sent out to intercept the farmers on their way to Philadelphia, and these troops not only took the provisions without payment, but often inflicted corporal punishment.* Consequently, during the early part of 1778, the British undertook to procure supplies for the army by predatory expeditions. About the middle of March, 1778, Lieutenant-colonel Mawhood and Colonel (afterward Lieutenant-colonel) J. Graves Simcoe, with a strong detachment, made a foraging expedition into New Jersey in the vicinity of Salem. Acting in accordance with the proclamation of the royal commissioners that the horrors of war would be increased unless the colo-

* Van Tyne, *American Revolution*, p. 244; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 130 *et seq.*

* Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., p. 557; Ford's edition of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 249, 295, 367-368; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 52-65 (ed. 1788); Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 343-344; Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, p. 130 *et seq.*

nies submitted, the troops comprising this expedition murdered some 50 or 60 of the militia and returned to Philadelphia with little loss.* Two months later, on May 4, a detachment of British encountered a small body of militia at Crooked Billet, seventeen miles from Philadelphia, but the Americans succeeded in escaping with only the loss of their baggage. On May 7 the British sent an expedition against the galleys and other ships which had escaped up the Delaware at the time of the capture of Mud Island, and a large number of vessels were destroyed, and some stores and provisions captured.† Because of their superiority in numbers and equipment, the British were able to undertake these expeditions and to send out numerous detachments to various points without fear of capture, while on the other hand, the movements of the militia were often tardy and inefficient. Because of their small numbers, the American army could not properly guard the roads, and the British were able to conduct their foraging expeditions and return to Philadelphia before an adequate force of Americans could be assembled to attack them.

In October, 1777, Howe had sent his resignation to the British ministry, but not until the spring of 1778 was it accepted, when Sir Henry Clinton

was appointed to succeed him. Upon his departure from Philadelphia, Howe was given a magnificent farewell entertainment.* Soon afterward, being quite certain that the British were preparing to evacuate Philadelphia, Washington ordered Lafayette to cross the Schuylkill with 2,200 troops and take post at Barren Hill, about twelve miles in front of the army at Valley Forge.† Lafayette picketed all the roads by which it was probable that the enemy would approach. About two miles to the left of his headquarters was White-marsh, where a number of roads formed a junction, and to guard these roads the Marquis had dispatched some militia, who, however, never went.‡ Having placed his guards, Lafayette directed a Quaker in the vicinity to provide him lodgings for the night. Inferring that Lafayette intended to stay there, the Quaker sent information of Lafayette's situation to the British. The latter thereupon determined to surprise Lafayette, and on May 19 General Grant, with about 5,000 men and a number of cannon, set out from Philadelphia.

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 122, 139-143; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 282 *et seq.*; Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 242-252, 716. See also André's description of the Mischianza, in Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 97 *et seq.* On the subsequent investigation of his conduct of the war, see Fisher, pp. 149-157.

† See his instructions to Lafayette in Sparks' ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., p. 368, and in Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 326-328.


‡ Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., p. 329.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 138-140.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 13.

Taking the Frankford road and crossing the country through the old York road and Whitemarsh, Grant, the next morning, entered the road on which the Marquis had stationed his camp, about two miles in his rear, at Plymouth meeting-house. The only ford by which Lafayette could retreat was Matson's Ford on the Schnylkill, about a mile and a quarter distant, and about two miles from Barren Hill church. Detaching some troops to take the Marquis in front, Grant, instead of securing this ford and then cutting off Lafayette's retreat, marched down the main road. Lafayette thereupon retreated by the road leading from Barren Hill church to Matson's Ford, and had nearly effected his retreat before the enemy were aware of the error they had committed. Doubling their pace, the British attempted to overtake Lafayette's troops, but before they came up with his rear, all the Americans had crossed and formed in battle order on the other side. Lafayette's loss was not more than nine men. Of Lafayette's danger the American army had received early information and adopted several expedients to distract the attacking forces. Some of the heaviest artillery was fired in the hope that the sound of it would be carried to the British, who might think that the whole American army was approaching. Evidently this was the case, for Grant hastily beat his way back to Philadelphia, seemingly under the apprehension that his small

body of troops were about to be attacked by the whole American army. Had he marched to Matson's Ford, and secured it, not only would he have entirely cut off Lafayette, but would have compelled him either to surrender or to have lost his entire



force in battle, which would have endangered the whole army.*

The probability that France would send a fleet to aid the Americans caused the British ministry great concern. Consequently, Sir Henry

* Tower, *Marquis de Lafayette*, vol. i., pp. 330-338; Bancroft, vol. v., p. 270; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 405-407; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 144-148; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 121-123. See also Wayne's account of this in Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, pp. 139-141; Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. v., p. 377.

Clinton was ordered to evacuate Philadelphia as soon as possible and to send a portion of his forces to aid in making a descent upon the French possessions in the West Indies. The remainder of his troops were to be stationed at New York.* Shipping part of his troops, Clinton began the march through New Jersey with the main body of the army, starting from Philadelphia on June 18, 1778.† Hardly had he evacuated the city when Arnold with a small detachment entered to take possession. A few days afterward Congress also retreated to the city.‡

At this time the British army in Philadelphia, New York, and Rhode Island numbered approximately 33,000 men,|| while the American force did not exceed 15,000, nor was it probable that it could have been raised to more than 20,000 effective men. The Council of War supposed that Howe's force numbered but 10,000 men; nevertheless they were reluctant to enter upon offensive operations, and with the exception of Washington and possibly two or three others, all the generals were opposed to attacking the British with

the object of bringing on a general engagement. Lee even declared it to be "criminal" to risk a battle with an enemy so superior in discipline and strength.* Most of the foreign officers concurred in this opinion, and Washington felt obliged to yield to the opinion of the majority of his council in a matter of so great importance.†

Some time previously, with the object of impeding the march of the British as much as possible, Washington had detached General Maxwell, with the Jersey brigade, across the Delaware to coöperate with General Philemon Dickinson with the Jersey militia in destroying bridges, felling trees across the roads, etc., as had been done at Saratoga, but Dickinson was ordered to guard against a sudden attack.‡ There were two roads leading from Philadelphia to New York; one running along the western bank of the Delaware to the ferry at Trenton, while the other followed the eastern bank to the same point. Unmolested by the American army, the British crossed the Delaware at Gloucester Point, and had taken the road leading along the eastern bank. Clinton carried with him a large quantity of baggage and pro-

* Bancroft, vol. v., p. 272.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 368-371.

‡ Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 222.

|| Carrington gives the figures at 33,756 — 19,530 at Philadelphia, 10,456 at New York, and 3,770 at Rhode Island — *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 411. Bancroft says Howe's force at Philadelphia amounted to about 17,000; Lafayette says 14,000, while Washington says between 9,000 and 10,000. See note in Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 176.

* Bancroft, vol. v., p. 274; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 347-348.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 373-374; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 100; Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, p. 159.

‡ Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., p. 348; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 147; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. ii., p. 445.

visions, so that the progress of the army, thus heavily encumbered, was exceedingly slow, and it did not reach Crosswicks and Allentown until June 24, having marched less than 40 miles in seven days.* It seemed to the Americans that Clinton's slow progress was intentional, with the purpose of drawing the Americans into a general engagement. On Clinton's approach, General Maxwell, who was posted at Mount Holly, retired, and neither he nor Dickinson was able to give the British much trouble. Thus far the British army had marched up the Delaware at only a short distance from the river, and Washington, who had left Valley Forge on the day that Clinton evacuated Philadelphia, found it necessary to take a circuitous route, and pass the river higher up at Coryell's Ferry. Crossing this on June 22, Washington stationed himself at Hopewell, where he remained throughout the 23d. From Allentown to New York were two roads; the left of which passed through South Amboy to the Hudson, while the right led to Monmouth and Sandy Hook. The first of these two roads was the shorter, but it was crossed by the Raritan, and as it would be difficult and dangerous to pass this river if

opposed by the enemy, Clinton determined to take the longer road.*

At Hopewell, Washington once more asked the advice of the Council of War. Lee again expressed the same opinion regarding the attack on the British and his opinion carried great weight in the Council. But Washington decided not to follow the advice of the Council and to act on his own initiative, deeming the reputation of the army in a measure involved, and knowing that the country expected that he would make an attack of some kind upon the British.† Washington could not be persuaded that the chances were so much against him as had been suggested by Lee and others. On receiving word that Sir Henry Clinton was proceeding by the right road to Monmouth Court-House, Washington sent forward 1,000 men under General Wayne, and directed General Lafayette to take command of the left flank, ordering him to attack the enemy's rear upon the first favorable opportunity.‡ Lee had been offered command of this corps, but had declined it. The whole

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 147-148.

† Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 179-181; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., p. 350; Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, p. 141 *et seq.*; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 101; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 148; Sparks, *Life of Washington*, pp. 271-273.

‡ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 414; Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, p. 144; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 352-353. His instructions to Lafayette are in Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. v., p. 417.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 413. Lowell says that on the 25th of June nearly a third of the Hessians were overcome by the heat and that there were many desertions — *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 213. See also Knox's letters of June 25 and 29 in Brooks, *Life of Knox*, pp. 119, 121.

army followed at a short distance behind the advance corps and reached Cranberry the next morning. Upon learning of the approach of the Americans, Clinton sent his baggage to the front and placed his grenadiers, light infantry, and chasseurs in the rear. Washington then sent forward two more brigades to the advance corps and dispatched General Lee, who for some reason now desired to have the command, to take charge of the whole advance corps.* On the morning of June 28 Lee was ordered to move on and attack, "unless there should be very powerful reasons to the contrary."† Washington followed with the main army to support the advance corps. When he had marched about five miles, he found the whole of the advance corps in full retreat, by Lee's orders, without having made any appreciable attempt to defeat the British.‡ Wash-

ington was astounded at the sudden change and asked Lee to explain. Lee replied with warmth and in very unsuitable language, and in turn was reproved in much stronger language than it was generally supposed Washington could use.* The regiments of Colonel Walter Stewart, William Irvine and Thomas Craig, together with the Virginia and Maryland regiments, were ordered to form on a piece of ground deemed suitable for checking the advance of the enemy.† Washington then asked Lee if he would take command on that ground, and he promptly consented. He was ordered to use the utmost diligence in checking the advance of the enemy, to which he replied, "Your orders shall be obeyed, and I will not be the first to leave the field."‡ Washington next rode to the main army, which was

* Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., p. 356 *et seq.*; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 59-61; Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 73-75. For an exposition of the reasons for Lee's change of heart, see Johnson, *General Washington*, pp. 198-199.

† See the extracts from testimony regarding orders given prior to the battle cited in Carrington, pp. 422-432. See also *New York Historical Society Collections*, 1873, vol. ii., p. 443, vol. iii., pp. 7-8; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 366-369; Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 274 *et seq.*



‡ On the various skirmishes see Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 369-381; Carrington, pp. 433-438; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 148-152. Fisher seems to think that Lee was not at fault in the measures he took.—*Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 183-185. See also the report of Wayne and Scott, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol.

ii., pp. 150-152; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 376-378.

* See Irving's *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 454-455; Fiske, vol. ii., pp. 62-64; *New York Historical Society Collections*, 1873, vol. iii., pp. 81, 112, 147, 156, 191; Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 230; *Pennsylvania Magazine of History*, vol. ii., p. 141; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 382-384. Tower, however (p. 389) says there is no evidence that Washington expressed violent feeling toward Lee or that he reproached him with angry words. However, had Washington known that the British commander was at this very moment acting on the plan that Lee himself had drawn up to destroy Washington, he probably would have expressed his feelings in much harsher language than he is reported to have used.

† Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, pp. 146-147.

‡ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 441; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 154; Johnson, *General Washington*, pp. 201-202.




1. THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH.
2. SERGEANT MOLLY AT THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

formed with the utmost expedition.* A sharp artillery duel now began between the British and American forces, and the advance troops of the two armies also opened up with their small arms. The Americans stood their ground until they had become intermixed with a part of the British army. Lee continued on

made a movement to the right, but in this they were also unsuccessful, as their design was frustrated by Greene's artillery.* Wayne advanced with a body of troops and maintained so well directed a fire that the British were soon compelled to give way,† retiring to the position which had been previously occupied

The Battle of Monmouth.



A. Position of British night before battle. B. British detachment moving toward Monmouth. C. British batteries. D. Oswald's American batteries. E. American troops formed near courthouse. F. Lee's first position in retreat. G. Attack by party of British in woods. H. Positions taken by Lee. I. British detachment. K. Last position of retreating troops. M. Army formed by Washington after he met Lee retreating. N. British detachment. O. American battery. P. Principal action. R. First position of British after action. S. Second position. T. British passed night after battle. U. Where Washington met Lee retreating. V. Hedge row. W. Meeting-house.

the field of battle until the last, and brought off the rear of the retreating troops. Meanwhile on the left wing Lord Stirling had effectually stopped the advance of the British. General Greene advantageously posted his troops on the right of Lord Stirling, and when the British attempted to turn the left flank, they were repulsed.† They also

by General Lee, Washington now resolved to attack them, and ordered General William Woodford to move around upon their left and General Enoch Poor to their right; but before the troops could get into position,

by the animation produced by the vexation of the morning, gave him the air best calculated to excite enthusiasm."

* Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 379-380.

† Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, pp. 147-148, 152-153; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 441-443; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 19-24; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 131-151; Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 80-81, 88-89, 94-96; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, pp. 156-157.

* F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 102.

† Speaking of this battle, Lafayette says: "Never was General Washington greater in war than in this action. His presence stopped the retreat. His dispositions fixed the victory. His fine appearance on horseback, his calm courage, roused

night had fallen, which prevented further operations.* These troops remained on the field of action during the night, with the intention of making an attack early next morning, and the main army also slept upon their arms to be ready to support them.† Washington himself, after discussing the events of the battle with Lafayette,‡ slept on his coat under a tree, in the hope of renewing the action the next day.

The British, however, did not wish to risk another battle, and in the night marched away in such silence that even General Poor, though he lay very near them, knew nothing of their departure.¶ They left behind them several officers and a number of wounded soldiers who could not be removed, though their other wounded were carried off.§ They continued on their retreat without further interruption until they had reached Sandy Hook, and on July 6 the entire army was safe in New York.¶ Washington decided that it would be inexpedient to further pursue the British army and soon drew off his troops to the

vicinity of the Hudson River. The loss of the Americans in the battle in killed, wounded, and missing, was about 360, while the British loss, including prisoners, was about 400, although in this battle, as in the majority of those fought in the Revolution, there is great discrepancy in the losses reported by both commanders.* The battle had been fought with bravery and skill, and had General Lee acted otherwise, the British forces might have been totally defeated. As it was, however, the result of the battle was quite satisfactory to the Americans, for they had compelled the British army to beat a hasty retreat, without committing any of the depredations that marked their march across the same territory toward Philadelphia. Upon receiving news of the battle, Congress resolved "that their thanks be given to General Washington for the activity with which he marched from the camp at Valley Forge in pursuit of the enemy; for his distinguished exertions in forming the line of battle; and for his great good conduct in leading on the attack, and gaining the important victory of Monmouth, over the British grand army, under the command of General Sir Henry Clinton, in their march from Philadelphia to New York."

Probably Washington would never again have thought of Lee's conduct

* Carrington, p. 444; Lossing, p. 157.

† As an instance of the intense heat of the day, it is stated that 59 British soldiers perished without a wound; and several of the American soldiers died from the same cause.

‡ Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 380; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 460.

¶ See Washington's report to Congress quoted in Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 387-388.

§ Brooks, *Life of Knox*, p. 121.

¶ Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 264, 273-274; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 154 (ed. 1788); Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. vii., p. 97.

* See Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 444; Fisher, *Struggles for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 186.

on the field of battle had not Lee himself revived the discussion regarding it. He was highly indignant at the terms used by the commander-in-chief during the battle and subsequently wrote him two letters regarding this, couched in very strong terms.* As a result, he was brought before a court-martial, at his own request, to determine whether his conduct had been according to the rules of war, or had been unbecoming an officer and prejudicial to the service. The charges against him were as follows: "1st. Disobedience of orders in not attacking the enemy on the 28th of June according to repeated instructions. 2d. Misbehavior before the enemy on the same day, by making an unnecessary, disorderly and shameful retreat.† 3d. Disrespect to

the commander-in-chief in two letters dated the 1st of July and the 28th of June."* The hearing before the court was long and tedious; Lee was finally found guilty and sentenced to be suspended from any command in the armies of the United States for a period of one year; but the second charge was softened by the court which found him guilty of misbehavior before the enemy by making an unnecessary, and in some few instances, a disorderly retreat.† After some hesitation, Congress approved the sentence of the court and Lee thereupon left the army never again to join it. His career closed with his death at Philadelphia, October 2, 1782.

* Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 467.

* See *New York Historical Society Collections*, vol. iii., p. 99 (1873). See also Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 464 *et seq.*

† Chief Justice Marshall, speaking of Lee's defence before the court, says, "He suggested a variety of reasons in justification of his retreat, which, if they do not absolutely establish its propriety, give it so questionable a form as to render it probable that a public examination never would have taken place, could his proud spirit have stooped to offer explanation, instead of outrage, to the commander-in-chief."

† On the court-martial and Lee's conduct in general, see the proceedings of the trial in vol. iii., of the *New York Historical Society Collections*, 1873, and the various items, opinions, etc., in vols. ii. and iv. of the same, also in Henry Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. i.; Gordon's *American Revolution*, vol. iii. (ed. 1788); La Fayette's *Memoirs and Correspondence*, vol. i.; John Laurens, *Army Correspondence* (Bradford Club series no. 7, 1867); George H. Moore, *Treason of Charles Lee*; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 189-197; Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 382-383.

CHAPTER XXII.

1778.

FRENCH FLEET ARRIVES: OPERATIONS IN RHODE ISLAND.

French fleet appears off Sandy Hook — Attack on British delayed — Fleet sails for Rhode Island — Sullivan's preparations to reduce Rhode Island — Disposition of the British garrison — Engagement between the French and British fleets — Armies overtaken by storm — Precarious situation of Sullivan — American officers beseech d'Estaing to remain — Fleet sails to Boston — Sullivan's general orders — Clamor against the French — Washington's letters to the various commanders — American army retires from Rhode Island — Clinton's expedition against New Bedford and Fairhaven — French fleet sails for the West Indies — Washington puts army in winter quarters — Labors of Baron Steuben — Naval operations.

In July, 1778, when the British army arrived in New York, Charles Henri Théodat d'Estaing, Count d'Estaing du Saillans, appeared off the coast of Virginia with a French fleet, which had sailed from Toulon about the middle of April.* It was expected that the French fleet would find the British still in Philadelphia, but contrary winds had delayed it so long that the British had evacuated the city and marched across Jersey before the French fleet arrived. Ascertaining that the British had evacuated Philadelphia, the French commander sailed to the north, and on July 11 appeared off Sandy Hook.† Lord Howe's fleet, which consisted of six 64's, three 50's, two 40's and some smaller frigates, had received early information of the movements of d'Estaing and knew of his arrival on the coast some days before he actually appeared off Sandy Hook. This timely warning enabled Howe to

make a judicious disposition of his forces for the defence of New York. For some time after the arrival of the French, unfavorable winds prevented a movement against the British fleet, but on July 22, the wind having changed, the French squadron got under way with the evident intention of making an immediate attack. When the ships arrived at Sandy Hook, however, the pilots expressed the opinion that the largest of the French vessels could not pass the bar, and they refused to undertake to carry them through the channel.* D'Estaing thereupon changed his plan and

* Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 399-400.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 647.

* Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 9-12; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 417-420; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 447-448; Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 101, 104-106, 108, 110, 114; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 156. Mahan, however, says that there was plenty of water and that d'Estaing's assertion that he could not pass the bar was a mere subterfuge, his real reason being that Howe's position was better and the French fleet was therefore, at a disadvantage. See Clowes, *Royal Navy*, vol. iii., pp. 399-402. See also d'Estaing's and Hamilton's letters in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 157-159, 160-161.

steered southward to the Delaware capes, where, upon his arrival, he changed his course and sailed for Rhode Island.* Arriving there on the 29th, he arranged with General Sullivan to attempt the reduction of that state. Sullivan had a detachment of Washington's army, and reinforcements constantly arrived from New England. For some time Sullivan had been preparing to reduce the British garrison at Rhode Island, and later Generals Greene and Lafayette were sent to assist him in subordinate commands.† General Pigott, the British commander, had been informed of the intentions of General Sullivan, and in order to impede the operations of the Americans, had dispatched two separate expeditions, one under Colonel Campbell, and the other under Major Eyre, into Providence Plantation. These expeditions destroyed a large quantity of naval and military stores, some galleys and armed sloops, and about 100 small boats which had been prepared for Sullivan's expedition. These losses considerably retarded General Sullivan's movements, and for several days after the French fleet arrived, the Americans were in no position to coöperate with them.

Rhode Island consists of two parts

connected by an isthmus, and has a number of small islands near it. On the west of the isthmus stands Newport, the chief town of the island, and between Rhode Island and the mainland lies the island of Conanicut. There are three entrances to Newport; one by the east or Seakonnet Passage; another by the west of the island, between it and Conanicut, called the Main Channel; and the other, called the West or Narragansett Passage, which unites with the Main Channel at the east of Conanicut. The main body of the British troops under General Pigott, numbering about 6,000 men,* lay at Newport; on Conanicut Island were three regiments; a chain of redoubts defended the isthmus; and each of the three entrances was guarded by frigates and galleys, which upon the appearance of Count d'Estaing were destroyed to prevent them from falling into his hands. The French fleet blockaded all the various passages, several ships of war being stationed in the Seakonnet and Narragansett passages, while the Main Channel was closed when the fleet anchored at its mouth. In this position the French fleet continued until August 8.† When the Americans were in a position to coöperate with him, the French commander

* Richman, *Rhode Island*, p. 228; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 479-480.

† F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 107. See also his instructions to Lafayette, in Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., p. 422; and to Greene and Lafayette in Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 8, 22.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 448. Sullivan estimated the force at 6,500. See his letter in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 178.

† On the conferences between the American generals and the French admiral regarding the plan of attack, see Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 431-455.

sailed toward the harbor, engaging the batteries on either side as he passed, and anchoring between Newport and Conanicut.*

When Howe received information of the arrival of the French fleet at Newport, he immediately began preparations to destroy it. By this time Howe's squadron had been increased to eight ships of the line, five ships of 50 guns each, two of 40, four frigates, several fire ships, two bombs, and a number of smaller vessels.† On August 9 this fleet arrived at Rhode Island, anchoring off Point Judith, a short distance from the entrance of the Main Channel.‡ For several days after the arrival of the French the winds continued contrary, but on the morning of the 10th they suddenly shifted to the northeast, and the French commander was seized with a desire to measure ships with Howe.¶ Accordingly, he went to sea in search of the British fleet, and soon discovered it. But upon seeing so formidable an armament advancing toward him, and being under the wind, which gave the French the weather-gage, Lord Howe declined an immediate engagement, and instead manœvered in an endeavor to secure the weather-gage himself. The contest lasted throughout the day, the French admiral en-

deavoring to retain his advantage. Toward the close of the second day, when the fleets were about to engage, a violent storm separated the two fleets and dispersed and considerably injured many of the ships. As a result, there was no general action, but single ships of both fleets afterward fell in with each other, though neither side gained any important advantage from these minor engagements. As both fleets were in a crippled condition, Howe returned to New York and d'Estaing to Newport.*

At this time Sullivan's army numbered about 10,000 troops, chiefly militia, and when the French commander sallied forth to intercept the British, Sullivan was prepared to take the field in coöperation with the French fleet.† When Sullivan saw the French fleet depart, however, he realized that it would be useless to attempt hostilities until it should return. Furthermore, he feared that d'Estaing would become offended if the American army should not wait until he could be at liberty to participate in any movement. On the other hand,

* Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 159; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 212-214; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 461-465; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 27-31; Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 276; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., p. 109.

† Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 175 (Abbatt's ed.); Lafayette's letter to D'Estaing in Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., p. 440. About 1,500 troops under Greene and Lafayette had been sent by Washington. See Spark's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. vi., pp. 28-37; Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. ii., pp. 113-128.

* Tower, vol. i., p. 456 *et seq.*

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 450.

‡ F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 109-110.

¶ See Peabody, *Life of John Sullivan*, p. 98 *et seq.*


the American army could not long be kept together and it was necessary that the American commander begin active operations immediately. Upon learning that Sullivan was ready to take the offensive, Pigott withdrew his troops from Conanient, called in his various outposts, and concentrated his whole army in an entrenched camp near Newport. The American army was then transported from the mainland to the northeast end of the island, and having taken possession of a fortified position which had been abandoned by the British, they marched toward Newport to begin the siege. On the 12th of August, before the siege was well under way, Sullivan's army was overtaken by the same terrific wind and rain storm which had created such havoc among the British and French ships. A great number of the tents were blown down, and fire-arms were rendered unfit for immediate use, and almost all the ammunition, of which 50 rounds had just been distributed to each soldier, was irreparably damaged. As the storm continued for three days and as they were without shelter, the soldiers suffered severely and large numbers of them perished.* After the storm had passed, the American army resumed the siege, but the absence of the French fleet placed

General Sullivan's army in a precarious situation as the British force at Newport could easily be increased. To the great relief of the Americans d'Estaing reappeared off the island on the evening of the 20th, but the joy of the Americans was of short duration, for upon his arrival d'Estaing informed General Sullivan that, agreeable to the advice of his officers, and in obedience to orders, it would be necessary for him to sail for Boston to repair his damaged fleet. He had been instructed to enter that port in case he should meet with disaster or find a superior British fleet on the coast. Now facing both situations (his fleet having been shattered and Admiral Byron having arrived with British reinforcements), he considered that the condition of affairs was exactly what had been contemplated in his instructions, and it was therefore incumbent upon him to take his fleet to Boston.*

This action greatly irritated General Sullivan, who was convinced that the departure of the French fleet would ruin the whole enterprise. Both Greene and Lafayette in a personal interview besought d'Estaing to reconsider his determination and to stand by the Americans in the present situation; they explained to him the importance of the movement just begun, further saying that it was now so well advanced that there could be no

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 214. See also Sullivan's letter of August 13 to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 175-178; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 650.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 452; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 466-469.



Map of a part of Rhode Island showing the Positions of the American and British Armies at the Siege of Newport and the Subsequent Action on August 29, 1778.

possibility of failure. On the other hand, it could not be abandoned at the present juncture without doing great injury to the American cause, for the volunteers under General Sullivan had undertaken the expedition in the expectation of receiving aid from the French fleet and had used every endeavor to furnish the army with supplies. To be abandoned by the French at so critical a moment, in conjunction with the ill success of the other American armies up to the present time, could not help but produce a high state of exasperation. The disaffected would also have good cause to deride the Americans for their faith in the French and the expected aid from them. They said that it would be very difficult for the fleet in its present condition to pass the shoals of Nantucket; that it could be repaired at Newport as well as at Boston; and finally that its present station offered advantages over Boston for distressing the enemy. On the other hand, if a superior fleet should appear, Boston harbor would be no safer than that at Newport. These arguments failed to change d'Estaing's determination, and, though a protest signed by all the leading officers except Lafayette was sent to the Count,* he adhered to his plan, and on August 22, 1778, sailed away from Newport, three days later arriving at Boston.†

General Sullivan was so chagrined and disgusted at the movements of the French* that on the 24th in the general orders, he inserted the following paragraph:

"The General cannot help lamenting the sudden and unexpected departure of the French fleet, as he finds it has a tendency to discourage some who placed great dependence upon the assistance of it; though he can by no means suppose the army, or any part of it, endangered by this movement. He yet hopes the event will prove America able to procure that by her own arms, which her allies refuse to assist in obtaining."‡

On the 26th he tried to smooth over the reflection contained in this paragraph by declaring that he did not mean to insinuate that the departure of the French fleet was because of a fixed determination not to assist the Americans, and that he would not wish to give to ungenerous and illiberal minds the slightest reason to make so unfair an interpretation. On the 26th, after his arrival at Boston, d'Estaing wrote a note to Congress in which he attempted to justify the departure of his fleet. He said that water and provisions were low; that he had been deceived with regard to these two articles, the need of which was growing more and more important; and that it was necessary for

475. See also Sullivan's, Lafayette's and Laurens' letters to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 178-188.

* See Greene's characterization of Sullivan's conduct in his letter to Washington, Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 188 *et seq.* See also Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., p. 478 *et seq.*

‡ Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 487. See also F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 112-113.

* See the text in Amory, *Life of Sullivan*, p. 77.

† Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 76-78; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 469-

him to consider the condition of his fleet at the present time rather than to risk its total annihilation by being in no condition to withstand an attack. He said that when notice of the arrival of British reinforcements was received, his ships were in such a situation that had he returned to Newport, Howe would have had a great advantage if an attack should be made. Consequently, he felt justified in going to Boston, but he did not think that the American generals were justified in expressing their opinions in such strong language. Undoubtedly the Count himself cannot be held blameable for the departure of the fleet, for all his officers, men of long experience, insisted that the preservation of the fleet demanded it. Nevertheless, the American commander and the soldiers under him were sorely disappointed, because had the French commander returned to Newport, the British garrison would have been compelled to surrender long before Howe could have arrived with aid. Consequently, as the Americans said, "there never was a prospect so favorable, blasted by such a shameful desertion." So bitter was the disappointment and chagrin that a clamor arose against the whole French nation and letters were sent to Boston full of bitter invective intended to prejudice the inhabitants against d'Estaing and his officers. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the cooler and more judicious part of the community were able to preserve peace between

the French sailors and the inhabitants of the city.

Washington readily foresaw that a general and mutual irritation would be productive of still greater violence, and he therefore exerted every effort to calm the minds of both parties. In this he was aided by Lafayette, who was equally well beloved by the French and Americans.* Lafayette naturally owed his first duty to the king, but he was devoted to Washington, and put forth every effort to reconcile the French and American commanders. Washington wrote to General Heath in command at Boston and to Sullivan and Greene at Rhode Island. In his letter to Heath he stated his fears "that the departure of the French fleet from Rhode Island, at so critical a moment, would not only weaken the confidence of the people in their new allies, but produce such prejudice and resentment as might prevent their giving the fleet, in its present distress, such zealous and effectual assistance as was demanded by the exigence of affairs, and the true interests of America." He added "that it would be sound policy to combat these effects, and to give the best construction of what had happened; and at the same time to make strenuous exertions for putting the French fleet as soon as possible in a condition to defend itself, and be useful." He furthermore said:

* See Washington's letters to Lafayette, in Sparks, *Life of Washington*, pp. 280-281.

"The departure of the fleet from Rhode Island is not yet publicly announced here; but when it is, I intend to ascribe it to necessity produced by the damage received in the late storm. This, it appears to me, is the idea which ought to be generally propagated. As I doubt not the force of these reasons will strike you equally with myself, I would recommend to you to use your utmost influence to palliate and soften matters, and to induce those whose business it is to provide succors of every kind for the fleet, to employ their utmost zeal and activity in doing it. It is our duty to make the best of our misfortunes, and not suffer passion to interfere with our interest and the public good."

On September 1 he wrote to General Sullivan as follows:*

"The disagreement between the army under your command and the fleet has given me very singular uneasiness. The continent at large is concerned in our cordiality, and it should be kept up by all possible means consistent with our honor and policy. First impressions, you know, are generally longest remembered, and will serve to fix in a general degree our national character among the French. In our conduct towards them we should remember, that they are a people old in war, very strict in military etiquette, and apt to take fire where others seem scarcely warmed. Permit me to recommend in the most particular manner, the cultivation of harmony and good agreement, and your endeavors to destroy that ill-humor which may have got into the officers. It is of the utmost importance, also, that the soldiers and the people should know nothing of this misunderstanding; or, if it has reached them, that ways may be used to stop its progress, and prevent its effect."†

To General Greene, Washington wrote:

"I have not now time to take notice of the several arguments which were made use of, for and against the Count's quitting the harbor of Newport, and sailing for Boston. Right or wrong, it will probably disappoint our sanguine expecta-

* Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vi., p. 44.

† See also Sullivan's reply, in which he states that he has done everything to satisfy d'Estaing and to restore perfect harmony.—Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 204–205; Amory, *Life of Sullivan*, p. 79.

tions of success, and, which I deem a still worse consequence, I fear it will sow the seeds of dissension and distrust between us and our new allies, unless the most prudent measures be taken to suppress the feuds and jealousies that have already arisen. I depend much on your temper and influence to conciliate that animosity which subsists between the American and French officers in our service. I beg you will take every measure to keep the protest entered into by the general officers from being made public. Congress, sensible of the ill consequences that will flow from our differences being known to the world, have passed a resolve to that purpose. Upon the whole, my dear sir, you can conceive my meaning better than I can express it; and I therefore fully depend on your exerting yourself to heal all private animosities between our principal officers and the French, and to prevent all illiberal expressions and reflections that may fall from the army at large."

Greene therefore employed every means to conciliate the French officers.* Washington exerted all his diplomacy to heal the breach with the French commander, and in writing to Count d'Estaing took no notice of the disagreements which had occurred. He composed his letter so that it would soothe every unpleasant sensation which might have disturbed his mind.† As a result of these combined efforts, good understanding and cordiality returned, although there were several manifestations of ill-will toward the French sailors, such as street brawls, etc.‡

* F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 113–114, 122–123.

† See Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 494; also Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. i., pp. 108–125; Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 160–164, 166, 168–175, 180, 182; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 165–169, 197–198, 200; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 38, 46–47.

‡ See Greene's letter to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 206–207.

Meanwhile the volunteers were leaving the American army in Rhode Island; in the course of twenty-four hours from 200 to 300 deserted, so that inside of three days Sullivan's force was not much larger than that of the British.* Therefore Sullivan determined to raise the siege and to retire to the northern end of the island, preparatory to an entire abandonment of the expedition. On the 29th of August the army began the march, and though they were warmly pursued by the Hessians and British, the retreat was conducted without serious loss.† When the American army arrived at Quaker Hill, however, a large force of the British attacked it and in the ensuing engagement the loss was severe on both sides. Finally the Americans under Greene succeeded in repulsing the British, and during the night of the 30th the whole army under Sullivan reached the mainland by the passages of Bristol and Howland's Ferry.‡ Sullivan made his retreat just in time, for the next day Clinton arrived with a light squadron containing about 4,000 men. Had Sullivan been less prompt in his

movements, or had the winds favored Clinton more than they did, Sullivan would probably have been in a most desperate position, for the British fleet would have intercepted his passage to the mainland while a superior British force would have attacked him by land. As it was, however, he extricated the army from a perilous position in the nick of time, for which he was thanked by Congress.*

Finding upon his arrival that Sullivan had retreated, Clinton immediately set out on his return to New York; but, desiring that the expedition should not return to the city without having accomplished something noteworthy, he placed the troops aboard the transports under command of General Grey, giving the latter officer orders to make an expedition to Buzzard's Bay. Grey sailed to Acushnet River, where he landed September 5, 1778, and destroyed all the shipping in the vicinity, amount-

* Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. ii., pp. 125-141; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 650-651.

† Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 177 (Abbatt's ed.).

‡ Bancroft, vol. v., p. 286; Richman, *Rhode Island*, pp. 231-232; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 114-115; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. i., pp. 488-489; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 454; Greene's letter to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 192 *et seq.*; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 651-652.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 652, note; *Journals of Congress*, vol. iv., p. 378. For other works on the Sullivan expedition see Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, vol. vi., pp. 592-603; T. C. Amory, *Life of Major-General John Sullivan*; T. Balch, *The French in America, 1777-83*; G. W. Cullum, *Fortification Defences of Narragansett Bay*; W. Heath, *Correspondence, in Massachusetts Historical Collections*, series vii., vol. iv.; A. T. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon History*; G. C. Mason, *The British Fleet in Rhode Island*, in *Rhode Island Historical Collections*, vol. vii.; S. S. Rider, *The Battle of Rhode Island*, in *Rider's Historical Tracts*, no. 6; S. S. Rider, *The Rhode Island Black Regiment*, in *Historical Tracts*, no. 10; J. G. Rosengarten, *The German Soldiers in Newport, 1776-79*, in *Rhode Island Historical Magazine*, vol. vii.; E. M. Stone, *Our French Allies, 1778-1782*; James B. Perkins, *France in the American Revolution* (1911).

ing to more than 70 sail. He then went to New Bedford and Fairhaven, the greater part of which towns he laid in ashes, and where he also destroyed a large quantity of military and naval stores, provisions, etc. He had landed at 6 o'clock in the evening, and so rapid were his movements that before noon of the next day the whole work of destruction had been accomplished and the troops reembarked. Grey next proceeded to Martha's Vineyard, where he burned several vessels, destroyed much property, compelled the inhabitants to surrender their arms, and forced them to supply him with a large number of sheep and oxen, which proved a seasonable relief to the British in New York.*

About the middle of September, 1778, Admiral Byron, the successor to Lord Howe in command of the British fleet, arrived at New York. As his fleet was in a much shattered condition because of stormy weather, he was unable to put to sea again until October 18, on which day he set sail for Boston in quest of d'Estaing. Again ill success attended him, for on November 1, when he reached Boston Bay, a storm arose which so damaged his ships that he was compelled to hasten to Rhode Island for repairs.† Having completed the repairs to his ships, d'Estaing seized this oppor-

tunity to put to sea, and on November 3 sailed for the West Indies. On the same day General Grant in command of a detachment of 6,000 men from the British army, convoyed by a fleet under Commodore Hotham, set sail for the same quarter. Toward the end of the same month another detachment of more than 2,000 British troops under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, embarked from New York for the purpose of invading the Southern States. This latter body of troops was escorted by Commodore Hyde Parker. Thus the British at New York were left only a sufficient force to defend the city against attack.*

As the campaign in the Northern and Middle States was now closed, Washington put his army into winter quarters, stationing the main body on both sides of the Hudson near Middlebrook, West Point and Danbury, while the artillery was sent to Pluckemin. Thus the army was stationed in various cantonments from Long Island Sound to the Delaware, and so arranged that in case of necessity all the other bodies could quickly reinforce any detachment that was suddenly attacked. In command of the troops at Danbury was General Putnam; McDougall commanded in the Highlands; and General Lincoln was sent to take command of the

* Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 169 (ed. 1788); Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 32, 39, 44.

† Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 46-47.

* See Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., *passim*.

forces in the South.* At this time the army was not compelled to undergo the sufferings experienced at Valley Forge, for though they were lodged in huts similar to those of the preceding year, they were more comfortably clothed than previously through the generosity of the French. Furthermore, the supplies came in more rapidly, animal food being brought in chiefly from the New England States, where no British force was present to interrupt.

While the army was in winter quarters a more systematic and thorough discipline was introduced through the exertions of Baron Steuben, who had been appointed inspector-general in place of Conway. He prepared a system of tactics which was soon put into practice. The difficulties confronting Steuben were enormous, and he found it difficult to reduce the discordant evolutions of the troops from different States into uniformity and efficiency in the field.† At this time also a change was made in the management of the medical department of the army, the directing and purveying business of the military hospital being placed in the hands of different officers, whereas they had previously been under the direction of the same person. This was due chiefly to the efforts of Dr. Rush.

Up to this time the naval operations of the United States had been rather desultory and without any important result. The number of vessels were small and of very inferior fighting qualities, so that there was little hope of being able to cope with the powerful British navy. Yet, in many ways the little American navy was an efficient force in furthering the cause of the country chiefly because of agility. These vessels would dart in and out of a fleet of British merchantmen and capture such vessels as they thought were richly laden, before the British ships of the line could interfere. During 1776 more than 300 English vessels had been taken by the American cruisers, and during the next year, notwithstanding the fact that the British maintained 70 ships of the line on the American coast alone, 467 merchantmen were lost, some of which were of immense value. On the other hand, the American shipping met with many disasters, and not only a large number of merchantmen, but also several of the privateers fell into the hands of the British.* In 1778, after the conclusion of the treaty with France, Congress devoted much time and

329-332, 337; Stille, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, pp. 129-130.

* Fiske says that prior to the French alliance more than 600 British vessels had been captured by the Americans while 900 American ships were taken by the British cruisers. *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 118-119. See also Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. i., chap. xxxiv., and authorities cited.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 457-458; Livingston, *Life of Putnam*, p. 383; Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, pp. 162-165.

† Trevelyan, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp.

thought to the creation of a navy. Several vessels were constructed in France, others were bought, and a considerable number were built in America. In this year, therefore, the outlook for successful naval operations was particularly bright. Early in the year, Captain Nicholas Biddle, in the *Randolph*, a 36, engaged the British ship *Yarmouth*, a 64, but after twenty minutes of severe fighting, the *Randolph* blew up and Captain Biddle and the entire crew perished, with the exception of four men who were rescued a few days later from a piece of the wreckage.* During the year Paul Jones made his appearance along the English coast and completely terrorized all the seaport towns of that country.† Captain John Barry distinguished himself in an action off the coast of Maine with two English vessels, sustaining the

conflict for seven hours and finally escaping on shore with his crew.* Captain Silas Talbot likewise distinguished himself in October by making another well-planned and successful attack upon a British vessel off Rhode Island. At this time the schooner *Pigot*, being stationed at the mouth of the Sakonnet River, had effectually broken up foreign commerce and had cut off all supplies and reinforcements for that part of the colony. Talbot obtained the consent of General Sullivan to attempt the capture of the vessel. In this project Talbot was successful, and the *Pigot* was carried off in triumph by the Continental forces. A month later Talbot received a complimentary letter from the President of Congress and was presented with a commission as lieutenant-colonel in the United States Army.†

CHAPTER XXIII.

1776-1779.

BORDER WARS: WYOMING: EXPEDITIONS OF CLARK AND SULLIVAN.

Cherokee war—The massacre of Wyoming—Slaughter of Colonel Baylor's regiment—Pulaski's corps attacked—Effect of these atrocities—Congress resolves upon retaliatory expeditions—Massacre of Cherry Valley—George Rogers Clark in the Northwest—Kaskaskia and Vincennes taken—Sullivan's expedition against the Six Nations—Other expeditions.

While the East was thus being deluged with blood, the West was undergoing no less severe trials. The

British were successful in their efforts to foment a war spirit among the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws and

* Bancroft, vol. v., p. 222; McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 233-235.

† See Cooper, *Naval History*, vol. i., pp. 87-90. See also the various lives of Jones, and Par-
ton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., pp. 335-343.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 641.

† See Mr. Tuckerman's *Life of Commodore Talbot*, pp. 52-64; Richman, *Rhode Island*, pp. 233-235; S. Talbot, *Capture of Pigot Galley*, in *Rhode Island Historical Society MSS.*, vol. iii., no. 671.

Chickasaws, to which tribes numerous agents had been sent. The subsequent ravages of the Indians maddened the American frontiersmen and changed their resentment against the British king into a deadly and lasting hatred.* These Indian forays reacted unfavorably on the Loyalist cause, for the Indians were too intent upon plunder and rapine to distinguish between Whig and Tory, and as a result large numbers of the latter were driven into the patriot ranks.† The British agents showed poor generalship in inciting the uprising so early, for as yet the British troops in the South were few in number, and the Americans were unhampered in their operations against the Indians.

The Cherokee villages lay in that cluster of mountains which marks the ending of the present boundaries of Georgia and the Carolinas. These provinces lay to the east and southeast of them, while to the north in the valley of the upper Tennessee lay the villages of the Watauga pioneers, and still further north, the Virginia outposts. The Watauga settlements were certain to suffer as they were in close proximity to the Cherokees. Early in the summer of 1776, these Indians gave unmistakable signs of preparing for war — shining guns, making moccasins, etc.‡ The ravages began in June, though the main attack was deferred until July, when the various

bands of Indians spread all over the country, wrapping the back country settlements from the Holston to the Tugelon, from northwestern Georgia to southwestern Virginia, in all the horrors of savage warfare.* The Watauga people had been warned of the attack, and the majority sought safety in their wooden forts or stations, but some delayed their departure and were slain as they fled or else captured, perhaps to die by torture. The Indians now laid waste the fields and burned the homesteads for miles around, soon transforming a prosperous community into a desolate waste and reducing the settlers to poverty. Rather than remain idle up in the fort while the Indians safely committed these depredations, the pioneers on July 20, to the number of 170, marched out toward Island Flats. After dispersing a small detachment of Indians, they had begun the journey homeward when a large body of Indians attacked their rear, but were decisively defeated with great loss, including their chief Dragging Canoe. The American loss was four slightly wounded.† On the same day the Watauga fort, garrisoned by 40 or 50 men under Robertson and Sevier, was attacked by a large force, but the Indians could only maintain an irregular siege for about three weeks, at the end of which they retired, fearing the approach of rescuing parties of frontiersmen. Of

* Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, vol. i., p. 279.

† *American Archives*, 5th series, vol. i., p. 610.

‡ *American Archives*, 5th series, vol. i., p. 111.

* Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, vol. i., pp. 282-283.

† *Ibid*, pp. 286-290.

the garrison but few were killed or captured.

Early in June the settlements along the western borders of the Carolinas and Georgia had been attacked. A small party of Georgians had attempted to capture the British agent, Cameron, but the Cherokees surprised the party, killing some and capturing others.* The Southern colonies determined upon an immediate revenge before the British could interpose.† The Cherokees came down the Catawba into North Carolina and inflicted great damage upon the back district settlements, but General Griffith Rutherford raised a frontier levy and soon relieved the beleaguered settlements. The small band of Indians who invaded Georgia were repulsed by Colonel Samuel Jack with a force of 200 rangers; and not only were the Indians expelled, but two or three of their villages were destroyed.‡

The party of Indians invading South Carolina was led by Cameron himself. The frontiersmen were commanded by Colonel Andrew Williamson, who with 40 men took station at Picken's Fort, July 3. At about this time Lyndley's Fort on Rayborn Creek was attacked by 200 Indians and Tories, who were beaten back with some loss. By the end of July Williamson's force numbered more

than 1,100 militia and he began the advance toward the Indians. With a party of 300 horsemen, he attempted to surprise and capture Cameron, who lay at Oconoree Creek, beyond the Cherokee town of Eseneka, but was ambushed and compelled to retreat with a loss of 5 mortally and 13 severely wounded. He succeeded in burning a number of houses, however, together with some 6,000 bushels of corn. He then returned to camp and the next day resumed the march, on the way destroying all the lower Indian towns, including Seconee, Keowee, Ostatay, Chelokee, Eustustie, Sugaw Town and Brass Town. Leaving a garrison of 600 men at Eseneka, which was renamed Fort Rutledge, Williamson returned home.*

The Carolinas and Virginia then united for action. Each State sent a column of 2,000 men, and the Carolina troops were launched against the middle and valley sections, while the Virginia troops went against the Overhill towns. On September 1, 1776, Rutherford left the head of the Catawba with 2,400 North Carolina troops, passed over the Blue Ridge at Swananoa Gap, crossed the French Broad at the Warrior's Ford, and then pushed on through the mountains to the middle towns. With 900 picked men, he next set out to the valley towns along the Hiawassee, but missed his way in the mountains — thus fortunately escaping an ambush — and on September 18 returned to

* McCall, *History of Georgia*, p. 76.

† *American Archives*, 4th series, vol. vi., p. 1228.

‡ Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, vol. i., pp. 294-295.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 296-299.

the middle towns at Canucca, where he met Williamson with the South Carolina troops.* Williamson then passed on through Noewee Pass and fell into the ambush which had been prepared for Rutherford. After suffering a loss of 17 killed and 29 wounded, Williamson with great difficulty extricated himself from this perilous situation. Rutherford then joined Williamson and the combined forces laid waste all the valley towns and returned home without serious loss.†

Meanwhile, on October 1, the Virginia forces, including some North Carolina troops, in all 2,000 strong, under command of Colonel William Christian, had started from Great Island on the Holston and pressed forward until they reached the Big Island on the French Broad, where the Indians were encamped. When the latter learned of the strength of the Virginia forces, they precipitatedly fled, but Christian pursued and early in November reached their towns, where he remained two weeks, devastating the country for miles around. The Indians then agreed to peace, and after burning the town of Tuskega, Christian led his forces homeward.‡

It will be remembered that the royal peace commissioners had been unsuccessful in their mission. Considering the Americans as incorrigible rebels, the British took little pains to accord to them the ordinary

comities of war. As a part of their campaign to make the war odious to the Americans, the British launched the savage hordes against the frontiers, where all manner of outrages were committed. Among the most atrocious and saddest of these events were the massacres at Wyoming and Cherry Valley. Dr. Thacher, in his *Military Journal* (pp. 140-143), gives an excellent account of the massacre of Wyoming.* This place, located on the eastern branch of the Susquehanna River, consisted of eight townships, containing about 1,000 families. The settlement was in a flourishing condition and was surrounded by large farms devoted chiefly to the production of grain, hemp, fruit, etc. While the greater part of the inhabitants were loyal Americans, and had ardently espoused the American cause, still there were a considerable number who clung to the British side. As a result, animosities arose to an astonishing height, the closest connections being severed. A number of the inhabitants in a spirit of revenge abandoned their plantations and united with the Indian allies of the British, instigating and assisting them in their barbarous work of slaughter and death, even among relatives and close friends. The adherents of the American cause had received intelligence that the Indians

* *Ibid.*, pp. 300-301.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 301-303.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 303-306.

* See also Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 279-280; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 82-90; W. L. Stone, *The Poetry and History of Wyoming* (3d ed., 1871); Miner, *History of Wyoming*; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 340-362.



THE MASSACRE OF WYOMING.

were about to set forth on an expedition against them and made preparations to repel the attack. Entrenchments and redoubts were constructed, and about July 1, 1778, the enemy to the number of about 1,600 Indians, Tories, and English were seen to be advancing. The commander of this motley combination was Colonel John Butler, probably one of the worst of the border ruffians. In the hope that they might deceive the inhabitants as to their intentions, the Indians notified the settlers that they had no hostile designs against them, and even the treacherous Butler sent word that for the present nothing would be done to molest the inhabitants in their daily tasks. Nevertheless, the inhabitants distrusted these professions of peace and with all rapidity pushed forward their preparations for defending the settlement. The able bodied men were placed under command of Colonel Zebulon Butler, while the women and children were sent to the forts as the safest place of refuge.

Hardly had this been done when the enemy approached, and pretending that they desired to confer with Colonel Butler, requested that he meet them at some distance from the fort for that purpose. Butler suspected their design and for protection took with him 400 armed men. In this piece of strategy, however, he was at fault, for hardly had he reached the meeting place when the whole body of the enemy surrounded the little band and attacked them from

every side. They defended themselves with great bravery, but only the commander and about 20 of his men succeeded in escaping. The enemy now pushed forward to invest the fort and cannonaded it the greater part of the day. After a cessation of the artillery fire, they demanded the surrender of the fort, and accompanying the message sent 196 scalps taken from the slain among Butler's party. Colonel Nathan Dennison, who had now succeeded to the command of the fort, intrepidly defended himself until most of his men had fallen. He then sent out a flag to inquire on what terms the garrison could surrender, and in reply received from the ferocious Butler the answer — "the hatchet."* Dennison was obliged to surrender at discretion, still retaining, however, a hope of mercy. In this he was utterly mistaken for Butler's threat was rigorously executed. After a few prisoners had been selected, the remainder of the people, including the women and children, were shut in the houses and barracks, which were then set on fire and the whole consumed together. Another fort in the vicinity, containing 70 Continental soldiers, was also captured and butchered in a similar manner.

The entire settlement was then set afire, though the houses and farms of the Tories were spared. The Indians then extended their cruelties to the

* Lossing, however, says this story has no foundation in truth — *Field-Book of the Revolution*, p. 359 note.

cattle in the field, committing all sorts of barbarous acts upon the dumb beasts. One of the prisoners, Captain Badlock (or Bidlack), was tortured by having his body stuck full of splinters of pine knots, and a fire of dry wood made around him; and two of his companions, Captains Ranson and Robert Durkee, were subjected to excruciating torture by being thrown into the same fire and held there with pitchforks until dead. As stated before a number of families had been split in twain over the merits of the cause and the results were seen in this massacre. Partial Terry, son of one of the American adherents, joined the Indian party and several times warned the family that he would exterminate it, if possible. During the massacre he carried out his threat, killing and scalping his father, mother, brothers and sisters. Thomas Terry butchered his own mother, his father-in-law, his sisters and their infant children, thus exterminating the family. A few of the inhabitants succeeded in escaping to the woods where they wandered for days in a starving and destitute condition until they reached habitations which had not been subjected to the savage fury. Such was one of the most dastardly acts perpetrated by the allies of the British. It was one of the darkest stains ever placed on the British escutcheon.*

Believing that Clinton contem-

plated an attack upon Boston, Washington established his headquarters at Fredericksburg, near the Connecticut border, about thirty miles from West Point. When the British fleet began the return voyage to New York, however, Washington knew that the enemy had no designs in that direction. But Clinton was not inactive; into New Jersey and the territory surrounding New York he sent foraging parties whose conduct was characterized by the same merciless cruelty as we have before noted in connection with their foraging expeditions. Toward the end of September, 1778, a regiment of troops under Colonel George Baylor had encamped near Tappan, New York, to watch a foraging party of British in that vicinity, and in turn were themselves suddenly surprised during the night. The slaughter was terrible and nearly the whole troop were killed.* About the middle of October, Major Patrick Ferguson made a similar assault upon the cavalry corps under Pulaski at Egg Harbor.† Regarding the im-

* Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 285; Stryker, *The Massacre at Old Tappan*; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 41; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 194 (ed. 1788); Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 219-221. See also Colonel Williams' and Colonel Baylor's letters in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 211-212, 222-224.

† Stryker, *The Affair at Egg Harbor*; Baneroft, vol. v., p. 288; Draper, *King's Mountain and its Heroes*, pp. 56, 61; Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 287; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 195-196; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 43-46; Lamb, *City of New York*, vol. ii., pp. 211-212.

* See also *Pennsylvania Archives*, vol. vi., pp. 626, 634, 647, 664.

policy of the British expeditions at this time, Sparks makes the following remarks:

"In fact this point of policy was strangely misunderstood by the British, or more strangely perverted, at every stage of the contest. They had many friends in the country, whom it was their interest to retain, and they professed a desire to conciliate others; yet they burned and destroyed towns, villages, and detached farmhouses, plundered the inhabitants without distinction, and brought down the savages, with the tomahawk and scalping knife, upon the defenseless frontier settlements, marking their course in every direction with murder, desolation and ruin. The ministry approved and encouraged these atrocities, flattering themselves that the people would sink under their sufferings, bewail their unhappy condition, become tired of the war, and compel their leaders to seek an accommodation. The effect was directly the contrary in every instance. The people knew their rights, and had the common feelings of humanity; and, when the former were wantonly invaded, and the latter outraged, it was natural that their passions should be inflamed, and that they who were at first pacifically inclined, should be roused to resistance and retaliation. If the British cabinet had aimed to defeat its own objects, and to consolidate the American people into a united phalanx of opposition, it could not have chosen or pursued more effectual methods." *

Having now become thoroughly aroused at the atrocious course pursued by the British, Congress also took up the matter, and on October 30 passed the following resolution:

"We, therefore, the Congress of the United States of America, do solemnly declare and proclaim that if our enemies presume to execute their threats, or persist in their present career of barbarity, we will take such exemplary vengeance as shall deter others from a like conduct. We appeal to that God who searcheth the hearts of men, for the rectitude of our intentions; and in his holy presence we declare, that, as we are not moved by any light and hasty suggestions of anger and revenge, so, through every possible change of fortune, we will adhere to this our determination."

* *Life of Washington*, pp. 282-283.

Profound sympathy for the sufferers at Wyoming was aroused throughout the country, and everywhere indignation was so high that a strong desire to punish the savage invaders became prevalent. For this purpose a regiment and two companies of militia, under the command of Colonel Hartley, marched against the Indian towns, destroyed a few and captured a number of prisoners, but because of the insufficiency of the force a retreat soon became necessary. Another regiment, the fourth Pennsylvania, together with a number of Morgan's riflemen under command of Lieutenant-colonel William Butler, marched to the defense of the western frontier. After a fatiguing march, Butler reached the Indians towns of Unadilla and Anaquagua, near the source of the Susquehanna, where a considerable quantity of corn had been stored. Butler quickly destroyed this and the Indian villages, driving the savages far into the interior and rendering a recurrence of their inroads more unlikely.

These small expeditions, however, did not inflict sufficient punishment on the Indians to deter them from massacres at other places. On November 11 a body of 500 Indians under Brant, and 200 rangers under Walter Butler made an attack upon the settlement at Cherry Valley, New York.* In command of the fort at that place was Colonel Ichabod

* *Clinton Papers*, vol. iv., pp. 266-300.

Alden, who appears to have been extremely negligent in his military duties and to have failed to provide against such an attack. As a result, the Indians completely surprised the little settlement. The most wanton acts of cruelty were committed, among which probably the best known is the murder of Miss Jane Wells, a full account of which is given by Judge Campbell.*

"She was a young lady, not distinguished for her personal beauty, but endeared to her friends by her amiable disposition, and her Christian charities; one 'in whom the friendless found a friend,' and to whom the poor would always say 'God speed thee.' She fled from the house to a pile of wood near by, behind which she endeavored to screen herself. Here she was pursued by an Indian, who, as he approached, deliberately wiped his bloody knife upon his leggings, and then placed it in its sheath; then drawing his tomahawk, he seized her by the arm; she possessed some knowledge of the Indian language, and remonstrated, and supplicated, though in vain. Peter Smith, a tory, who had formerly been a domestic in Mr. Wells's family, now interposed, saying she was his sister, and desiring him to spare her life. He shook his tomahawk at him in defiance, and then, turning round, with

one blow smote her to the earth. John Wells, Esq., at this time deceased, and the father of Robert Wells, had been one of the judges of the courts of Tryon County; in that capacity, and as one of the justices of the quorum, he had been on intimate terms with Sir William Johnson and family, who frequently visited at his house, and with also Colonel John Butler, likewise a judge. The family were not active either for or against the country; they wished to remain neutral, so far as they could, in such turbulent times; they also performed military duty, when called out to defend the country. Colonel John Butler, in a conversation relative to them, remarked: 'I would have gone miles on my hands and knees to have saved that family, and why my son did not do it God only knows.' " *

On the other hand, while the savages were spreading desolation along the borders of Pennsylvania and New York, Colonel George Rogers Clark prevented the same calamity on the Virginia borders. Clark believed that the time had now come for the conquest of the Northwest, and in December, 1777, laid before Governor Patrick Henry of Virginia a plan by which this might be accomplished. On January 2, 1778, Henry gave Clark two sets of instructions, one for raising 350 men for military service in Kentucky, the other, secret, ordering him to use this force to capture

* See also Stone's *Life of Brant*, vol. i., pp. 379-381; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 267-270; E. T. Tomlinson, *Red Chief: a Story of the Massacre of Cherry Valley* (1905).

* *Border Warfare of New York*, pp. 138-139. See also Roberts, *New York*, vol. ii., pp. 427-428.

Kaskaskia.* On June 24, 1778, Clark, who had now been joined by Simon Kenton,† started at the head of about 150 men and, after almost incredible exertions, penetrated to the British settlements on the Mississippi. On July 4 Kaskaskia (now a dependency of Canada, having been given to the British at the peace of 1763) was surprised and taken, and a few days later the neighboring town Cahokia was also captured, the inhabitants taking the oath of allegiance to America. Clark was now in a very dangerous situation, for not only was he far removed from his base of supplies and from all support, but was in the very midst of numerous fierce and hostile tribes. Nevertheless, his quick wit and his courage saved the whole band and quickly won the confidence of the natives. He formed his plans with remarkable quickness and great judgment and they were executed with promptness and courage. During the most inclement season of the year, he suddenly attacked the Indian villages and turned their own artifices against them, materially damp-

ening the ardor of the savages for further warfare on the frontiersmen.*

Having pacified the territory surrounding Kaskaskia, Clark dispatched an expedition to capture Rocheblave, the governor of the territory. This was successful. The governor was taken, together with his written instructions for the conduct of the war sent him from Quebec, Detroit and Michillimackinac. From these papers Clark gathered much important information regarding the plans of Colonel Henry Hamilton, then governor of Detroit. After having captured Vincennes, Hamilton intended to make a vigorous attack

* Henry, *Life of Patrick Henry*, vol. i., pp. 584-588; Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, vol. ii., pp. 36-38. For Governor Henry's instructions see W. H. English, *The Conquest of the Country Northwest of the River Ohio*, vol. i., pp. 92-104; Clark's Campaign in the Illinois, pp. 95-97. See also Moore, *The Northwest under Three Flags*, pp. 217-218; Dunn, *Indiana*, p. 133; and Henry's letter to the delegates in Congress, quoted in Tyler, *Life of Patrick Henry*, pp. 230-231.

† For a short sketch of Kenton's early career see Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, vol. i., pp. 118, 158, 219, 241, 268, vol. ii., pp. 25-30.

* The most important sources of information for Clark's campaign of 1778-1779 are his own accounts, all four of which will be found in W. H. English, *Conquest of the Northwest*, vol. i., App. These accounts will be found separately in Jefferson's Works (Washington's ed.), vol. i., pp. 222-226; the memoir in Dillon, *History of Indiana*, pp. 127-184; and the journal from the Canadian Archives at Ottawa, in *American Historical Review*, vol. i., pp. 91-96, parts of which will be found also in Hart, *American History Told by Contemporaries*, vol. ii., pp. 579-582. Governor Hamilton's report from the Canadian Archives is in *Michigan Historical and Pioneer Collections*, vol. ix., pp. 489-516. See also *Colonel George Rogers Clark's Sketches of his Campaign in the Illinois in 1778-1779*, in *Ohio Valley Historical Series*, no. iii.; Hinsdale, *Old Northwest*, chap. x.; Ogg, *Opening of the Mississippi*, p. 354 et seq.; Thwaites, *How George Rogers Clark Won the Northwest*; Winsor, *The Westward Movement*, chaps. viii.-ix.; Hosmer, *Short History of the Mississippi Valley*, pp. 80-95; Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, vol. ii., chap. ii.; Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, vol. vi., pp. 716-742; Jacob P. Dunn, *Indiana*, chap. iv.; W. H. Smith, *Indiana*, vol. i., chap. iv.; John Reynolds, *The Pioneer History of Illinois*, chap. iv.; Mann Butler, *Kentucky*, chaps. iii.-v.; *Illinois Historical Collections*, vol. i., pp. 199-204; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 287 et seq.

upon the Virginia frontiers.* Clark soon received intelligence that Hamilton, believing himself safe because of his distance from danger and the difficulty of sending an expedition against him, had dispatched his Indians to harass the frontier, and had taken post at Vincennes, with only about 80 soldiers and three field pieces and some swivels.† Though he could muster only 170 effective men, Clark determined to seize the opportunity to attack Hamilton; this being the only means by which he could save himself and disconcert Hamilton's plans. About February 7, 1779, therefore, Clark sent out a small galley, mounting two four-pounders and four swivels and manned with a company of soldiers. This vessel was to proceed up the Wabash until she reached a point a few miles below Vincennes, instructions being given that no person be allowed to pass her. Clark himself then set out and spent sixteen days in crossing the country between Kaskaskia and Vincennes, being compelled to undergo all manner of hardship in the woods and marshes.‡ In crossing the drowned lands of the Wabash about five days were spent, and for miles at a time the members of the little band were compelled to wade through water up to their breasts.¶ At times the men almost

mutinied, but such was Clark's influence that all who were able continued on with him and soon reached their destination.* On February 24 Clark reached Vincennes and completely surprised the town. The inhabitants readily submitted to Clark's authority, but Hamilton, the governor, made an effort to defend the fort. On the next day, however, he was compelled to surrender himself and the garrison prisoners of war.† Because of his activities in inciting the Indians to atrocities, Hamilton had become so obnoxious to the Americans that the executive council of Virginia placed him and some of his agents in prison under irons.‡ Several months afterward, however, they were released on

torical Series, vol. iii., p. 99 *et seq.*; Dunn, *Indiana*, pp. 142-144. See also the excerpts from Bowman's *Journal* in Henry, *Life of Patrick Henry*, vol. i., pp. 597-601, and Clark's letter of April 29, 1779, to Governor Henry, vol. iii., p. 233 *et seq.*

*Roosevelt, pp. 72-73.

† See Law, *The Colonial History of Vincennes*; Ogg, *Opening of the Mississippi*, pp. 362-366; Smith in Powell's *Historic Towns of the Western States*; E. A. Bryan, *Indiana's First Settlement*; Clark's *Important Conquest of Post Vincennes*, in *Magazine of American History*, vol. xxi., pp. 386-403; Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West*, vol. ii., chap. iii.; English, *The Conquest of the Northwest*, vol. i., chaps. x.-xi.; Hamilton's report previously quoted; Dillon, *Indiana*, chaps. xii.-xv.; Dunn, *Indiana*, pp. 138-151; Smith, *Indiana*, vol. i., chap. iv.; C. W. Butterfield, *History of George Rogers Clark's Conquest of the Illinois and Wabash Towns, 1778 and 1779* (1904); Moore, *The Northwest under Three Flags*, pp. 219-244; *Illinois Historical Collections*, vol. i., p. 255 *et seq.*; Cooke, *Virginia*, p. 450 *et seq.*

‡ Cooley, *Michigan*, pp. 99-100; Roosevelt, vol. ii., pp. 86-87. See also Jefferson's letters regarding this in Ford's ed. of *Jefferson's Writings*, vol. ii., pp. 246-256.

* *Michigan Pioneer Collections*, vol. ix., p. 489 *et seq.*

† Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, vol. ii., p. 68.

‡ *Illinois Historical Collections*, vol. i., pp. 246-253; Roosevelt, p. 69 *et seq.*

¶ See Bowman's *Journal* in *Ohio Valley His-*

the recommendation of General Washington.* Clark's expedition was of especial benefit to the American cause, for it not only disconcerted Hamilton's plans and saved the western frontier from savage incursions, but also proved to the Indians that the Americans could fight equally as well as the British and that in the long run the Indians would gain nothing by adhering to the British.†

For a long time Congress had endeavored to persuade the Indians to remain neutral, if they could not espouse the cause of the revolutionists; but as the Indians refused to do this and continued their depredations, Congress determined to stop their ravages by inflicting upon them such punishment as their deeds merited. Among the Indians who participated in the massacre of Wyoming were those of the Six Nations, with the exception of a portion of the Oneidas, and Washington determined that these Indians should be taught a lesson they would not soon forget. General Sullivan was placed in command of 3,000 troops and ordered to proceed from Wyoming into the country of the Senecas, where his troops were to be joined by a force under General Clinton, proceeding from the Mohawk River. After the two forces had united, they were to march into the heart of the Indian

country and spread devastation on all sides. Washington directed Sullivan to be unsparing in his severity and ordered him to detach parties "to lay waste all the settlements around, with instructions to do it in an effectual manner, that the country may be not merely overrun, but destroyed." This should be done before Sullivan considered any overtures of peace.* Peabody says:

"It must be owned that orders like these come strangely from the pen of Washington. The most tender mercies of war are sufficiently cruel, when softened by all the mitigations which have resulted from the improved sentiment and feeling of modern times. These mitigations are not unlike the rules of chivalry, which make it dishonorable to strike at particular portions of the body, while each combatant was at perfect liberty to murder his opponent by hard blows on all the rest. But to ravage flourishing settlements with fire, to destroy them so effectually that, as in ancient times, the plough might pass over the places where they stood, and that not a trace of sustaining vegetation might remain in the fields whitening to the harvest, can hardly be thought of without emotions of pain and horror; they are the dark calamities of war, from which the heart turns shuddering away.

"But we are not to forget that they were designed to fall upon a foe, whose path was always to be traced in blood; against whose fury neither the helplessness of infancy, nor feeble age, nor the defenceless state of woman, could afford the least protection. We have already mentioned their atrocities at Wyoming and Cherry Valley; these had awakened a deep and universal conviction, that the only security against such enemies was to be found in driving them completely from the haunts, where urged on by British agents, or by loyalists more savage and relentless than themselves, they came forth to the work of death. They obeyed the impulses of their wild education, which converted cruelty and revenge into virtues; and the responsibility of the measures adopted

* Dunn, *Indiana*, p. 149; Ford's ed. of Jefferson's *Writings*, vol. ii., p. 258 *et seq.*

† Dunn, *Indiana*, p. 150. See also Henry's instructions for governing the territory, in Henry, *Life of Patrick Henry*, vol. iii., p. 209 *et seq.*

* See the instructions in Sparks' ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. v., p. 264; also Sullivan's letter of April 16, 1779, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 264-268.

against them must certainly rest upon those by whom they were stimulated to aggression, with a full knowledge of the consequences that must follow. It is enough to show how strong must have been the sense entertained of the necessity of such measures, at the time, when we see them planned and ordained by Washington; the last man to devise or desire anything which bore in his view the aspect of wanton cruelty." *

Marshall says:

"The devastation of the country has been spoken of with some degree of disapprobation; but this sentiment is the result rather of an amiable disposition in the human mind to condemn whatever may have the appearance of tending to aggravate the miseries of war, than of reflection. Circumstances existed, which reconciled to humanity this seeming departure from it. Great Britain possessed advantages, which insured a controlling influence over the Indians, and kept them in almost continual war with the United States. Their habitual ferocity seemed to have derived increased virulence from the malignity of the white men, who had taken refuge among them; and there was real foundation for the opinion, that an annual repetition of the horrors of Wyoming could be prevented only by disabling the savages from perpetrating them. No means in the power of the United States promised so certainly to effect this desirable object, as the removal of neighbors, whose hostility could be diminished only by terror, and whose resentments were to be assuaged only by fear." †

On August 11, 1779, Sullivan's army reached the point of confluence of the Tioga with the Susquehanna. On the 22d General Clinton arrived, and the united forces proceeded upon their work of devastation. The Indians under Brant determined to resist the American troops with all their force, and selected for a battle ground a place about one mile in front of Newtown. According to the estimates of General Sullivan, the

whole Indian force numbered 1,500 men, though the Indians themselves say there were about 800. About 200 whites were also with them. On a piece of rising ground the Indians had constructed a breastwork half a mile in length, the right flank being covered by the river, which, bending to the right and winding round the rear, left only the front and left of the breastwork open to attack. To the left was a high ridge nearly parallel to the general course of the river, which terminated a little below the breastwork. Still further to the left and in the same direction ran another ridge leading to the rear of the American army. The battle ground was thickly covered with underbrush and high trees, and the Indians had so constructed their breastwork that this underbrush completely concealed it from the approaching enemy. Furthermore, the road ran parallel to the breastwork and thus the whole flank of the passing enemy would be exposed to the fire of those within the breastwork. Beside the forces in the breastwork, parties of Indians were stationed on both hills so as to fall on Sullivan's flanks the minute the action should begin.


This arrangement had been discovered by Sullivan on August 29, and before beginning the general action, Sullivan ordered his men to drive the outlying parties toward the breastwork, so that he could not possibly be taken in the rear. When the main army had advanced, Sullivan directed

* *Life of General Sullivan*, pp. 128-129.

† Marshall, *Life of Washington*, vol. i., p. 323.

General Poor to take possession of the hill leading to his rear and then, turning to the left, to strike the breastwork upon the rear. Colonel Hand with the artillery was to attack the breastwork in front. These orders were promptly and effectively executed. While the artillery was battering the front of the breastwork,

American army lost 30 men and the Indian loss was correspondingly light, but the effect upon the Indians was considerable, for they were so intimidated that all resistance was abandoned. The Americans penetrated into the very heart of the country laying waste in every direction; houses, corn-fields, gardens,



Poor began a sharp attack upon the Indians stationed on the mountain. Though the defense was sustained for some time with much intrepidity, Poor finally pushed the Indians back and gained the summit of the hill. Now perceiving that their flank was exposed to attack and that they were in precarious situation, the Indians abandoned their breastwork and precipitately fled. In the attack the

orchards, etc., were completely destroyed. Early in October, having executed his orders, Sullivan returned to Easton, Pa., and shortly afterward was rewarded by Congress with a vote of thanks.*

* See Cooke, *Sullivan's Indian Expedition*; Conover (ed.), *Journals of the Military Expedition of Major-General John Sullivan against the Six Nations of Indians in 1779* (1887); the account by Rev. D. Craft, in Weller, *Centennial Celebration of General Sullivan's Campaign* (1880);

During the same year various other expeditions were sent against the Indians. In April Colonel Van Schaick, with 55 men, marched from Fort Schuyler into the Onondaga territory burning their settlements and destroying large quantities of provisions. In addition, 12 Indians were killed and 34 prisoners taken without the loss of a single man to the Americans. While Sullivan was engaged in laying waste the territory of the Six Nations, Colonel Brodhead was engaged in a similar task, his expedition starting from Pittsburg and going up

the Alleghany. He advanced about 200 miles up the river and destroyed a number of villages and large quantities of grain on the head branches of that river. As in New York, the Indians were unable to withstand the attack of the American troops, and after a slight and unsuccessful resistance, abandoned their villages to the mercy of the Americans. These expeditions had a wonderful effect upon the savage mind, for while no great numbers of Indians were killed, still the savages were intimidated and their incursions became less frequent.

CHAPTER XXIV.

1778-1779.

GENERAL LANGUOR : DEPRESSED CONDITION OF FINANCES.

Party dissensions in Congress — Washington's letter to Harrison expressing apprehension — Effect of French alliance — Washington's intercourse with Congress — Relaxation in vigorous preparations for war — Inefficiency of American army — Efforts of Washington and others to remedy condition of affairs — Lust for riches among contractors — Depression of the currency — Revolt of the Jersey Brigade — Washington's address to the latter — Issues of paper money — Trouble among foreign representatives — Money borrowed in foreign countries — Quarrel between Lee, Franklin and Deane transferred to Congress — Paine's connection with the dispute — The accounts of Beaumarchais — Lee and Izard recalled — Deane discharged — His subsequent career — Further issues of money — Treasury board reorganized — Prices of commodities rise — Riot in Philadelphia — Convention at Hartford — States slow in remitting quotas — States called upon for specific supplies — The new currency — Committee appointed to investigate condition of army — Their report.

The jealousies and party dissensions prevailing in Congress at this time were a source of great anxiety to Washington. By far the greater

part of the prominent men who had been connected with that body had long since resigned; of the number left only a few continued to perform their duties; and those who attended the sessions were of comparatively small weight and influence.* As a

Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 307, 491 (ed. 1788); Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 307, 460-463, vol. viii., pp. 9-17; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 271-278; Stone, *Life of Brant*, vol. ii.

* Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 514-515.

general thing, not more than 30 members were present at any one time and frequently some of the States were entirely unrepresented. Furthermore, party feuds greatly interfered with the work of Congress and had a tendency to completely disorganize every department connected with the government. Washington was deeply concerned at this condition of affairs, and in a letter to Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, dated December 18, 1778, he gives expression to his apprehensions as follows:

"It appears as clear to me as ever the sun did in its meridian brightness that America never stood in more eminent need of the wise, patriotic, and spirited exertions of her sons than at this period; and, if it is not a sufficient cause for general lamentation, my misconception of the matter impresses it too strongly upon me, that the states, separately, are too much engaged in their local concerns, and have too many of their ablest men withdrawn from the general council, for the good of the common weal. In a word, I think our political system may be compared to the mechanism of a clock, and that we should derive a lesson from it; for it answers no good purpose to keep the smaller wheels in order, if the greater one, which is the support and prime mover of the whole, is neglected.

"How far the latter is the case, it does not become me to pronounce; but, as there can be no harm in a pious wish for the good of one's country, I shall offer it as mine, that each state would not only choose, but absolutely compel their ablest men to attend Congress; and that they would instruct them to go into a thorough investigation of the causes, that have produced so many disagreeable effects in the army and country; in a word, that public abuses should be corrected. Without this, it does not, in my judgment, require the spirit of divination to foretell the consequences of the present administration; nor to how little purpose the states individually are framing constitutions, providing laws, and filling offices with the abilities of their ablest men. These, if the great whole is mismanaged, must sink in the general wreck, which will carry with it the remorse of thinking that we are lost

by our own folly and negligence, or by the desire perhaps of living in ease and tranquillity during the expected accomplishment of so great a revolution, in the effecting of which, the greatest abilities, and the most honest men, our American world affords, ought to be employed.

"It is much to be feared, my dear sir, that the states, in their separate capacities, have very inadequate ideas of the present danger. Many persons removed far distant from the scene of action, and seeing and hearing such publications only, as flatter their wishes, conceive that the contest is at an end, and that to regulate the government and the police of their own state is all that remains to be done; but it is devoutly to be wished that a sad reverse of this may not fall upon them like a thunderclap, that is little expected. I do not mean to designate particular states. I wish to cast no reflection upon any one. The public believe (and, if they do *believe* it, the fact might almost as well be so) that the states at this time are badly represented, and that the great and important concerns of the nation are horribly conducted, for want either of abilities or application in the members, or through the discord and party views of some individuals. That they should be so, is to be lamented more at this time than formerly, as we are far advanced in the dispute, and, in the opinion of many, drawing to a happy period; we have the eyes of Europe upon us, and as I am persuaded many political spies to watch, who discover our situation, and give information of our weaknesses and wants.*"

While the French alliance had given a great impetus to the cause of the colonies, still it had considerable ill effect upon the community. People considered that, as the French king had determined to lend his aid in securing to America independence from Great Britain, it was unnecessary that the Americans continue their exertions. To many it seemed as though it were only necessary to allow the French to fight the battles for the Americans, and when the war had finally been won, without any hard-

* Sparks, *Life of Washington*, pp. 286-287.

ship or sacrifice upon their own part, to accept the independence thus gained as a matter of course and of right. Consequently, general languor and indifference prevailed. Thinking that the final result of the war was now a foregone conclusion and being very nearly exhausted by the long protracted struggle, the Americans began to grow weary of the fight and to shrink from every sacrifice. Public and private enterprises lagged; accessions to the army came in but slowly, and even for those who came in it was difficult to provide supplies. The necessity of emitting still further and greater sums of paper money had led to a number of deplorable circumstances; attempts to sustain the currency at par were abortive, and hard currency afterward became so valuable that it was worth ten, fifteen and twenty times the face value of the colonial bills. The Tories began to emit forged Continental currency, which helped to depreciate the value of paper money. Prices soared far beyond the ability of people to pay, and a wide field of speculation opened itself to contractors and speculators, who seized the opportunity to acquire sudden riches amidst the distresses of their compatriots. As a result of this depression, probably none suffered more than the army itself, for supplies were so high that Congress could not issue enough paper money to buy sufficient quantities and could obtain but little coin money. In South Carolina a pair of

shoes cost \$700 in paper money, while the pay of the officers and privates was hardly sufficient to provide them even the barest existence. Speaking of these speculators, Washington said, "I would to God that some one of the more atrocious in each state was hung in gibbets upon a gallows five times as high as the one prepared for Haman. No punishment in my opinion is too severe for the man who can build his greatness upon his country's ruin.*"

During 1778 but little had been accomplished by the army and both the Americans and French had been unsuccessful in their attempts to drive the British from the continent. On the other hand, however, the British had been unable to make any accession to the territory under their sway. Therefore, in order to concert plans for the coming year, Washington visited Philadelphia to hold personal intercourse with the members of Congress. In this service about five weeks was spent, during which it was finally concluded, considering the condition of the army and the general state of affairs, to act chiefly on the defensive, with the exception of punishing inroads upon the borders. Washington exerted the whole weight of his influence to offset the general impression that the mere fact of the French alliance would result in the ultimate success of the American conflict and that it in itself would relieve

* Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 253.

the generally depressed economic conditions. He corresponded with members of Congress and the governors of the various States and other influential citizens, pointing out the fallacy of the belief that peace was near and showing that a force sufficient for active operations should be immediately raised, equipped and well supported. He said also that whatever arrangements were made for the army should be made early so that the recruits could all be assembled at headquarters by January 1. Despite his urgent requests, it was not until January 23, 1779, that Congress passed resolutions to reenlist the army, and not until March 9 were the States requested to furnish their quotas. The military establishment for 1780 did not receive consideration until some time later, and was not agreed upon until February 9; even then the men were not required to reach headquarters until April 1. Thus when the American army should have been in the field coöperating with the French, nothing had been done with the exception of granting authority to reenlist and recruit the army. This delay was most inopportune and vexations.

The winter of 1778-1779 had been particularly severe. In New York and Staten Island the British suffered from lack of fuel and other supplies from the country, for Washington had established his troops in that vicinity so as to cut off completely the British garrison from communication

with the outside world. They therefore no longer enjoyed the security which their insular position hitherto offered. Having used every available piece of material for fuel and having entirely consumed the supplies already in the city, the garrison were compelled to make frequent expeditions into the country, which occasioned many skirmishes, though without any great damage to either side. The army under Washington, however, was too weak to attack the British army even in its present precarious situation. Had he been properly supported, Washington would have seized a number of opportunities to effectively assault the garrison, for the reinforcements sent to the South had greatly reduced it and there was no possible chance of success. But Washington was now numerically weaker than his enemy and could not consider any enterprise of a hazardous or risky nature. Furthermore, he was destitute of necessary supplies, particularly clothing, and could not undertake active operations during the winter.

In addition to the inactivity of the army, affairs in general were in a depressed state. While at first the news of the French alliance had filled the people with unbounded enthusiasm, the protraction of the struggle had been quite beyond expectations and their enthusiasm speedily began to die out and their ardor to cool. After the surrender of Burgoyne and the arrival of the French troops in

America, the notion was entertained that the war was virtually at an end and that the French would finish the quarrel with the British while the Americans stood by and, in case of victory, reap all the benefits. This considerably alarmed Washington and those who had the sagacity to see the outcome of this tendency toward relaxation, and they used every endeavor to remedy the condition of affairs. They issued numbers of exhortations to the people, pointing out that the respect of the allies should not be forfeited by their own weakening conduct, that peril was still at hand, and that they must continue their exertions if they wished the war to terminate successfully. It was in vain, however. The people would not be aroused, for they had become reckless as to consequences, and were willing to risk their future on the turn of events, provided they themselves were not compelled to undergo any further hardships.

The army had been recruited very slowly. Large numbers of the veterans had served the term for which they had enlisted and retired to their homes, while others became tired of serving a government from whom they received only paper money in payment for their services, and deserted. Congress had stipulated that new recruits must enlist for three years or until the end of the war, and on this basis but few volunteers could be secured; while on the other hand, short time volunteers were of no use

in the army, and Washington had repeatedly expressed with sorrow his inability to put any faith in them. Conscription was considered too hazardous to be adopted in the present state of the public mind. Therefore, it was fortunate for the army and for the country that the British remained idle during this period and did not undertake any expeditions of great magnitude.*

Lukewarmness and indifference, however, were not the only influences with which the patriots were called upon to contend, for among a certain class of people a lust for riches had sprung up—no matter how these riches were obtained. Large numbers of men sought to acquire private fortunes at the expense of the public, and nothing mattered to them so they could fatten on the substance of the state. While the patriots were exerting their energies, spending their private fortunes, and devoting their very lives to their country, these speculators unblushingly plundered the public and divided the spoils. All private contracts became the object of their nsurious influence and nefarious gains; contracts for army supplies were padded and very often the States were mulcted of huge sums of money for which they received absolutely nothing. While robbing with their hands, these plunderers were singing forth their own praises and lauding

* See Greene's letters to Washington in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 271-275, 371-374, and other letters in the same volume.

themselves as being the only ones animated with national patriotism and a desire for freedom. Those who refused to concur in their plans for debauching the public credit and plundering the continental treasury were denounced as Tories, Loyalists, bought by England, etc.

The great poverty of the country at this time led to the issuing of enormous sums of irredeemable paper currency, which, from the very nature of things, soon became almost worthless; and with malignant cruelty, the British added to the confusion by issuing quantities of counterfeit paper. The faith in contracts was dead and everywhere violated, and the government itself was a party to the pecuniary frauds of these agents and servants. Innumerable times hardened creditors had taken advantage of their contracts which had been made when paper and coin were at par, and demanded at the present time the fulfillment of these contracts in coin. Others compelled creditors to take depreciated continental bills, which upon their face were equal in value to coin, in payment of debts contracted at the time when coin was current. The contagion soon became general, spreading throughout the country, and even Washington himself experienced a taste of such fraudulent transactions on the part of those to whom he had given aid in times of dire necessity. The country suffered, too, from the activities of certain speculators, who by circulating favorable and

unfavorable news, as suited their purposes, reaped huge rewards from the temporary rise or fall in the currency. At first but a few were successful, but when others saw fortunes being made from this kind of speculation, they immediately engaged in the nefarious traffic and the most estimable and upright soon sank into indigence. The contagion spread to all classes of persons and finally the soldiers became infected, refusing to enlist unless an enormous bounty were given them. No one would contract to furnish supplies to the government, nor manufacturers to supply the contractors, without enormous profits. Few would accept public office without a large salary and illicit perquisites. Washington summed up the state of affairs in a few short sentences to Harrison, as follows:

“If I were to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and of men, from what I have seen, heard, and in part know, I should in one word say that idleness, dissipation, and extravagance seem to have laid fast hold of most of them; that speculation, speculation, and an insatiable thirst for riches seem to have got the better of every other consideration, and almost of every order of men; that party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day; while the momentous concerns of an empire, a great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and want of credit, which, in its consequences, is the want of everything, are but secondary considerations and postponed from day to day and week to week as if our affairs wore the most promising aspect.”*

Undoubtedly the disorder and confusion in the finances and general

* Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 516; Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., pp. 253-254.

affairs greatly affected labor conditions; the ordinary pursuits of commerce and industry were abandoned for the more alluring chances of gaining fortunes by speculation without any appreciable effort.*

The effect of this general disorder was seen directly in the army, for so greatly had paper money depreciated that the pay of officers and privates was unequal to their support,† which of necessity produced great discontent. In May, 1779, the Jersey Brigade had been ordered to march to the West, but General Maxwell replied to this order by stating that the officers of the first regiment had sent a remonstrance to their colonel, addressed to the New Jersey Legislature, in which they declared that, unless their previous complaints regarding pay were given immediate attention, they were to be considered at the end of three days as having resigned their commissions. In case of such a contingency, they requested the Legislature to appoint officers to take their places. Knowing the justice of their demands, the sufferings through which they had gone, and the sterling patriotism of the general rank and file, Washington was heartily in sympathy with them, but at the same time foresaw the result of such action on their part. Therefore, in

the capacity of friend and commander, he wrote a letter to General Maxwell to be laid before the officers* in which he made a forcible appeal to their patriotism, as follows:

"There is nothing which has happened in the course of the war, that has given me so much pain as the remonstrance you mention from the officers of the first Jersey regiment. I cannot but consider it a hasty and imprudent step, which, on more cool consideration, they will themselves condemn. I am very sensible of the inconveniences under which the officers of the army labor, and I hope they do me the justice to believe, that my endeavors to procure them relief are incessant. There is more difficulty, however, in satisfying their wishes, than perhaps they are aware of. Our resources have been hitherto very limited. The situation of our money is no small embarrassment, for which, though there are remedies, they cannot be the work of a moment. Government is not insensible of the merits and sacrifices of the officers, nor unwilling to make a compensation; but it is a truth of which a very little observation must convince us, that it is very much straitened in the means. Great allowances ought to be made on this account, for any delay and seeming backwardness which may appear.

"Some of the states, indeed, have done as generously as was in their power; and if others have been less expeditious, it ought to be ascribed to some peculiar cause, which a little time, aided by example, will remove. The patience and perseverance of the army have been, under every disadvantage, such as do them the highest honor at home and abroad, and have inspired me with an unlimited confidence in their virtue, which has consoled me amidst every perplexity and reverse of fortune, to which our affairs in a struggle of this nature, were necessarily exposed.

"Now that we have made so great a progress to the attainment of the end we have in view, so that we cannot fail, without a most shameful desertion of our own interests, any thing like a change of conduct would imply a very unhappy change of principles, and a forgetfulness as well of what we owe to ourselves as to our country. Did I suppose it possible this should be the case, even in a single regiment of the army, I should be mortified and chagrined beyond expression. I

*See Botta, *History of the War of Independence*, vol. iii., pp. 76-91.

†For a brief resumé of this subject see Ramsey, *History of the American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 12-22.

*Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., pp. 520-521.

should feel it as a wound given to my own honor, which I consider as embarked with that of the army. But this I believe to be impossible. Any corps that was about to set an example of the kind would weigh well the consequences; and no officer of common discernment and sensibility would hazard them. If they should stand alone in it, independent of other consequences, what would be their feelings on reflecting that they had held themselves out to the world in a point of light inferior to the rest of the army? Or, if their example should be followed, and become general, how could they console themselves for having been the foremost in bringing ruin and disgrace upon their country? They would remember that the army would share a double portion of the general infamy and distress; and that the character of an American officer would become as despicable as it is now glorious.

"I confess the appearances in the present instance are disagreeable; but I am convinced they seem to mean more than they really do. The Jersey officers have not been outdone by any others, in the qualities either of citizens or soldiers; and I am confident no part of them would seriously intend any thing that would be a stain on their former reputation. The gentlemen cannot be in earnest; they have only reasoned wrong about the means of attaining a good end, and, on consideration, I hope and flatter myself they will renounce what must appear improper.

"At the opening of a campaign, when under marching orders for an important service, their own honor, duty to the public, and to themselves, and a regard to military propriety, will not suffer them to persist in a measure which would be a violation of them all. It will even wound their delicacy coolly to reflect, that they have hazarded a step which has an air of dictating terms to their country, by taking advantage of the necessity of the moment.

"The declaration they have made to the state, at so critical a time, that 'unless they obtain relief in the short period of three days, they must be considered out of the service,' has very much that aspect; and the seeming relaxation of continuing until the state can have a reasonable time to provide other officers, will be thought only a superficial veil.

"I am now to request that you will convey my sentiments to the gentlemen concerned, and endeavor to make them sensible of their error. The service for which the regiment was intended, will not admit of delay. It must at all events march on Monday morning, in the first place to

this camp, and further directions will be given when it arrives. I am sure I shall not be mistaken in expecting a prompt and cheerful obedience."

This considerably softened the attitude of the officers, and while they did not recede entirely from their claims, they continued to serve in the army and declared to the commander-in-chief "their unhappiness that any step of theirs should give him pain." They said that their conduct was justifiable under the circumstances, as they were in extreme want and repeated memorials to their Legislature had produced no change. They added:

"We have lost all confidence in that body. Reason and experience forbid that we should have any. Few of us have private fortunes; many have families who are already suffering every thing that can be received from an ungrateful country. Are we then to suffer all the inconveniences, fatigues, and dangers of a military life, while our wives and our children are perishing for want of common necessities at home; and that without the distant prospect of reward, for our pay is now only nominal? We are sensible that your Excellency cannot wish or desire this from us.

"We are sorry that you should imagine we meant to disobey orders. It was, and still is, our determination to march with our regiment, and to do the duty of officers until the legislature should have a reasonable time to appoint others; but no longer.

"We beg leave to assure your Excellency, that we have the highest sense of your ability and virtues; that executing your orders has ever given us pleasure; that we love the service, and we love our country; but when that country is so lost to virtue and to justice as to forget to support its servants, it then becomes their duty to retire from its service."

While Washington realized the justice of their complaints, he also knew that to comply with their demands was impossible, and in this embarrassing situation he deemed it best to

take no other notice of their letter than to declare to the officers through General Maxwell, "that while they continued to do their duty, he should only regret the part they had taken." A short time afterward the Jersey Legislature made partial provision for their troops, who thereupon continued to serve without further complaint. Washington knew by experience the ill consequences likely to result from the measures adopted by the Jersey Brigade, and he therefore urged upon Congress that some general and adequate provision be made for the army officers, observing, "that the distresses in some corps are so great, that officers have solicited even to be supplied with clothing destined for the common soldiery, coarse and unsuitable as it was. I had not power to comply with the request. The patience of men animated by a sense of duty and honor, will support them to a certain point, beyond which it will not go. I doubt not Congress will be sensible of the danger of an extreme in this respect, and will pardon my anxiety to obviate it." Congress, however, was greatly divided upon this matter; some agreed with Washington that a permanent army should be established, well equipped, well supplied and well supported; while others feared that a permanent army would infringe upon their future liberties and emphatically stated their preference for enlistments for short periods not exceeding a year. Others favored a

State system, and the occasional calling upon the States for quotas for the Continental army. In the consideration of military affairs, sometimes one party predominated and sometimes the other, the consequence of which was that Washington at no time received the undivided support of Congress.

Meanwhile the finances continued to be a source of anxiety and much trouble. Bills of credit constituted the main resource of Congress and as their value depreciated, the issues became larger and larger. During the first six months of 1778, \$23,500,000 had been issued, but this being insufficient, \$5,000,000 were authorized in July, \$15,000,000 in September, and \$10,000,000 each in November and December, thus bringing the total for the year up to \$63,500,000 and the total outstanding up to nearly \$100,000,000. "Several millions of these bills had been exchanged for certificates of loan bearing interest; but the bills thus borrowed had been immediately paid out again, and the certificates of war, serving themselves to a certain extent as a currency, helped also to increase the depreciation, which, before the end of the year, amounted in the North to six, in the South to eight for one."* The States had been called upon also to raise \$15,000,000 of paper dollars by taxation, and in December, 1778, were

* Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 264.

again called upon to raise \$6,000,000 annually for eighteen years, beginning with 1780.* This sum was to be appropriated to pay the interest of all loans made to the United States previous to that year, and the balance, as well as the \$15,000,000 previously called for, was to be cancelled. During 1778 the total expenditures amounted to \$67,000,000 (worth in specie about \$24,000,000) which was nearly the same amount as had been expended during the previous year.

Trouble now arose among the representatives of Congress in France. In the latter part of 1777 John Adams had been sent to France to take the place of Deane who was recalled to give an account of his conduct.† When Adams arrived at Paris, he found Deane and Franklin on one side and Arthur Lee on the other engaged in a violent quarrel, which even the recall of Deane did not terminate.‡

* Baneroft, vol. v., p. 294.

† Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., pp. 249-251; John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., p. 275 *et seq.*, vol. iii., pp. 94-120, vol. vii., p. 5 *et seq.*

‡ John Adams, *Works*, vol. iii., p. 123. "He [Franklin] said there had been disputes between Mr. Deane and Mr. Lee; that Mr. Lee was a man of an anxious, uneasy temper, which made it disagreeable to do business with him; that he seemed to be one of those men, of whom he had known many in his day, who went on through life quarrelling with one person or another till they commonly ended with the loss of their reason. He said, Mr. Izard was there too, and joined in close friendship with Mr. Lee; that Mr. Izard was a man of violent and ungoverned passions; that each of these had a number of Americans about him, who were always exciting disputes, and propagating stories that made the service very disagreeable; that Mr. Izard * * * instead of minding his own business * * *

Congress, therefore, on September 14, 1778, appointed Franklin sole commissioner to France, Arthur Lee still remaining commissioner to Spain, though not allowed to enter that country. Adams had avoided participation in the quarrel as much as possible, but in the new arrangement of commissionerships no notice seems to have been taken of him and he soon hastened home intending to return to his law practice "to make writs, draw deeds, and be happy."* With all their dissensions, however, the commissioners had succeeded in borrowing 3,000,000 livres (about \$500,000) from the court of Spain, but this sum proved very insufficient out of which to pay for arms and stores and for the equipment of cruisers and to meet the bills for interest drawn upon them by Congress.†

The quarrel between the commissioners was now transferred to America. Arthur Lee had written home letters full of insinuations against both his colleagues, but more

spent his time in consultations with Mr. Lee, and in interfering with the business of the commission to this court; that they had made strong objections to the treaty, and opposed several articles of it; that neither Mr. Lee nor Mr. Izard was liked by the French; that Mr. William Lee, his brother, * * * called upon the ministers at Paris for considerable sums of money, and by his connection with Lee and Izard and their party, increased the uneasiness, &c., &c., &c." See also pp. 138, 159-161, 175-176; vol. vii., pp. 14-15.

* John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., pp. 280 *et seq.*, 289-290, vol. iii., p. 219, vol. vii., pp. 82-83, 87.

† Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 265-266; Morse, *Life of Franklin*, pp. 261 *et seq.*, 291 *et seq.*; Hale, *Franklin in France*, vol. i., p. 228 *et seq.*

particularly against Deane, through whose hands almost all the receipts and expenditures of the commissioners had passed. Similar insinuations were made against Deane by Ralph Izard and by William Carmichael, the former secretary of the commissioners, the latter claiming that Deane had appropriated the public money to his private use.* Carmichael and Deane were now examined at the bar of Congress the latter later making a written report. The adherents of Deane, led by Robert Morris, Gouverneur Morris, and other members of Congress well acquainted with mercantile matters, now opened an acrimonious debate with the Lee adherents, headed by Richard Henry Lee, brother of Arthur Lee, and chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs.† Deane published an "Address to the People of the United States" in the *Philadelphia Gazette* in which, beside attacking the Lees, he claimed the credit for securing the supplies obtained through Beaumarchais.‡ Thomas Paine, at this time secretary to the Committee for Foreign Affairs, then entered the lists in behalf of Arthur Lee, in a reply in the *Phila-*

delphia Packet of January 2, 1779, claiming that the arrangement with Beaumarchais had been made by Arthur Lee while in London; and that those supplies, while furnished by a mercantile house, really came from the French court. Paine's publication angered Gérard, the French ambassador, as it involved France in a charge of double dealing with England, and in consequence Paine resigned his office. Congress denied that the French court had made any presents of money or supplies previous to the late treaty of alliance.*

It subsequently developed, however, that the French court had furnished Beaumarchais 1,000,000 livres, but that the shipments made by Beaumarchais amounted to a much larger sum, being, according to his account, over \$1,000,000. The proceeds of certain cargoes of tobacco were credited against this, but a heavy balance still remained and he sent an agent to Philadelphia to solicit payment. Congress soon afterward gave him bills of exchange, payable three years after sight, drawn on Franklin, for nearly \$500,000 and by him accepted and paid when due out of the funds loaned by the French court. The accounts of Beaumarchais were evidently kept in a careless manner, and this was one of the charges against Deane, but it likewise might have been made with equal justice against Lee and Franklin.

* Charges of incompetence were made also against Franklin. See Morse, *Life of Franklin*, p. 287 *et seq.* For excerpts from some of his letters see Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., pp. 254 *et seq.*, 354, also chap. x.

† See Oberholtzer, *Life of Robert Morris*, p. 52 *et seq.*; W. G. Sumner, *Robert Morris*, p. 29 *et seq.*; Roosevelt, *Gouverneur Morris*, pp. 93-94.

‡ See Adams' letter to Vergennes regarding this, in John Adams, *Works*, vol. vii., pp. 79-80.

* Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., pp. 356-359; John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., p. 283.

The warmth of the discussion influenced Congress to recall Izard and William Lee. Deane was finally discharged from his attendance on Congress and returned to France for the settlement of his accounts, under which he claimed that Congress owed him a large balance. Congress, however, did not appoint any one to settle the accounts of their agents; and as this claim constituted Deane's sole support, its nonpayment reduced him to poverty. "No proof appears that he had been dishonest, or had employed the public money in speculations of his own, as his enemies alleged; but he had occupied the unfortunate position of having large sums of public money pass through his hands before any proper system of vouchers and accountability had been established, and he fell before the same spirit of malignant accusation which presently assaulted Wadsworth, Greene, Morris, and even Franklin himself, but which they had better means of warding off. Some letters from Deane to his friends in America, intercepted and published a year or two afterward, in which he expressed the wish and hope for an accommodation with Great Britain ruined him forever, and extinguished the least desire to do him justice." *

* Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 270. See also Foster, *Century of American Diplomacy*, p. 35 et seq. Mr. Elkanah Watson, writing in 1781, says: "On my return from Brussels, I called upon the once celebrated Silas Deane, at Ghent. He was a member of the first Congress, a sensible and intriguing man, and our early secret agent at the court of

While distracted by these disputes, Congress was still wrestling with the financial problem. Though there were now \$100,000,000 of Continental money in circulation, Congress, at the beginning of 1779, authorized \$50,000,000 more, the faith of the United States being pledged to redeem these on or before January, 1797, under the futile scheme already mentioned of having the States contribute \$6,000,000 annually for eighteen years. The channels of circulation were already full and this issue met with little success, being considered a poor investment. But the issues did not stop here. In February \$10,000,000 more were authorized with \$20,000,000 loan-office certificates: in April \$5,000,000 of bills of credit were issued; and in May and June \$20,000,000 additional. This rapid issue caused the depreciation to reach twenty for one; and in May Congress requested the States to pay \$45,-

France. He had lost his high standing both in France and America. I found him a voluntary exile, misanthropic in his feelings, intent on getting money, and deadly hostile to his native land. His language was so strong and decided on the subject of American affairs, and evinced so much hostility to his native land, that I felt constrained, upon my return to Paris, to announce to Dr. Franklin my conviction that Mr. Deane must be regarded an enemy alike to France and America. He observed to me, that similar reports had reached him before, but that he had been unwilling to admit the truth." In a note, Mr. Watson quotes from a letter of John Trumbull, the author of *McFingal*, some remarks in vindication of Mr. Deane, and calculated to explain, at least, in part, the reasons which led to many of his acts.—See *Men and Times of the Revolution*, pp. 130-131. See also Pitkin, *Political and Civil History of the United States*.

000,000 more of the bills in addition to the \$15,600,000 already called for.*

In the summer of 1779 the Treasury Board was reorganized, but this did not prevent the rapid depreciation in the value of bills of credit. They now passed at the rate of twenty for one, but were still a lawful tender for the payment of debts. This situation afforded many a dishonest debtor an opportunity to pay his debts at a very cheap rate, a species of legalized robbery which caused much suffering.† The public clamor against this state of affairs became louder and louder, and in order to quiet it, Congress on September 1, 1779, resolved that the issue should not exceed \$200,000,000. The bills already out amounted to \$160,000,000.‡ The loans prior to August 1, 1778, the interest of which was payable in bills on France, were \$7,500,000; and the loans contracted since, the rate of interest upon which was to increase as the issues were increased, amounted to more than \$26,000,000. The debt abroad was estimated at \$4,000,000. The States had paid in but \$3,000,000 of the \$6,000,000 in paper money already issued.||

Prices of commodities also continued to rise and finally became so high§ that they occasioned a riot at

the very doors of Congress. In Pennsylvania party spirit was still very violent, the constitutional party, who were in power, favoring the regulation of trade by law and the enactment of strong measures against engrossing, while the leaders of the opposition took the other side. A committee of Philadelphia citizens had undertaken to regulate the prices of ham, salt, flour, sugar, coffee, etc., after the example of Boston and other places, but Robert Morris and some of the leading merchants refused to conform. James Wilson became particularly obnoxious and he was denounced as a defender of Tories, for which it was proposed to banish him and some of his friends. These friends, among whom were George Clymer and Mifflin and probably Morris,* assembled at Wilson's house and were there attacked by a mob with small arms and cannon. One of the inmates of the house was killed and two wounded, but before any further damage could be done, President Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania appeared with a few cavalry and dispersed the mob. Prosecutions were begun on both sides, but before the proceedings had gone far the Assembly passed an act of oblivion.†

It was useless to deny the great depreciation and a convention of the

* Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 271; Bancroft, vol. v., p. 439.

† Bullock, *Monetary History of the United States*, pp. 65, 69; Bancroft, vol. v., p. 292.

‡ Bancroft, vol. v., p. 440.

|| Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 296.

§ Regarding this see Kalb's letters quoted in Kapp's *Life of Kalb*, pp. 183-184. On December

8, 1779, Madison wrote: "Corn is already at £20, and rising. Tobacco is also rising. Pork will probably command any price. Imported goods exceed everything else many hundred per cent."—Madison's *Works* (Congress ed.), vol. i., p. 32.

* Sumner, *Robert Morris*, p. 36.

† Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 297-298.

five Eastern States, held at Hartford October 20, 1779, proposed that prices be regulated on the basis of twenty for one, at the same time advising that a convention be held at Philadelphia at the beginning of the year for the general adoption of this scheme.* Congress, however, while approving the plan, urged the States to put the regulation into force at once, without waiting for a convention.

The remainder of the \$200,000,000 of Continental bills was issued before the end of the year, at which time the depreciation stood at thirty for one, but the clamor was now stopped. Washington doubted that the stoppage of money issues was expedient, for he saw no other means of feeding the army, and soon afterward an attempt was made to secure further issues.

The States were exceedingly slow in remitting the amounts allotted to them, and to meet pressing necessities Congress sold long-date bills of exchange on Jay and Laurens, which were to be met by the proceeds of loans to be obtained in Holland and Spain. Those bills were sold for paper at the rate of twenty-five for one, it being required that the purchaser lend an additional amount equal to the purchase money.

The expenditures for the year reached a total of \$160,000,000, of which \$100,000,000 were new issues and \$60,000,000 the proceeds of loans,

taxes, and bills sold; but the specie value of the whole did not equal \$10,000,000. The only resources to which Congress could look forward for the ensuing year were the unpaid balance of the \$65,000,000 of paper already called for and a further call from the States, except Georgia, for \$15,000,000 monthly, the payments of which were to begin in February, 1780.

In January, 1780, the depreciation of the currency had reached forty for one, and the hope of regulating prices at a convention at Philadelphia was destroyed. The army commissaries had no money with which to obtain food, and credit would not be extended them; consequently, Washington adopted the harsh expedient of levying contributions on the country surrounding his camp, each county being called upon for a certain quantity of the necessities, in payment for which the commissaries gave certificates. A plan was then formulated of calling upon the States for "specific supplies"—pork, beef, salt, flour, corn, rice, hay, tobacco, rum, etc.—the States being credited at fixed prices for the supplies furnished. For immediate use in place of certificates, the commissaries were given drafts on the State treasuries for the portions of their unpaid quotas of the requisitions heretofore made.*

* Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 301-302; Washington's *Writings* (Ford's ed.), vol. vi., p. 281. See also Oberholtzer, *Life of Robert Morris*, p. 61 *et seq.*

* Baneroft, vol. v., p. 446.

Congress now advised the States to repeal all laws which made the old bills legal tender, at the same time offering to receive gold and silver at the rate of forty for one in charge of the unpaid State quotas. A scheme was adopted which, it was hoped, would give the Federal treasury a moderate supply, and also draw in and cancel the outstanding bills of credit. "As the bills came in, in payment of the fifteen millions already called for, they were to be cancelled; but, for every twenty dollars so cancelled, one dollar was to be issued in 'new tenor,' bearing interest at five per cent., and redeemable in specie within six years; these new bills to be guaranteed by the confederacy, but to be issued on the credit of the individual states in proportion to their payments of the old tenor; each state to provide for redeeming its own issues at the rate of a sixth part yearly, and to receive for its own use six-tenths of the new issue, the other four-tenths to belong to Congress. This process, if fully carried out, would substitute for the outstanding two hundred millions of old bills, ten millions in 'new tenor,' of which six would go to the states paying in the bills, and four to the federal treasury. While a better, and, it was hoped, a stable currency would thus be provided in place of the old tenor, the states would be furnished with means to purchase 'the specifics' demanded by Congress. The federal treasury, also, would be moderately supplied,

without the necessity of imposing new taxes."*

Those who held commissary certificates for supplies furnished to the army now complained because they would be compelled to pay Continental taxes while the certificates were still unpaid. Congress therefore resolved that these commissary certificates might be used at their nominal value for paying all Continental taxes. Congress endeavored also to satisfy the complaining element in the army by passing a resolution in April, 1780, that the deficiency of pay occasioned by the depreciation of the currency would be made up to the troops as soon as the condition of the finances would allow, but this resolution gave no immediate relief.

Shortly afterward, a committee was appointed to investigate the condition of the army and in May it reported that "the army was five months unpaid; that it seldom had more than six days' provisions in advance, and was on several occasions, for sundry successive days, without meat; that the army was destitute of forage; that the medical department had neither sugar, tea, chocolate, wine, nor spirits; and that every department was without money or even the shadow of credit."† Under these trying conditions the campaign in the South was begun.

* Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 302; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 442-443.

† See Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 304.

CHAPTER XXV.

1779.

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH.

British under Campbell land at Savannah — Americans defeated and Savannah captured — Moderation of Colonel Campbell — General Lincoln arrives at Charleston — Plundering of the Tories — Campbell compelled to retreat from Augusta — General Ashe defeated by Prevost — The latter's irruption into South Carolina — Lincoln pursues Prevost — Prevost retreats from Charleston — Battle of Stono Ferry — American army goes into summer encampment — Desertion of the soldiers — General Matthews in Virginia — French fleet arrives at Savannah — French and American forces defeated in attack upon Savannah — Count Pulaski killed — Enterprize of Colonel John White.

As their operations in the North had resulted in little less than failure, the British determined to transfer the scene of operations to the South. As Georgia was now one of the weakest States in the Union and at the same time abounding in provisions of all kinds, it was decided to begin the southern campaign from Savannah. Toward the close of November, 1778, Colonel Archibald Campbell sailed from New York, and after a voyage of three weeks, landed near the mouth of the Savannah River. From the landing place a narrow causeway, 600 yards in length, with a ditch on each side, led through a swamp, and here a small party of Americans attempted to dispute the passage of the British, but unsuccessfully. Between the morass and the city, General Robert Howe, to whom the defence of Georgia had been committed, placed himself with a force of about 800 Americans and prepared to make a resolute defence. Having knowledge of the situation of the American

troops, a negro carried the information to Campbell and apprized him of a by-path by which he could gain the rear of the American encampment and attack the American detachment simultaneously from both sides. Campbell thereupon sent a force against the Americans, and in the conflict 100 of the latter were killed and wounded and between 400 and 500 made prisoners.* Thus within a few hours after landing, the British had possessed themselves of the fort and of the stores it contained, together with the shipping in the river and a large quantity of provisions. In addition, they were in possession of the capital of Georgia. Such of the American forces as escaped fled up

* Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 166-167; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 460; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 68 *et seq.*; Moultrie's *Memoirs*, p. 251 *et seq.*; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 525-526; McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 326-329; Sullivan's letter of January 5, 1779, to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 244-247; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 239-240.

the Savannah River and crossed into South Carolina.*

Shortly after the fall of Savannah, the fort at Sunbury, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Lachlan McIntosh, surrendered to the British.† Troops had also been rushed to the British from St. Augustine, and in command of the combined forces from these places and from New York was placed General Augustine Prevost. Some time prior to his arrival, a proclamation had been issued requesting the inhabitants to submit to British authority with promises of protection, provided they would arm to support the British cause. In his treatment of the inhabitants, Colonel Campbell displayed great moderation, and by his humane methods probably accomplished more in a short time toward reestablishing British authority in that vicinity than all the other officers who had preceded him. He not only subdued all attempts at opposition, but for a time completely obliterated every trace of republican government, paving the way for the revival of royal authority. In fact, Georgia was the only State in the Union in which, after the proclamation of the Declaration of Independence, a legislative body was convened under the authority of the crown.

In command of the American forces in the Southern department was General Benjamin Lincoln, who toward the close of 1778, arrived at Charleston and began vigorous preparations to resist British encroachments. The troops in the Southern department were not only badly disciplined but miserably furnished, and it was some time before Lincoln could place an army in the field which was capable of making any strenuous resistance to the British. In compliance with the recommendation of Congress, North Carolina had raised 2,000 men, who were sent under command of Generals John Ashe and Griffith Rutherford to join Lincoln.* Upon receiving word of Howe's defeat at Savannah, Lincoln established his headquarters at Purrysburg on the Savannah; his forces at this time numbered between 2,500 and 3,000 men, many of whom were new levies and militia. The British army under Prevost was somewhat larger and greatly superior in equipment and training. Nevertheless, Prevost found that it was no easy task to advance into South Carolina, for the Savannah River lay between the two armies. For about 100 miles from its mouth this river flowed through a marshy country, and at no place was there any solid ground on both sides of the river that made a crossing possible. There were only a few narrow causeways through the

*Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 229-230.

† McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 324, 336; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 526-527.

* McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 314, 330-332; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 552.

marsh where it could be passed, and on many occasions even these could not be crossed by an army. Thus, both the American and British generals were unable to attack each other or to cross the river for the purpose of attacking isolated posts. General Prevost did, however, send out detachments along the coast; among these being a detachment of 200 men under Major Gardiner, who were sent to take possession of the Island of Port Royal. But early in February, Gardiner was attacked by General Moultrie and compelled to retreat with severe loss. For the present, therefore, General Prevost decided to make no further attempts on South Carolina.*

The British confined their operations to Georgia and endeavored to recruit their army from the Tories of South Carolina. About 700 of these banded together under command of Colonel Boyd and marched along the western frontier of South Carolina, intending to join the British at Augusta, Ga. Their whole journey was marked by plunder and outrage, and the inhabitants of the country through which they passed were thoroughly aroused. The Whig militia of the district of Ninety Six assembled under Colonel Andrew Pickens to prevent further outrage on the part of the Tories, but leaving

a guard at the Cherokee fort to prevent the Tories from crossing the Savannah, Pickens departed upon some other service, and during the absence the Tories succeeded in crossing the river. With 300 men, however, Pickens immediately set out in pursuit, and on February 14 the two forces met. After an engagement lasting about three-quarters of an hour the Tories gave way and were utterly routed—their loss being 40 killed, including Colonel Boyd, while Pickens lost only 9 killed and several wounded. Those Tories who escaped quickly dispersed all over the country, some going to North Carolina and others returning home, where they threw themselves upon the mercy of their State government. Being citizens of South Carolina they were tried in the regular manner and 70 condemned to death, but only five of the principals were executed and the others were pardoned.*

General Lincoln fixed his encampments at Black Swamp, and nearly opposite to Augusta on the north side. In order to strengthen the last and to take advantage of any opportunity which might offer for crossing the river and limiting the British operations to the sea-coast of Georgia, Lincoln sent General Ashe to the upper parts of the country. On February

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 464; McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 339-340; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 553.

* McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 337-338; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 505-506; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 108; Ramsay, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 15.

10 Ashe set out with about 1,500 North Carolina militia and the remains of the Georgia Continentals, arriving three days later at the camp of General Andrew Williamson, opposite Augusta. Upon the approach of the American forces, Colonel Campbell hastily retreated from Augusta and early the next morning placed fourteen miles between his army and the enemy. Undoubtedly Campbell's great haste was due to either one of two facts, that he had received false intelligence regarding the strength of Ashe's force, or had learned of the arrival of a large body of Continentals at Charleston. This intelligence was credited by Campbell, who saw that, if he did not make a hasty retreat, escape would be cut off. Ascertaining that Campbell had abandoned Augusta, Lincoln on February 16 instructed Ashe that, were the enemy out of the upper part of the country, he should follow them down as fast as possible and prevent a junction with the British forces below. He was ordered to attack the small British force before it could join the other, and thus be in a position to decisively defeat him. On the 22d Lincoln sent Ashe the following word: "I think that Briar Creek will be a good stand for you until some plan of co-operation be digested, for which purpose, as soon as you arrive there, I will meet you at the Two Sisters, you appointing the time." With 1,200 troops and 200 light horse, Ashe crossed the Savannah, and on the

morning of the 27th arrived at the lower bridge on Briar Creek; Ashe now having gone to meet Lincoln, General Brian and Colonel Samuel Elbert placed the troops in camp.*

On March 2 the outposts of the enemy were reported as having been seen, and on the following day the commanders were informed that one of the soldiers had been shot; but little or no notice was taken of these occurrences. Nor was anything done toward repairing the bridge which Campbell had destroyed on his march downward, though it was reported that the repairs would take but a few hours. Within an hour after the report was made regarding the shooting of this soldier, word was sent from the outposts that 500 British regulars were at the ferry. Soon after four o'clock, a few of the American horse returned from skirmishing with the enemy and orders were given that the troops be formed into platoons from the right and composed into a column. Shortly after this the British light infantry appeared. While the small body of British regulars was making a feint in front, Lieutenant-colonel Prevost, after a circuitous march of about 50 miles, came unexpectedly on Ashe's rear with about 900 troops, including some horse.† Upon the appearance of the British light infantry,

* On these movements see Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 506-507.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 464-465. Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 507, says Prevost had 1,800 men.

Ashe said to Elbert, the commander of the continentals, "Sir, you had better advance and engage them." The Continentals, though not more than 100 rank and file, advanced thirty yards in front of the enemy and began a sharp fire upon them; this continuing for about fifteen minutes. Ashe and the North Carolina militia, however, remained about one hundred yards in the rear entirely inactive, and instead of supporting the advance party were so panic stricken that they fled in confusion without even discharging their muskets. The Georgia regulars, therefore, finding themselves deserted and being almost surrounded by the enemy, abandoned the conflict and used their utmost endeavors to escape. Elbert exerted all his influence to rally them, but it was in vain. He and the survivors of his brave corps were made prisoners. The American loss was 150 killed and 227 captured. None had any chance of escaping except by crossing the river, in attempting which many were drowned; of those who reached safety, a large number returned home and never afterward rejoined the American army, the number that did so being not more than 450.* Thus the British secured possession of Georgia, establishing communication with the Indians and the Tories of North and South Carolina.† Sir

James Wright was then reëstablished in his former office as royal governor.*

The people of South Carolina were determined not to abandon the struggle without a supreme effort in behalf of their liberty. John Rutledge was elected governor† and endeavored to send reinforcements to the army and to place the State in a condition to defend itself against British invasion. A reinforcement of 1,000 men was sent to join Lincoln, who on April 23 marched up the Savannah with the main body of his army. This movement was made chiefly for the purpose of protecting the Georgia Legislature, which was to assemble at Augusta on May 1. At this time the river was in full flood, the marshes and swamps along its banks were completely inundated; and it was believed that a small body of troops would be able to defend the country against an invading army. General Lincoln, therefore, left only 200 Continentals and 800 militia under Colonel McIntosh, the whole commanded by General Moultrie, who, it will be remembered, had distinguished himself at Sullivan's Island in 1776. It was supposed that if the British should invade the territory, the militia would probably take the field in defending their homes. General Prevost, however, pursued a different

* McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 343-345; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 507-508.

† Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 368-369.

* See B. F. Stevens, *Facsimiles of MSS. in European Archives relating to America, 1773-1783*, nos. 1270, 1274.

† McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, chap. xiii.

course than that which the Americans expected. Instead of marching up the river and attacking Lincoln in the interior, Prevost endeavored to compel the return of Lincoln from his expedition by making an irruption into South Carolina.* On April 29, after Lincoln had gone a long distance on his way toward Augusta, General Prevost, with 2,500 troops and a considerable force of Indians, suddenly passed the river near Purrysburg, compelling McIntosh, who was there stationed with a small force, to retreat to General Moultrie at Black Swamp.† Prevost made a rapid march into the interior and compelled Moultrie to retire hastily before him, destroying the bridges on his way. The militia showed little courage in the field and could not be prevailed upon to defend the passes in the face of large numbers. Moreover, many of those under Moultrie's command deserted, and the State government was not as successful in recruiting the militia as had been expected; consequently, Moultrie's force was rapidly diminished.

Immediately after the British had passed the river, Lincoln was informed of the movement; but as he was then nearly opposite Augusta, he considered Prevost's movement as a feint to recall him from the upper

parts of the river.* He therefore determined to continue in his project, and, instead of being recalled himself, compelled the British general to return to the defense of Augusta. Dispatching a body of 300 light troops to Moultrie's assistance and crossing the river at Augusta, he continued upon his way on the south side toward Savannah. Meanwhile, the British had suffered little opposition, as Moultrie's force was insufficient to make a successful resistance. More over, the troops were in a state of panic because of the plundering tactics of the British, who seemed determined to desolate the country in a most uncivilized manner.‡ The citizens of Charleston made every preparation to defend the city: the houses in the suburbs were destroyed; cannon were mounted at intervals along the peninsula between Ashley and Cooper rivers; and 3,000 troops were assembled to repel the threatened attack.‡

On May 11 a detachment of Prevost's army crossed the ferry at Ashley River and appeared before Charleston.|| Lincoln in the meantime had sent word that he was re-

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 553.

† See McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 392-395; Ramsay, *Revolution in South Carolina*, vol. ii., pp. 30-34.

‡ Moultrie in his *Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 429, estimates the force at 3,180 but McCrady says that Rutledge's estimate of 2,500 is nearer the truth.—*South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 363-364.

|| Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 553-554.

* This evidently was Prevost's original intention, but as the way to Charleston was open he determined to pursue it. See Stedman's *American War*, vol. ii., p. 110.

† McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, p. 352.

turning toward Charleston, and Governor Rutledge, knowing this, desired to gain time. He therefore entered into negotiations with the British and used every obstructive tactic with which he was acquainted. The commissioners from the American garrison were instructed to "propose neutrality during the war between Great Britain and America, and that the question whether the state belong to Great Britain or remain one of the United States, be determined by the treaty of peace between these powers."* Prevost refused to consider such a proposal and insisted that, as they were in arms, the people of the city must surrender as prisoners of war.† Rutledge refused to surrender on such terms, and it was expected that an assault would be made immediately. But as Prevost had learned that Lincoln was rapidly approaching, he deemed it expedient to retreat, as he had no hope of capturing the city by assault.‡

In his retreat, however, Prevost did not take the direct route by which he had advanced, for Lincoln was near at hand with his army and in Charleston there was a considerable garrison. Instead, after passing Ashley Ferry, he turned to the left and proceeded

to the coast, which, because of its numerous islands, afforded him the easiest and safest means by which he could transport his baggage to Savannah. As the British possessed great naval superiority over the Americans, pursuit of Prevost was practically out of the question, for the British naval forces in the vicinity were able to give Prevost all the protection necessary. Having reached the coast, Prevost first went to St. James Island and then to St. John, where he awaited the arrival of provisions sometime previously sent from New York. In spite of all difficulties, General Lincoln arrived at Dorchester from Charleston before Prevost had passed the Ashley Ferry, and upon learning the direction taken by the latter, immediately set off in pursuit. He soon came within reaching distance of the British and placed his army in encampment, the two armies then being about thirty miles from Charleston.* The opposing forces remained in their respective positions until June 20, when a detachment of about 1,200 Americans attacked 700 British and Hessians at Stono Ferry. For over an hour the contest raged and probably would have resulted in victory for the Americans, if the force under Moultrie had succeeded in passing over to James Island in time so as to attack the British from a different point. But Lincoln decided that it was best

* McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 366-370; Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 433; Ramsay, *Revolution in South Carolina*, vol. ii., p. 27; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 257; Moore, *Diary of the American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 162.

† McCrady, pp. 373-375.

‡ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 555.

* McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, p. 382.

to retire and draw off his forces in good order.* The British loss was 23 killed and 103 wounded;† the American loss was 146, including 24 officers killed and wounded, beside 155 missing.‡ Three days after the battle, the British evacuated Stono Ferry and St. John Island, continuing their march until they reached Beaufort on the island of Port Royal, where a garrison was left by General Prevost under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Maitland.||

The heat had now become so intense that active operations were impossible, for the summer climate of the South acted in a similar manner as the winter cold of the North. The chief duties of the commanders during this hot season were to prevent the spread of fevers in the army and to keep their soldiers in condition for the next campaign, which would probably open in October. The American militia dispersed, leaving Lincoln with only about 800 men which he placed in encampment at Sheldon, near Beaufort.§ The operations carried on by the British at the coast alarmed Washington, and, weak as his own army was, he sent a detachment, consisting of Bland's cavalry

regiment and the troops under Lieutenant-colonel William Washington' with some new levies, to Lincoln's aid.

The principal result of the irruption of Prevost into South Carolina was the pecuniary loss of the inhabitants of the province, for it did no credit to the British army nor in any way served the British cause. Plunder and devastation marked every stage of the march of the British army; houses were entered and robbed of plate, money, jewels, etc., and oftentimes what the soldiers could not carry away was destroyed.* Large numbers of slaves, allured by promises of freedom, deserted their homes and repaired to the British army. In the hope of gaining the favor of the British, some disclosed the places where the valuables of their masters had been concealed. For these services the negroes did not obtain the expected reward; many were shipped to and sold in the West Indies, while hundreds died of camp fever. Others, overtaken by sickness and disease, were ordered from the British camp and went to the woods, where they perished miserably, being afraid to return to their masters for proper treatment. In this way it is calculated that South Carolina lost about 4,000 slaves. In order to save as much as possible of their property, many of the inhabitants professed their attachment to the royal cause.†

* *Ibid.*, pp. 385-389; Lee, *Memoirs of the War*, pp. 130-131; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 116-118; Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. i., pp. 495-498; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 241.

† Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 118.

‡ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 555.

|| *Ibid.*

§ McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 395-396.

* Baneroft, vol. v., p. 371.

† Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp.

During 1779-1780 there were few operations of any note by either the British or American armies; the latter remained chiefly on the defensive, while the British devoted themselves principally to punitive expeditions and enterprises, with the hope of distressing the people and ruining them so that they would abandon the American cause. The territory surrounding Chesapeake Bay suffered greatly from these depredations. In 1779 General George Collyer (or Collier), who had superseded Admiral Gambier as commander of the British naval forces in America, concerted a plan with Sir Henry Clinton for interrupting the commerce of the Chesapeake and destroying the magazines along the coast. In accordance with this plan, 1,800 men under General Matthews were sent out under convoy; the whole fleet started from Sandy Hook May 5, 1779, and three days later reached the Chesapeake. The fleet anchored in Hampton Roads, and on the 10th entered the Elizabeth River. The American forces in that vicinity were unable to offer effective resistance to this overwhelming force, and fled, allowing the British troops to land unopposed.* General Matthews established his headquarters at Portsmouth, from which point he sent out

small parties to Norfolk, Suffolk, Kemp's Landing, and Gosport, where it is claimed that they destroyed or carried off large quantities of military stores and sank or abandoned more than 130 ships, some of which were heavily laden.* The losses sustained by the public and individuals were enormous, without being of any real advantage to the British. Jefferson says they were "unjustifiable by the usage of civilized nations."† After having accomplished the object of this expedition, General Matthews returned north to New York.‡

Meanwhile, in November, 1778, d'Estaing had sailed for the West Indies for the purpose of attacking and capturing the British Islands. Dominica had already fallen into the hands of the French, but to offset this the British had captured St. Vincent's and Grenada and spread great alarm throughout the West Indies. The fleets of the two nations soon engaged in a warm but indecisive combat after which d'Estaing prepared to return home;|| but at the urgent request of Governor Rutledge, General Lincoln and the French Consul, he

* See Henry's letter of May 21, quoted in Tyler, *Life of Patrick Henry*, p. 238; Henry, vol. iii., p. 241; also May 19, vol. ii., p. 30; and the British account, in *Virginia Historical Magazine*, vol. iv., p. 181.

† Ford's ed. of *Jefferson's Writings*, vol. ii., p. 242.

‡ Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 260 (ed. 1788); Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 136-139.

|| Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 286-293 (ed. 1788); Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 91-101.

253-260 (ed. 1788); Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 103-120.

* See Henry's letters of May 11 and 12 to the President of Congress quoted in Tyler, *Life of Patrick Henry*, pp. 236-237; Henry, *Life of Patrick Henry*, vol. iii., pp. 239-240.

set sail for Savannah, where on September 1, 1779, he arrived with twenty-two ships of the line and a number of smaller vessels. Upon his arrival, the *Experiment*, a 50 gun ship, and several other British ships were captured.* Upon learning of the arrival of d'Estaing, General Lincoln, with about 1,000 men, marched to Zubly's Ferry on the Savannah, but had great difficulty in crossing the river and its marshes. On the evening of September 13, however, he reached the southern bank and encamped on the heights of Ebenezer, about twenty-three miles from Savannah. At this place Colonel McIntosh with his detachment reinforced him, and shortly afterward Pulaski's legion arrived. On the same day that Lincoln passed Zubly's ferry, d'Estaing landed 3,000 men at Beaulieu, and on September 16 the two armies united before Savannah.† At Savannah was General Prevost in command of the British troops in the Southern provinces, and, apprehending no danger from the Americans, he had detached a considerable portion of his troops to establish outposts in Georgia; a strong detachment was left also under Colonel Maitland at Beaufort, on the island of Port Royal, South Carolina. On the appearance

of the French fleet, however, Prevost called in his outposts.* So slow were the movements of the French and Americans that, before the former had landed or the latter had crossed the river, all the British detachments in Georgia had assembled at Savannah, thus bringing the number of the British troops up to nearly 2,500.‡

Upon his arrival before the city, d'Estaing summoned Prevost to surrender, but being anxious to gain time, the British general, under some pretext, persuaded the French commander to suspend hostilities for twenty-four hours. During this time he pushed forward the work of strengthening his defences with all possible speed, and before the twenty-four hours had elapsed, Colonel Maitland with his detachment had arrived from Beaufort. Thereupon the British general announced his intention to defend the city to the last extremity.‡ The French and American generals determined to lay siege to the town and began their preparations with that end in view. Several days were consumed in bringing up heavy artillery and stores from the fleet and ground was broken before the town on September 23, 1773. By October

* Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 123.

† Lee, *Memoirs of the War*, p. 137; Stedman, vol. ii., p. 127; Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 41.


‡ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 478-479; McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 403-407; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 529-530.

* Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 121-123; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 257.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 528-529.

1 the lines had been advanced to within 300 yards of the British works; for several days the various batteries, mounting 33 pieces of heavy cannon and 9 mortars, bombarded the fortifications, and a floating battery of 16 guns constantly played upon

to expel the British entirely from the province. During his absence in America, the French West Indies were exposed to danger from the British fleet; the worst season of the year was now setting in; a superior British fleet might at any time put in



them from the river, but little impression was made by this bombardment.*

The situation of the allied armies was now almost desperate, d'Estaing had already spent more time in the siege than he supposed it would take

an appearance; and in view of all these facts his officers remonstrated against longer remaining at Savannah. Had the besiegers continued their present tactics a few days longer, undoubtedly they would have captured the city, but d'Estaing felt that he could not spare this time, and

* McCrady. pp. 408-409.

consequently it became necessary either to abandon the siege or to storm the works. The besiegers determined upon the latter alternative. On the morning of October 9 a heavy bombardment was begun against the town, and 3,500 French and 950 Americans, led by d'Estaing and Lincoln, advanced in three columns to the assault.* Meanwhile the garrison had not been idle, but had considerably strengthened the fortifications and had skillfully placed their batteries. As a result, when the French and Americans advanced to the assault, they met with a warm reception. The batteries opened upon them with a well directed and destructive fire, but they resolutely advanced and finally succeeded in mounting the parapet. Both the French and Americans planted a standard on a redoubt, but when they attempted to force their way inside the works the slaughter was terrible.† In addition, while the opposition in front was great, their flanks were galled by the fire of the batteries. At the head of 200 troops Pulaski galloped between the batteries toward the town so as to take the garrison in the rear, but he was killed and his squadron dispersed. For nearly an hour the French and Americans stood the terrific fire from the British, but were

finally compelled to retreat. The French lost in killed and wounded about 640 men and the Americans 450, while the British loss was comparatively small.*

No hope of taking the town now remained, and on October 18 after d'Estaing had removed the heavy artillery, both armies abandoned the siege. d'Estaing marched away slowly, so as to protect General Lincoln's retreat and to secure him from pursuit from the garrison. The Americans recrossed the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry and took a position in South Carolina. The French immediately embarked, but hardly were they aboard when a violent storm dispersed the fleet. While the results of this expedition were exceedingly discouraging, yet the French fleet rendered material aid to the American cause by disconcerting the plans of the British. Even this under the present conditions was of great serv-

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 480; McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 409-414.

† Among the killed was Sergeant Jasper, the hero of Moultrie—Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, pp. 75-79.

* *Georgia Historical Society Collections*, vol. v., pt. i.; Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, pp. 374-375; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 257-260; Stevens, *Facsimiles*, no. 2010; Baneroft, vol. v., pp. 372-374; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 481-482; Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, chap. viii. Estimates of the losses vary greatly. The above figures are from Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 41; Lossing (*Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 522) gives practically the same figures—637 and 457. Lee (*Memoirs of the War*, p. 142) states the American loss to have been 240; Stedman (*American War*, vol. ii., p. 131) says 264; Ramsay (*Revolution in South Carolina*, vol. ii., p. 45) says 257; and McCrady (*South Carolina in the Revolution*, p. 417) says 250 Americans and 337 French.

ice to the American army. Nevertheless the Americans had anticipated such brilliant results from the co-operation of the French fleet that the failure of the expedition threw a deep gloom over the Southern provinces and it seemed as if the cause of independence were more desperate at the present time than at any former period of the war. General Lincoln asked for help and Congress took every step in its power to give the succor so imperatively needed, but the paper money had now become so depreciated that only the most ardent patriots would take it, and consequently it was almost impossible to furnish supplies and munitions of war to the army. On the other hand, the successes of the British had raised high the hopes of the Tories.

While the siege of Savannah was in progress, Colonel John White of the Georgia line executed an in-

genious enterprise of partisan warfare. Before the French fleet arrived, a British captain with 111 men had taken post near the Ogeeche River, about twenty-five miles from Savannah. At this place were also five British vessels, four of which were armed — the largest with 14 guns and the smallest with 4. Late on the night of September 30, White with six followers, including a servant, kindled a number of fires in different places, so as to give the appearance of a large encampment. He then went forward to the British encampment, with a supposed summons from the American commander to the British to surrender. Believing that a superior force was in the neighborhood, the British officer deemed it wise to submit without making any defence. By this ruse all were taken prisoners and conducted to the American post at Sunbury, twenty-five miles distant.*

CHAPTER XXVI.

1779-1780.

BRITISH DEPREDACTIONS: STONY POINT: PAUL JONES.

Condition of American army — Clinton captures Stony Point and Fort Lafayette — Tryon's expedition into Connecticut — Wayne captures Stony Point — Stony Point abandoned by Americans — British attack on Penobscot — Major Henry Lee at Paulus Hook — Army goes into winter quarters — Life in camp — Stirling's attempt on Staten Island — Discontent among soldiers — Knyphausen's raid in Jersey — Lafayette arrives in Boston — Washington's letter to Congress regarding embarrassments — French fleet arrives at Newport — Washington confers with French at Hartford — Major Tallmadge's exploit on Long Island — Irruption of Major Carleton in northern New York — Battle between the *Bonhomme Richard* and the *Serapis*.

At this time the American army was in sore straits, for both clothing and food were deficient. During 1779 and 1780, crops had been poor; the labors of the farmers had been in-

terrupted by calls to military duties and the depredations of various detachments of the army. Further-

* Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 179-180.

more, those farmers who had succeeded in raising good crops were loathe to part with them for the continental paper money then in circulation, because of its great depreciation in value as compared with coin. Finally, however, the necessities of the army became so urgent that Washington called upon the magistrates of the adjacent counties for specified quantities of provisions, to be delivered to the army within a certain time. He also was compelled to send out detachments of troops to take provisions from the farmers and citizens by force, but at length this expedient failed, for there were no more supplies in the country adjacent to the quarters of the army. Beside this, the morals and discipline of the army were endangered and the affections of the people were much alienated by these impressments. Prior to this time the inhabitants had leaned toward the American cause, chiefly because of the fact that they had experienced much better treatment from the Americans than from the British. They had looked up to Washington as their protector, and to a great extent had willingly supplied him with the provisions he needed. But when Continental money began to depreciate so rapidly, the inhabitants lost their ardor for the cause and would not send supplies, unless reimbursed in coin. Washington was now confronted with the alternatives either of disbanding his troops or of supporting them by

force; he was between the two problems of supplying the army and at the same time protecting the property of the inhabitants; and to supply the one without offending the other seemed almost an impossibility. On the other hand, Washington experienced much difficulty in maintaining discipline among the soldiers and in restraining them when dispatched for provisions from plundering the houses of the inhabitants. To preserve order and subordination in an army like that under Washington, even if well fed, promptly paid, and properly clothed, would have been a task of no little difficulty; but when they were destitute not only of the comforts, but also of the necessities of life, the task became doubly difficult, and required capabilities which are rarely found in any one man. Nevertheless, Washington displayed the firmness and ability necessary in this crisis and not only retained the services of the greater part of the army, but also kept the good will of the major portion of the inhabitants.

In June, 1779, the army was cheered by the news that after much hesitation Spain had joined France in the war against Great Britain. In its attempt to settle the various questions arising in connection with this new alliance, Congress found great difficulty, for both France and Spain seemed bent upon obtaining concessions which the Americans were unwilling to give. Because of her assistance, the French minister at-

tempted to obtain for Spain the concession of the Floridas and exclusive right to navigate the Mississippi, while for France he sought the Newfoundland fisheries. The debates in Congress regarding these matters were long and often angry, for the terms offered by the French court were unreasonable and conflicted with the interests of the various States. That which one State or one section was willing to concede as being of no importance, the other considered vital. The South would not listen to anything but the free navigation of the Mississippi, while the New England States, particularly Massachusetts, refused to consider any terms which surrendered the right to the Newfoundland fisheries. Eventually, however, a compromise was reached by which Florida was given to Spain, but no decision was reached upon other matters. Upon one point all were decided—that the war should be maintained until independence had been established.*

Meanwhile, because of deficiency of provisions and equipment, Washington could not undertake anything of a decisive character. The army numbered only about 13,000 troops, while the British numbered between 16,000 and 17,000 and were strongly fortified in New York and Rhode Island.

Moreover, a British fleet supported the British army and gave them every means for concentrating their forces at a given point before the American army could march to meet them. This was particularly true with regard to the movements of the two armies in the Highlands of New York. At various times divisions of both armies were posted on each side of the Hudson; the British could cross directly over the river and unite their forces in any particular enterprise, while the Americans could not safely cross unless they made a wide circuit to avoid the British shipping.

Washington considered the preservation of West Point and its dependencies of the utmost importance, and to make their security certain he was compelled to refuse applications of neighboring States for troops to defend local points. He realized that if his force were subdivided into small detachments, the enemy could easily cut these detachments off and destroy his entire army, piece by piece. On June 1, 1779, Clinton advanced up the Hudson for the purpose of attacking the American works at Stony Point, on the west side of the river, and Verplanck's point opposite. The Americans had not yet completed the fortifications at West Point, and upon the British advance were compelled to abandon them. As a result, Fort Lafayette on Verplanck's Point became untenable, and after it had been completely invested by Clinton, the garrison surrendered

* See Pitkin, *Political and Civil History of the United States*, vol. ii., pp. 73-87; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 320-327; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 131-135; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 248 *et seq.*, 262, and authorities cited.

as prisoners of war. The British then made preparations for completing the fortifications on both sides and placing them in a strong state of defence.* Clinton thereupon returned to New York and prepared to send out predatory expeditions against the maritime towns of Connecticut, as had been done in Virginia.

In command of the ships of war and transports sent out with this expedition was Sir George Collyer, while the land forces, consisting of 2,600 troops, were under the command of Governor Tryon, assisted by General Garth. On July 4 these commanders issued an address to the inhabitants of Connecticut, inviting them to return to their allegiance to the mother country, and promising protection to person and property for all who should remain peaceably in their residences, but with the exception of the civil and military officers of the government; but those who failed to heed the warning were threatened with condign punishment. The English troops were immediately landed and the work of devastation began, so that the people had no time to consider the terms even had they wished

before a force was employed to compel their obedience.*

On July 5 the troops under Tryon were landed at East Haven, and those under Garth at West Haven. The troops under Garth then marched toward New Haven, where they arrived about noon after having been harassed on the way by the militia and the inhabitants who joined them. Immediately upon entering the town, the troops began to plunder the houses promiscuously; the Whigs and Tories suffered alike, all having their money, plate, jewelry, etc., and even much of their furniture carried off and wantonly destroyed. News of these outrages spread rapidly and the militia collected so quickly that the commanders deemed it wise to retreat. Furthermore, the British soldiers had become disorderly through liquor and were in a state of insubordination. The next morning the troops suddenly retreated without putting into effect the intended design of burning the town, though after they had secured their own safety they did burn some stores on the long wharf. At East Haven the troops under Tryon burned a number of houses and killed many of the cattle in the adjoining fields, but by the afternoon the militia had collected in such large numbers that Tryon retreated on board the transport and in the evening sailed for Fairfield.† On Wednesday afternoon the troops

* Baneroft, vol. v., p. 329; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 140; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 261; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. ii., pp. 526-528; Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 465-470, 479-480; the letters of St. Clair, McDougall and Malcolm in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 307-308; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 743-744; Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, pp. 170-171.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 469.

† Johnston, *Connecticut*, p. 308.

landed at the latter place, and Governor Tryon immediately sent an address to the militia, under command of Colonel Whiting, allowing an hour in which to answer, and threatening that if the town did not surrender it would be burned. Colonel Whiting answered: "The flames have now preceded their answer to your flag, and they will persist to oppose to the utmost, that power which is exerted against injured innocence." During the night of July 7 and 8 the British troops plundered the town and finally laid it in ashes, the devastation covering a tract of two miles square, reaching as far as Green-farms, though not to Greenfield. The British troops then retreated to their shipping and crossed the Sound to the shore of Long Island whence they later sailed to Norwalk which suffered a fate similar to that of Fairfield. At Norwalk 80 dwelling houses, 22 stores, 17 shops, 4 mills, 2 houses of public worship, 87 barns and 5 vessels were burned, as were 82 dwelling houses, 15 stores, 15 shops, 2 houses of public worship and 55 barns at Fairfield. At Green-farms 15 dwelling houses, several stores, 1 house of worship and 11 barns were burned. At New Haven the stores were destroyed and a number of houses at East Haven.*

* Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 265-268 (ed. 1788); Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 142; Johnston, *Connecticut*, pp. 308-309; *Connecticut State Records*, vol. ii., pp. 423-426; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 329-330; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 469-471; the letters

While the British were engaged in this work of devastation, Washington laid plans for the capture of Stony Point, determining to take it by assault. The conduct of the expedition was entrusted to "Mad Anthony" Wayne.* A detachment of 1,200 light infantry was placed under his command and, after marching fourteen miles, he reached the vicinity of the fort toward midnight July 16. He immediately began preparations for the assault and ordered that every man should advance silently with unloaded musket and fixed bayonet. He demanded strict obedience to his instructions, as it was absolutely necessary that silence be maintained to make the expedition a success. A soldier disobeyed the command and began to load his musket and though the order was repeated, he persisted in loading, whereupon he was immediately run through by an officer with his sword. Discipline and obedience to orders were indispensable to the success of the expedition, for had the British been warned, undoubtedly the result would have been far different.†

The right column was composed of 150 volunteers under Lieutenant-colonel Louis de Fleury, while the left column was composed of 100 volunteers under Major John Stuart (or

in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 314-316; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 422-427.


* For the manner in which this name was given him, see Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, p. 207 *et seq.*

† Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 193 (Abbatt's ed.).

Stewart); preceding each column was a forlorn hope of 20 picked men under command of Lieutenants James Gibbons and George Knox, these being sent forward to remove any obstructions that might be in the way.* Shortly after twelve o'clock the American troops advanced to the assault and, in the face of a tremendous and incessant musketry fire and grape-shot from the cannon, forced their way over the ramparts. Both columns met in the centre of the

missing, while 472 were captured (some say 543). Among the number captured were the commander of the fort, Colonel Henry Johnston, and several other officers; the stores captured were valued at \$158,640. Two flags and two standards were taken, the former belonging to the garrison, the latter to the seventeenth regiment. Out of the forlorn hope sent forward under Lieutenant Gibbon, 17 were killed or wounded.*

In his report of the assault General Wayne speaks very highly of the conduct of the officers and troops, especially mentioning Colonels Fleury and Butler and Major Stuart. In the action Lieutenant-colonel Hay was wounded in the thigh and General Wayne himself received a slight wound in the head but, with the support of his aides, continued the march with the troops and entered the fort at the same time. In his letter to Congress Washington speaks very highly of the conduct of officers and men and particularly mentions Lieutenants Gibbon and Knox, who commanded the forlorn hope, as having conducted themselves with conspic-



enemy's works at about the same time. Colonel Fleury was the first to enter the fort and with his own hand struck the British standard.† Major Thomas Posey was the first to give the watchword "The fort is ours." The American loss was 15 killed and 83 wounded; the British loss was 20 killed, 74 wounded, and 58

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 473; Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, p. 190 *et seq.*

† Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, pp. 178-179.

* See H. P. Johnston, *The Storming of Stony Point* (1900); the account by Henry B. Dawson; Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, pp. 182-196, 208-210, 396-416; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 473; Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 311-313; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 144-148; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 268 (ed. 1788); Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 144-146; Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 487-490, 492-500; Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vi., appendix, p. 537 *et seq.*



STORMING OF STONY POINT BY WAYNE.

uous bravery. With regard to General Wayne Washington said "that his conduct throughout the whole of this arduous enterprise, merits the warmest approbation of Congress; he improved on the plan recommended by me, and executed it in a manner that does signal honor to his judgment and to his bravery. In a critical moment of the assault he received a flesh wound in the head, with a musket ball, but continued leading on his men with unshaken firmness."* As a reward for their bravery, Congress presented a gold medal to General Wayne, and silver medals to Colonel Fleury and Major Stuart. Lieutenants Gibbon and Knox were brevetted captains, and in accordance with Washington's desires, Congress directed that the value of the military stores captured be distributed among the soldiers.†

Washington had planned to make an attack on Fort Lafayette at the same time, and directed that two brigades under General McDougall be held in readiness to make the assault as soon as information was received that General Wayne had been successful in his attack upon Stony Point. McDougall, however, did not advance in time, and the British garrison at Fort Lafayette had received sufficient warning to prepare them-

selves for resistance. Wayne turned the artillery of Stony Point upon the British ships which lay in the river and compelled them to drop down a considerable distance.* He fired also on Verplanck's Point, but owing to the great distance his shot had little effect upon the works. As McDougall had lost the critical moment of assaulting Fort Lafayette, the plan of operation against it was considerably changed. General Robert Howe was placed in command of McDougall's forces and was provided with cannon to make a breach in the fortifications; but before he was able to act, it was found expedient to retreat.†

When Clinton received word of the capture of Stony Point, he abandoned his design against New London and the other Connecticut towns, recalled his transports and troops, and sent a large body to the assistance of the garrison at Fort Lafayette. He himself soon followed with a larger force, in the hope that he might be able to draw Washington into a general battle for the possession of Stony Point. However, the failure of the expedition against Fort Lafayette made the possession of Stony Point of little importance, and after the Americans had destroyed the fortifications, the place was evacuated. The British thereupon took possession, re-

* Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, p. 198.

† *Journals of Congress*, vol. v., pp. 226-227; Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 172-174; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 748-759; Stillé, pp. 198 *et seq.*, 416-418.

* Lamb, *City of New York*, vol. ii., p. 225.

† Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 240-241; the letters in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 319-322, 325-328; Heath's *Memoirs*, pp. 194-196 (Abbatt's ed.).

built the fortifications and placed a strong garrison there.* After he found that Washington could not be drawn from his encampment, Clinton returned to New York.

Meanwhile, the British had conducted an expedition into Maine similar to that in Connecticut. In June, 1779, Colonel Francis Maclean, in command of a detachment from Halifax, determined to establish a post on the Penobscot, in the easternmost part of what was then Massachusetts. The Boston people immediately planned to repel the invaders and equipped a considerable fleet. General Lovell was placed in command of about 1,000 militia and sent to the scene of action, the American fleet arriving at Penobscot Bay July 25. Because of the opposition of some British war vessels and the rugged nature of the coast, three days were spent in effecting a landing. Thus Maclean had opportunity to perfect his fortifications. Lovell established a battery within 750 yards of the works and for several days maintained a brisk cannonade. Lovell only awaited the arrival of reinforcements to make an assault; but before these reinforcements arrived, he was informed, August 13, that General George Collyer with a large naval force had entered the bay. Lovell was therefore compelled to embark his troops and cannon and depart from the vicinity. The British at once pursued, and during the flight

the *Warren*, a 32 gun frigate, and 14 other smaller vessels were either blown up or taken. Confusion prevailed among the Americans and finally the troops were landed in an uncultivated part of the country and the transports burned. The troops were then compelled to find their way through miles of unbroken forests to a settled country and on the march large numbers perished. After this expedition, Collyer returned to New York, where he resigned command of the fleet, and was succeeded by Admiral Arbuthnot, who in the meantime had arrived from England with ships of war, reinforcements, supplies, etc.*

As an offset to this exploit, Major Henry Lee performed a most daring feat when he surprised the British post at Paulus Hook, in full view of the British garrison at New York. Washington favored the project,† and Lee energetically entered upon the enterprise. With 300 men, he set out on August 18 and during the night made the attack. He was completely successful and captured 160 prisoners, including several officers. Fearing an attack from the garrison at New York, Lee decided not to spend the time necessary to destroy the barracks and artillery, but retreated

* Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 166 *et seq.*; *Collections of the Maine Historical Society*, vol. vii., pp. 121-126; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 305 (ed. 1788); Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 147-151; Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 296-299.

* Lamb, *City of New York*, vol. ii., p. 226.

† Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 345.

while there was opportunity.* For this exploit, Congress awarded Lee a gold medal.

Washington had hoped that d'Estaing would render great assistance in a combined attack upon New York, but when the operations at the South proved abortive, all expectations of aid in the northern campaign were abandoned and toward the close of December Washington placed the army in winter quarters. These quarters were chosen for convenience of wood, water, and provisions and also to best protect the country. The army was divided into two divisions, the northern being placed under command of General Heath and stationed with a view to the security of West Point and the surrounding territory. The other division was encamped at Morristown, New Jersey.† In this

situation, which was well calculated to protect the country south of New York, Washington, with the principal division of the army, took his station for the winter.*

During the winter Washington was unable to undertake any important enterprise, but a number of small expeditions were sent out to harass and annoy the British. On January 14, 1780, Lord Stirling was placed in command of an expedition to attack

ham, sometimes a shoulder of bacon, to grace the head of the table, a piece of roast beef adorns the foot, and a dish of beans, or greens, almost imperceptible, decorates the centre. When the cook has a mind to cut a figure, which I presume will be the case tomorrow, we have two beef-steak pies, or dishes of crabs, in addition, one on each side of the centre dish, dividing the space, and reducing the distance between dish and dish to about six feet, which, without them, would be nearly twelve feet apart. Of late he has had the surprising sagacity to discover, that apples will make pies, and it is a question, if, in the violence of his efforts, we do not get one of apples, instead of having both of beef-steaks. If the ladies can put up with such entertainment, and will submit to partake of it on plates once tin, but now iron, (not become so by labor of scouring,) I shall be happy to see them."—*Sparks, Life of Washington*, pp. 302–305; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iii., p. 549.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 475; Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. viii., pp. 27, 33–34; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 227–229.

† That the reader may get a glimpse of the every day routine of life at camp and an idea of the manner in which Washington lived, we quote a letter from Washington to Dr. John Cochran, surgeon-general and physician to the army, in which the grave and dignified commander-in-chief evinces that he could be playful even while the affairs of the whole country were pressing heavily upon his attention. The letter is dated, West Point, August 16, 1779. "Dear Doctor:—I have asked Mrs. Cochran and Mrs. Livingston to dine with me tomorrow, but am I not in honor bound to apprise them of their fare? As I hate deception, even where the imagination only is concerned, I will. It is needless to premise, that my table is large enough to hold the ladies. Of this they had ocular proof yesterday. To say how it is usually covered, is rather more essential, and this shall be the purport of my letter. Since our arrival at this happy spot, we have had a

* "The operations of the enemy, this campaign," said Washington, writing to Lafayette, in France, "have been confined to this establishment of works of defence, taking a post at King's Ferry, and burning the defenceless towns of New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk, on the Sound, within reach of their shipping, where little else was, or could be opposed to them, than the cries of distressed women and children; but these were offered in vain. Since these notable exploits, they have never stepped out of their works, or beyond their lines. How a conduct of this kind is to effect the conquest of America, the wisdom of a North, a Germaine, or a Sandwich, can best decide. It is too deep and refined for the comprehension of common understandings, and the general run of politicians."

the British post on Staten Island. The British received warning of the approach of the Americans, however, and a message was sent to the main British army at New York requesting aid. After a few minor skirmishes, the Americans, seeing no prospect of success, and fearing that the arrival of reinforcements from New York would prove their undoing, soon began to retreat. This was effected without any serious loss, but because of the severity of the weather and the fact that the soldiers were poorly clad, large numbers suffered severely from the cold and frost.*

Much discontent prevailed among the troops because the paper money was daily depreciating and because of continued privations. The officers of the Jersey line complained in strong terms to the Legislature of their State of the deplorable conditions to which they were reduced, saying that "unless a speedy and ample remedy was provided, the total dissolution of their line was inevitable." Only the influence of Washington prevented the officers from resigning in numbers and the troops from breaking out into mutinous and seditious conduct. The British had been apprized of the temperament of the soldiers, and

thinking it likely that large numbers could be led to desert, General Knyp-hausen, early in June, 1780, went from Staten Island to Elizabethtown, New Jersey with a body of 5,000 men. After committing several outrages in various parts of the country, Knyp-hausen stopped at Connecticut Farms, where, besides destroying the village, he barbarously murdered Mrs. James Caldwell, the wife of the Presbyterian minister of that place. This thoroughly aroused the inhabitants of the section, and the British soon found it expedient to retreat.* Greene was in command in the vicinity with Maxwell's and Stark's brigades, Lee's corps of light horse and the militia.† Several sharp skirmishes between Greene's force and the troops under Knyp-hausen ensued, particularly one at Springfield, and fearing that Greene might receive reinforcements from the main army, Knyp-hausen retreated to Staten Island.‡ The object of this expedition is not quite clear. It is not material whether it was intended to

* Bancroft, vol. v., p. 424; Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 194; Lamb, *City of New York*, vol. ii., pp. 238-240.

† F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 139-140; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 64 *et seq.*

‡ Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 257-260; Thacher, pp. 196-197; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 499-502; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 279-280; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 240; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 322 *et seq.*; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 368-374 (ed. 1788). See also the letters in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 5-7; and in Sparks' ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. vii., p. 506 *et seq.*

* Jones, *New York in the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 318, 320-323; Lamb, *City of New York*, vol. ii., p. 232; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 233, 239; Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. viii., pp. 155-166, 180-181, 183, 187, 213, 219; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 67; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 361 (ed. 1788).

divert Washington's attention while a stronger force made an attack on the Highlands, or whether the object was to fall upon the stores at Morristown. In either contingency, Washington was prepared and was constantly watching Clinton's movements. The first few months of the year were passed in these desultory operations, but Washington was deprived of the means of attempting anything beyond defensive measures, because both Congress and the States were so tardy in furnishing supplies, etc., the government was weak and inefficient, and money had depreciated to a remarkable extent.

Toward the end of April, Lafayette arrived at Boston from France, bringing news that the latter would shortly send large reinforcements in troops and great quantities of supplies.* For a time this served to arouse the Americans from the lethargy into which they had fallen. Requisitions

from the various States for men and money were urged with still greater earnestness;* Washington also was busily engaged writing to the public officials requesting that they put forth greater exertions to remedy the condition of affairs and urging upon them to act in concert with the allies when they arrived. The States, however, executed the resolutions of Congress very slowly and it was a long time before the requests began to bear fruit. Washington had seen that the predominance of State systems over the national system must in the end work injury to the cause, and in writing of the matter to Congress he said:

"Unless Congress speaks in a more decisive tone; unless they are vested with powers by the several states competent to the great purposes of the war, or assume them as matter of right, and they and the states respectively, act with more energy than hitherto they have done; our cause is lost. We can no longer drudge on in the old way. By ill-timing the adoption of measures; by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantable jealousies, we incur enormous expenses and derive no benefit. One state will comply with a requisition from Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ in the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are always working up hill; and while such a system as the present one, or rather want of one, prevails, we shall ever be unable to apply our strength or resources to any advantage. This, my dear sir, is plain language to a member of Congress; but it is the language of truth and friendship. It is the result of long thinking, close application, and strict observation. I see one head gradually changing into thirteen; I see one army branching into thirteen, and, instead of looking up to Congress, as the supreme controlling power of the United States, considering themselves as dependent on their respective states. In a word, I see the power of Congress declining too fast

* The enthusiasm and importunity of Lafayette in behalf of his adopted country were so great that the French prime minister, Count de Maurepas, said one day, rather sarcastically, in council: "It is fortunate for the king, that Lafayette does not take it into his head to strip Versailles of its furniture, to send to his dear Americans; as his majesty would be unable to refuse it." Not content with these public succors, he generously expended large sums of his private fortune, in providing swords and appointments for the corps placed under his command. Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 309, note. His instructions from the French court may be found in Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writing*, vol. vii., p. 496. On his services in behalf of America at the French court see Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., chaps. xvii.-xviii. On the aid of France in general, see James B. Perkins, *France in the American Revolution* (1911).

* *Journals of Congress*, vol. vi., pp. 50-51.

for the consequence and respect which are due to them, as the great representative body of America, and am fearful of its consequences."

While the States themselves were slow in furnishing their quotas of troops and money, some relief was obtained from private sources. The citizens of Philadelphia, among whom were Robert Morris, Clymer and others, formed an association to procure a supply of necessary articles for the suffering soldiers. Within a few days \$300,000 were subscribed, and in this way relief was afforded to the army, though really not enough to greatly alleviate their sufferings. There was still a great deficiency, especially in articles of clothing, and Washington expressed his sorrow that the troops and officers would be compelled to meet the French forces in this destitute condition. The summer was now far advanced, and yet Washington was uncertain as to the number of troops upon which he could rely for active operations. He therefore wrote to Congress as follows:

"The season is come when we have every reason to expect the arrival of the fleet; and yet for want of this point of primary consequence, it is impossible for me to form a system of co-operation. I have no basis to act upon, and of course, were this generous succor of our ally now to arrive, I should find myself in the most awkward, embarrassing, and painful situation. The general and the admiral, as soon as they approach our coast, will require of me a plan of the measures to be pursued, and there ought of right to be one prepared; but circumstanced as I am, I cannot even give them conjectures. From these considerations, I yesterday suggested to the committee* the in-

dispensable necessity of their writing again to the states, urging them to give immediate and precise information of the measures they have taken, and of the result. The interest of the states, the honor and reputation of our councils, the justice and gratitude due to our allies; all require that I should, without delay, be enabled to ascertain and inform them, what we can or cannot undertake. There is a point which ought now to be determined, on the success of which all our future operations may depend; on which, for want of knowing our prospects, I can make no decision. For fear of involving the fleet and army of our allies in circumstances which would expose them, if not seconded by us, to material inconvenience and hazard, I shall be compelled to sustain it, and delay may be fatal to our hopes."

On July 10, 1780, the French fleet, consisting of six ships of the line and five frigates, entered Newport Harbor. The fleet was under the command of Charles Louis d'Arsae, Chevalier de Ternay, and the army under the command of Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeure, Comte de Rochambeau.* The entire force of French soldiers, about 6,000, was placed under Washington's supreme direction, and was to act as an auxiliary and to yield precedence to the Americans, thus eliminating the possibility of jealousy or dissatisfaction on the part of either. The disaster at Savannah had suggested the wisdom of this measure.† With the combined force Washington now desired to make an attack upon New

securing the aid and relief so urgently needed. Schuyler devoted much time to finding and forwarding provisions to the army and was often obliged to pledge his private credit in order to obtain the supplies. See Tuckerman, *Life of Schuyler*, p. 244.

* His instructions will be found in Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., p. 493.

† Marshall, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 257.

* A Committee of Congress, General Schuyler being one of the members, spent some two or three months in camp at this date, to take measures for

York, and accordingly a plan was drawn up and submitted by Lafayette to the French commander. The French troops were to join the American army early in August at Morrisania and undoubtedly would have done so had not the British naval force at New York been reinforced by a fleet under Admiral Graves. This deprived the French fleet of its superiority over the British, which was essential to the consummation of Washington's plan.* Because of their superiority, the British determined to attack the French at Newport, and, with 8,000 of his best men to coöperate with the fleet, Clinton embarked for Rhode Island. Fearing that Washington might attack New York during his absence, Clinton proceeded no further than Huntington Bay, Long Island, and then hastily returned to the city.† The fleet, however, succeeded in blockading the French vessels so that they were unable to aid the Americans. It was hoped that another fleet, then in the West Indies under command of Count de Guichen, would soon arrive and enable the French to un-

dertake the expedition originally planned for attacking New York. When the expectations of the Americans were at the highest pitch and when everything was in readiness to put the plans into execution, word was received that de Guichen had departed for France.* Nevertheless, Washington adhered to his purpose of attacking New York. He corresponded with the French commanders, and on September 21 conferred in person with them at Hartford.† But shortly afterward Admiral Sir George Rodney arrived with a fleet of 11 ships of the line, which compelled the allies to abandon all their plans for the season. With infinite regret, Washington beheld the succession of abortive projects throughout the campaign of 1780, for he had great expectations of being able to terminate the war this year with the active coöperation of the French. In a letter to a friend he writes as follows:

"We are now drawing to a close an inactive campaign, the beginning of which appeared pregnant with events of a very favorable complexion. I hoped, but I hoped in vain, that a prospect was opening, which would enable me to fix a period to my military pursuits, and restore me to domestic life. The favorable disposition of Spain; the promised succor from France; the combined force in the West Indies; the declaration of Russia (acceded to by other powers of Europe, humiliating to the naval pride and power of Great Britain); the superiority of France and Spain by sea, in Europe; the Irish claims, and English disturb-

* For details of the plan see Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., pp. 113-128; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 285-291. See also Heath's and Rochambeau's letters in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 35-37.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 503; Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. viii., pp. 364-375; Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 227 *et seq.* (Abbatt's ed.); Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 655-656; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., p. 129-137.

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 292.

† Sparks, *Life of Washington*, p. 312. On the correspondence and negotiations between Lafayette, Washington, and the French generals see Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., pp. 138-163.

ances; formed in the aggregate an opinion in my breast, which is not very susceptible of peaceful dreams, that the hour of deliverance was not far distant: for that, however unwilling Great Britain might be to yield the point, it would not be in her power to continue the contest. But, alas! these prospects, flattering as they were, have proved delusory; and I see nothing before us, but accumulating distress. We have been half of our time without provisions, and are likely to continue so. We have no magazines, nor money to form them. We have lived upon expedients, until we can live no longer. In a word, the history of the war is a history of false hopes and temporary devices, instead of system and economy. It is in vain, however, to look back; nor is it our business to do so. Our case is not desperate, if virtue exists in the people, and there is wisdom among our rulers. But, to suppose that this great revolution can be accomplished by a temporary army; that this army will be subsisted by state supplies; and that taxation alone is adequate to our wants, is, in my opinion, absurd.*

During the remainder of the campaign but few operations were carried on, and those of no moment. On November 21, 1780, being informed that the British had a large magazine at Coram, Long Island, which was protected only by a small garrison at Fort George, on South Haven, Major Tallmadge crossed the sound with about 100 men, surprised the fort, and made the garrison of 50 troops prisoners and then burned the magazines at Coram. He recrossed the sound and returned to his starting point without losing a single man.† To offset this expedition, Major Carleton in the latter part of October

made a sudden irruption into the northern part of New York at the head of 1,000 Europeans, Indians and Loyalists and captured Forts Anne and George, making the garrisons prisoners. Sir John Johnson, too, at the head of a smaller body of troops, lay waste a large section of the Mohawk Valley. A number of skirmishes were fought, as a result of which Johnson was compelled to retreat.* Madison says: "The inroads of the enemy on the frontier of New York have been distressing and wasteful almost beyond their own example. They have totally laid in ashes a fine settlement called Schoharie, which was capable, General Washington says, of yielding no less than 80,000 bushels of grain for public consumption. Such a loss is inestimable, and is the more to be regretted because both local circumstances and the energy of that government left little doubt that it would have been applied to public use."†

The winter was now approaching and both armies were placed in winter quarters. The French army remained at Newport, with the exception of the legion of Duke de Lauzun, which was stationed at Lebanon, in Connecticut.‡ Washington stationed the Pennsylvania line near Morris-

* See also Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. viii., pp. 383-400, 405-407, 410-412, 415, 417, 419, 421-423, 432-437, 468, 476-479, 505. vol. ix., pp. 13, 17, 45-48, 53-62, 73, 79-80, 110, 116, 137, 139-142, 165.

† Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 237; Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 245 (Abbatt's ed.).

* See Governor Clinton's letter of October 30 to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 130-135; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 279 et seq.; Roberts, *New York*, vol. ii., p. 430 et seq.

† Madison's *Works* (Congress ed.), vol. i., p. 37.

‡ Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., p. 176.

town; the Jersey line in the vicinity of Pompton; the New England troops on both sides of the Hudson in the vicinity of West Point; while the New York troops were ordered to remain at Albany, whither they had been sent to oppose the inroads of Carleton and Johnson.

Meanwhile the navy had been conducting itself quite creditably, considering its size. We have already spoken about the exploits of Paul Jones, and during the year of 1779 he made his name still more famous. Jones had obtained an old vessel in France, which he renamed the *Bonhomme Richard*.* She was pierced for 40 guns and manned by about 375 men. Jones formed a little squadron by adding three other vessels, the *Alliance*, 36 guns, the *Pallas*, 32 guns, and the *Vengeance*, 12 guns, Jones acting as commodore of the squadron. Toward the end of July, 1779, Jones set sail from l'Orient and steered for the western coast of Ireland. He swept the seas in all directions until, on September 19, he had come off the Firth of Forth, after which he directed his course to Flamborough Head, England.† On the 23d he fell in with a fleet of merchant-

men from the Baltic under the convoy of the *Serapis*, Captain Richard Pearson, and the *Countess of Scarborough*, Captain Piercy. Captain Pearson had received intelligence that Jones was in the vicinity, and when the headmost of the fleet sighted Jones' squadron, all the vessels crowded on sail to escape, while the *Serapis* made haste to place herself between Jones and the merchantmen. By four o'clock of the 23d Captain Pearson was able to make out that Jones' fleet consisted of three large ships and a brig. He ordered the *Countess of Scarborough* to join him as soon as possible, and a little after seven the battle commenced. For a long time the fight was vigorously maintained by both sides, each vessel using every means to gain an advantage. The *Serapis* was handled much more easily than the *Bonhomme Richard*, and Captain Pearson was able to obtain advantages in spite of every effort of Jones to prevent it. Not only was the *Serapis* superior in sailing qualities, but also in armament, carrying 44 guns in two tiers, the lower of which were 18 pounders. Jones determined to lay his ship athwart the hawse of the other, and though he did not entirely succeed in his object, yet as the bowsprit of the *Serapis* ran between his poop and mizzen-mast, the two vessels were lashed together. They were now so close that the muzzles of the guns of the one touched the sides of the opposite vessel and in this

* See Hale, *Franklin in France*, vol. i., p. 253 *et seq.*

† Many writers state that Flamborough Head is on the coast of Scotland, but even a casual glance at the map of England will show that it is on the coast of England, just north of the 54th parallel of north latitude. Even Fisher, in his *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 253, a book published in 1908, makes this mistake. He evidently follows the old accounts.

position the fight was maintained for two hours—from 8:30 to 10:30. Before it commenced, however, the *Bonhomme Richard* had sprung a leak. Her tier of 12 pounders were rendered useless, while her six 18 pounders were practically of no service, they being fired but eight times altogether.

During the succeeding action Jones used only three 9 pounders, the fire from which was ably seconded by that of his men in the round tops; large quantities of combustibles were also thrown from places of vantage into the hold of the *Serapis*, so that during the action she was afire nearly a dozen times in different parts. About 9:30 a powder box aboard the *Serapis* was accidentally set afire, the flames communicating from one powder box to another all the way aft and blowing up all the gunners, sailors and officers abaft the mainmast. In addition, the guns were also rendered useless for the remainder of the action. At times both ships were afire together and the spectacle was dreadful. Meanwhile the *Alliance* sailed round and round both ships, raking the *Serapis* fore and aft and killing many of her men on the quarter and main decks. About 10 o'clock she again opened fire, but this time the *Serapis* and *Bonhomme Richard* were so close together that

the fire was not only poured into the former but also into the latter, 11 of whose men beside an officer were killed. Perceiving that it was impossible to continue the contest, Captain Pearson struck his flag; not, however, until he had secured to his convoy the opportunity of saving themselves. The loss of both sides in killed and wounded was heavy. The *Bonhomme Richard* was a complete wreck after the battle and had nearly seven feet of water in her hold. The minute it was ascertained that the pumps could make no headway the wounded were removed and only the first lieutenant of the *Pallas* with some men were left on board to work at the pumps. On September 25 the water rose up to the lower deck and she finally went down. The *Countess of Scarborough*, after a two hour fight, had also been compelled to surrender to the *Pallas*. With these prizes, Jones now made for Holland and on October 3 anchored off the Texel. It is estimated that the prizes taken by the *Bonhomme Richard* during her cruise were valued at more than £40,000.*

* For a more elaborate and carefully digested account of this renowned battle, see Cooper, *Naval History*, vol. i., pp. 98–114; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 120–129; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 163–166; and lives of Jones by J. S. C. Abbott, Buell, J. P. Frothingham, Hutchins Hapgood, J. O. Kaler, A. S. McKenzie, Henri Marion, M. E. Seawell.



PAUL JONES CAPTURING THE *SERAPIS*.

CHAPTER XXVII.

1780.

CLINTON AND CORNWALLIS IN THE SOUTH: GATES DEFEATED AT CAMDEN:
KING'S MOUNTAIN.

Clinton embarks for the South — Charleston put in a state of defense — Governor Rutledge invested with dictatorial authority — The siege and the capture of Charleston — Expeditions planned by Clinton — Colonel Buford defeated by Tarleton at Waxhaws — Clinton's proclamation — Activity of the Americans — Tyranny of the British — Partisan warfare — Sumter and Marion — Gates placed in command of the southern army — Defeated at battle of Camden — Sumter defeated — Greene supersedes Gates — Cornwallis orders rebels to be punished — Injustice of the proceedings — Ferguson defeated at King's Mountain — Defeat of British detachment — Patriotism of the women.

As Count d'Estaing had departed with his fleet, Sir Henry Clinton made preparations to begin operations once again in the South. Toward the close of December, 1779, leaving General Knyphausen in command at New York, he embarked for Savannah with about 7,500 troops, a corps of cavalry and large quantities of military stores and provisions.* On the voyage a severe storm arose and the fleet was dispersed; one of the ships foundered, another was captured by the Americans, and, in addition, nearly all the horses perished.† On the last day of January, 1780, the fleet arrived at Tybee, Georgia. Clinton had hoped to attack Charleston before the inhabitants were aware of his purpose and had had time to properly defend it, but the necessity for repairing the ships on the coast of Georgia delayed

the expedition sufficiently to afford the Carolinians opportunity to provide against the threatened invasion. General Lincoln and Governor Rutledge used their utmost endeavors to place the city in a state of defence, but the regular troops were few and the militia were poorly equipped; beside which there was a small-pox epidemic in the city, because of which the militia were unwilling to serve.* Funds were also deficient and Congress failed to send suitable reinforcements,† so that it was almost impossible to fully provide against the British advance. Nevertheless, everything possible was done; several hundred negroes were set at work, under the direction of French engineers, to extend the fortifications, rendering them more formidable;‡ and had Lincoln received the

* Fortescue, *British Army*, vol. iii., p. 306; Car-
rington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 493-494.

† Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*,
vol. ii., p. 263.

* McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, p.
430.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii.,
p. 557.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 557.

promised reinforcements and had he not been compelled to defend the city with less than 3,000 troops, undoubtedly he would have been able to resist the British attack successfully.*

On February 11 Clinton landed about thirty miles south of Charleston,† and probably had he made an immediate advance upon the city he would have been able to reduce it with little trouble, but remembering his repulse in 1776, he determined upon slow and sure progress. He proceeded by way of St. John and St. James islands, sending part of the fleet to blockade the harbor. He also requested a reinforcement of 3,000 men from New York, directed General Prevost to join him with 1,100 men from Savannah,‡ and neglected nothing that would contribute to ultimate success. With all his reinforcements, Clinton had an army of about 13,000 men.||

In order to cope properly with the situation, Governor Rutledge had been invested with dictatorial authority and empowered to do everything necessary to make a proper defence, with the exception of taking away the life of a citizen, save by due

process of law.* This power was to continue in force until ten days after the next session of the Legislature began. Rutledge exerted himself in every way to meet the emergency, but was only partially successful.

While the Americans were thus preparing to defend Charleston, Clinton was constructing forts and magazines at the proper places, being particularly careful to secure communication between these forts and the sea.† In order to provide himself with cavalry, he dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton into the neighboring country to secure horses. Partly by threat of confiscation and partly by the use of money, Tarleton obtained a considerable number of horses on Port Royal Island, on which the dragoons were mounted.‡ Thus, toward the latter end of March, 1780, preparations were far enough advanced to begin the siege of Charleston, for at the time only the Ashley River separated the British army from the city. On the night of April 1, Clinton began the construction of siege works about 1,000 yards from the American fortifications,|| which had been constructed under the direction of a French engineer named Laumoy.

* McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 427-429, 507-510; Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, vol. vi., p. 525.

† McCrady, p. 431; Lincoln's and Laurens' letters to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 401-403, 413-415.

‡ Ramsay, *The Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 55; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 353.

|| Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 357; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., p. 274.

* Ramsay, vol. ii., p. 48.

† See Lincoln's letter in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 418-420.

‡ McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, p. 447.

|| McCrady, p. 455; Lincoln's and Laurens' letters of April 9 in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 433-436.

On April 7 General William Woodford arrived in the city, bringing reinforcements of 700 Continental troops,* so that the garrison amounted to 2,000 regulars and 1,000 North Carolina militia, in addition to the inhabitants of the city. Governor Rutledge had made strenuous efforts to raise the militia of the province, but had met with little success, not more than 200 repairing to the American standard.

On April 9 Admiral Arbuthnot took his fleet past Fort Moultrie and anchored just within reach of the guns at Charleston.† While passing, the fort maintained a heavy fire against the fleet, which did some damage to the ships themselves beside killing and wounding 29 men.‡ After Clinton had finished his first parallel, he established batteries at distances ranging from 600 to 1,100 yards from the American works, and then jointly with the admiral demanded that General Lincoln surrender the city. The latter replied as follows: "Sixty days have passed since it has been known that your intentions against this town were hostile, in which time has been afforded to abandon it; but duty and inclination point to the pro-

priety of supporting it to the last extremity."* The only means of communication between the city and the country were two regiments of cavalry under command of Colonel William Washington and General Isaac Huger, who were stationed at Monk's Corner. To surprise this detachment and to cut off absolutely all communication with the country, Clinton, on April 14, sent a body of troops under Lieutenant-colonel James Webster, accompanied by Patrick Ferguson and Tarleton. The British had captured a negro and compelled him to lead the troops by a roundabout way so as to surprise the Americans. In this manner the British had approached near to the American camp before their presence became known, and it was only after great difficulty and through the aid of darkness that Huger and Washington escaped. The British captured 400 horses, of which they stood in great need, together with considerable quantities of arms, clothing, stores, etc., and 100 officers and men.† The defeat of this detachment left the city entirely beleaguered, and the


* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 495. See also Woodford's letter in Sparks, *Correspondence*, vol. ii., pp. 430-433; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 558.


† Lossing, p. 558.

‡ McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 459-461; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 266; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, p. 247.

* The complete text of Clinton's summons and Lincoln's answer is given in McCrady, p. 462. See also Ramsay, *The Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 399.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 496; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 559. Tarleton, in his *History of the Campaigns of 1780-81 in the Southern Provinces of North America*, p. 16, claims to have captured 400 horses, but Stedman (*American War*, vol. ii., p. 183) says they captured 42 wagons, 102 wagon horses and 83 dragoon horses.





THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON.

British were now free to overrun the surrounding territory.

On April 21, considering an evacuation of the city next to impossible, Lincoln offered to capitulate on certain terms, which were rejected by Clinton.* On May 7 Clinton captured Fort Moultrie and the city was now completely invested.† All hope of assistance had long ago been abandoned. The city was in no condition to withstand a long siege, as the troops were insufficient to man the lines adequately, numbers of the guns were dismounted, ammunition was nearly exhausted, and bread and meat and other food supplies were almost entirely consumed. The siege works had also been pushed very near to the defenses, and it was feared that an assault would be made at any moment. Under the circumstances, Lincoln did not feel that he should be entirely accountable for the city and he summoned a council of war, which recommended a capitulation. It was then proposed to Clinton that the town and garrison be surrendered with the condition that the militia and armed citizens should not be considered prisoners of war, but should be allowed to return to their homes and not be molested. These terms were refused and hos-

tilities were renewed.* As it was seen that the British were about to make an assault upon the city, the citizens demanded that Lincoln surrender rather than allow the city to be laid in ashes. Considering the case hopeless, Lincoln offered to surrender on the terms formerly proposed by Clinton† and this offer was accepted, the capitulation being signed May 12.

According to the terms, the town and fortifications, together with the shipping, artillery and all other public stores, were to be surrendered in their present condition; the entire garrison, together with all citizens who had borne arms, were to be prisoners of war; the garrison were to march out of the city and lay down their arms in front of the works, but their colors were not to be seized nor could their drums beat a British march; the Continental troops and sailors were to be sent to some other place where they were to be maintained until exchanged; the militia were to be allowed to return to their homes on parole; the officers were to retain their side arms, baggage and servants, and permission was given them to sell their horses, provided they were not taken out of Charleston; so long as the militia and citi-

*The terms offered by Lincoln are given in full in McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 479-480; for the discussions in council regarding capitulation, see *ibid*, pp. 472-478.

†Baneroft, vol. v., p. 377; McCrady, pp. 482-493.

*McCrady, pp. 495-500, where the terms demanded by Lincoln are given in full. See also Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 86-96; Ramsay, *The Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 400-403.

†Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 97; Ramsay, *The Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 463. See also Dupontail's letter to Washington in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 450-453.

zens kept their parole, neither their persons nor property would in any way be molested; and General Lincoln was permitted to send a ship to Philadelphia with his dispatches. Thus, after a siege of more than a month, Charleston was in the hands of the British. It is estimated that more than 5,000 men under arms were captured, including seven general officers, ten continental regiments and three battalions of artillery.* In addition, 400 pieces of artillery of every description fell into the hands of the British,† together with large quantities of powder, cannon balls, etc.,‡ and a number of American frigates and two French vessels.

Clinton now proceeded to institute such civil and military measures as he considered necessary to re-establish order. Shortly after these measures had been adopted, he prepared to place the rest of the province under British authority. He accordingly planned three expeditions, one of which was to march toward the Savannah River, Georgia, another was to march against Ninety-six beyond the Saluda, and the third was to scour the country between the Cooper and Santee rivers. The first two were sent out with the principal ob-

ject of raising the Loyalists, while the last was to disperse a body of Americans under Colonel Abraham Buford, then marching as rapidly as possible toward North Carolina. All three expeditions were completely successful. The inhabitants flocked from all quarters to resume their allegiance to British authority and to offer their services in the British cause. Even a number of the citizens of Charleston, deceived by the proclamations of the British general, expressed a desire to join the British troops. Lord Cornwallis, after having swept the two banks of the Cooper and passed the Santee, secured possession of Georgetown. Tarleton offered to take command of the expedition to capture Colonel Buford. The latter had continued his rapid retreat and it seemed almost impossible that he could be overtaken, but having under his command a corps of cavalry with about 100 light infantry mounted on horses, Tarleton made such rapid progress that he arrived at Camden on May 28, but a day behind Buford. At Camden Tarleton learned that Buford had departed only the preceding day and that he was making an especial effort to join another body of troops on the march from North Carolina. Realizing his inability to cope with the combined forces, Tarleton determined to strike Buford before the conjunction of the two. Notwithstanding the fatigue of men and horses and in spite of the extreme heat, he redoubled his pace, and after

* Tarleton in his *Campaigns*, p. 43 says 6,000. See also the various estimates in McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 507-510; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 559-561.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 497.

‡ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 106-107.

a march of 105 miles in 54 hours came up with Buford at Waxhaws.* There Tarleton demanded that Buford surrender, but the latter answered that he was prepared to defend himself to the last extremity.† Buford thereupon drew up his forces in battle array, his troops consisting of 400 Virginia regulars with a small detachment of horse. While his troops were placed in a single line, the artillery and baggage were ordered to proceed to the rear without halting and with all possible despatch. The troops were directed to withhold their fire until the British cavalry had approached within twenty yards.‡ Tarleton immediately charged and after a slight resistance the Americans gave way. The British began a vigorous pursuit and the carnage was dreadful, many of those who threw down their arms and offered to surrender being murdered without mercy. Thus "Tarleton's quarter" became synonymous among the American forces with barbarous warfare. Tarleton reported the American loss as 113 killed, 150 wounded and 53 prisoners, and the British loss was 5 killed and 15 wounded.¶ The

British captured all the stores and artillery, and shortly afterward returned to Camden where Cornwallis highly praised Tarleton for his work.*

Meanwhile the inhabitants had expressed much devotion, either feigned or real, to the royal cause, and not content with themselves joining the victorious British army, many of the inhabitants dragged in a number of American prisoners. Clinton therefore supposed the whole country to be in a state of submission and instituted measures for setting up a complete civil administration for the State. On June 3 he issued a proclamation stating that all the inhabitants must take an active part in making secure the royal government and in delivering the country from the anarchy which had so long prevailed. He also discharged from their parole the militia who had been taken prisoners, with the exception of those who had been taken at Charleston and Fort Moultrie, restoring to those who were liberated all their rights and duties as citizens. He then declared that all who refused to return to their allegiance should be treated as enemies and rebels.† This proclamation was both unjust and impolitic, as it proceeded on the supposition that the people were subdued rebels, restored by an act of clemency to the privileges and duties of

* Tarleton's *Campaigns*, p. 32.

† See James, *Life of Marion*, pp. 39, 183.

‡ Tarleton's *Campaigns*, pp. 29-30.

¶ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 497-498; McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 515-523; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 458. Lee (*Memoirs of the War*, p. 165) says that most of the American wounded died. See also Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 360 (ed. 1788); Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 193.

* Ramsay, *The Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 111.

† Ramsay, *The Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 441; McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, p. 553 *et seq.*; Tarleton, *Campaigns*, p. 73.

citizens, while on the other hand, it ignored the fact that for several years past independent authority had been established, and that the determination as to whether they were traitors or rebels depended upon the final issue of the war and not on the issue of a single battle. Many of the colonists had submitted in the hope that they would be released under the protection of the British government and would be allowed to attend to their private affairs in a state of tranquillity. The proclamation, however, dissipated this delusion, for neutrality and peace were denied them; it being required, if they did not place themselves under the standards of their country, that they should serve as British subjects in the royal militia. As a result, much resentment was aroused against the British, and those whose affections the British desired to gain were instead alienated and practically driven into the patriot ranks. They preferred to take the chance of gaining liberty rather than to submit to the British and then to violate the allegiance and parole which Clinton had imposed upon them.

Supposing that he had now established perfect order in the South, Clinton left Lord Cornwallis with about 4,000 men in Georgia and South Carolina, and on June 5 embarked for New York.* As

he had learned that the French were about to send reinforcements to America, he deemed it wise to take the larger part of the army back with him to New York. For more than a month after his departure an unusual state of peace and quiet prevailed. Thinking that both South Carolina and Georgia were now completely reannexed to the British empire, Cornwallis determined to carry the war into North Carolina and to go through the same process in that State. He was delayed in carrying his purpose into immediate execution because of the great heat, the impossibility of subsisting his army in the field before the crops had been harvested, the want of magazines, etc. Nevertheless, he did not waste his time in idleness but distributed his troops throughout South Carolina and Georgia in such a manner as to favor the enlistment of all young men who could be prevailed upon to join the British army. He ordered companies of royal militia to be formed and maintained, and opened correspondence with such of the inhabitants of North Carolina as were friendly to the British cause. He informed them of the reasons for his delay in dispatching an expedition into their State and advised them to await the arrival of the British army before attempting an uprising against the Continental forces. Despite his admonitions the militia of North Carolina were too eager to show their zeal for the British cause

* McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, p. 561.

and several premature insurrections broke out which the State authorities vigorously suppressed. One party of Loyalists, however, numbering about 800 men, under command of Colonel Bryan, succeeded in marching down the Yadkin to the British post at Cheraws and subsequently reached Camden.

While Cornwallis was thus following out the plan of campaign as laid down by his superiors, the Americans were not idle. Governor Rutledge had continued actively at work, he alone keeping alive in his person a spark of the revolutionary power.* A large body of North Carolina militia was ordered to take the field and a detachment from the main army was directed by Congress to march to the South. Such was the effect of the American efforts that many of those who had previously adopted an apathetic attitude now determined to use their utmost endeavors to repel the invaders. A strong spirit of revenge was aroused by the haughty attitude and insolent tyranny of the British officers and Tory militia. The following picture of the internal condition of affairs at this date is drawn up by a well-known historian:

"With dispositions as fell and vindictive as all the sanguinary passions could render them, neighbor was reciprocally arrayed against neighbor, brother against brother, and even father against son. Neither in the darkness of the night, the enclosures of dwelling-houses, the depths of forests, nor the entanglements of the swamps and morasses of the country, was security to be

found. Places of secrecy and retreat, being known alike to both parties, afforded no asylum; but were oftentimes marked with the most shocking barbarities. The murderer in his ambush, and the warriors in their ambuscade, being thus in the daily perpetration of deeds of violence and blood, travelling became almost as dangerous as battle. Strangers, of whom nothing was known, and who appeared to be quietly pursuing their journey, were oftentimes shot down, or otherwise assassinated, in the public road. Whole districts of country resembled our frontier settlements during the prevalence of an Indian war. Even when engaged in their common concerns, the inhabitants wore arms, prepared alike for attack or defence. But this was not all. The period was marked with another source of slaughter, which added not a little to its fatal character. Participating in the murderous spirit of the times, slaves, that were in many places numerous and powerful, rose against their masters, armed with whatever weapon of destruction accident or secret preparation might supply. In these scenes of horror, the knife, the hatchet, and the poisoned cup were indiscriminately employed. Some whole families were strangled by their slaves, while, by the same hands, others were consumed amid the blaze of their dwellings in the dead of the night. These dispositions in the population generally, inflamed by the ardor, and urged by force, of southern passions, were sublimed to a pitch, to which the more temperate people of the north were strangers." *

In consequence of the turbulent conditions, partisan warfare came much into vogue. Among the first of many such partisan leaders to take the field was Colonel Thomas Sumter. Collecting a force that soon amounted to 600 men, Sumter, on July 12, 1780, routed a detachment of the royal army at Williamson's Plantation.† In the beginning these bodies of troops were very poorly equipped

* Caldwell, *Life and Campaigns of General Greene*, pp. 102-103.

† McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 592-600; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 453.

* McCrady, pp. 533-535.

and at times were compelled to use agricultural implements for weapons of war. Their resources were meagre and they trusted to chance for their means of subsistence. In some instances they have been known to charge an opposing force with about three rounds of ammunition apiece, but their success in their skirmishes with the British soon provided them with muskets and cartridges and eventually they became fairly well equipped. Sumter now determined to advance against some of the stronger British outposts, making his first attempt at Rocky Mount, where, however, he was obliged to retreat.* He then attacked the British post at Hanging Rock and annihilated a British regiment stationed there.† It was at this time that Andrew Jackson, then an orphan boy of 13, made his first appearance in history.‡

Another of these partisan warriors was Francis Marion, whose activity and ability in carrying on these campaigns was of great service in the American cause.¶ Both Marion (the

Swamp Fox) and Sumter (the Game-cock) were perfectly familiar with every part of the neighborhood and were able to dart in upon the British detachments and elude all pursuit by fleeing to the forests where they remained until ready to make another fell sweep upon some isolated post.* This method of fighting not only greatly weakened the British forces and disconcerted the plans of the British generals, but also emboldened the Americans and strengthened their belief in themselves and in the ultimate outcome of the contest. Beside Marion and Sumter, Baron De Kalb had been sent from Maryland to Carolina with a few regular troops, but because of the extreme heat and the difficulty of securing supplies progress toward the South had been slow.† On the way toward Carolina De Kalb was reinforced by a body of Virginia militia and the troops of North Carolina under General Richard Caswell. The three forces of Americans therefore kept Cornwallis extremely busy, and he soon found that he could not rest on past laurels but must set seriously to the work of attempting to subdue the country.

Meanwhile General Gates had assumed command of the southern army. Washington had desired that

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 453-454.

† Bancroft, vol. v., p. 383; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 508-509; McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 621-631; Lossing, pp. 456-457.

‡ Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 185.

¶ It is of Marion that the interesting story is told, of his being visited by a young English officer on official business, and his impressing upon the mind of the Englishman by what he saw, that men who could eat sweet potatoes and drink water, for the cause of liberty, were not to be conquered. Simms, *Life of General Marion*, pp. 176-180; Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, pp. 183-187.

* For an account of these partisan leaders see McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, chap. xxvi.

† Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, pp. 196-202; McCrady, *South American in the Revolution*, pp. 656-657; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 295.

General Greene be appointed to the supreme command, but the reputation of General Gates gained during Burgoyne's invasion completely overshadowed the work done by other officers, and on June 13 Congress appointed him commander-in-chief of the southern forces.* It was confidently expected that he would add greater fame to his already illustrious name, but unfortunately for himself, as well as for the country, his "northern laurels" turned to "southern willows." On July 25 Gates joined the army at Deep River and resolved to inaugurate a campaign for the destruction of the British army. Upon his arrival in the South, De Kalb had been willing to accept the suggestions of those well acquainted with the territory as to the best roads, the sections in which forage and provisions were most likely to be obtained, etc. He had, therefore, resolved to turn out of the direct road to Camden so as to conduct his little force through a more plentiful country and also to establish magazines and hospitals at advantageous points.† Gates, however, considered himself above the suggestions of the natives, and thinking his reputation would overshadow any shortcomings in military strategy, determined to push toward the Brit-

ish encampment by a straight road, although this road lay through a barren country which afforded only a scanty subsistence even to the inhabitants. This he did in spite of the remonstrances of the greater number of the subordinate officers.* On July 27 he set the army in motion and had not proceeded far before he began to experience the privations which De Kalb had been so desirous to avoid. What cattle were accidentally found in the woods were lean and thin, and even the supply of such animals was very limited.† Meal and grain were scarce, and the soldiers were finally compelled to use unripe corn and peaches instead of bread. This food, together with the intense heat and unhealthy climate, soon produced disease and threatened the health and final destruction of the entire army.‡ After more than two weeks of trial and hardships, Gates finally brought the army out of this inhospitable region, and arrived at Clermont, or Rugely's Mills, on the 13th of August. At this time the American army consisted of about 4,000 men.||

* Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, p. 207 *et seq.*; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 509; Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, p. 118. See also *A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780* by Colonel O. H. Williams, printed as an appendix to Johnston, *Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathaniel Greene*, vol. iv., pp. 485-507, and in W. G. Simms, *Life of Greene*, pp. 359-383.

† Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 188-189.

‡ Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, pp. 118-120; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 464.

|| Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, pp. 211-220.

* Van Tyne, *American Revolution*, p. 300; Bancroft, vol. v., p. 384; Johnson, *General Washington*, pp. 241-242.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 462-463.

When Gates reached the frontiers of the State, he issued a proclamation requesting the patriotic citizens "to join heartily in rescuing themselves and their country from the oppression of a government imposed upon them by the ruffian hand of conquest." He promised pardon to all those who had been compelled to take the oath of allegiance to the British, with the exception of those who had committed depredations upon the persons or property of American citizens.* This proclamation had a wonderful effect, for large numbers joined the American forces, and even whole companies of militia who had been taken into the British service deserted to the American army. When Francis, Lord Rawdon, commander of the British forces on the Carolina frontiers, learned of the American advance, he notified Cornwallis, who shortly afterward joined him at Camden.† Cornwallis now thought it necessary to retreat or to strike a decisive blow, for the whole country seemed to be rising, and Camden could not well be defended against an attacking force. On the other hand, a retreat to Charleston would be a signal for the States of South Carolina and Georgia to rise against British authority, and if such a retreat were made, the whole of

these two provinces, with the exception of Charleston and Savannah, must be abandoned.* The consequences of such a movement would be nearly as fatal as a defeat.

Cornwallis was informed that the American army amounted to 7,000 men, a number considerably in excess of its actual strength.‡ Nevertheless, he determined to risk battle, and during the night of August 15, at the very hour when Gates was proceeding from Rugely's Mills about 13 miles distant, began the march toward the American camp.§ At about two o'clock on the morning of August 16,|| the advance posts of the two armies unexpectedly met in the woods and skirmishing immediately began. At the first discharge some of the American cavalry were wounded, whereupon the party fell back in disorder, broke the Maryland regiment at the head of the advancing column, and threw the whole army into confusion. From this condition the militia seems not to have recovered, judging from their actions during the ensuing battle. During the preliminary skirmishes a number of

* Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, pp. 224-225.

† Gates himself thought his army larger than it really was, for at this time, instead of having 7,000 men, he had only 3,052 fit for duty. But though he was informed of the true conditions, he determined to risk battle. See Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, p. 222 *et seq.*

‡ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 464-465; Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, p. 226.

|| Kapp, p. 226. Some say 2:30 A. M. (Tarleton, *Campaigns*, p. 131), others midnight (Johnson, *Life of Greene*, Appendix, p. 494).

* Carrington, p. 510; Ramsay, *Revolution of South Carolina*, vol. ii., pp. 145, 449-451; Tarleton, *Campaigns*, p. 98.

† McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 665-666; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 296-297.



BATTLE OF CAMDEN. DEATH OF GENERAL DE KALB.

prisoners were taken by each army, from whom the generals obtained more definite information regarding the forces opposing them.* From this information Cornwallis perceived that the advantage was on his side and that undoubtedly his disciplined troops would quickly rout the raw and unseasoned militia under Gates. Cornwallis divided his army into two columns, placing the right under command of Colonel Webster and the left under Lord Rawdon. The right of the American army consisted of the second Maryland brigade and the Delaware troops under General Mordecai Gist, and under the supreme command of De Kalb; the center was held by the North Carolina militia under Richard Caswell; while the left was composed of the Virginia militia together with the light infantry under Edward Stevens. The first Maryland brigade under Smallwood, was formed in reserve. Gates took no particular position but stationed himself where he could be most useful.†

At dawn the British right wing under Webster was ordered to begin the attack on the American left. The opposing volunteer militia poured a desultory musketry fire against the British columns, but the firing soon ceased when the British soldiers with a shout charged the American line.

The militia immediately threw down their arms and fled, many of them without even having discharged their muskets. The efforts of the officers to restrain the flight were unavailing.* The North Carolina militia in the centre imitated the example of the Virginia troops,† so that hardly a shot was sent against the British by either division. Few of the Americans in their precipitate flight carried off their arms. The British set out in pursuit and eagerly cut down the fugitives. Gates, with the general officers of the militia, made several attempts to turn this headlong flight, but in vain, and the farther the fugitives fled the more dispersed they became. Seeing that the fortune of the day was against the Americans, Gates also fled, as the commonest coward in the army, not stopping until he reached Charlotteville, over sixty miles from the field of battle.‡ “It was common talk in those days that he killed three horses in his flight.” §

Meanwhile Baron De Kalb, abandoned by the militia and forsaken by the supreme commander, was compelled to bear the whole brunt of the British attack. Nevertheless, the

* Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, pp. 231-232.

† McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, p. 677.


‡ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 516-517; McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 678-680; David Schenck, *North Carolina in 1780-1781*, pp. 95-96; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 466-467.

§ Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, p. 124.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 513-515.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 466; Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, pp. 229-230.

Continental troops stood their ground and defended themselves with great bravery. At the same time Webster time the outcome of the battle was doubtful. The reserve covered the left of De Kalb's division, but the



broke the left wing, Lord Rawdon attacked the right wing. De Kalb, however, unlike Gates, made an obstinate resistance and for some flight of the militia had completely exposed the right. Consequently, after dispatching a body of cavalry in pursuit of the retreating fugitives,

Webster turned his attention to the Continental troops under De Kalb, attacking them in front and flank. A severe contest ensued, the Americans fighting desperately to beat off the British attack; but finally Cornwallis hurled his whole force against De Kalb and the line gave way and began to retreat in some confusion. To save as many of his army as possible, De Kalb endeavored to cover the retreat by making a desperate charge at the head of a body of cavalry. The effort resulted in some benefit to the army as a whole, but this benefit was gained at the expense of De Kalb's life, who fell pierced with eleven wounds. His aide endeavored to shield the general, and in explaining to the attacking force De Kalb's rank and nationality, was severely wounded and taken prisoner with him. The British treated De Kalb with every kindness and attention, but medical assistance was of little avail, he expiring within a few hours.* In recognition of his services, Congress afterward ordered the erection of a monument to his memory.

The American loss amounted to 800 or 900 killed and wounded and about 1,200 prisoners, while the British loss was less than 100 killed and 250 wounded. In addition, all the baggage and artillery of the American army fell into the hands of the British.*

The rout of the American army was complete, and the only force which was not dispersed was that under Sumter. The latter had overtaken a convoy on the Wateree and had made 200 prisoners, but when he heard of the disaster at Camden, he retreated with all possible speed. After retreating for many miles, he supposed that he was out of the danger zone and halted to rest his troops who were worn out with constant marching and loss of sleep. Hardly had he halted, when Tarleton pressed in upon him and so completely surprised the American detachment that he recovered the stores and prisoners and killed or captured between 300 and 400 of the Americans. Sumter, however, was well acquainted with the by-paths of the woods in the vicinity and was able to make his escape.†

After the retreat Gates gathered

* Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, pp. 124-126; Kapp, *Life of Kalb*, p. 232 *et seq.*; Smith, *Memoir of Baron De Kalb*; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 467-468; Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 314-315; Fortesque, *British Army*, vol. iii., pp. 316-319; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 384-389; Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 205-206; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 190-193; Tarleton, *Campaigns*, pp. 104-109, 131-135; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 391, 429-447; Stedman, *American War*, pp. 204-211; Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. iii., pp. 15-31; Wheeler, *History of North Carolina*, vol. ii., p. 154.

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 518; Tarleton's *Campaigns*, p. 133.

† McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 667-668, 681-683; Tarleton's *Campaigns*, pp. 112-116, 134, 148 *et seq.*; Lee, *Memoirs of the War*, pp. 187-189; Ramsay, *Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 153; Wheeler, *History of North Carolina*, p. 195; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 447 (ed. 1788); Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 454.

together the scattered remnants of the army and finally made his way to Hillsborough, where he exerted every effort to recover from the terrible blow which had befallen him.* In November he advanced toward Salisbury, and soon after, to Charlotte. But in the meantime, on October 5, Congress had instituted an inquiry into his conduct of the campaign, and though this investigation was not pressed, Gates did not continue in command of the army much longer. Washington was requested to propose the name of Gates' successor, and he named General Greene, whose nomination was approved by Congress on October 30.† Greene reached the headquarters of the army in the South on December 2. Gates thereupon left the army, never again to resume active service. He undoubtedly suffered keenly from the disgrace of defeat, and his fall was all the more humiliating because of the excellent reputation he had previously gained in the North. Shortly after leaving the army, his son died and he set out for the North, where he soon sank into oblivion and was forgotten by the majority of Americans.

Fortunately for the Americans, Cornwallis did not follow up the victory with his usual activity, for his

army had been considerably reduced by sickness and by the sword. Nor had he brought with him sufficient supplies to maintain the army while conducting a pursuit, and he did not deem it expedient to leave South Carolina until he had completely extinguished every manifestation of resistance to British authority. In order to accomplish the subjugation of the State in the most thorough manner, he resorted to several harsh measures. He considered the State as a conquered province which was reduced to unconditional surrender and to allegiance to its former sovereign. According to his theory, the citizens were still British subjects, liable to all their privileges, duties and penalties in case of an infraction of the law. He seemed to forget that many of the citizens were prisoners of war on parole, that without their consent they had been discharged from their parole, and that it was only by proclamation that they had been declared British subjects. Supposing that the whole province was now prostrate at his feet, Cornwallis sent the following message to the British commander at Ninety Six, and similar messages to the commanders of other posts:

"I have given orders that all the inhabitants of this province who have subscribed, and have taken part in the revolt should be punished with the utmost rigour; and also those who will not turn out that they may be imprisoned, and their whole property taken from them or destroyed. I have likewise ordered that compensation should be made out of their estates to the persons who have been injured or oppressed by them. I have or-

* See his letter to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 66-67.

† F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 160, 166 *et seq.*; Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 187, 257; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 469 (ed. 1788).

dered in the most positive manner that every militiaman who has borne arms with us and afterwards joined the enemy shall be immediately hanged. I desire you will take the most rigorous measures to punish the rebels in the district in which you command, and that you obey in the strictest manner the directions I have given in this letter relative to the inhabitants of this country."*

The officers and soldiers to whom the execution of these orders was committed possessed little humanity and little prudence, and the consequences were calamitous. The orders were executed exactly in the spirit in which they were given; numbers of people were put to death, many others were imprisoned and thousands of dollars worth of property destroyed or confiscated.† As a result of these operations, the people were thoroughly aroused and longed for revenge. Cornwallis' conduct toward the principal citizens of Charleston was extremely disgraceful. Without cause or excuse, they were seized during the night, placed on board a guard ship, and soon after sent to St. Augustine, despite their earnest remonstrances that such action was contrary to all the rules of war and entirely unnecessary in the present circumstances.‡

Cornwallis left Camden September 8, and arrived at Charleston, North

Carolina, toward the end of the month taking possession of the latter place after a slight resistance on the part of some volunteer cavalry under command of Colonel William R. Davie.* He then advanced toward Salisbury and ordered the militia to cross the Yadkin, but his victorious career was suddenly arrested by an unexpected disaster. Cornwallis had endeavored to form a British militia out of the well-affected inhabitants of the country, and for this purpose had dispatched Major Patrick Ferguson of the Seventy-first regiment with a small detachment toward Ninety-Six. Ferguson was to train the Loyalists who joined the British army and to induce others to join. Cornwallis expected much from Ferguson's operations, for he was well known as an officer of much merit and as one who executed his assignments with zeal and energy. The first part of the program was carried out with complete success; Ferguson collected a large number of Loyalists and had created great havoc among the backwoods settlements, which were as a rule friendly to the American cause. At this time Colonel Elijah Clarke was retreating from the vicinity of Augusta, Ga.,† and,

* See Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 391-392; Ramsay, *Revolution*, p. 157; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 214.

† Ramsay, *Revolution of South Carolina*, vol. ii., p. 158.

‡ McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, p. 714 *et seq.* See also the letters of Nash and Rutledge, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 179-181, 187-189.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 418 *et seq.*

† For details of which see McCrady, p. 734 *et seq.* See also McCall, *History of Georgia*, vol. ii., pp. 322-327, and Tarleton, *Campaigns*, p. 192, for some of the atrocities committed by the English.

thinking that he might cut off and destroy this detachment, Ferguson determined to stay in the vicinity of the western mountains longer than he would have tarried under other circumstances. This delay was his undoing; the mountaineers of the Wateree and Holston settlements had learned of Ferguson's approach and his work of devastation and determined upon reprisal. From all parts they came together under various leaders, including Isaac Shelby and John Sevier, and set out in quest of the enemy. They were all mounted, and as each man had only a blanket, knapsack and rifle, there was no encumbrance such as baggage to hinder their march. Consequently, they were able to hunt down the British detachment by the same methods they would have used in hunting the wild beasts of the forest or the savages of the border.* Their numbers rendered them formidable, and so rapid was their march that Ferguson would probably have been unable to escape even if he had received warning of their intentions. Early in October the mountaineers reached Gilbert-town—their forces numbering nearly 3,000 men.†

Ferguson had heard of the ap-

proach of this force and attempted to escape, but the mountaineers, selecting about 1,400 of their best riflemen, set out in pursuit on their swiftest horses and finally compelled Ferguson to halt. Sensible that he would ultimately be overtaken, Ferguson deemed it best to select his battle ground with the greatest possible care before the American force could come up. He therefore chose King's Mountain on the border line between North and South Carolina as the place where he should make his stand, challenging "all the rebels outside of hell" to dislodge him,* and declaring that "God Almighty could not drive him from it."† The American forces arrived on the scene of action October 7. By this time, owing to the rapidity of the pursuit, the Americans had dwindled to a little over 900 men; in nominal command was Colonel William Campbell, but there was little subordination or order in the attack, each man being instructed to shift for himself and to fight as only the frontiersmen knew how. Upon arriving at King's Mountain, the American troops were divided so as to attack Ferguson from several different quarters, separate divisions being led by Benjamin Cleveland, James Williams, Charles McDowell, Shelby and Sevier. Before the attack was begun, Cleveland addressed

* Draper, *King's Mountain and Its Heroes*, pp. 174-175, 530, 563-564.

† For the details of the organization of this force see McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 755-764 and authorities cited; Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, vol. ii., chap. ix., pp. 241-294; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 343 *et seq.*

* Van Tyne, *American Revolution*, p. 302; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 246.

† McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, p. 782.




THE BATTLE OF KING'S MOUNTAIN.

the men as follows: "My brave fellows, we have beat the Tories and we can beat them. * * * When engaged you are not to wait for the word of command from me. I will show you by my example how to fight; I can undertake no more. Every man must consider himself as an officer and act from his own judgment. * * * If we are repulsed, let us make a point to return and renew the fight. * * * If any of you are afraid, such have leave to retire, and they are requested immediately to take themselves off."*

The attack was immediately begun, the Americans climbing the rocky sides of the mountain and placing themselves behind rocks and trees, and pouring in a galling fire upon the solid British ranks. Several times the British made a bayonet charge to drive the Americans back, but as often the latter returned to the conflict and in turn compelled the British to give way.† For nearly an hour the contest raged with great fury; the advantage being now on one side and now the other. Finally, however, Ferguson was mortally wounded in an attempt to cut his way through the American lines, and soon after the officer who succeeded to the command saw that it was useless to continue the fight and thereupon sur-

rendered.* The American loss was 28 killed and 62 wounded; the British loss was reported at 206 killed, 127 wounded and 261 prisoners (all Tories), and of the regulars, 17 killed, 35 wounded and 70 captured.† So great was the anger of the mountaineers against the Tories that nine of the most obnoxious were hanged on the spot, and undoubtedly more would have suffered the same fate had not Sevier and Shelby interposed. After the victory the moun-



taineers returned to their homes as quickly and quietly as they had come, without waiting for or expecting the congratulations and acclamations of their country.‡

* McCrady, p. 798 *et seq.*; Ramsay, *Annals of Tennessee*, pp. 238-239.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 521. McCrady, however (p. 803), following Allaire's Diary in Draper, *King's Mountain and Its Heroes*, app., p. 510, places the British loss at 119 killed, 123 wounded, and 664 prisoners—a total of 906.

‡ For full details see Lyman C. Draper, *King's Mountain and Its Heroes* (1881), where the orig-

* Ramsay, *Revolution of South Carolina*, vol. ii., pp. 182-183; Draper, *King's Mountain and Its Heroes*, pp. 248-249.

† McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 794-797.

This blow was a very severe one to Cornwallis, for it completely disconcerted his plans and prevented his progress northward. On October 14, when he learned of the annihilation of Ferguson's force, Cornwallis left Charlotte and began to retreat toward South Carolina. In this movement the army suffered severely, for it rained almost incessantly, the soldiers had no tents, and the roads were almost impassable. Being injured to the climate, the Loyalists who had joined the royal army were extremely useful at this juncture, but because of harsh treatment, abusive language and even blows, a large number deserted the army.* Finally Cornwallis succeeded in passing the Catawba, and on October 29 reached WYMSBOROUGH (or WINNSBORO).†

Meanwhile, having considerably augmented his forces, Sumter continued to harass the British in all quarters. He was a veritable will-o-the-wisp, flying from position to position before the British could gather sufficient troops to pursue him. He intercepted their convoys, cut off various detachments and in number-

less ways kept the army in constant alarm. Marion, too, continued to harass Tarleton and so successfully eluded the latter that he exclaimed "Come, my boys! let us go back, and we will soon find the game-cock [Sumter]; but as for this d—d *old fox* [Marion] the devil himself could not catch him."*. On November 12 Sumter was attacked by Major James Wemyss at Broad River, but he successfully repelled the assault. Wemyss was wounded and taken prisoner, but notwithstanding he had committed many acts of vandalism, he was protected from the fury of the militia.† On the 20th Sumter was again attacked at Blackstock Hill by Tarleton, but the latter also was defeated with great loss. In this conflict Sumter was wounded and for some months compelled to remain quiet.‡ Thus the Americans

* On Marion's operations against Tarleton see Tarleton, *Campaigns*, p. 171 *et seq.*; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 227 *et seq.*; McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, p. 815 *et seq.*; James, *Life of Marion*, p. 60 *et seq.*; Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, p. 137 *et seq.*; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 563 *et seq.*

† Tarleton, *Campaigns*, p. 173 *et seq.*; McCall, *History of Georgia*, vol. ii., p. 340 *et seq.*; James, *Life of Marion*, p. 73; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., p. 317; Ramsay, *Revolution of South Carolina*, vol. ii., p. 189; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 445-446; McCrady, pp. 821-824; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 369-370.

‡ McCall, *History of Georgia*, vol. ii., p. 343 *et seq.*; Lee, *Memoirs of the War*, p. 205 *et seq.*; Tarleton, *Campaigns*, p. 175 *et seq.*; Moore, *Life of Lacey*, p. 22 *et seq.*; Baneroft, vol. v., pp. 402-403; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 521-522; McCrady, pp. 824-830; Draper,

inal evidence has been exhaustively collected; Baneroft, vol. v., pp. 395-401; M. A. Moore, *The Life of General Edward Tracey, with a list of Battles and Skirmishes in South Carolina during the Revolutionary War* (1859); Ramsay, *Revolution of South Carolina*, vol. ii., p. 812 *et seq.*; McCrady, chap. xxxv.; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 342-365; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 424-429.

* Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 225.

† Baneroft, vol. v., p. 401; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 429.

were gradually winning back all the ground lost by Gates in his defeat at Camden, and with one or two exceptions from this time the British were continually defeated until the final surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown.*

King's Mountain and Its Heroes, pp. 376-377; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 446-447; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 471 (ed. 1778); Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., pp. 228-236.

* During the year, 34 battles had been fought in South Carolina (not including the affairs at Rugley's Mills, December 4, Hammond's Store, December 20, and Williams' Plantation, December 31, which properly belong to Greene's Campaign of 1781). Several engagements had also taken place in North Carolina and Georgia. In the 34 battles the Americans lost 1,967 killed and wounded and 7,227 prisoners—a total of 9,194, against a British loss of 1,816 killed and wounded and 1,317 prisoners—a total of 3,133. The chief American losses were at Charleston, where over 5,000 were surrendered and at Camden where over 1,200 were captured, the killed and wounded in these two battles being over 1,100. These losses occurred principally in the first half of the year, when Continental troops comprised the American armies, and during the same time the British had only suffered a total loss of about 650. After the partisan leaders assumed command, the conditions were exactly reversed, the British losing a total of about 2,500 men, whereas the American forces suffered a loss of only a few over 800.—See the statistical tables in McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution*, pp. 849-854.

But while the men were doing the actual fighting, we must not forget the part played in this memorable contest by the female element of the population. The mothers, wives and daughters of the patriots gloried in being called “rebel ladies.” They visited the prison-ships in their efforts to relieve the sufferings of the soldiers, and in all parts of the country they were zealously employed in providing clothing for the soldiers. At Philadelphia a society was formed at the head of which was Martha Washington, wife of the commander-in-chief. Among other members were Mrs. Joseph Reed and Mrs. Sarah Bache, daughter of Benjamin Franklin. These women subscribed considerable sums of money to the public cause, and when their means were exhausted made a house to house canvass to collect as large a sum as possible from the inhabitants. Societies were formed to prepare lint and other necessities for the hospital service, and everything possible was done to offset the ill-effects of the delinquencies of Congress in this respect.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

1780.

TREASON OF BENEDICT ARNOLD.

Arnold's marriage and extravagances — The injustice of Arnold's treatment by Congress — His court-martial and Washington's sentence — He resolves to avenge himself by surrendering West Point to the British — Conference between him and André — André's capture — Washington goes to West Point — Arnold learns of André's capture, and flees — Washington's measures to defeat Clinton's designs — Court-martial of André — Correspondence between Clinton and Washington — Execution of André — Appendix to Chapter XXVIII. — Sergeant Champe's adventure.

While Washington and the other patriots were experiencing all manner of difficulty in carrying on the war, the whole country was startled by the news of an act of treachery which, had it not been discovered in time, might have proved fatal to the cause of independence. This was the attempt of Benedict Arnold to turn over the fortifications at West Point to the British, in compensation for which he was to receive British gold and rank in the British army. Despite his great services in the early part of the war, therefore, Arnold's name must forever be held up as an inglorious example of a man whose pride and personal ambition outran all prudence and stifled all love of country — a man, who, when his pride was hurt and his ambition crossed, connived at a mode of revenge so detestible that all his previous record, brilliant as it was, could never atone for it. Yet, for the sake of historical accuracy, the two different chapters in Arnold's biography should be studied separately — the more so as the earlier one, though it

may help to explain, cannot fully extenuate the later.*

Up to this time, Arnold had possessed the esteem and confidence of the entire country, and particularly of the army. His daring and impetuous valor had made him greatly beloved among officers and men, and he had achieved remarkable military glory by his expedition to Canada, the subsequent battle on Lake Champlain, and particularly his desperate charge at Behm's Heights, in which he received a wound. Being rendered incapable of active service for some time, Arnold had been appointed commander of the troops at Philadelphia, probably one of the most injudicious selections possible.† At Philadelphia, because of his commanding position, Arnold soon became one of the leading men; but instead of con-

* In connection with Arnold, the reader should carefully and discriminately consult Sparks, *Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold*, being vol. iii., of the *Library of American Biography*, as Mr. Sparks is one of Arnold's severest critics. See also Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 520-552.

† Johnson, *General Washington*, p. 219.

ducting himself as became an officer and a thorough gentleman, he soon began to act arrogantly even to those who were his superiors. That he might maintain himself in the position he occupied with a greater degree of display than was actually necessary, he expended more than his income and gradually became involved in debt. He had established himself in the house formerly occupied by Penn, and had furnished it in a most sumptuous manner. There his entertainments quickly gathered around him a number of society people of Philadelphia, among whom were Margaret (Peggy) Shippen, daughter of Edward Shippen, a prominent merchant of the city. The two soon fell in love and shortly afterward became engaged and were married.* Arnold's entire mode of living changed from the time he entered Philadelphia, and even a large fortune, would have been sadly depleted by the banquets, balls, concerts, etc., which were given by him.† As his salary as an officer and the emoluments of his office did not suffice to pay for these, he was rapidly falling into debt, and was accused of having engaged in commercial and other enterprises that would not bear too close scrutiny. He was of a speculative nature, but though unfortunate at the table, could not resist

the temptation to play. As a result debts accumulated and he was constantly harassed by creditors. It was reported that he had engaged in practices highly discreditable to him both as a man and an officer,* and shortly

* "I am inclined to believe, that Arnold was a finished scoundrel from early manhood to his grave; nor do I believe that he had any real and true-hearted attachment to the Whig cause. He fought as a mere adventurer, and took sides from a calculation of personal gain, and chances of plunder and advancement."—Sabine, *American Loyalists*, p. 131. This quotation is given to show how far some writers will go in their efforts to blacken a character to suit their own purposes. So far from gaining by his attachment to the Whig cause, Arnold had lost a great part of his personal fortune in aiding that cause. He had expended large sums of his own money to maintain his army in Canada and elsewhere, and when he desired a settlement from Congress he was met with insinuations of fraud, deceit, speculation, etc., the sting of which even the exoneration of a court of inquiry could not palliate. Arnold had also contributed generously to the support and education of General Warren's children and in innumerable ways had displayed a whole-souled love for the cause in which he had taken up arms. Up to this time Arnold had performed greater services than any other single individual save Washington; it was Arnold who prevented Carleton from triumphantly marching through New York; it was Arnold who repulsed the British in Connecticut; it was Arnold who drove St. Leger from the Mohawk, thus saving the New York frontier; and finally it was Arnold who by his impetuous daring and superior generalship won the battle at Saratoga which caused the surrender of Burgoyne and prevented the division of the confederation which would have occurred had Clinton and Burgoyne joined forces. But for all these services, loss of fortune, and his wounds, how had he been treated by Congress? In addition to the accusation of fraud mentioned above, Congress had refused to promote him but had raised several of his juniors over his head; had refused to send him reinforcements when they were most needed; had almost refused him permission to go to fields where he could reap more laurels; and finally, when compelled to recognize his services, had done so in so grudging a way that the promotion was not less

* Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 227-231; Johnson, *George Washington*, pp. 221-223.

† Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 12; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 239-240.

afterward he was assailed with a series of charges by the Pennsylvania authorities, headed by President Joseph Reed.* Most of the charges were frivolous but two were serious—that he courted the Loyalists at the expense of the patriots and that he had used his position for his personal profit. A committee of Congress which examined the charges acquitted him absolutely, except on

bitter than would have been a reduction in rank. This was in great part due to his friendship for Schuyler and also to his habit of giving an impartial and fearless opinion regarding matters on which Congress had desired his opinion. Schuyler had been the object for the hatred of the New England members of Congress, then all powerful, and as we have seen, had been superseded by the intriguing Gates, then high in favor. Arnold's friendship for Schuyler therefore gained him the animosity of Gates, who did all possible to prevent his securing any further glory, even depriving him of command, and when the first battle had been won failing to mention his name in reports to Congress. Arnold had a sensitive nature and felt these disgraces keenly, so much so that he several times resigned but was persuaded by Washington to remain in the army. But even Washington himself could not secure for Arnold the recognition he thought due him, and it was only at Washington's earnest solicitation that Congress finally restored Arnold to a "violated right." The injustice of the whole thing, combined with the precarious condition of his financial affairs and the fact that he was in close personal relations with a large number of the Loyalist element of the population who constantly urged him to desert the cause, preyed upon Arnold's mind until he lost sight of the cause of liberty and became self-centered, a condition which ultimately resulted in his disgrace before the whole world. Washington was practically in the same position as Arnold but could view circumstances from an impersonal standpoint, whereas Arnold lacked the moral fibre to successfully stand the supreme test—and he fell, a fall for which as already intimated no valid excuse can possibly be offered.

*The charges are given in full in Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 243-245.

two foolish counts, and advised that these be ignored. Arnold seemed satisfied and then resigned his command, but Reed protested on the ground that he had more evidence and the whole affair was then referred to a court-martial. Month after month was spent by Arnold in an endeavor to secure a speedy trial, but with equal pertinacity Reed delayed his "evidence" until more than a year had passed from the time of the first indictment. In rendering its verdict January 26, 1780, the court returned practically the same verdict as before, but in addition sentenced him to be publicly reprimanded by Washington.* Accordingly, with great delicacy and yet with great firmness, Washington discharged this unpleasant duty.† He said: "Our

*Irving says: "We have considered [the particulars of this trial attentively] discharging from our minds, as much as possible, all impressions produced by Arnold's subsequent history, and we are surprised to find, after the hostility manifested against him by the Council of Pennsylvania, and their extraordinary measures to [pre]possess the public mind against him, how venial are the trespasses of which he stood convicted. * * * In regard to both charges nothing fraudulent on the part of Arnold was found, but the transactions involved in the first were pronounced irregular and contrary to one of the articles of war, and in the second imprudent and reprehensible considering the high station occupied by the general at the time."—*Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 22. See also Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 238 *et seq.*, 257-258.

† See the *Proceedings of a General Court-Martial for the Trial of Major-General Arnold*; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 245 *et seq.*; Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. vi., pp. 514-530; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 210 *et seq.*; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol.

profession is the chastest of all; even the shadow of a fault tarnishes the lustre of our finest achievements. The least inadvertence may rob us of the public favor, so hard to be acquired. I reprimand you for having forgotten that in proportion as you had rendered yourself formidable to our enemies, you should have been guarded and temperate in your deportment towards your fellow-citizens. Exhibit anew those noble qualities which have placed you on the list of our most valued commanders. I will myself furnish you, as far as it may be in my power, with opportunities of gaining the esteem of your country.”*

But it was too late: the public disgrace imposed on Arnold after all his magnificent services, his wounds, and his losses, filled him with a determination to revenge himself. He actually seems to have persuaded himself into the belief that he should be playing

the part of a real patriot by ending the war at a single blow, restoring peace and prosperity, and giving the colonies a much better government than they had now or had had before the war. He thought the British offers meant the practical granting of independence, and that once this were done the whole country would rise up to thank and honor him.* He therefore grasped the first opportunity which presented itself. He entered into correspondence with the British, which at first seems to have been of an innocent nature, but which grew apace from innocence into guilt and treason. Arnold knew that he could secure a good price for his treason, and as he required ready money to silence his most urgent creditors, determined to secure as much from the British as possible. He then gave form to his guilty intentions in letters to Colonel Beverly Robinson, by whom they were immediately communicated to Sir Henry Clinton.† This correspondence continued for more than a year before the compact was finally made, the letters to Major John André, adjutant-general of the British army, and from the latter to Arnold, being signed with the fictitious names of Gustavus and John Anderson.‡ In addition to a large sum of money, Arnold was

ii., pp. 302-304. See also the letters regarding this in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 275-278, 290-292.

* Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 23. See Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 711, note 4; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 261. Arnold says: "The most unqualified language of condemnation has generally been used against him [Arnold] and the decision of the court-martial by which he was tried has been cited as establishing his guilt. So far from this, the judgment of the court, though in form guilty on two charges, was substantially an acquittal. The so-called reprimand of Washington was an eulogy, such as has rarely been bestowed on a public officer, and its warm commendation and generous sympathy—following the severe charges so widely circulated—was intended to, and did, express Washington's confidence and respect."—*Life of Arnold*, pp. 237-238 (Copyright by A. C. McClurg & Co.)

* Regarding Arnold's feelings at this time, see Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 267 *et seq.*

† Regarding these letters see Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 271-281.

‡ Johnson, *General Washington*, p. 225.

promised rank in the British army equal to that which he enjoyed in the American army, he on his part agreeing to render the British some signal service. As he knew that West Point was the key to the whole American position, Arnold determined to secure command of the fortifications and army at that place. He then pretended an aversion to longer residence in Philadelphia and a desire to resume active service in the army, and finally persuaded Washington to give him command of West Point together with all forces in that vicinity.* In the early part of August, he arrived at West Point; and from the time of his arrival watched a favorable opportunity for the consummation of his treasonable designs, planning not only to deliver the fortress to the British, but also to scatter the troops under his command so that the British could fall upon them and easily cut them off, one by one.

At about this time Washington had gone to Hartford to confer with the French officers,† and the absence of the commander-in-chief seemed to afford a favorable opportunity for putting into execution the plans which had been formulated. Accord-

ingly, on September 21, the sloop of war *Vulture* sailed up the river and anchored in Haverstraw Bay, a few miles below King's Ferry. In this ship came Major André, for the purpose of agreeing upon the final arrangements necessary for the capture of the fortress. About midnight André landed from the *Vulture* and spent the whole night in conference with Arnold. As the conference took longer than was at first thought necessary, Arnold urged André to go to the house of Joshua H. Smith, and André reluctantly complied with his request.* In the early hours of the morning, André passed with Arnold through the American lines at Haverstraw and spent the forenoon in completing the details of the plan at Smith's house.† Arnold gave André a detailed account of the works and forces at West Point and also a pass under the name of Anderson, so that he could safely recross the lines if challenged. Arnold then returned to his headquarters at Hobinson's house, opposite West Point.‡



* Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., pp. 119-122.

† It is a matter of doubt how far this person was, or was not, an accomplice of Arnold's in his traitorous designs. The exact extent of his complicity will probably never be clearly ascertained. At his trial by court-martial no positive evidence was adduced on which he could be convicted, and after a few months of imprisonment he was allowed to escape. See Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 228-229; Leake, *Life of John Lamb*.

‡ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 714-724; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 287-288.

* Sparks, *Life of Arnold*, p. 158 *et seq.*; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 284 *et seq.*; Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., p. 139. See also his letters of March 6, 1780, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 409-411; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 712-713; Johnson, *General Washington*, p. 227.

† Lodge says that Washington went to meet Rochambeau with some misgivings. See his *George Washington*, vol. i., p. 274.



1. ARNOLD PERSUADING ANDRÉ TO CONCEAL THE PAPERS IN HIS BOOT.
2. THE DEATH WARRANT OF MAJOR ANDRÉ.

André was anxious to return to the *Vulture* with the least possible delay, but that ship had been fired upon from shore and had dropped down the river some distance, in consequence of which André was unable to persuade the boatmen to carry him the greater distance necessary to put him on board the ship. He therefore had no alternative but to return to the British lines by land. He thereupon changed his regimentals for citizen's dress over which he threw a great coat, and accompanied by Smith, set out a little before sunset upon his return trip. He crossed the river at King's Ferry to Verplanck's Point, and shortly after dark took the road toward New York. On the outposts the two men were challenged by a sentinel, but after close scrutiny André's pass secured his release with an apology. He was advised to remain all night in that vicinity because of the marauders infesting the "neutral ground," and it was only after much persuasion on the part of Smith that André finally consented to do so. At daybreak, after a night of great restlessness and uneasiness, André and Smith again started. After traveling some distance, the two men separated and André continued his journey toward New York alone.* While passing over the "neutral ground," a tract some 30 miles in extent along the

Hudson between the American and British lines, and when about a mile north of Tarrytown, André was accosted by three armed men who demanded to know his destination. Supposing himself to be among friends, André said: "I hope you belong to our party." "What party?" one of the men asked. "The lower party," answered André. As he was answered in the affirmative, André then declared himself to be a British officer engaged upon pressing business, but perceiving from the countenances of the three men that he had made a mistake, he showed Arnold's pass and urged them not to detain him.* The three men, John Paulding, Isaac VanWart, and David Williams, refused his request, ordered him to dismount, and then proceeded to search him. In his stockings were discovered the papers which Arnold had given him detailing the works and forces at West Point, etc.† Knowing that the men had sufficient evidence to condemn him as a spy, André offered them large sums of money for his release,‡ but they rejected the bribe and a few hours afterward André was lodged in confinement at Newcastle, the nearest military post, under command of Lieutenant-colonel John Jameson.||

* See the testimony in Sparks, *Life and Treason of Arnold*, pp. 223-226; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 126.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 756.

‡ Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 129.

|| On the 3d of November, it was resolved, "That

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 306-307; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 753-755.

When Jameson perceived the importance of the papers found upon André, he seems to have lost his senses entirely. With the absolute proof of Arnold's treachery in his possession, Jameson was so devoid of sagacity as to write a short note to Arnold telling him of André's arrest and of his determination to

send the prisoner to West Point.* Fortunately, he sent the papers with another note to meet Washington who was then supposed to be on the road returning from Hartford. In the evening Major Benjamin Tallmadge, second in command, came in from White Plains, and being thoroughly astonished and highly indignant at the news of the treachery of Arnold, begged Jameson to detain the prisoner at the post. Finally Jameson reluctantly consented to do this, though he still persisted in sending his letter to Arnold, thus giving him fair warning that his treachery was discovered and sufficient time to escape capture.†

André now realized that further attempts to conceal his true position would be foolhardy, for he knew that the papers sent to Washington would immediately establish his position as a spy. On September 24, therefore, he wrote a note to Washington revealing his name and rank, and endeavoring to prove that he was neither an imposter nor a spy. He asserted that he had come on the "neutral ground" for the purpose

Congress have a high sense of the virtuous and patriotic conduct of John Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac VanWart: in testimony whereof, ordered, that each of them receive annually, \$200 in specie, or an equivalent in the current money of these states, during life, and that the Board of War be directed to procure for each of them, a silver medal, on one side of which, shall be a shield, with this inscription, 'Fidelity,' and on the other, the following motto, 'Vincit Amor Patriæ,' and forward them to the commander-in-chief, who is requested to present the same, with a copy of this resolution, and the thanks of Congress for their fidelity, and the eminent service they have rendered their country." See *Journals of Congress*, vol. vi., p. 154; Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 213, footnote; Lossing, pp. 773-774. There has been much dispute as to whether it was "sterling virtue" or the hope of a larger reward from Congress than André offered that prompted the men to turn André over to the nearest patriot officer. Against their honesty it is argued by many people who knew the circumstances that these men consulted for some time before refusing the bribe and then rejected it only because the risk was too great and they had no faith in its being paid. Major Tallmadge believed that the men would have allowed André to enter New York if they had had the faintest idea that the money would be paid them, but they were afraid, if they sent a messenger after the money with a note from André telling their place of concealment, that a British detachment would be sent to capture them and release André, in which case they would be losers. On the various points of the controversy, see Benson, *Vindication of the Captors of André*; Abbott, *Crisis of the Revolution*, p. 31; Boynton, *History of West Point*, chap. vii.; J. J. Boudinot, *Life of Boudinot*, vol. i., pp. 192-203; Ford's ed. of Washington's *Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 417-420, vol. viii., pp. 444-445, 449, 455.

* Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 214.

† Jameson wrote to Washington on September 27 as follows: "I am very sorry that I wrote to General Arnold. I did not think of a British ship being up the river, and expected that, if he was the man he has since turned out to be, he would come down to the troops in this quarter, in which case I should have secured him. I mentioned my intention to Major Tallmadge, and some others of the Field-Officers, all of whom were clearly of the opinion that it would be right, until I could hear from your Excellency."—See Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 102.

of consulting with another party, and that he had unknowingly gone within the American lines.* In other ways he also tried to prove that his rank entitled him to considerations other than those usually accorded a spy.

Meanwhile, on the evening of September 24, Washington had arrived at Fishkill, eighteen miles from Arnold's quarters, intending to go to West Point that evening. One of the officers, however, urged him to remain over night at Fishkill, and it was not until early on the morning of the 25th that he set off toward West Point, sending word ahead that he would breakfast with Arnold at Robinson's house. When nearly opposite West Point, Washington drove his horse from the main road down a lane, and was thereupon reminded by Lafayette that this road did not lead to Arnold's house and that at that time Mrs. Arnold was undoubtedly awaiting them for breakfast. With some words as to the officers being in love with Mrs. Arnold, Washington insisted upon riding still further to examine the redoubts on that side of the river, and sent forward two of his aides to Mrs. Arnold to explain the cause of delay.†

When Arnold learned that Washington and his suite would not arrive

for some time, he and his family, together with the aides, sat down to breakfast. While at the table, the messenger from Jameson arrived and presented the letter to Arnold, giving him the first information of André's capture. "Yet," says Irving, "in this awful moment he gave evidence of that quickness of mind which had won laurels for him when in the path of duty."** With a self-control that was amazing, Arnold read the letter, and, arising, informed the company that he must proceed at once to West Point. He then went to his wife's chamber, and calling her to him informed her of the circumstances and that he must fly for his life. Leaving her in a swoon on the floor, he hastily rode to the edge of the river, entered a barge which was waiting there for him, and urging the men forward by promises of reward, he soon reached safety aboard the *Vulture*.† Thence he was conveyed to New York, and later departed for Virginia.

Shortly afterward Washington reached headquarters at Robinson's house, and being informed that Arnold had crossed the river, he determined to hurry breakfast and to follow Arnold as soon as possible. As the whole party crossed the river, Washington remarked: "Gentlemen, I am glad General Arnold has gone

* See the letter in Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 757-758, notes; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., pp. 132-133; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 292-293.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 726. Another version is given in Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 137.

* *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 138.

† Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 225-226; Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 235 (Abbatt's ed.); Lossing, pp. 726-727; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 295-297.

before us, for we shall now have a salute, and the roaring of the cannon will have a fine effect among these mountains."* The boat approached the other side of the river, but the cannon did not roar, nor was there any appearance of preparations being made to receive them, whereupon Washington exclaimed: "What, do they not intend to salute us?" Upon landing an officer arrived from the fortress and apologized for not being in condition to receive so distinguished a visitor. At this, Washington said: "How is this, sir, is not General Arnold here?" "No, sir," replied the officer, "he has not been here for two days past, nor have I heard from him in that time."† "This is extraordinary," said Washington; "we were told that he had crossed the river and that we should find him here. However, our visit must not be in vain. Since we have come, although unexpectedly, we must look around a little and see in what state things are with you." He then leisurely examined the fortifications, after which he and the officers returned to Robinson's house.‡

On his return, Washington was met by Hamilton (who had stayed behind) in a very agitated frame of mind. Hamilton placed in Washington's hands the papers which had just ar-

rived from Jameson together with André's letter. Although Washington was shocked by Arnold's treachery, he did not lose self-command for a moment, but simply said to Lafayette and Knox: "Whom can we trust now?"* For a time he kept the matter quiet, but sent Hamilton down to Verplanck's Point to intercept Arnold; but Hamilton arrived at that place too late.†

Meanwhile Mrs. Arnold was frantic with grief and excitement, and received the sympathies and attention of Washington and his officers, who considered the woman innocent of complicity in the plot, and merely as the unfortunate wife of a traitor. Shortly afterward Arnold wrote a letter to Washington requesting that his wife and child be protected, asserting that Mrs. Arnold was entirely innocent of any knowledge of his treasonable actions.‡ In this letter he also boasted that love of country had prompted his conduct. At the

* Brooks, *Life of Knox*, p. 136. See also Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. i., pp. 276-277.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 727-728.

‡ Mr. Sparks is of the opinion that nothing ever transpired to show that Mrs. Arnold was aware of her husband's plans and purposes. On the other hand, Mr. Davis, in his *Memoirs of Aaron Burr* (vol. i., p. 219), very positively declares Mrs. Arnold was not only a participator in his crimes, but worse than that, was a chief tempter to him, to sell himself and his country for gold. Parton in his *Life of Burr*, vol. i., p. 126, also takes this view, but it seems to be conclusively refuted by Sabine in his *Loyalists of the American Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 172-178. See also Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 299-302, 316 *et seq.*; and Lafayette's letter to Luzerne, quoted in Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., pp. 164-168.

* Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 298.

† *Ibid.* p. 298; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 139.

‡ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 727.

same time Washington received another letter from Beverly Robinson claiming that André had come into the American lines under the protection of a flag, had been given a pass by the commanding officer of the American forces, and therefore ought to be set at liberty immediately.* Washington at once took measures to prevent the successful consummation of Clinton's designs, and while he did not know to what extent the blandishments of the British had turned the affections of the soldiers from the country, yet he did not withdraw his confidence from any, but treated them all as innocent of any connection with the crime. Wayne and the troops under him were ordered to proceed to West Point as a further precaution against attack by the British.†

On September 26 André, in the custody of Major Tallmadge, arrived at Robinson's house, and two days later was sent under an escort of cavalry to Stony Point and thence to Tappan. Soliciting Tallmadge's opinion as to the probable outcome of his capture, André was not very greatly reassured. According to Sparks, the conversation was as follows (Sparks quoting a letter):

"When I could no longer evade his importunity, I remarked to him as follows:—"I had a much-beloved class-mate in Yale College, by the name of Nathan Hale, who entered the army, in 1775. Immediately after the battle of Long Island,

General Washington wanted information respecting the strength, position, and probable movements of the enemy. Captain Hale tendered his services, went over to Brooklyn, and was taken, just as he was passing the outposts of the enemy on his return." Said I, with emphasis, 'Do you remember the sequel of this story?' 'Yes,' said André, 'he was hanged as a spy. But you surely do not consider his case and mine alike?' I replied, 'Yes, precisely similar, and similar will be your fate.' He endeavored to answer my remarks, but it was manifest, he was more troubled in spirit than I had ever seen him before."*

The next day Washington appointed a court-martial of which General Greene was president, and of which Knox, Stirling, St. Clair, Robert Howe, Samuel H. Parsons, John Glover, James Clinton, John Patterson, Edward Hand, John Huntington, John Stark, John Lawrence, Lafayette, and Stenben were members. When André was brought before the court-martial for examination, he candidly avowed the extent of his participation in the affair, concealing nothing that concerned himself, but steadily refusing to inculcate others. He acknowledged everything that was necessary to convict him as a spy, and the court-martial decided that he was guilty of being within the American lines in the capacity of a spy, and therefore ought to suffer a spy's death.‡ Washington then com-

* Lossing, p. 729; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., pp. 142-143.

† Stillé, *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, p. 233 *et seq.*

* Sparks, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 255-259. See also Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., pp. 149-150.

‡ Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 216-220; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 765-768; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 155 *et seq.*; Brooks, *Life of Knox*, pp. 136-137. Regarding the status of André, see the article by Charles J. Biddle, in *Memoirs of the Pennsylvania Historical Society*, vol. vi. (1858); Arnold, *Life*

municated the result to Clinton, at the same time allowing André to write a letter to the British general regarding his personal affairs.* Washington also indirectly made efforts to effect an exchange for André in the hope that Clinton would be willing to give up Arnold in André's stead, but this Clinton refused to do.† Instead, he entered into correspondence with Washington urging that by every consideration of justice, policy, and humanity, André ought not to be hanged. His letters were ineffectual, however, and he therefore sent three gentlemen to confer with Washington or any other officer whom the latter might appoint. At a meeting between the American officers and these British emissaries at Dobb's Ferry, every conceivable point in connection with André's conduct was discussed. The British advanced every reason as to why André should not be considered a spy and put to death as such. The conference ended without result, how-

ever, and the verdict of the court-martial was allowed to stand.*

The execution was to take place at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of October 1, but owing to the length of the conference between the American and British officers, it became necessary to postpone it until 12 o'clock October 2. André had pleaded to be shot as a soldier instead of being hanged as a spy;‡ but his entreaties were refused as being inconsistent with the usages of war and the established facts in connection with his case.§ He was therefore hanged and the following picture of the scene is given by Dr. Thacher.||

"October 2d.—Major André is no more among the living. I have just witnessed his exit. It was a tragical scene of the deepest interest. During his confinement and trial, he exhibited these proud and elevated sensibilities, which designate greatness and dignity of mind. Not a murmur, or a sigh, ever escaped him, and the civilities and attentions bestowed on him, were politely acknowledged. Having left a mother and two sisters in Eng-

of Arnold, p. 322 *et seq.* See also H. W. Smith, *Andréana* (1865); Dawson, *Collection* (1866).

* Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 155.

† The romantic adventures of Sergeant John Champe are related by Major Lee, in his *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 159-187. See also Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 369-386; Lossing, vol. i., p. 774 *et seq.* Mr. Sparks in his *Life of Washington*, pp. 317-318, notes that there is an important error, in its being supposed that Champe was employed to bring away Arnold, in order to save André, whereas Champe did not go into New York till eighteen days after André's execution. The story of the sergeant's exploits is too interesting, however, to be omitted. See Appendix at end of present chapter.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 768-770; Sparks, *Life of Arnold*, p. 275; Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 305 *et seq.*; Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 538, 541; Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., pp. 158-160.

† The letter is given by Lossing, p. 770, note; by Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, p. 309; and in Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., p. 543. Hamilton also urged that André's request be granted. See Lodge's ed. of *Hamilton's Works*, vol. viii., p. 18.

‡ Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., pp. 162-165.

|| Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 222-223.

land, he was heard to mention them in terms of the greatest affection, and in his letter to Sir Henry Clinton, he recommends them to his particular attention.*

“The principal guard officer, who was constantly in the room with the prisoner, relates, that when the hour of his execution was announced to him in the morning, he received it without emotion, and while all present were affected with silent gloom, he retained a firm countenance, with a calmness and composure of mind. Observing his servant enter his room in tears, he exclaimed, ‘Leave me, till you can show yourself more manly.’ His breakfast being sent him from the table of General Washington, which had been done every day of his confinement, he partook of it as usual, and having shaved and dressed himself he placed his hat on the table, and cheerfully said to the guard officers, ‘I am ready at any moment, gentlemen, to wait on you.’ The fatal hour having arrived, a large detachment of troops was paraded, and an immense concourse of people assembled; almost all our general and field officers, excepting his Excellency and his staff, were present on horseback; melancholy and gloom pervaded all ranks; and the scene was affectingly awful. I was so near during the solemn march to the fatal spot, as to observe every

movement, and participate in every emotion which the melancholy scene was calculated to produce. Major André walked from the stone house, in which he had been confined, between two of our subaltern officers, arm in arm; the eyes of the immense multitude were fixed on him, who, rising superior to the fears of death, appeared as if conscious of the dignified deportment which he displayed. He betrayed no want of fortitude, but retained a complacent smile on his countenance, and politely bowed to several gentlemen whom he knew, which was respectfully returned. It was his earnest desire to be shot, as being the mode of death most conformable to the feelings of a military man, and he had indulged the hope that his request would be granted. At the moment, therefore, when suddenly he came in view of the gallows, he involuntarily started backward, and made a pause. ‘Why this emotion, sir?’ said an officer by his side. Instantly recovering his composure, he said, ‘I am reconciled to my death, but I detest the mode.’ While waiting and standing near the gallows, I observed some degree of trepidation; placing his foot upon a stone, and rolling it over, and choking in his throat, as if attempting to swallow. So soon, however, as he perceived that things were in readiness, he stepped quickly into the waggon, and at this moment he appeared to shrink, but instantly elevating his head, with firmness, he said, ‘It will be but a

* See Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 313–314; Sparks’ ed. of *Washington’s Writings*, vol. vii., p. 537.

momentary pang;' and taking from his pocket two white handkerchiefs, the provost-marshal, with one, loosely pinioned his arms, and with the other, the victim, after taking off his hat and stock, bandaged his own eyes with perfect firmness, which melted the hearts and moistened the cheeks, not only of his servant, but of the throng of spectators. The rope being appended to the gallows, he slipped the noose over his head, and adjusted it to his neck, without the assistance of the awkward executioner. Colonel Scammel now informed him, that he

had an opportunity to speak, if he desired it; he raised his handkerchief from his eyes, and said, 'I pray you, to bear me witness, that I meet my fate like a brave man.' The waggon being now removed from under him, he was suspended, and instantly expired. It proved, indeed, 'but a momentary pang.' He was dressed in his royal regimentals and boots, and his remains, in the same dress, were placed in an ordinary coffin, and interred at the foot of the gallows; and the spot was consecrated by the tears of thousands."*

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXVIII.

SERGEANT CHAMPE'S ADVENTURE.

BY MAJOR LEE.

WASHINGTON, informed that others of the American officers, were, like Arnold, traitors to their country, resolved to ascertain, if possible, whether the information was correct. He sent for Major Lee, and asked him to name a man who was able and willing to proceed to New York, under the guise of a deserter, and ascertain the truth so important to be known, for the interest of the country, and the vindication of the character of the army, viz., whether there were other Arnolds among the officers, or whether he alone was the guilty traitor. Lee, happily, was possessed of the very man in his corps, and after an interview with the gallant sergeant, and overcoming his scruples against so unusual a duty, Champe agreed to make the required attempt. We now quote from Major Lee.

This part of the business being finished, the major's and sergeant's deliberations were turned to the manner of the latter's desertion; for it was well known to both, that to pass the numerous patrols of horse and foot crossing from the stationary guards, was itself difficult, which was now rendered more so, by parties thrown occasionally beyond the place called Liberty-pole, as well as by the swarms of irregulars, induced

sometimes to venture down to the very point of Paulus Hook, with the hope of picking up booty.

* See Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 319-324; Baneroff, vol. v., pp. 427-438; Boynton, *History of West Point*.

"In no instance," says Washington, in a private letter, "since the commencement of the war, has the interposition of Providence appeared more remarkably conspicuous, than in the rescue of the post and garrison at West Point. How far Arnold meant to involve me in the catastrophe of this place, does not appear by any indubitable evidence, and I am rather inclined to think, he did not wish to hazard the more important object, by attempting to combine two events, the lesser of which might have marred the greater. A combination of extraordinary circumstances, and unaccountable deprivation of presence of mind in a man of the first abilities, and the virtue of three militiamen, threw the adjutant-general of the British forces, with full proof of Arnold's intention, into our hands, and, but for the egregious folly, or the bewildered conception, of Lieutenant-colonel Jameson, who seemed lost in astonishment, and not to have

Evidently discernible as were the difficulties in the way, no relief could be administered by Major Lee, lest it might induce a belief, that he was privy to the desertion, which opinion getting to the enemy, would involve the life of Champe. The sergeant was left to his own resources, and to his own management, with the declared determination, that in case his departure should be discovered before morning, Lee would take care to delay pursuit as long as was practicable.

Giving to the sergeant three guineas, and presenting his best wishes, he recommended him to start without delay, and enjoined him to communicate his arrival in New York, as soon thereafter as might be practicable. Champe, pulling out his watch, compared it with the major's, reminding the latter of the importance of holding back pursuit, which he was convinced would take place in the course of the night, and which might be fatal, as he knew that he should be obliged to zigzag, in order to avoid the patrols, which would consume time. It was now nearly eleven. The sergeant returned to camp, and taking his cloak, valise, and orderly-book, he drew his horse from the picket, and, mounting him, put himself on fortune. Lee, charmed with his expeditious consummation of the first part of the enterprise, retired to rest. Useless attempt! the past scene could not be obliterated; and, indeed, had that been practicable, the interruption which ensued, would have stopped repose.

Within half an hour Captain Carnes, officer of the day, waited on the major, and with considerable emotion, told him that one of the patrol had fallen in with a dragoon, who, being challenged, put spur to his horse, and escaped, though instantly pursued. Lee, complaining of the interruption, and pretending to be extremely fatigued by his ride to and from head-quarters, answered as if he did not understand what had been said, which compelled the captain to repeat it. "Who can the fellow that was pursued be?" inquired

known what he was doing, I should undoubtedly have gotten Arnold. André has met his fate, and with that fortitude which was to be expected from an accomplished man, and a gallant officer; but I mistake, if Arnold is suffering at this time, the torments of a mental hell. He wants feeling. From some traits of his character, which have lately come to my knowledge, he seems to have been so hackneyed in crime, so lost to all sense of honor and shame, that while his faculties still enable him to continue his sordid pursuits, there will be no time for remorse."—See Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 227.

the major, adding, "a countryman, probably." "No," replied the captain; "the patrol sufficiently distinguished him, to know that he was a dragoon; probably one from the army, if not certainly one of our own." This idea was ridiculed, from its improbability, as during the whole war but a single dragoon had deserted from the legion. This did not convince Carnes, so much stress was it now the fashion to lay on the desertion of Arnold, and the probable effect of his example. The captain withdrew to examine the squadron of horse, whom he had ordered to assemble in pursuance of established usage on similar occasions. Very quickly he returned, stating that the scoundrel was known, and was no less a person than the sergeant-major, who was gone off with his horse, baggage, arms, and orderly-book—so presumed, as neither the one nor the other could be found. Sensibly affected at the supposed baseness of a soldier extremely respected, the captain added, that he had ordered a party to make ready for pursuit, and begged the major's written orders.

Occasionally this discourse was interrupted, and every idea suggested, which the excellent character of the sergeant warranted, to induce the suspicion, that he had not deserted, but had taken the liberty to leave the camp, with a view to personal pleasure; an example, said Lee, too often set by the officers themselves, destructive, as it was, of discipline, opposed, as it was, to orders, and disastrous, as it might prove, to the corps, in the course of service.

Some little delay was thus interposed; but it being now announced, that the pursuing party was ready, Major Lee directed a change in the officer, saying, that he had a particular service in view, which he had determined to intrust to the lieutenant ready for duty, and which probably must be performed in the morning. He therefore directed him to summon Cornet Middleton for the present command. Lee was induced thus to act, first, to add to the delay, and next, from his knowledge of the tenderness of Middleton's disposition, which he hoped would lead to the protection of Champe, should he be taken. Within ten minutes, Middleton appeared to receive his orders, which were delivered to him, made out in the customary form, and signed by the major. "Pursue, so far as you can with safety, Sergeant Champe, who is suspected of deserting to the enemy, and has taken the road leading to Paulus Hook. Bring him alive that he may suffer in the presence of the army; but kill him, if he resists, or escapes after being taken."

Detaining the cornet a few minutes longer in advising him what course to pursue; urging him

to take care of the horse and accoutrements, if recovered, and enjoining him to be on his guard, lest he might, by his eager pursuit, improvidently fall into the hands of the enemy; the major dismissed Middleton, wishing him success. A shower of rain fell soon after Champe's departure, which enabled the pursuing dragoons to take the trail of his horse: knowing, as officer and trooper did, the make of their shoes, whose impression was an unerring guide.*

When Middleton departed, it was a few minutes past twelve, so that Champe had only the start of rather more than an hour; by no means so long as was desired. Lee became very unhappy, not only because the estimable and gallant Champe might be injured, but lest the enterprise might be delayed; and he spent a sleepless night. The pursuing party, during the night, was, on their part, delayed by the necessary halts, to examine occasionally the road, as the impression of the horse's shoes directed their course; this was unfortunately too evident, no other horse having passed along the road since the shower. When the day broke, Middleton was no longer forced to halt and he passed on with rapidity. Ascending an eminence, before he reached the Three Pigeons, some miles on the north of the village of Bergen, as the pursuing party reached its summit, Champe was desiered not more than half a mile in front. Resembling an Indian in his vigilance, the sergeant, at the same moment, discovered the party, to whose object he was no stranger, and, giving spur to his horse, he determined to outstrip his pursuers. Middleton, at the same instant, put his horses to the top of their speed; and being, as the legion all were, well acquainted with the country, he recollected a short route through the woods, to the bridge below Bergen, which diverged from the great road, just after you gain the Three Pigeons. Reaching the point of separation, he halted, and dividing his party, directed a sergeant, with a few dragoons, to take the near cut, and possess, with all possible dispatch, the bridge, while he, with the residue, followed Champe; not doubting but that Champe must deliver himself up, as he would be enclosed between himself and his sergeant. Champe did not forget the short cut, and would have taken it himself, but he knew it was the usual route of our parties, when returning in the day from the neighborhood of the enemy, properly preferring the

woods to the road. He consequently avoided it; and, persuaded that Middleton would avail himself of it, wisely resolved to relinquish his intention of getting to Paulus Hook, and to seek refuge from two British galleys, lying a few miles to the west of Bergen.

This was a station always occupied by one or two galleys, and which it was known now lay there. Entering the village of Bergen, Champe turned to his right, and disguising his change of course as much as he could, by taking the beaten streets, turning as they turned, he passed through the village, and took the road towards Elizabeth-town Point. Middleton's sergeant gained the bridge, where he concealed himself, ready to pounce on Champe, when he came up; and, Middleton, pursuing his course through Bergen, soon got also to the bridge, when, to his extreme mortification, he found that the sergeant had slipped through his fingers. Returning up the road, he inquired of the villagers of Bergen, whether a dragoon had been seen that morning preceding his party. He was answered in the affirmative, but could learn nothing satisfactory as to the route he had taken. While engaged in inquiries himself, he spread his party through the village, to strike the trail of Champe's horse, a resort always resorted to. Some of his dragoons hit it, just as the sergeant, leaving the village, got in the road to the point. Pursuit was renewed with vigor, and again Champe was desiered. He apprehending the event, had prepared himself for it, by lashing his valise, containing his clothes and orderly-book, on his shoulders, and holding his drawn sword in his hand, having thrown away its scabbard. This he did, to save what was indispensable to him, and to prevent any interruption to his swimming, from the scabbard, should Middleton, as he presumed, when disappointed at the bridge, take the measures adopted by him. The pursuit was rapid and close, as the stop occasioned by the sergeant's preparations for swimming, had brought Middleton within two or three hundred yards. As soon as Champe got abreast of the galleys, he dismounted, and running through the marsh to the river, plunged into it, calling on the galleys for help. This was readily given; they fired on our horse, and sent a boat to meet Champe, who was taken in, and carried on board, and conveyed to New York, with a letter from the captain of the galley, stating the past scene all of which he had seen.

The horse, with his equipments, the sergeant's cloak, and sword scabbard, were recovered; the sword itself, being held by Champe, till he plunged

* The horses being all shod by our own farriers, the shoes were made in the same form; which, with a private mark annexed to the fore shoes, and known to the troopers, pointed out the trail of our dragoons to each other, which was often very useful.

into the river, was lost, as Middleton found it necessary to retire, without searching for it.

About three o'clock in the evening, our party returned; and the soldiers, seeing the horse, well known to them, in our possession, made the air resound with exclamations, that the scoundrel was killed.

Major Lee, called by this heart-rendering annunciation, from his tent, saw the sergeant's horse led by one of Middleton's dragoons, and began to reproach himself with the blood of the highly-prized, faithful, and intrepid Champe. Stillings his agony, he advanced to meet Middleton, and became somewhat relieved, as soon as he got near enough to discern the countenance of his officer and party. There was evidence in their looks of disappointment, and he was quickly relieved, by Middleton's information, that the sergeant had effected his escape, with the loss of his horse, and narrated the particulars just recited.

Lee's joy was now as full as, the moment before, his torture had been excruciating. Never was a happier conclusion. The sergeant escaped unhurt, carrying with him to the enemy, undeniable testimony of the sincerity of his desertion; cancelling every apprehension before entertained, lest the enemy might suspect him of being what he really was.

Major Lee imparted to the commander-in-chief the occurrence, who was sensibly affected by the hair breadth escape of Champe, and anticipated with pleasure, the good effect sure to follow the enemy's knowledge of its manner.

On the fourth day after Champe's departure, Lee received a letter from him, written the day before, in a disguised hand, without any signature, and stating what had passed, after he got on board the galley, where he was kindly received.

He was carried to the commandant of New York as soon as he arrived, and presented the letter addressed to this officer from the captain of the galley. Being asked to what corps he belonged, and a few other common questions, he was sent, under care of an orderly-sergeant, to the adjutant-general, who, finding that he was sergeant-major of the legion of horse, heretofore remarkable for their fidelity, he began to interrogate him. He was told by Champe, that such was the spirit of defection which prevailed among the American troops, in consequence of Arnold's example, that, he had no doubt, if the temper was properly cherished, Washington's ranks would not only be greatly thinned, but that some of his best corps would leave him. To this conclusion, the sergeant said, he was led by his own observations, and especially by his knowledge of the discontents which

agitated the corps to which he had belonged. His size, place of birth, his form, countenance, color of his hair, the corps in which he had served, with other remarks in conformity to the British usage, were noted in a large folio book. After this was finished, he was sent to the commander-in-chief, in charge of one of the staff, with a letter from the adjutant-general. Sir Henry Clinton treated him very kindly, and detained him more than an hour, asking him many questions, all leading—first, to know to what extent this spirit of defection might be pushed by proper incitements; what were the most operating incitements; whether any general officers were suspected by Washington, as concerned in Arnold's conspiracy, or any other officers of note; who they were, and whether the troops approved or censured Washington's suspicions; whether his popularity in the army was sinking, or continued stationary; what was Major André's situation; whether any change had taken place in the manner of his confinement; what was the current opinion of his probable fate, and whether it was thought Washington would treat him as a spy. To these various interrogations, some of which were perplexing, Champe answered warily; exciting, nevertheless, hopes that the adoption of proper measures to encourage desertion, of which he could not pretend to form an opinion, would certainly bring off hundreds of the American soldiers, including some of the best troops, horse as well as foot. Respecting the fate of André, he said he was ignorant, though there appeared to be a general wish in the army that his life should not be taken; and that he believed, it would depend more on the disposition of Congress, than on the will of Washington.

After this long conversation ended, Sir Henry presented Champe with a couple of guineas, and recommended him to wait on General Arnold, who was engaged in raising an American legion in the service of his majesty. He directed one of his aids to write to Arnold by Champe, stating who he was, and what he had said about the disposition in the army to follow his example, which was very soon done; it was given to the orderly attending on Champe, to be presented, with the deserter, to General Arnold. Arnold expressed much satisfaction on hearing from Champe, the manner of his escape, and the effect of Arnold's example; and concluded his numerous inquiries, by assigning quarters to the sergeant; the same as were occupied by his recruiting-sergeants.

He also proposed to Champe to join his legion, telling him he could give to him the same station he had held in the rebel service, and promising further advancement when merited. Expressing

his wish to retire from war, and his conviction of the certainty of his being hung if ever taken by the rebels, he begged to be excused from enlistment; assuring the general that, should he change his mind, he would certainly accept his offer. Retiring to the assigned quarters, Champe now turned his attention to the delivery of his letters, which he could not effect till the next night, and then only to one of the two *incogniti* to whom he was recommended. This man received the sergeant with extreme attention, and, having read the letter, assured Champe that he might rely on his faithful co-operation in doing every thing in his power consistently with his safety, to guard which required the utmost prudence and circumspection. The sole object in which the aid of this individual was required, regarded the general and others of our army, implicated in the information sent to Washington by him. To this object Champe urged his attention, assuring him of the solicitude it had excited, and telling him that its speedy investigation had induced the general to send him into New York. Promising to enter on it with zeal, and engaging to send out Champe's letters to Major Lee, he fixed the time and place for their next meeting, when they separated.

Lee made known to the general what had been transmitted to him by Champe, and received in answer directions to press Champe to the expeditious conclusion of his mission, as the fate of André would be soon decided, when little or no delay could be admitted in executing whatever sentence the court might decree. The same messenger who brought Champe's letter, returned with the ordered communication. Five days had nearly elapsed after reaching New York, before Champe saw the confidant to whom only the attempt against Arnold was to be intrusted. This person entered with promptitude into the design, promising his cordial assistance. To procure a proper associate to Champe was the first object, and this he promised to do with all possible dispatch. Furnishing a conveyance to Lee, he again heard from Champe, who stated what I have related, with the additional intelligence that he had that morning, the last of September, been appointed one of Arnold's recruiting-sergeants, having enlisted the day before with Arnold; and that he was induced to take this afflicting step, for the purpose of securing uninterrupted ingress and egress to the house which the general occupied, it being indispensable to a speedy conclusion of the difficult enterprise which the information he had just received had so forcibly urged. He added, that the difficulties in his way were nu-

merous and stubborn, and that his prospect of success was by no means cheering. With respect to the additional treason, he asserted that he had every reason to believe that it was groundless; that the report took its rise in the enemy's camp, and that he hoped soon to clear up this matter satisfactorily. The pleasure which the first part of this communication afforded was damped by the tidings it imparted respecting Arnold, as on his speedy delivery depended André's relief. The interposition of Sir Henry Clinton, who was extremely anxious to save his much beloved aid-de-camp, still continued; and it was expected the examination of witnesses and the defence of the prisoner would protract the decision of the court of inquiry, now assembled, and give sufficient time for the consummation of the project committed to Champe. A complete disappointment took place from a quarter unforeseen and unexpected. The honorable and accomplished André, knowing his guilt, disdained defence, and prevented the examination of witnesses, by confessing the character in which he stood. On the next day, the 2d of October, the court again assembled, when every doubt that could possibly arise in the case having been removed by the previous confession, André was declared to be a spy, and condemned to suffer accordingly.

The sentence was executed on the subsequent day in the usual form, the commander-in-chief deeming it improper to interpose any delay. In this decision he was warranted by the very unpromising intelligence received from Champe—by the still existing implication of other officers in Arnold's conspiracy—by a due regard to public opinion—and by real tenderness to the condemned.

Neither Congress nor the nation could have been with propriety informed of the cause of the delay, and without such information it must have excited in both alarm and suspicion. André himself could not have been intrusted with the secret, and would consequently have attributed the unlooked-for event to the expostulation and exertion of Sir Henry Clinton, which would not fail to produce in his breast expectations of ultimate relief; to excite which would have been cruel, as the realization of such expectations depended only on a possible but improbable contingency. The fate of André, hastened by himself, deprived the enterprise committed to Champe of a feature which had been highly prized by its projector, and which had very much engaged the heart of the individual chosen to execute it.

Washington ordered Major Lee to communicate what had passed to the sergeant, with direc-

tions to encourage him to prosecute with unre-
laxed vigor the remaining objects of his instru-
tions, but to intermit haste in the execution only
so far as was compatible with final success.

This was accordingly done, by the first oppor-
tunity, in the manner directed. Champe deplored
the sad necessity which occurred, and candidly
confessed that the hope of enabling Washington
to save the life of André, who had been the sub-
ject of universal commiseration in the American
camp, greatly contributed to remove the serious
difficulties which opposed his acceding to the
proposition when first propounded. Some docu-
ments accompanied this communication, tending
to prove the innocence of the accused general;
they were completely satisfactory, and did credit
to the discrimination, zeal and diligence of the
sergeant. Lee inclosed them immediately to the
commander-in-chief, who was pleased to express
the satisfaction he derived from the information,
and to order the major to wait on him the next
day; when the whole subject was re-examined,
and the distrust heretofore entertained of the
accused was forever dismissed. Nothing now
remained to be done but the seizure and safe deli-
very of Arnold. To this object Champe gave
his undivided attention; and on the 19th of Octo-
ber, Major Lee received from him a very particu-
lar account of the progress he had made, with the
outlines of his plan. This was without delay sub-
mitted to Washington; with a request for a few
additional guineas. The general's letter, written
on the same day, 20th of October, evinces his at-
tention to the minutiae of business, as well as his
immutable determination to possess Arnold alive,
or not at all. This was his original injunction,
which he never omitted to enforce on every proper
occasion.

Major Lee had an opportunity, in the course of
the week, of writing to Champe, when he told
him, that the rewards which he had promised to
his associates, would be certainly paid on the deli-
very of Arnold; and, in the mean time, small
sums of money would be furnished for casual ex-
penses, it being deemed improper that he should
appear with much, lest it might lead to suspicion
and detection. That five guineas were now sent,
and that more would follow, when absolutely
necessary.

Ten days elapsed before Champe brought his
measures to conclusion, when Lee received from
him his final communication, appointing the third
subsequent night for a party of dragoons to meet
him at Hoboken, when he hoped to deliver Ar-
nold to the officer. Champe had, from his enlist-
ment into the American legion, (Arnold's corps,)

every opportunity he could wish to attend to the
habits of the general. He discovered, that it was
his custom, to return home about twelve every
night, and that previous to going to bed, he al-
ways visited the garden. During this visit, the
conspirators were to seize him, and, being pre-
pared with a gag, intended to have applied the
same instantly.

Adjoining the house in which Arnold resided,
and in which it was designed to seize and gag
him, Champe had taken off several of the palings,
and replaced them, so that with care, and with-
out noise, he could readily open his way to the
adjoining alley. Into this alley, he meant to have
conveyed his prisoner, aided by his companion,
one of two associates, who had been introduced
by the friend, to whom Champe had been origi-
nally made known by letter from the commander-
in-chief, and with whose aid and counsel, he had
so far conducted the enterprise. His other asso-
ciate, was, with the boat prepared, at one of the
wharves, on the Hudson river to receive the
party.

Champe, and his friend, intended to have
placed themselves each under Arnold's shoulder
and to have thus borne him through the most un-
frequented alleys and streets to the boat; repre-
senting Arnold, in case of being questioned, as a
drunken soldier, whom they were conveying to
the guard-house.

When arrived at the boat, the difficulties would
be all surmounted, there being no danger, nor
obstacle, in passing to the Jersey shore. These
particulars, so soon as known to Lee were com-
municated to the commander-in-chief, who was
highly gratified with the most-desired intelligence.
He directed Major Lee to meet Champe, and to
take care that Arnold should not be hurt. The
day arrived, and Lee, with a party of dragoons,
left camp late in the evening, with three led ac-
counted horses; one for Arnold, one for the ser-
geant, and the third for his associate, never
doubting the success of the enterprise, from the
tenor of the last-received communications. The
party reached Hoboken about midnight, where
they were concealed in the adjoining wood — Lee,
with three dragoons, stationing himself near the
river shore. Hour after hour passed — no boat ap-
proached. At length the day broke, and the major
retired to his party, and, with his led horses,
returned to camp, when he proceeded to head-
quarters, to inform the general of the much la-
mented disappointment, as mortifying as inex-
plicable. Washington having perused Champe's
plan and communication, had indulged the pre-
sumption, that at length the object of his keen

and constant pursuit, was sure of execution, and did not dissemble the joy such conviction produced. He was chagrined at the issue, and apprehended that his faithful sergeant must have been detected in the last scene of his tedious and difficult enterprise.

In a few days, Lee received an anonymous letter from Champe's patron and friend, informing him, that on the day preceding the night fixed for the execution of the plot, Arnold had removed his quarters to another part of the town, to superintend the embarkation of troops, preparing, as was rumored, for an expedition to be directed by himself: and that the American legion, consisting chiefly of American deserters, had been transferred from their barracks to one of the transports; it being apprehended, that if left on shore, till the expedition was ready, many of them might desert. Thus it happened, that John Champe, instead of crossing the Hudson that night, was safely deposited on board one of the fleet of transports, whence he never departed, till the troops under Arnold, landed in Virginia! nor was he able to escape from the British army, till after the junction of Lord Cornwallis, at Petersburg, when he deserted, and proceeding high up into Virginia, he passed into North Carolina, near the Sams towns, and, keeping in the friendly districts of that state, safely joined the army soon

after it had passed the Congaree, in pursuit of Lord Rawdon.

His appearance excited extreme surprise among his former comrades, which was not a little increased when they saw the cordial reception he met with from the late Major, now Lieutenant-Colonel Lee. His whole story soon became known to the corps, which reproduced the love and respect of both officer and soldier, heretofore invariably entertained for the sergeant, heightened by universal admiration of his late daring and arduous attempt.

Champe was introduced to General Greene, who very cheerfully complied with the promises made by the commander-in-chief, so far as in his power; and having provided the sergeant with a good horse and money for his journey, sent him to General Washington, who munificently anticipated every desire of the sergeant, and presented him with his discharge from further service,* lest he might in the vicissitudes of war fall into the enemy's hands; when, if recognized, he was sure to die on the gibbet.

* When General Washington was called by President Adams to the command of the army prepared to defend the country from French hostility, he sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, to inquire for Champe: being determined to bring him into the field at the head of a company of infantry. Lee sent to Loudon county, where Champe settled after his discharge from the army; when he learned that the gallant soldier removed to Kentucky, where he soon after died.

CHAPTER XXIX.

1781.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS; FINANCIAL DEPRESSION CAUSES MUTINY.

Jay's futile efforts to obtain aid from Spain — British attack neutral commerce — The Armed Neutrality — Adams negotiates treaty with Holland — Diplomatic agents unsuccessful in other countries — Alarming condition of affairs in colonies — Notes of credit worthless — States requisitioned for more money — The domestic debt and interest — Money continues to depreciate — Robert Morris appointed superintendent of finances — He establishes a bank — Loans from foreign countries — Revolt of the Pennsylvania Line — Wayne's attempt to pacify mutineers — Revolt of the New Jersey Brigade. Appendix to Chapter XXIX — Treaty of Armed Neutrality.

The conclusion of the treaties of commerce and alliance with France was followed by three events which had an important influence upon the fortunes of the colonies. These events were the declaration of war against Great Britain by Spain, the

armed neutrality of the nations of northern Europe, and the treaty concluded between Holland and the United States. At this time, Spain, though not as powerful as she had been during preceding centuries, was still formidable, and her possessions

in America made it important that Continental Congress should establish friendly relations with her. Franklin had early made efforts through the French court and by correspondence to secure united action between France and Spain, and to the treaty of 1778 a secret clause was appended providing for the adhesion of Spain to the alliance. In 1779 John Jay was appointed United States minister at Madrid, but for two years his labors had been fruitless.* So anxious had been Congress to secure an alliance with Spain that Jay was authorized to surrender the right of navigation of the Mississippi, and to renounce all claims or designs upon Spanish territory in America, as its price. Fortunately for the future of the country, Jay's mission was a failure. He himself said, "The cession of the navigation [of the Mississippi] will in my opinion render a future war with Spain unavoidable, and I shall look upon my subscribing to the one as fixing the certainty of the other." However, Spain was soon led into war with England, and the United States thereby reaped the advantages of an alliance without its necessary burdens. The declaration of war between these two countries was much better for the United States than if the treaty had been concluded upon the terms which Jay was authorized to offer.

Nevertheless, Spain could not be

induced to recognize the independence of the American colonies, nor to give any great substantial aid in promoting the American cause. Hence all the efforts of the French statesmen to secure the adhesion of Spain to the treaty of 1778 were of no avail. Count de Aranda, the Spanish ambassador, wrote to his government as follows: "The independence of the English colonies has been there recognized. It is for me a subject of grief and fear. France has but few possessions in America; but she was bound to consider that Spain, her most intimate ally, had many, and that she now stands exposed to terrible reverses. From the beginning, France has acted against her true interests in encouraging and supporting this independence, and so I have often declared to the ministers of this nation."

The vast naval power of Great Britain had rendered her haughty and overbearing, and she not only claimed the right to search vessels and seize the property of an enemy wherever found at sea, but also exercised this right with rigorous severity. She did not stop at capturing the vessels of the enemy, but also boarded neutral vessels and confiscated whatever of their cargoes was supposed to be the property of the enemy. The neutral powers had become sorely vexed at the arrogant attitude of the British in this respect and complained at the interference with commerce by British ships of war. This was particularly

* See Fellew, *John Jay*, chap. vi.

the case with the Dutch, whose commerce was not only very extensive but also profitable, their ships carrying ship timber and other military stores into the ports of France. At first Great Britain only remonstrated; then threatened, and finally resorted to force by attacking a convoy bound for the Mediterranean, which insult provoked the Dutch and finally involved the nation in a war with the British.* Ostensibly for the purpose of protecting their neutral commerce from the belligerents in the war then being carried on between Great Britain and her colonies, France and Spain, a confederacy was entered into in 1780 between Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Holland, known as the Armed Neutrality, which was the idea of Catharine II., of Russia.† This confederation defined contraband goods, declared that free ships made free goods, and stipulated also for the joint protection of their commerce by armed convoys, etc. It was resolved that neutral ships should enjoy a free navigation, even from port to port, and on the coasts of the belligerent powers; that all effects belonging to the subjects of the powers at war should be regarded as free on board neutral ships, except such goods as were stipulated to be contraband; and that no port should

be considered as in a state of blockade unless there should be a sufficient force before it to render such a blockade absolutely effectual.* The other European powers were requested to join this confederacy and France and Spain agreed to do so at once. Portugal, however, declined and the United Provinces delayed their answer.† While this confederation outwardly assumed an attitude of neutrality coupled with armed enforcement of its terms against the belligerents without favor, it was intended and accepted as an act unfriendly to Great Britain, and indicated to her that she was without a friend among the powers of Europe, and must fight her battles alone and unaided.

Meanwhile, Henry Laurens, when on his way to Holland to solicit a loan for the United States,‡ was captured,|| and the papers taken from him disclosed to the British ministry that Continental Congress was negotiating with Holland for a treaty. Toward the close of 1780, therefore, England resolved upon a war with the States-General.§

The third event, probably next in

* On the diplomatic events leading up to this and on the causes which brought about the armed neutrality see Bancroft, vol. v., chaps. xxii.-xxiii.; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 138-156.

† Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, p. 369.

* Freeman Snow, *Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy*, pp. 7-11. See also Appendix at end of present chapter.

† Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 371-374.

‡ See the *Secret Journals of Congress*, vol. ii., pp. 282-318, and especially for October, 21-26-30, November 1, 5, and 8, 1779, and June 20, 1780.

|| Moore, *American Diplomacy*, p. 16.

§ Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 334; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 155-157; John Adams, *Works*, vol. vii., pp. 346-347, 348.

importance to the French alliance, in the foreign relations of the colonies was the treaty with Holland, the negotiations for which were conducted by John Adams.* As before stated, Henry Laurens was captured by the British, and Adams, then in Paris, was substituted. Before his departure for Holland, he offended Vergennes so greatly that he refused to correspond further with him,† Upon his arrival in Holland he entered upon the task before him with the zeal and devotion which were so characteristic of him, and after two years of effort his labors were crowned by a treaty of amity and commerce, which was especially valuable as recognizing the independence of the United States and rendering more easy the procuring of the greatly needed loans.‡ Mr. Adams was highly elated at his success in Holland, as is shown by his dispatches to America, and he ranked the result of his labors as “the greatest triumph of his life.”|| He said also, “I think the treaty is conformable to the principles of perfect reciprocity, and contains nothing

that can possibly be hurtful to America or offensive to our allies, or to any other nation, except Great Britain, to whom it is indeed, without a speedy peace, a mortal blow.”*

The other diplomatic agents who had been sent by Congress to solicit recognition from European powers were not so successful. Arthur Lee had made an ineffectual attempt to enter upon negotiations at Madrid, but had been turned back by the Spanish government, and the treatment accorded him at Berlin was no more civil. William Lee, who had been accredited to Vienna and Berlin, had been kept away from both places and had not reached a point nearer either capital than Frankfort. Ralph Izard, who was appointed to Tuscany, was refused permission to go to Italy and remained in Paris. At St. Petersburg, Francis Dana spent two years in obscurity and experienced nothing but humiliation and failure.† Paris seemed to be the only place where American representatives were welcome, and there they all congregated to await a more favorable turn of events. The idle ministers and their secretaries were not only a drain upon the scanty treasury, but were also a continued source of trouble to Franklin, not only because of disputes among themselves and jealousy of him, but also because of actual interference

* The resolutions and commission authorizing Adams to conduct the negotiations in Holland in place of Laurens are in *Secret Journals of Congress*, vol. ii., pp. 314-317.

† For details see Foster, *A Century of American Diplomacy*, pp. 43-47; John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., p. 315 *et seq.*, vol. iii., pp. 187, 190-191, vol. vii., p. 243.

‡ John Adams, *Works*, vol. i., p. 329 *et seq.*, vol. vii., *passim*.

|| *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 353. See also vol. vii., pp. 581-582, 587-591.

* *Ibid.*, vol. vii., p. 648.

† Moore, *American Diplomacy*, p. 19 *et seq.*

between him and the court. The two Lees and Izard were extremely envious of Franklin and lost no opportunity to manifest their enmity, but Franklin had too much serious work on his hands to pay attention to the disputes among his countrymen and in every way ignored their insidious attacks upon him. These attacks and insinuations against his usefulness and integrity of character did little harm to his reputation in America, for the great body of the American people and a large majority of the members of Congress had the utmost faith in him, and subsequent events proved that this faith was not misplaced.

It is not necessary that we enter into the details of the struggle which took place between Great Britain and her European antagonists in various parts of the globe. Their operations were of astounding magnitude, and victory rested first with one and then with the other. Great naval battles were fought with varied success, and large fleets of merchantmen were captured alternately by the English and by their foes, though upon the whole the English were the most successful. Several of the West India Islands changed hands a number of times during the war. The Spaniards captured Pensacola and extended their authority over the whole province of Florida, but neither France nor Great Britain lost sight of the war in America. In addition to the force under Rochambeau, France

determined to dispatch a larger fleet under the Count de Grasse, which, after completing certain operations in the West Indies, was to repair to the United States and aid Rochambeau and Washington in any manner possible. The English also spared no effort to increase their army in the colonies, in the hope that she might make a change for the better. In her affairs there and still further extend the progress of the British arms.

At this time the position of affairs in the colonies was such that the friends of the American cause were in a state of great alarm. While temporary relief had been afforded, no permanent system of supplying the needs of the army had been established and the country appeared to be on the verge of ruin.* The con-

* Madison described the situation in a letter to his father as follows: "Our army threatened with an immediate alternative of disbanding or living at free quarters; the public treasury empty; public credit exhausted, nay the private credit of purchasing agents employed, I am told, as far as it can bear; Congress complaining of the extortion of the people; the people of the improvidence of Congress; and the army of both; our affairs requiring the most mature and systematic measures, and the urgency of the occasion admitting only of temporary expedients, and these expedients generating new difficulties; Congress recommending plans to the several States for execution, and the States separately rejudging the expediency of such plans, whereby the same distrust of concurrent exertions that has dampened the ardour of patriotic individuals must produce the same effect among the States themselves; an old system of finance discarded as incompetent to our necessities, an untried and precarious one substituted and a total stagnation in prospect between the end of the former and the operation of the latter. These are the outlines of the picture

test was developing into a struggle for bare existence. The enemy in strong force was in the very heart of the country, while the Continental government was almost without an army, was absolutely devoid of money and, as Robert Morris said, its authority was almost "reduced to a metaphysical idea." * Notes of credit were worthless and Congress had been compelled to acknowledge this fact, their bills of credit being no longer a legal tender or receivable in payment of taxes. The early issues were so worthless that barber shops were papered with it.† But the darker the outlook, the greater were the exertions of the patriots. Their agents abroad were instructed to obtain loans from France, Spain and Holland, and further internal taxes were laid and apportioned among the several States by whose authority they were to be collected.‡

of our public situation."—See Gaillard Hunt, *Life of Madison*, p. 32; Gay, *Life of Madison*, p. 21.

* Sumner, *Financier and Finances of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 286.

† Breck, *Historical Sketch of Continental Paper Money*, in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. iii., p. 18.

‡ "About this time, the old continental money, by common consent, ceased to have currency. Like an aged man, expiring by the decays of nature, without a sigh or a groan, it fell asleep in the hands of its last possessors. By the scale of depreciation, the war was carried on five years, for little more than £1,000,000 sterling, and two hundred millions of paper dollars were made redeemable, by five millions of silver ones. In other countries, such measures would have produced popular insurrections, but in the United States, they were submitted to without any tumults. Public faith was violated, but in the

"Exclusive of these sums obtained abroad, the debts contracted by arrears of army pay and commissary certificates at home, and such specific supplies as had been received, the expenditures from the federal treasury for the year 1780 amounted to \$83,000,000 in old tenor, and \$900,000 in new; the whole value in specie at about \$3,000,000, a great falling off from the expenditures even the last year, and an indication of the rapidly declining resources of Congress."*

On March 18, 1781, Congress called upon the States for an additional \$6,000,000, in quarterly installments, the payment of which was to be in money of specie value and to commence on June 1. This was in addition to the requisitions of last year which remained to a great extent undischarged. The domestic debt now

opinion of most men, public good was promoted. The evils consequent on depreciation had taken place and the redemption of bills of credit, at their nominal value, as originally promised, instead of remedying the distress of the sufferers, would, in many cases, have increased them, by subjecting their small remains of property, to exorbitant taxation. The money had, in a great measure, got out of the hands of the original proprietors, and it was in the possession of others, who had obtained it at a rate of value, not exceeding what was fixed upon it by the scale of depreciation. Nothing could afford a stronger proof, that the resistance of America to Great Britain, was grounded in the hearts of the people, than these events. * * * The people saw the necessity which compelled their rulers to act in the manner they had done, and being well convinced that under other circumstances, would scarcely have been expiated by the lives and fortunes of their authors."—Ramsay, *History of the American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 519.

* Hildreth, vol. iii. p. 331.

amounted to \$24,000,000, specie value, to which about \$5,000,000, due abroad, were to be added the amount being estimated under the scale of depreciation adopted by Congress, the outstanding old tenor having sunk to 75 for 1. Beside this annual interest to the amount of \$1,000,000 was already payable on the liquidated portion of this debt.

Including \$500,000 of outstanding commissary certificates, it was estimated that the requirements for the year 1781 would be \$19,500,000, specie value, to meet which the treasury officials counted on receiving \$9,000,000 from the unpaid requisitions of the last year, and three of the quarterly installments of the \$6,000,000 requisition lately made upon the States, which would give \$4,500,000. Beside this, \$3,200,000 were counted upon from the exchange of outstanding "old tenors" for bills of the new emission; \$500,000 in commissary certificates would be produced by outstanding paper money requisitions; and it was hoped that the proposed import duty of 5 per cent. would yield another \$500,000. But the estimated income did not reach the amount of the estimated expenditure, and when the time came for the actual transactions, the greater part of the income was not realized. The "old tenor" paper continued to depreciate, carrying with it the "new tenor." In May, 1781, besides recommending to the States that they repeal any laws

making paper bills of any sort a legal tender, Congress informed the States that the requisitions called for must be met in "solid coin" or its equivalent. The "new tenor" having now sunk to 4 for 1, it was not an equivalent, and as further issues would entail heavy loss on the government, Congress advised that they be stopped. Thus rejected by its creator, the paper money, of which over \$100,000,000 in "old tenor" remained outstanding, declined more rapidly than ever, falling to 100, 125, 200, 500 and finally to 1,000 for it, being considered so valueless that nobody would hold it for a day, even the soldiers resolving not to take it. It soon disappeared from circulation.*

The management of financial affairs by means of a committee had now proven to be prejudicial to the interests of the country, and Congress therefore determined to introduce a thorough reform. It was decided to place one man at the head of the financial department who should be responsible to the country for the proper handling of its affairs. As there was a great disorder and waste in the finances, it was felt that the country could not secure a better person to make the desired change than Robert Morris, a man whose pure morals, ardent patriotism and vast knowledge of financial matters eminently fitted him for this im-

* Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 359-361.

portant station. Accordingly, on February 20, 1781, Morris was elected superintendent of finances by the unanimous vote of the States, with the exception of Massachusetts, which abstained from voting.* On May 14 Morris was installed in office† and on the 17th laid before Congress a plan for a national bank,‡ concerning which he and Alexander Hamilton had corresponded freely. Morris planned to capitalize the bank at \$400,000 in gold and silver, with power to increase this amount if necessary, its notes constituting the currency of the country and to be accepted as specie for duties and taxes by the Nation and by every State.|| Congress, however, had not the power to legalize such a bank and the proposition was submitted to the States. The vote was carried by New Hampshire, New Jersey and the five southernmost States, while Massachusetts voted in the negative, Pennsylvania was divided, and Madison alone of the Virginia members opposed it as being beyond the powers of the Confederation.§ The bank was incorporated as the "President, Directors and Corporation of the

Bank of North America.'"* By borrowing in the name of the government through this bank, and pledging for payment the taxes as yet uncollected, Morris was enabled to anticipate them and to command a ready supply of money. Though the government credit had failed, Morris used his own private credit which was considered excellent.† It has been reported that large sums of money were advanced by him out of his own personal resources, but these legends may be rejected as unfounded.‡

But America was indebted no less to her foreign representatives than she was to the exertions of the officials at home. Franklin, who in September, 1778, had been appointed minister plenipotentiary to France, obtained from Louis XVI. a gift of 6,000,000 livres (over \$1,100,000) beside a loan of 4,000,000 livres (over \$740,000). Holland, however, refused

* Oberholtzer, p. 108.

† Oberholtzer, p. 157.

‡ Sumner, *Robert Morris*, pp. 61-63. For other details regarding Morris and his financial operations, see W. G. Sumner, *The Financier and the Finances of the Revolution* (2 vols., New York, 1891); Michael Nourse, *Robert Morris, the Financier in Banker's Magazine*, vol. ix., (1860); Charles H. Hart, *Robert Morris, the Financier of the American Revolution*, in *Pennsylvania Magazine*, vol. i.; Robert Waln, Jr., *Robert Morris*, vol. v. of Sanderson's *Lives of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence* (Philadelphia, 1823); Redwood Fisher, *Revolutionary Reminiscences connected with the life of Robert Morris*; Lawrence Lewis, Jr., *A History of the Bank of North America* (Philadelphia, 1882), the *Letters to Robert Morris, 1775-1782*, in *Collections of the New York Historical Society* for 1878.

* *Journals of Congress*, vol. iii., p. 580; Oberholtzer, *Life of Robert Morris*, pp. 65-73; Sumner, *Robert Morris*, p. 53 *et seq.*

† Though he did not take the oath of office as Superintendent of Finance until June 27.

‡ *Journals of Congress*, vol. iii., p. 624; *Diplomatic Correspondence*, vol. vii., pp. 444-449; Oberholtzer, p. 74.

|| Oberholtzer, p. 96 *et seq.*

§ Bancroft, vol. vi., pp. 26-27.

to loan the United States on their own credit, but the French monarch guaranteed the loan to the States-General, and on this security Congress obtained 10,000,000 livres (about \$1,850,000) from Holland.* Spain refused to advance any money unless the United States would renounce the navigation of the Mississippi; but, as before stated, this proposition was peremptorily rejected.

Before the beneficent effect of these measures was felt, an event had occurred which threatened the most serious consequences. On January 1, 1781, about 1,300 soldiers of the Pennsylvania Line, because of non-payment of salaries, etc., paraded under arms, refused to obey their officers and committed a number of outrages.† They had enlisted for a term of three years, or during the war, and the officers contended that, according to the agreement, the soldiers should serve to the end of the war, no matter how far distant that end might be; while, on the other hand, the soldiers maintained that they had engaged to serve three years only, or during the war if it

should terminate before the three years had elapsed.* Consequently, when they were not allowed to return home at the end of their terms, they became highly disgruntled, which condition was further aggravated by their sufferings from extreme want.† They determined to obtain a redress of grievances, and, having seized six field-pieces, marched off toward Princeton, intending to go to Philadelphia to lay their situation before Congress.‡ In an effort to bring the mutineers to submission, General Wayne interposed and threatened to shoot the most audacious, but hardly had he cocked his pistol when several bayonets were at his breast, the men exclaiming, "We respect you, General; we love you, but you are a dead man if you fire! Do not mistake us, we are not going to the enemy; on the contrary, were they to come out, you should see us fight under you with as much resolution and alacrity as ever;

* L. C. Hatch, *The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army*, in *Harvard Historical Studies*, vol. x., pp. 125-127; Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 240-241. There were several other causes for discontent among the Pennsylvania troops, for details of which see Stillé *Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line*, pp. 166-181, 215-218, 229-233.

† Wayne said in a letter: "Poorly clothed, badly fed, and worse paid, some of them not having received a paper dollar for near twelve months; exposed to winter's piercing cold, to drifting snows and chilling blasts, with no protection but old worn-out coats, tattered linen overalls and but one blanket between three men. * * * The delicate mind and eye of humanity are hurt, very much hurt, at their visible distress and private complainings."—See Irving, *Life of Washington*, vol. iv., p. 224.

‡ Stillé, *Wayne*, pp. 240-243.

* Sparks, *Life of Franklin*, p. 468; Parton, *Life of Franklin*, vol. ii., pp. 389-391; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 447-449; Morse, *Life of Franklin*, chap. xii. See also the various letters of Franklin, Vergennes, and others in Hale, *Franklin in France*, especially vol. i., pp. 455-456, vol. ii., p. 29.

† See Wayne's letter to Washington, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 192-193; Heath's *Memoirs*, pp. 248-249 (Abbatt's ed.)

but we wish a redress of grievances and will no longer be trifled with.”* Wayne, however, argued the matter with the mutineers and finally induced them to put their demands in writing. The demands consisted of a request that all who had served three years should be discharged, an immediate payment of all arrears due them, and that future pay be in specie to all who remained in the service.† At Princeton the mutineers were met by a committee of Congress, joined by President Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania, and a satisfactory compromise was reached, whereupon the mutineers gave up their arms.‡ The British commander had hoped to profit by this revolt, and emissaries were sent among the discontented troops, making them all sorts of inducements to join the British army. These offers were declined with indignation, as the troops had no idea of turning traitors to their country, merely wishing justice at the hand of Congress.||

This movement had caused Washington no little concern and anxiety.

* Quincy's *Memoir of Major Shaw*, p. 85.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., pp. 312-313.

‡ See the *Diary of the Revolt in Pennsylvania Archives*, series ii., vol. xi., pp. 631-674. See also Stillé, *Wayne*, p. 243 *et seq.*; and the letters in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 194-199.

|| Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 336-338; Heath's *Memoirs*, pp. 249-250; Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 242-243; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 536-538; Sullivan's and Dickinson's letters in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 199, 205-207.

He was perfectly well aware that the grounds for discontent were plenty, and was disposed to be as lenient as possible with men who had been driven to an extremity. Nevertheless, he realized the significance of the example of the Pennsylvania troops in inciting similar outbreaks, and therefore took effectual measures to quell every such attempt. He selected a body of troops in the Highlands, in whom he placed complete reliance, and held them in readiness to march at a moment's notice. Hardly had the organization of this force been completed, when on January 20 a part of the New Jersey Brigade rebelled and made demands similar to those to which Congress had yielded in the case of the Pennsylvania troops. The Jersey soldiers marched to Chatham, but Washington immediately dispatched General Robert Howe against them to crush the revolt by force, unless the men should unconditionally surrender and return to duty. Washington's orders were promptly executed, and having been taken by surprise, the Jersey soldiers immediately yielded. Two of the ringleaders were shot and the spirit of mutiny was thus effectually subdued.*

* Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 338-339; Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 380-381, App. no. x.; Thacher, pp. 244-245. On these revolts see also Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 16-22 (ed. 1788); Stillé, *Life of Wayne*, pp. 239-262; Ford's ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. ix., pp. 87-98, 100-102, 117-119, 121-123; Bolton, *The Private Soldier Under*

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIX.

TREATY ON ARMED NEUTRALITY BETWEEN THE EMPRESS OF RUSSIA AND THE KING OF DENMARK; ACCEDED TO BY THE KING OF SWEDEN, AND THE STATES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED PROVINCES.

Article I.—Their respective majesties are fully and sincerely determined to keep upon the most friendly terms with the present belligerent powers, and preserve the most exact neutrality: they solemnly declare their firm intention to be, that their respective subjects shall strictly observe the Laws forbidding all contraband trade with the powers now being, or that may hereafter be, concerned in the present disputes.

Article II.—To prevent all equivocation or misunderstanding of the word Contraband, their imperial and royal majesties declare, that the meaning of the said word is solely restrained to such goods and commodities, as are mentioned under that denomination, in the treaties subsisting between their said majesties and either of the belligerent powers. Her imperial majesty abiding principally by the X. and XI. articles of the treaty of commerce with Great Britain; the conditions therein mentioned, which are founded on the Rights of Nations, being understood to extend to the kings of France and Spain; as there is at present no specific treaty of commerce between the two latter and the former. His Danish majesty, on his part, regulates his conduct in this particular, by the first article of his treaty with England, and by the 26th and 27th of that subsisting between his said majesty and the king of France, extending the provisions made in the latter to the Catholic king; there being no treaty *ad hoc*, between Denmark and Spain.

Article III.—And whereas, by this means, the word contraband, conformable to the treaties now extant, and the stipulations made between the contracting powers, and those that are now at war, is fully explained; especially by the treaty between Russia and England, of the 20th of June, 1766; between the latter and Denmark, of the 11th of July, 1670; and between their Danish and most Christian majesties, of August 23d, 1642; the will and opinion of the high contracting powers are, that all other trade whatsoever shall be deemed, and remain free and unrestrained.

By the declaration delivered to the belligerent powers, their contracting majesties have already challenged the privileges founded on Natural Right, whence spring the Freedom of Trade and Navigation, as well as the right of Neutral Powers: and being fully determined not to depend in future merely on an arbitrary interpretation, devised to answer some private advantages or concerns, they mutually covenanted as followeth:

1st. That it will be lawful for any ship, whatever, to sail freely from one port to another, or along the coasts of the powers not at war.

2nd. That all merchandize and effects belonging to the subjects of the said belligerent powers, and shipped on neutral bottoms, shall be entirely free; except contraband goods.

3d. In order to ascertain what constitutes the blockade of any place or port, it is to be understood to be in such predicament when the assailing power has taken such a station, as to expose to imminent danger, any ship or ships that would attempt to sail in or out of the said ports.

4th. No neutral ship shall be stopped, without a material and well-grounded cause; and in such cases, justice shall be done to them, without loss of time; and besides indemnifying, each and every time, the party aggrieved or thus stopped without sufficient cause, full satisfaction shall be given to the high contracting powers, for the insult offered to their flag.

Article IV.—In order to protect officially the general trade of their respective subjects, on the fundamental principles aforesaid, her imperial and his royal majesty have thought proper, for effecting such purpose, each respectively to fit out a proportionate rate of ships of war and frigates. The squadron of each of the contracting powers shall be employed in escorting convoys, according to the particular circumstances of the navigators and traders of each nation.

Article V.—Should any of the merchantmen belonging to the subjects of the contracting powers, sail in a latitude where there shall be no ships of war of their own nation, and thus be deprived of the protection; in such case, the commander of the squadron belonging to the other friendly power shall, at the request of said mer-

Washington, pp. 65, 67, 70; Reed, *Life of Joseph Reed*, vol. ii., p. 325; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. i., p. 314.

chantmen, grant them sincerely, and *bona fide*, all necessary assistance. The ships of war and frigates, of either of the contracting powers, shall thus protect and assist the merchantmen of the other: provided nevertheless, that, under the sanction of such required assistance and protection, no contraband shall be carried on, nor any prohibited trade, contrary to the Laws of Neutrality.

Article VI.—The present convention cannot be supposed to have any relative effect; that is, to extend to the differences that may have arisen since its being concluded, unless the controversy should spring from continual vexations, which might tend to aggrieve and oppress all the European nations.

Article VII.—If, notwithstanding the cautious and friendly care of the contracting powers, and their steady adherence to an exact Neutrality, the Russian and Danish merchantmen should happen to be insulted, plundered, or captured by any of the armed ships of privateers, belonging to any of the belligerent powers: in such case, the ambassador or envoy of the aggrieved party, to the offending court, shall claim such ship or ships, insisting on a proper satisfaction. * * * and never neglect to obtain a reparation for the insult offered to the flag of his court. The minister of the other contracting power shall at the same time, in the most efficacious and vigorous manner, defend such requisitions, which shall be supported by both parties with unanimity. But in case of any refusal, or even delay in redressing the grievances complained of; then their majesties will retaliate against the powers that shall thus refuse to do them justice, and immediately agree together on the most proper means of making well-founded reprisals.

Article VIII.—In case either of the contracting powers, or both at the same time, should be in any manner aggrieved or attacked, in consequence of the present convention, or for any reason relating thereto; it is agreed, that both powers will join, act in concert for their mutual defence, and unite their forces, in order to procure to themselves an adequate and perfect satisfaction, both in regard to the insult put upon their respective flags, and the losses suffered by their subjects.

Article IX.—This convention shall remain in force for and during the continuance of the present war; and the obligation enforced thereby, will serve as the ground-work of all treaties that may be set on foot hereafter: according to future

occurrences, and on the breaking out of any fresh maritime wars which might unluckily disturb the tranquillity of Europe. Meanwhile, all that is hereby agreed upon, shall be deemed as binding and permanent, in regard both to mercantile and naval affairs; and shall have the force of Law, in determining the rights of Neutral Nations.

Article X.—The chief aim and principal object of the present convention being to secure the Freedom of Trade and Navigation, the high contracting powers have antecedently agreed, and do engage to give to all other neutral powers free leave to accede to the present treaty, and, after a thorough knowledge of the principles on which it rests, share equally in the obligations and advantages thereof.

Article XI.—In order that the powers, now at war, may not be ignorant of the strength and nature of the engagements entered into by the two courts aforesaid, the high contracting parties shall give notice, in the most friendly manner, to the belligerent powers, of the measures by them taken; by which, far from meaning any manner of hostility, or causing any loss or injury to other powers, their only intention is to protect the trade and navigation of their respective subjects.

Article XII.—This convention shall be ratified by the contracting powers, and the ratifications interchanged between the parties in due form, within the space of six weeks, from the day of its being signed, or even sooner, if possible. In witness whereof, and by virtue of the full powers granted us for the purpose, we have put our hands and seals to the present treaty.

Given at Copenhagen, July the 19th, 1780.

CHARLES D'OSTEN, called SOKEN.

J. SCHACK RATLAU.

A. P. COMTE BERNSTORFF.

O. THOFT.

H. EIKSTEDT.

Acceded to, and signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the court of Sweden, at St. Petersburg, 21st of July, 1780: and by the States-General accepted, November 20th, 1780; and signed at St. Petersburg January 5th, 1781, with the addition only of article * * *

Article XIII.—If the respective squadrons, or ships of war, should meet or unite to enact in conjunction, the command in chief will be regulated according to what is only commonly practised between the crown heads and the republic.

CHAPTER XXX.

1781.

ARNOLD IN VIRGINIA: CORNWALLIS AND RAWDON IN THE CAROLINAS.

Arnold goes to Virginia — Washington's ineffectual efforts to intercept him — Arnold's depredations in Virginia — General Phillips sent to Virginia — Battle of Petersburg — Lafayette placed in command of troops in Virginia — Condition of the troops — Death of General Phillips — General Greene takes command of southern army — Army divided — Morgan's attack on Ninety-Six — Battle of Cowpens — Cornwallis pursues Morgan — The race between Greene and Cornwallis — Battle of Guilford Court House — Battle of Hobkirk's Hill — American forces attack Orangeburgh, Fort Watson and Fort Mott — Partisan warfare in Georgia — Greene's attack on Ninety-Six — Army placed in summer quarters — Battle of Eutaw Springs — Close of the war in South Carolina.

Meanwhile, Arnold had been sent by the British commander to devastate the Virginia coast and Washington was anxious to intercept him. Toward the middle of January, 1781, a storm overtook the British fleet off the east end of Long Island and so much damaged it as to render the French fleet greatly superior on the sea. The French admiral, Des-touches, who had succeeded to the command of the fleet upon the death of DeTernay, was now induced to send a force to the Chesapeake to act against Arnold, but the ships returned without accomplishing anything save the capture of a 50-gun ship, the *Romulus*, on the way from Charleston to Chesapeake Bay. Washington himself then went to Newport, and on March 6, in conference with the French commanders, persuaded them to send the whole fleet to the Chesapeake with a detachment of troops aboard. Owing to unforeseen circumstances, however, the fleet did not depart until the 8th.*

* On the preparations for this expedition see

Washington now entertained great hope of apprehending Arnold, and ordered Lafayette, should he capture Arnold, to grant him no terms which would save him from the consequences of his crime.* But the delay in the departure of the French fleet frustrated Washington's designs, for the British were afforded an opportunity to repair the damage to their fleet and immediately set out in pursuit of the French. On March 16 the two fleets met off the coast of Virginia and an indecisive engagement occurred, each party claiming the victory. But the English were successful in their object, for they diverted the attention of the French and compelled them to return to Newport without in any way molesting Arnold.†

Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., pp. 219-227, 239.

* See Washington's letter to LaFayette, Feb. 20, 1781,—Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. vii., pp. 417-419.

† Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 451-453; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., pp. 241-242.

While these operations were taking place at the North, Arnold had landed at Westover on the James River, January 4, 1781. In command of the American troops in that part of the State was Baron Steuben, but he was unable to do more than remove the stores from Petersburg to a place of greater security. Immediately upon landing, Arnold marched toward Richmond, quickly dispersing a few regulars who tried to oppose his advance. Upon learning the object of Arnold, Steuben put forth every exertion to save the stores at Richmond and succeeded in removing the greater part across the river and to West Ham, at the head of the rapids.*

There was little opposition to Arnold's entrance into Richmond. With 500 men he halted there and sent forward a detachment under Lieutenant-colonel J. G. Simcoe to West Ham, where a foundry, powder magazine, a boring mill, and a considerable quantity of provisions and military stores were destroyed. Simcoe then returned to Richmond, where the public property, together with large quantities of rum, salt, and other stores were destroyed.† Having completed the work of destruction at Richmond, Arnold returned to

Westover January 7, and on the 10th, after some skirmishing, reëmbarked. He then sailed down the river, on his way destroying the stores at Smithfield and Mackay's Mills.* On the 20th he arrived at Portsmouth, where it was his intention to establish a permanent camp. Arnold states his loss during the entire expedition at 7 men killed and 23 wounded.‡

At this time the troops under Baron Steuben were in no condition to take the offensive against Arnold. The American general could only post his troops at convenient places to prevent incursions of the British into the country, and to prevent the loyal element in the population from carrying provisions to the British. While Arnold lay at Portsmouth, Washington was putting forth every effort to capture him, but, as we have seen, the plan failed through the inability of the French to render effective aid.‡ The British now resolved to increase Arnold's force, and about the middle of March sent General Phillips (one of the officers captured with Burgoyne) from New York, in command of 2,000 picked men. Phillips arrived at Portsmouth on the 26th, and being the senior offi-

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 228.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 549; Jefferson's letter to Washington in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 199-203; Simcoe, *Military Journal*, p. 161 *et seq.*; Cooke, *Virginia*, pp. 456-457.

* See Steuben's letter of January 11, 1781, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 203-205; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 237-238.

‡ Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 342-343. See also J. Austin Stephens, *LaFayette's Expedition Against Arnold*.


‡ Hildreth, *History of the United States*, vol. iii., pp. 339-341.

cer, took command of the British troops in Virginia.

Phillips wasted no time in beginning offensive operations. He first completed the fortifications at Portsmouth, and then, on April 18, with 2,500 men sailed up the James River in order to destroy everything which

entered Williamsburg without opposition. From that central point he dispatched small expeditions throughout the surrounding country to destroy all public stores and property which could be found. Having completed this work of devastation, he reëmbarked and sailed up the river to

THE SKIRMISH AT PETERSBURG APRIL 25, 1781.



1. Yagers. 2. Four pieces of artillery. 3. British light infantry. 4. Queen's Rangers. 5. Riflemen. 6. Americans. 7. Second position of Americans. 8. Third position of Americans. 9. Second position of Queen's Rangers. 10. Third position of Queen's Rangers.

might have escaped the ravages of the Arnold. He landed at Burwell's Ferry and thence marched to Williamsburg where a small body of militia had assembled to oppose him; but the latter quickly retreated before the superior force, and Phillips

City Point where he landed on the 24th. On the 25th, after attacking and defeating a detachment of troops under Major-general Peter Muhlenburg, he marched to Petersburg, where immense quantities of tobacco and other stores were destroyed, to-

gether with all the ships then lying in the river.* In opposition to the force under Phillips, Baron Steuben had but a few ill-equipped troops and consequently was unable to make any effectual resistance to this ruthless work of devastation. The regular State troops had been sent to reinforce General Greene, and the militia did not exceed 2,000 men, and could scarcely be relied upon to face regular troops. To have hazarded a battle against the trained British soldiers would have been to court defeat, the loss of all arms and accoutrements, and the subsequent discouragement of the whole country. Steuben, therefore, could only sit idly by and see the country devastated without being able to prevent it or to inflict any counter damage. After some slight skirmishing, therefore, he retreated toward Richmond.†

Arnold was now sent to Osborne, a small village on the south side of the James River, a few miles below Richmond; and on April 27 Phillips marched to Chesterfield Court House, which had been appointed a place of rendezvous for the new Virginia levies. At this place he destroyed the barracks and such of the public stores as had not been removed. In addition, he destroyed a number of small

armed vessels lying in the river half way between Osborne and Richmond. These were scuttled and set afire, after which the crews escaped and joined the State militia.* On April 30 Arnold and Phillips marched to Manchester, opposite Richmond, on the south side of the James River, and here also destroyed much property.‡

At about this time Lafayette arrived from the North to take command of the troops in the State. He had been appointed to command the troops which Washington intended to send against Arnold, but when the naval expedition was abandoned by the French he returned to the head of the Elk where once again he was ordered by Washington to take command of the troops in Virginia.§ The troops under Lafayette's command had been drawn chiefly from the Northern States, and as it was supposed the campaign would be of short duration, they were ill-equipped for hard fighting, or in fact, any kind of fighting in the southern climate. Furthermore, when the troops learned that the service might be permanent, some deserted; but the great majority, inspired by the example of

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 339.

† See Arnold's report in Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 345-346; Lossing, p. 340; Jefferson's letter of May 9, 1781, in Ford's ed. of *Jefferson's Writings*, vol. iii., pp. 32-34.

‡ See the two letters dated April 8 and 18 in Sparks' ed. of *Washington's Writings*, vol. viii., pp. 512-513. See also Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., p. 247 *et seq.*

* See Arnold's report to Clinton quoted in full in Arnold, *Life of Arnold*, pp. 344-345. See also Muhlenberg, *Life of Major-General Peter Muhlenberg*, p. 248; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., pp. 291-292; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 337-339.

† Kapp, *Life of Steuben*, p. 426.

Lafayette, remained with the army and resolved to brave every danger.* Knowing their condition and realizing the hardships of a campaign in the South, Lafayette sought to encourage the soldiers by purchasing shoes, linen, and other necessities, using his personal credit to secure the money with which to pay for these supplies. His ardor for the American cause stimulated all to further exertions, and the ladies at Baltimore organized a society for making clothes suitable for summer wear in the South.† Lafayette and his troops arrived at Richmond the night before Phillips entered Manchester, but instead of attempting to pass the river in spite of Lafayette, the British general marched back to Bermuda Hundred, destroying valuable property on the way.‡ He then embarked his army and sailed down the river as far as Hog's Island, where the van of his fleet arrived on May 5.||

Immediately upon his arrival, and after he had discovered the retreat of the British, Lafayette sent out small parties to harass them and to watch their movements, while he him-

* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 586.

† Bancroft, vol. v., p. 506; Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., p. 260 *et seq.*

‡ Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 340.

|| See Jefferson's letter of May 9, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 307-309; Arnold's report in *Arnold Life of Arnold*, p. 346; Simcoe's *Military Journal*, p. 199 *et seq.*; LaFayette's reports to Greene, etc., quoted in Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., pp. 293-296.

self established headquarters behind the Chickahominy, some distance from Richmond. On May 7 General Phillips received instructions from Cornwallis to march toward Petersburg for the purpose of forming a junction with the British troops in that province.* Accordingly, he immediately returned up the river, landed one division at Brandon, and another at City Point, and on May 9 the two divisions met at Petersburg. So sudden and unexpected was their arrival that some of Lafayette's officers, who had been sent to Petersburg to collect boats for conveying Lafayette's troops across the river, were taken prisoners.† In the meantime General Phillips had been taken sick, and on reaching Petersburg was in no condition to command the troops.‡ He rapidly declined, and on May 13 died, the command of the troops then devolving on Arnold until the arrival of a superior British officer.||

Meanwhile, in December, 1780, General Greene had taken command of the southern army, which at that time consisted of about 2,300 effective men, ill trained, without arms, ammunition, and other necessities, and totally unfit to successfully oppose

* Tower, *Marquis de LaFayette*, vol. ii., pp. 305-306.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 591; Arnold's report in *Arnold, Life of Arnold*, p. 346; Simcoe's *Military Journal*, p. 204.

‡ Arnold, p. 347.

|| Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 340-341.

the march of the superior force under Cornwallis.* Greene fully realized the responsibility of his position and how much was expected of him. Though he knew the danger of his situation at the present time, he nevertheless took the risk of dividing his forces, placing one division under General Morgan, and the other under General Huger, with the whole subordinate to himself. In this way he could more closely watch the movements of the enemy, and more effectively harass him at every turn; while on the other hand, if he kept his forces intact, he could no more effectually oppose Cornwallis.† Under Morgan's general supervision, therefore, Greene placed 320 infantry under Colonel John Eager Howard, about 200 riflemen under Major Triplett, and about 80 light dragoons under Colonel William Washington.‡ Morgan was then dispatched to the south of the Catawba to watch and annoy the enemy at Wynnsborough and Camden, though he was cautioned to use every precaution against surprise. On December 25, 1780, Morgan took a position toward the western frontier of South Carolina, about fifty miles northwest of Wynns-

borough and not far from the confluence of the Pacolet and Broad rivers.*

On December 20 Greene left Charlotte with the other division of the army, arriving at Hick's Corner, on the east side of the Peedee, opposite the Cheraw Hills, about seventy miles northeast of Wynnsborough, on December 29. He had marched to that place with the hope that the troops would find more plentiful subsistence; but after remaining there for some time he found that his burdens in this respect were not much lightened, as the destructive warfare carried on between the Whigs and Tories of that section had completely laid waste the whole country.† While in this position, however, he did not remain inactive. On December 27 he detached Colonel Washington with his cavalry and about 200 militia, who after marching 40 miles, surprised a body of Tories near Ninety-Six. Exasperated by the recent outrages on the part of the British, the Continentals fell on the Tories with uncontrollable fury and slaughtered the entire party without losing a single man.‡ As a result of this expedition, Cornwallis was unable at any subsequent time to persuade a large body

* See his letter to Washington in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 165-168; also F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 174 *et seq.*

† See G. W. Greene, *Life of General Greene*, pp. 108-116; Graham, *Life of General Morgan*, pp. 258-259.

‡ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 532; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 183-184

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 431.

† See Greene's letter to Washington in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 189-192.

‡ Graham, *Life of Morgan*, p. 262; G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. iii., p. 135; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 541.

of Tories to take the field against the Americans. At about this time, Colonel Andrew Pickens and Major McCall, with 260 mounted troops, arrived in camp from the Carolinas.

Cornwallis had determined to await reinforcements under General Leslie before he began offensive operations, but the manœuvres of Morgan in the vicinity of Ninety-Six had alarmed him. On January 1, without awaiting the arrival of reinforcements, he sent Tarleton in command of 1,000 men to annihilate Morgan's force, no doubt being entertained of his ability to accomplish this.* When Tarleton arrived at Ninety-Six he found everything quiet, as the Americans had retired after some slight skirmishing. He then determined to march against Morgan in the hope of surprising him or at least of driving him beyond the Broad River. Cornwallis approved of the design and resolved to aid Tarleton by ascending the left bank of the Broad River, thus menacing Morgan's rear. At first everything prospered with the British. Having passed the Ennoree and the Tiger, Tarleton pushed along the banks of the Pacolet. Morgan retreated before Tarleton, and the pursuit was pressed with unabated vigor. Realizing that it would be extremely dangerous to ford the river with an enterprising enemy hanging upon his rear, and believing that his men


would stand against the British, Morgan determined to face about and engage Tarleton in battle. In order to make his men fight more desperately, he placed them so that their retreat was cut off, thus forcing them to fight for their lives. As Morgan said: "When men are forced to fight, they will sell their lives dearly."*

Morgan took a position at Cowpens, about 6 miles from the Broad River, feeling certain that the 1,000 men under him would defeat the forces under Tarleton. On the morning of January 17, Morgan formed his troops in two divisions; the first, composed of militia under Colonel Pickens, was placed in front of a wood and in view of the enemy; while the second, composed of marksmen and old Continental troops under command of Colonel Howard, was concealed in the wood itself. Beyond the second division, and acting as a reserve, was the cavalry under Colonel Washington.† Tarleton's army was formed in two divisions, the infantry composing the centre of each while the cavalry, which was much superior to the Americans, was on the flanks. Though Tarleton's troops were fatigued by their long march in

* See Morgan's letter quoted in Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 543; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 384.

† Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 253-254; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 433-434.

* F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 185 et seq.




THE BATTLE OF CORPENS — CONFLICT BETWEEN COLONELS WASHINGTON AND TARLETON

pursuit of Morgan, still they were eager for battle.*

When the action commenced, the British rushed impetuously toward the front line of American marksmen, which, after a single fire, retired toward the militia under Pickens. The British then furiously attacked the militia, who were finally compelled to give way and seek shelter with the reserve behind the hill. Tarleton considered the battle almost won, and his troops eagerly pressed forward, but the reserve met the onslaught with great firmness, and an obstinate conflict ensued. Tarleton immediately ordered up his infantry and cavalry reserves and almost succeeded in breaking the American line. To protect the right flank, Colonel Howard ordered a retrograde movement, and the British, thinking this the beginning of the American retreat, rushed forward to begin the rout. On reaching the top of the hill, however, Howard ordered his men to wheel about and face the enemy, who now encountered a well-directed and deadly fire. The British were thrown into utter confusion by this wholly unexpected and destructive fire, and observing the disorder in their ranks, Howard ordered a bayonet charge. His troops promptly obeyed and the British line was soon broken.† About the same time, the

cavalry under Washington had routed the cavalry on the British right, Washington himself charging the enemy, sword in hand. The struggle was of short duration and resulted in the total defeat of the British. Remembering the odious nature of "Tarleton's quarter," so deeply impressed upon the minds of many of the troops, it was only with the greatest difficulty that the officers pre-



vented the troops from taking vengeance on the British now in their power.* Tarleton and a portion of his force escaped,† but more than 200

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 385.

† Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 544; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 434-435.

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 385.

† It was to this redoubtable colonel that Mrs. Ashe, a spirited North Carolina lady, made a keen reply, when, at a later date, Tarleton said he had a great desire to see Colonel Washington. He was calling with Cornwallis, at the time, at Colonel Ashe's residence, when he ventured to say what he did. "If you looked behind you, sir, at the battle of the Cowpens, you would most certainly have seen him!"

of the British were killed and wounded, and about 600 captured. The American loss was 12 killed and 61 wounded.* This victory seriously crippled Cornwallis' movements during the remainder of the campaign.

Meanwhile Cornwallis had been waiting favorable news from Tarleton at Turkey Creek, about twenty-five miles distant from Cowpens. At this time he was between the two American armies under Greene and Morgan, and it was highly important that he prevent their junction, and absolutely necessary that he annihilate one or the other that he might not be crushed between the two. He had therefore marched up the Broad River and had instructed General Leslie to proceed along the banks of the Catawba so as to keep the Americans in a state of uncertainty concerning the route he intended to pursue. The unexpected defeat of his detachment, however, made it necessary for him to move quickly lest he were himself caught in the trap prepared for the Americans.† In his present position, Cornwallis was nearer the fords of the Catawba than Morgan, and he hoped that by mak-

ing a forced march he would be able to overtake Morgan before he could pass the river. He therefore joined his forces with those under Leslie and started in pursuit of Morgan, destroying all superfluous baggage and retaining only those wagons which were necessary to transport provisions, ammunition, etc.* Nevertheless, his exertions were in vain, for Morgan was not to be thus easily caught, and had displayed as much prudence and sagacity after the victory as he had before. After defeating Tarleton, Morgan lost no time in setting his army in motion. Sending off the prisoners, and leaving behind the wounded, he crossed the Broad River and on January 28 reached the Catawba, which was safely passed the next day. Hardly had the last of his men gained the opposite bank when the van of the British army appeared. As the night was now approaching, Cornwallis was obliged to postpone the passing until the next morning. This was most unfortunate for him, as during the night a heavy rain fell, rendering the ford impassable, and before the water had subsided sufficiently for him to cross three days had passed.‡

General Greene had been extremely anxious as to Morgan's fate, and had determined to ascertain for himself the exact conditions. Leaving his

* Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 254-255; Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 341-343; Tarleton, *The Campaign of 1780-81*, pp. 221-227, 255-258; Baneroft, vol. v., pp. 480-485; Myers, *Cowpens Papers*; Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. i., pp. 255-266; F. V. Greene, pp. 106-190; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., pp. 368-387; G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. iii., p. 147; Graham, *Life of Morgan*, pp. 290-312; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 33 (ed. 1788).

† Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 186.

* Baneroft, vol. v., p. 486.

‡ See Greene's letter in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 225.

army under command of Huger* to follow him with all possible dispatch, he set out, accompanied by but a few attendants, to join Morgan.† On January 30, but a day or so after Morgan had succeeded in eluding the pursuit of Cornwallis, Greene arrived at Morgan's camp and took full charge of the army. At this time the river had subsided sufficiently for Cornwallis to attempt the passage, and he accordingly did so. He was attacked by a body of militia under General Davidson,‡ but succeeded in effecting a passage of the river. In the skirmish between the two armies General Davidson was mortally wounded.||

* Greene gives a good idea of the condition of the army at this time in a letter to General Sumter. He says: "More than half our members are in a manner naked; so much so that we cannot put them on the least kind of duty. Indeed there is a great number that have not a rag of clothes on them except a little piece of blanket, in the Indian form, around their waists."—Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 547.

† F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 193–194.

‡ Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 551; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 39 (ed. 1788); G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. iii., p. 155; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., p. 416; Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 328; Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 226; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 195–196.

|| An anecdote illustrative of the patriotism of the women of the Revolution deserves to be told here. General Greene, greatly grieved at the loss of Davidson, was retreating toward Salisbury. He had ridden all day through rain and storm, and, wearied and exhausted, his garments soiled with mud from the road, he alighted at the door of the principal hotel, kept by Mrs. Elizabeth Steele. In reply to the greeting of Dr. Reed, who anxiously inquired after his


The race between the retreating Americans and the pursuing British was now becoming exciting. So rapidly did General Greene march that by February 3 he had crossed the Yadkin; but his march was no more rapid than that of the British, for many times the British van was in sight of the American rear, and skirmishes between the two frequently occurred. Not far from the ford at the Yadkin, a skirmish took place between a body of American riflemen and the advance guard of the British. General Greene had secured all the boats on the south side of the river so as to hamper the British as much as possible in their operations. Again Greene was favored by the fates, for when the British arrived at the river, the rain fell in torrents and the river suddenly rose so that the British were unable to effect the passage and pursue the flying Americans.*

health, Greene could not refrain from exclaiming that he was "tired out, hungry, and penniless." The good landlady overheard the remark, and while Greene was obtaining refreshment, she entered the room, carefully closed the door, and producing two small bags of specie, the earnings of years, and particularly valuable at that day, she urged them upon the desponding general. "Take these," she said, "you need them; I can do without them." We may well believe that encouragement like this, of the deep hold which our country's liberty had upon the hearts of the people, was appreciated by such a man and such a patriot as Greene.

* F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 195–196; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 486–487; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 394–395; Greene's letter in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 226.

Perceiving that his attempt to annihilate Morgan's force was completely frustrated, Cornwallis furiously bombarded the American en-

small cabin. In this General Greene had taken up his quarters, and while his family and some of the staff were amusing themselves as they thought



campment on the other side of the river. "At a little distance down the river," says an eye-witness, "and behind a pile of rocks, was situated a

proper, he was busily engaged in preparing his dispatches. At this time the artillery was playing furiously, but seemed to attract no one's atten-

tion. At length, however, whether from intelligence or conjecture, their rage seemed to vent itself exclusively at our cabin; and the balls were heard to rebound against the rocks, directly in the rear of it. Little more than its roof showed above them, and at this the firing was obviously directed. Nor were they long before striking it; and in a few moments the clapboards were flying from it in all directions. But still the general wrote on, nor seemed to notice anything but his dispatches, and the innumerable applications that were made to him from various quarters. His pen never rested, but when a new visitor arrived; and then the answer was given with calmness and precision, and the pen was immediately resumed."

As the river continued to rise and was therefore unfordable, Cornwallis determined to march up the south bank of the Yadkin for about twenty-five miles where he was informed that there was a ford sufficiently shallow for the army to cross. He thus hoped to cross the river in time to attack General Greene, but the latter had continued the march northward, and on February 7 effected a junction with the division under Huger and Otho Williams near Guildford Court House.* Unwilling to abandon the pursuit, Cornwallis determined to force Greene into a fight before he

could receive reinforcements. He therefore took up his march toward the Dan, that he might prevent the passage of the Americans into Virginia. Morgan was now suffering from a severe attack of rheumatism, and was compelled to relinquish the command in favor of Colonel Williams.* On February 10 Greene left Guildford Court House on his march toward the Dan, and the retreat of the Americans and pursuit by the British was almost equally rapid. The British, however, were compelled to advance with great circumspection and caution, for Greene sent back a body of light troops to delay the British and obstruct their passage. On one occasion, Colonel Henry ("Light Horse Harry") Lee furiously charged the advance guard of the British army, killed a number and took several prisoners.† Greene therefore succeeded in passing the Dan on February 14 without great difficulty, also taking his baggage and stores across the river in safety. His army had marched forty miles on that day, but hardly had the last of the troops reached the northern bank of the river when the advance guard of the British army appeared on the

* It is ordinarily supposed that there was a serious personal difference between Greene and Morgan, previous to the latter's retiring from active duty. Mr. Graham devotes several pages to this point, and controverts the general impression. See his *Life of General Morgan*, pp. 366-368.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 396-397.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 394-395.

other side.* During this race of more than 200 miles, both armies had suffered exceedingly,† chiefly from want of tents, scarcity of provisions, the heavy rains, bad roads, etc. Having no change of clothing, the Americans were often compelled to march in their wet clothes until the hot sun evaporated the moisture. They were in a far worse condition than the British, who were well provided in every respect and also comfortably housed. Though the Americans were barefoot and many of them in rags, they endured these trials with most patient fortitude.‡

Because of his failure to capture Morgan's force, Cornwallis was greatly disappointed, and instead of continuing to pursue the American army he determined to remain in North Carolina and to collect as large a body of Loyalists as was possible. He therefore went to Hillsborough, where he endeavored to persuade the inhabitants to espouse the royal cause, but his efforts did not

meet with the anticipated success.* Though a large portion of the inhabitants foresaw that the Americans would ultimately triumph and hesitated to manifest any attachment to the British cause, Cornwallis secured considerable numbers of Tory recruits. He sent Tarleton with his legion to the district between the Haw and Deep rivers to encourage a rising of the Loyalists in that section of the country.† Learning that Tarleton had been detached from the main army, General Greene sent Colonel Lee with a body of cavalry across the country to surprise and attack him. Lee soon overtook a body of Tories under command of Colonel Pyle marching to join Corn-

* Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 257.

† The conduct of the British not only irritated the Whigs but disgusted the Tories. In a letter to Philip Mazzei, July 7, 1781, Madison said: "No description can give you an adequate idea of the barbarity with which the enemy have conducted the war in the southern states. Every outrage which humanity could suffer has been committed by them. They have acted more like desperate robbers or buccaneers than like a nation making war for dominion. Negroes, horses, tobacco, etc., not the standards and arms of their antagonists, are the trophies which display their success. Rapes, murders, and the whole catalogue of individual cruelties, not protection and the distribution of justice, are the acts which characterize the sphere of their usurped jurisdiction. The advantage we derive from such proceedings would, if it were purchased on other terms than the distresses of our citizens, fully compensate for the injury accruing to the public. They are a daily lesson to the people of the United States of the necessity of perseverance in the contest; and wherever the pressure of their local tyranny is removed, the subjects of it rise up as one man to avenge their wrongs and prevent a repetition of them."—Madison's *Works* (Congress ed.), vol. i., p. 49.

* G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. iii., chap. x.; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., pp. 408-413; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 397-400; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 43-46 (ed. 1788); Greene's letter of February 15, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 233-236; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 200-202.

† General Greene's military genius was strikingly displayed in the conduct of his celebrated retreat. "You may be assured," were Washington's words, "that your retreat before Cornwallis is highly applauded by all ranks, and reflects much honor on your military abilities."—Bancroft, vol. v., p. 490.

‡ F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 202-203.

wallis. The Tories, supposing Lee's cavalry to be Tarleton's troops, immediately declared their attachment to the royal cause, crying "Long live the king!" This only tended to further exasperate the American soldiers, and between 200 and 300 of the Tories were killed and the survivors taken prisoners.* A similar occurrence took place shortly afterward, when Tarleton also met a body of Tories, and thinking them to be American troops and without ascertaining whether they were friends or enemies, slaughtered them without mercy. Before Tarleton had time to engage in battle with Lee, he was recalled to Hillsborough by Cornwallis.†

Having received a reinforcement of Continentals and militia, Greene's army now numbered about 4,500.‡

* Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. i., pp. 302-312; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. i., p. 453; G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. iii., pp. 182-183; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 206-208; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 554; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 48 (ed. 1788); Tarleton *Campaign*, pp. 230-233, 265; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 384-387; Greene's letter of February 28 to Washington in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 244-247 and Jefferson's letter in *ibid*, pp. 257-259.

† Baneroff, vol. v., p. 491; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 208.

‡ An interesting letter from Abner Nash, Governor of North Carolina and Member of the Continental Congress, to General Greene, May 24, 1781, gives an account of the deplorable condition of affairs in his State at that trying period. Nash writes:

"All my endeavors to raise the militia even to obstruct the march of Lord Cornwallis through this State proved in vain. I was myself in their front most of the way, but able to effect nothing.

As his army was numerically superior to the British, who numbered about 2,300,* he decided to force the fighting, and with that purpose in view recrossed the Dan into North Carolina. He then marched toward Cornwallis, who had taken post at Guildford (or Guilford) Court House. The armies met on March 15. For a few moments all proceeded well; but very shortly the North Carolina militia became panic stricken and fled in hopeless confusion from the field. Greene says that "none fired more than twice and very few more than once, and nearly one-half not at all."† The Virgin-

ing. They have now passed over Roanoke into Virginia, where the joined enemy are greatly an overmatch for the Marquis [Lafayette]. His force is not only small, but he mentions in his letter of the 15th that he knows nothing of the Pennsylvania troops.


"The Virginia Militia are for the present fresh and spirited, and I hope they will prove of great support to the Marquis. Our militia, especially of the lower parts, are good for nothing. I congratulate you, sir, on your success against the enemy to the southward, their being compelled by the judicious methods you took to abandon their strong posts in the heart of the country.

"The Marquis is very public spirited and disinterested. He wishes me to have much more at heart the reinforcing you than himself. Great numbers have taken protection on parole of Lord Cornwallis on his march through the country, and parties of robbers commanded by officers of his commissioning, are ranging through the country committing murders, robberies, and every species of enormity. Could you permit General Sumner to remain a while to assist in punishing the guilty and in recovering Wilmington, it would be of the greatest consequence to this poor, distressed, and wretched country."

* See the tables in F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 213, 215.

† See his letter of March 18, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 266.

ians, however, stood their ground like veterans, and had they been sustained by the Maryland regiment American side.* But whatever advantage the Americans may have had in the beginning by reason of



with equal intrepidity, probably the victory would have rested on the

numbers, was lost in effectiveness when the battle actually began. The conflict raged for about two hours,

See also F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 218-219; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 403.

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 407-408.

and was furiously contested, some of the cannon being captured and recaptured several times. Finally Greene was compelled to retire from the field. Retreating in good order, he reached Speedwell Iron Works, about ten miles distant, the same day. The American loss in this battle was close to 1,300 killed, wounded and missing. The British loss was more severe, one-third of the troops having fallen, while a number of their most efficient officers were killed.*

Cornwallis claimed that this battle was a British victory, yet no permanent advantage accrued to him, for his army had been very much diminished and the fear of it throughout the province had been greatly lessened. Furthermore, Greene's army was gradually increasing by the addition of volunteers, so that it was impossible for Cornwallis to assume the offensive. While Cornwallis took all the credit of the victory, he did not follow it up by pursuing the retreating foe. On the contrary, the means of subsistence in that part of the country were so meagre that three days after the battle he himself began to retreat, leaving a number of wounded, who

could not be removed, in the Quaker Meeting House.

The position of affairs was now entirely reversed. Instead of being pursued, Greene became the pursuer. Though compelled to retire from the field of action a few days before, he set out in pursuit of the supposed victor and his army, and for a time harassed the British army on its march to Wilmington. On April 5 Greene changed his plans and moved toward Camden, where the British army was stationed under Lord Rawdon.* On the morning of April 20 he came in sight of the British works at Logtown and encamped.† On April 7 Cornwallis halted at Wilmington and was undecided as to whether he should proceed to the relief of Rawdon or continue the march into Virginia. He decided upon the latter course, and, having refreshed his troops, set out on April 25 and reached Petersburg a month later, there taking command of the British forces in Virginia.

At this time the British held several important posts in the South — Charleston, Ninety-Six, Augusta, and Camden, where Rawdon then was. It

* Baneroft, vol. v., pp. 491-495; Fiske, *American Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 258-260; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 556-565; Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. i., pp. 339-358; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. ii., pp. 1-26; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 216-229; G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. iii., pp. 204-207; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 54 (ed. 1788); Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 399-406;

Stedman, *American War*, vol. ii., p. 346; Tarleton, *Campaigns*, pp. 270-279; Lowell, *Hessians in the Revolution*, pp. 267-270; Jefferson's letter of March 21, 1781, to the President of Congress, in Ford's ed. of *Jefferson's Writings*, vol. ii., pp. 505-506.

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 407.

† Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 424-426; Lossing, p. 471.

had been also necessary to maintain garrisons at several other unimportant places, for the inhabitants were so disaffected that the British were compelled to divide their forces in order to maintain communication between the various posts and to secure supplies for their subsistence. The disaffection of the people was still more noticeable when news was received of the defeat of Cornwallis. Hundreds of the inhabitants flocked to the standards of Sumter and Marion, who by bold and prudent movements continually gained advantages over the royalists. So numerous and so powerful did these partisans become that they were able to hold in check the whole of lower Carolina, while Greene with his army faced Rawdon in the highlands. Finding himself in a dangerous position, Rawdon called in the troops from the surrounding outposts and prepared to make the best defence possible.

While Rawdon awaited the arrival of reinforcements under Colonel Watson, General Greene entrenched at Hobkirk's Hill, about a mile north of Camden. On April 25 Rawdon received information from a deserter which induced him to venture an attack upon Greene's forces. He therefore marched by a circuitous route and gained the American left before his approach was discovered.* Thus the American troops were sur-

prised, but before the British could gain material advantage Greene had the army in battle array and eager for fight. He quickly perceived that the British were advancing in a solid but not extended column, and he therefore ordered a simultaneous attack on both flanks and in front. The engagement soon became general and was furiously fought throughout. The superior discipline of the British troops prevailed, however, and Greene was compelled to order a retreat, though all the baggage artillery, provisions, etc., were saved. The British loss in killed, wounded and missing was 258, and the American 271.* The victory at Hobkirk's Hill was of no permanent advantage to the British, for Rawdon, lacking cavalry, was unable to pursue Greene.


Greene retreated only about twelve miles to Rugeley's Mills, and from that position very closely watched Rawdon. He also dispatched troops to Marion, so that the latter might obstruct the progress of Watson in every way possible. Watson reached Camden on May 7 and Rawdon thereupon determined to attack Greene, but after a careful reconnaissance of Greene's position, he abandoned this

* Baneroff, vol. v., pp. 498-499; Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution*, pp. 570-574; Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 54-67; Tarleton, *Campaigns*, pp. 460-470; G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. iii., pp. 239-260; Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. ii., pp. 72-95; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., p. 81 (ed. 1788); F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 239-241; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 472-474.

* F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 239.

project.* Rawdon was now in a critical situation, and he deemed it wise to evacuate Camden. Accordingly, on May 10, having burned some houses, mills, and stores, he began

city, several of the British posts fell in rapid succession. On May 11 Sumter captured Orangeburgh, together with 80 men and several officers.* On April 23 Marion and Lee,



to retreat toward Charleston.† Immediately after the evacuation of the

after having taken Fort Watson,† crossed the Santee and marched

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 428-429; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 243; Lossing, pp. 474-475.

† See Greene's letter of May 14, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 310; Lossing, p. 475.

* See Greene's letter of May 14, in Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 310-311.

† For details see F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 233-237; Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, pp. 264-268; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 472, 500-502.

against Fort Mott on the other side of the Congaree, a little above its confluence with the Wateree. On May 8 this place was invested by Marion and Lee, and so vigorously was the siege conducted that on the 12th the garrison, consisting of 140 men, capitulated.* A detachment of Marion's corps then attacked and reduced Georgetown, on the Black River,† and on the 15th Lee captured Fort Granby, a post at Friday's Ferry on the south side of the Congaree, which at the time was garrisoned by 350 men.‡

As a result of the successes of the American army, the inhabitants, who had hitherto favored the British cause, now openly revolted against British authority. In this critical emergency, therefore, Rawdon retreated to Monk's Corner so as to be better able to cover those districts from which Charleston secured its supplies; where also he might be secure from sudden attack, and be ready to seize any favorable opportunity to defeat the American forces. Greene, however, did not deem it expedient to pursue Rawdon, but instead turned his attention to the western parts of the province and to the upper posts in Georgia. He

ordered Pickens to assemble the militia of Ninety-Six, and after Fort Granby had surrendered, sent Lee to join him.* In 1780, when the British had overrun Georgia and South Carolina, the greater part of the Americans in those sections retreated across the mountains or fled into North Carolina. The others submitted to the victorious British in the hope that they would be allowed to live in peace and to enjoy the fruits of their labors. But, to their disgust, they were treated with overbearing insolence, mercilessly plundered and even forced to bear arms against their countrymen. As a result, a feeling of bitter hostility was engendered against the British.

When the British army marched northward, this spirit soon manifested itself. In September, 1780, Colonel Elijah Clarke, at the head of a band of these discontented persons, marched against the British garrison at Augusta under Colonel Thomas Brown, but the expedition was abortive, as Lieutenant-colonel John H. Cruger, who commanded at Ninety-Six, marched to Brown's relief, thereby compelling Clarke to flee. Some of the Americans fell into the hands of Colonel Brown and were severely treated.† Nevertheless, this first failure did not extinguish the ardor for the American cause, and

* Sparks, p. 311; Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, pp. 269-271; Lossing, pp. 479-481.

† Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, pp. 238-239.

‡ Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 68-87; Bancroft, vol. v., p. 500; Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 429-431; Tarleton's *Campaigns*, pp. 473-479; Lossing, pp. 482-483.

* Lossing, *Field Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 483.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 509-510.

numerous armed parties prowled about the vicinity, keeping the garrisons at the various British posts in a constant state of fear and alarm. One of these bands under Captain McCoy infested the banks of the Savannah River and captured the supplies intended for the garrison. Colonel Brown sent a body of soldiers against McCoy, but these were defeated. Shortly afterward, however, Colonel Brown sent a force sufficient to completely annihilate the troops under McCoy, and for a time thereafter the band was dispersed. McCoy was afterward mortally wounded in a combat, and his son was captured by Brown and hung.* These desultory encounters were followed by more regular movements. General Pickens arrived in the vicinity and took charge of the troops about Augusta. Soon after the fall of Fort Granby, Lee marched towards Pickens' camp, and four days later joined him. Almost immediately an attack was made on Fort Golphin or Dreadnought, at Silver Bluff, on the south side of the Savannah. On May 1 the garrison of 70 men at that place surrendered to Lee's troops, under command of Captain John Rudolph.†

Pickens and Lee now made a joint attack upon Fort Cornwallis, at

Augusta, where Colonel Brown made a most obstinate resistance. The Americans placed their batteries in the most advantageous position, overlooking the fort, two of them being within thirty yards of the parapet; from these the American riflemen picked off every soldier in the garrison who showed himself, thereby greatly reducing it. On June 5, after undergoing considerable hardships, the garrison to the number of 300 capitulated. During the siege, the Americans lost about 40 men, killed or wounded.* Because of their severe treatment of the Americans prior to this time, the British officers at Augusta had become exceedingly obnoxious to the inhabitants of the surrounding country. After the surrender some unknown person shot one of the officers, and it was only with the greatest effort that Colonel Brown himself was saved from a similar fate. He was sent under a heavy escort to Savannah.†

While Lee and Pickens were reducing the British posts in Georgia, Greene was besieging Ninety-Six, S. C., where Colonel Cruger was in command with 550 men. Rawdon had sent messengers to Cruger with orders directing him to abandon the post and to retire to Augusta, but by some misfortune these messengers did not reach Cruger, and he deter-

* Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, pp. 245-247; McCall, *History of Georgia*, vol. ii., p. 305; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, pp. 510, 513.

† Lossing, vol. ii., pp. 484-485.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 510-513.

† Lee, *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 88-118; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 250-251.

mined to hold out at Ninety-Six.* Greene began the investment of the city toward the latter end of May. On June 3, after his approaches had been made in regular order, Greene summoned the garrison to surrender, which was refused. Greene then pushed the siege with vigor, but before he could compel the capitulation of the garrison, Rawdon marched from Charleston with 2,000 men to Cruger's relief. On June 18 Greene ordered an assault, but failed to capture the fort. On the 20th, therefore, learning that reinforcements were approaching the city, Greene crossed the Saluda and began his retreat. Rawdon set out in pursuit, but did not follow for any length of time.† When Greene perceived that the pursuit was abandoned by Rawdon, he immediately stopped his retreat. Rawdon then evacuated Ninety-Six and drew in the garrisons from the surrounding outposts. The loyal inhabitants of the district considered it wise to follow Rawdon's army, as they feared the vengeance of the Americans should they fall into their hands. Rawdon therefore left about half of his force under Cruger to escort the Loyalists

from their homes.* After a few day's stay at Ninety-Six, the British began their march to the Congaree with 800 infantry and 600 cavalry, expecting to be there joined by reinforcements from Charleston. The reinforcements, however, had been delayed in their departure, but as the messenger had been intercepted, Rawdon did not receive word of this delay.†

It was evident that the British commander thought that Greene had been driven out of South Carolina, though as a matter of fact he had simply retreated behind Broad River; and when he heard of the division of the British forces, he faced about and returned toward the Congaree. Shortly after Rawdon arrived at this river, Lee's legion surprised one of his foraging parties and captured about 40 prisoners. Consequently Rawdon was convinced that the American army under Greene could not be far distant, and he retreated toward Orangeburgh, where he arrived in safety and received the expected reinforcements from Charleston. Upon his arrival at the Congaree, General Greene was joined by 1,000 men under Marion and Sumter, and on July 11, deeming his force sufficiently strong to attack the British, marched toward Orangeburgh with that intention; but when he arrived at that post, he found the

* F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 249; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 484.

† Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol. ii., p. 139; G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. iii., pp. 301-319; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 251-259; Tarleton, *Campaigns*, pp. 479-502; Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 96-99, 119-131; Gordon, *American Revolution*, vol. iv., pp. 92-96 (ed. 1788); Lossing, pp. 484-488.

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., pp. 436-438.

† F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 260.

British so strongly entrenched that he considered it unwise to make any attempt at this time.* While there, he was informed that Colonel Cruger had evacuated Ninety-Six and was marching toward Orangeburgh; but as Rawdon commanded the only ford across the river, Greene was prevented from attacking Cruger. He therefore retreated over the Congaree and marched to the high hills of the Santee.†

On July 13 Greene detached Sumter, Marion, and Lee with a body of troops to attack the British outpost at Monk's Corner and Dorchester. Lee captured a considerable quantity of provisions and stores; Sumter attacked the British under Colonel Coates at Biggin's Church, and compelled them to retreat; Colonel Wade Hampton captured 50 prisoners within sight of the British entrenchments at Charleston; and several other similar movements were made.‡ The weather was now becoming extremely warm, and it was impossible to carry on further operations. Greene now put his army into summer quarters, on July 16 reaching the high hills of the Santee, where he remained until August 22. During this

period of inactivity Rawdon obtained leave of absence and embarked for Europe; but before his departure he committed an act of vindictive cruelty which has left an indelible blot upon his name. He had captured Colonel Isaac Hayne, and executed him under circumstances of barbarous cruelty. This aroused much indignation throughout the country, and the American officers had much difficulty in restraining the troops under them from retaliatory measures.* After Rawdon's departure, the command of the troops at Orangeburgh devolved on Colonel Stuart.†

The British had now resumed their station on the south side of the Congaree, and again Greene undertook to force them from their position. Despite the fact that Greene's troops were in wretched condition, the majority miserably clothed and some almost naked, he made a rapid march across the Congaree and Wateree, and was soon afterward joined by General Pickens with the militia of Ninety-Six, and by General Marion with the troops under his command.‡ Early on the morning of September 8, as all the American forces in the

* Fisher, *Struggle for American Independence*, vol. ii., p. 439.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, pp. 488-489, 567-568.

‡ See Simms, *Eutaw; a Tale of the Revolution*, p. 310 *et seq.*; also Marshall, *Life of Washington*, vol. ii., pp. 13-15; Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 142-158; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 261-262.


* For a full account of the whole matter, see Gordon, *History of the American Revolution*, vol. iii., pp. 202-205. See also Thacher, *Military Journal*, pp. 285-288; Horry and Weems, *Life of Marion*, pp. 247-253.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 490-491.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 493; Gordon, *History of the American Revolution*, vol. iii., p. 242.

vicinity had now been brought together, Greene proceeded to attack the British army under Colonel Stuart, who had taken post at Eutaw Springs, about sixty miles north of Charleston. The two armies were nearly equal numerically, each con-

colonel Richard Campbell and Colonel O. H. Williams, and consisted of the North Carolina, Virginia and Maryland Continental troops. The right flank was covered by Colonel Lee with his line, while Henderson with the State troops was on the left.



taining about 2,000 men; but the American army consisted for the most part of raw levies and militia. Greene formed his troops in two lines. The first, under command of Marion, Pickens and Colonel de Malmady, consisted of the North Carolina and South Carolina militia. The second was under command of General Jethro Sumner, Lieutenant-

The reserve consisted of Washington with his cavalry, and Captain Robert Kirkwood with the Delaware troops.*

At 4 o'clock in the morning the march was begun. The advance guard had not proceeded far when two parties of British were encoun-

* Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., p. 494.



THE BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS.

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tered and quickly driven back to the main army.* The front line advanced rapidly after this encounter, and soon the action became general all along the line. The Americans were in turn obliged to retreat, but were well supported by Sumner's North Carolina Continentals. During the severest part of the engagement, Greene ordered the Maryland and Virginia Continentals under Campbell and Williams to charge with trailed arms. This was done with unsurpassed courage, in the face of a heavy discharge of cannon balls, and the movement was completely successful. Lee succeeded in turning the left flank of the British, and at the same time attacked them in the rear. Henderson had been wounded early in the action, and Wade Hampton assumed command. He then ordered a charge against the British and took more than 100 prisoners.† The British were routed in all quarters. Washington now brought up the reserve, and his cavalry and Kirkwood's infantry charged so suddenly and unexpectedly that the British had no time to reform their lines and began a hasty retreat. The Americans closely pursued, but on their retreat a considerable number of British occupied a strong brick house, and there resisted the charge of the Americans. The latter impetuously attacked the house, but in the attempt to dislodge

them Washington was wounded, his horse was shot under him, and he was taken prisoner.* The artillery was now placed in position before the house, but so deadly was the fire from the house that the gunners could not properly serve their guns, and Greene determined to abandon the attack.† The Americans collected their wounded and retired to the ground they had occupied in the morning. The action had continued for four hours, and was one of the hottest in which Greene had been engaged. During the evening of the next day, Colonel Stuart destroyed a large quantity of his stores, abandoned the Eutaw, and moved toward Charleston, leaving more than 70 wounded and 1,000 stand of arms on the field. The loss of the British in this action was severe; more than 500 were taken prisoners, including the wounded abandoned upon their retreat, while the killed numbered almost as many. Several of the officers were paroled on the field of battle; two were killed and 16 wounded. The American loss was 114 killed, 300 wounded, and 40 missing, including 22 officers killed and mortally wounded, and 39 others slightly wounded.‡ Among the killed was

* Bancroft, vol. v., p. 503.

† Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 495-497.

‡ Carrington gives the total of American casualties as 408 and the British as 693. See *Battles of the Revolution*, p. 582. Lossing, p. 498, makes the British loss the same but places the American loss at 555. See also Johnson, *Life of Greene*, vol.

* *Ibid.*, p. 495.

† F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, p. 273.

Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, who received a mortal wound while leading the charge that determined the fate of the battle.* On October 29 Congress voted thanks to General Greene and the army under him, and presented to him a British standard and a gold medal.†

The British now became so alarmed that they burned their stores at Dorchester and evacuated the post at Monk's Corner. The Americans also left the scene of action and retired to the high hills of the Santee. While the British were lying at Monk's Corner, more than 80 prisoners were taken by the Americans within sight of the British encampment. The British seemed to have lost heart at the recent defeat and upon the slightest apprehension of danger displayed the same disposition to retreat as had been previously exhibited by the raw American militia.

The battle of Eutaw Springs practically closed the war in South Caro-

lina. At the beginning of the campaign, the British had been in force all over the State, but when the campaign closed they were proceeding only with the greatest caution, and scarcely dared venture more than twenty miles from Charleston. Naturally, a few incursions were made into the surrounding country and several skirmishes occurred, but none of any importance. Toward the end of November General Greene compelled the British to evacuate the post at Dorchester, and after a slight skirmish the British retired to the vicinity of Charleston. Greene posted his troops on both sides of the Ashley, and completely covered the country from the Cooper to the Edisto, confining the British to Charleston and the vicinity.* The British force in Georgia was concentrated at Savannah. During this campaign General Pickens conducted an expedition against the Cherokee Indians who had been instigated by the British to declare war against the Americans. Pickens was completely successful, and the Cherokees shortly afterward concluded peace.

ii., pp. 220-237; G. W. Greene, *Life of Greene*, vol. iii., p. 388; F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 269-277; Tarleton, *Campaigns*, pp. 508-518; Lee's *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 276-295.

*Thacher, *Military Journal*, p. 291.

†Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 497-498.

*F. V. Greene, *Life of Greene*, pp. 283-284; Lossing, *Field-Book of the Revolution*, vol. ii., pp. 569-570.

